


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SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, M.A., C.I.E., Hony. D.Litt.,

29442

SIXTH EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED WITH PORTRAITS

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PREFACE

When Captain J. Grant Duff was writing his *History of the Mahrattas* (published in 3 vols. in 1826), the veteran scholar-statesman Mountstuart Elphinstone, in a letter to him (20th April, 1822) exactly described the character of the materials then available for a life of Shivaji: "Your difficulty was to get facts and combine them with judgment, so as to make a consistent and rational history out of a mass of gossiping *bakhars* and gasconading *tawārikhs*." These two sources of admittedly dubious value were supplemented by the English factory records, which Grant Duff rightly declared to be "very important for fixing dates, and invaluable in corroborating facts admitted by native authorities."

Four classes of sources unknown to Grant Duff have now filled up many gaps in our knowledge and proved his narrative of Shivaji's career obsolete and erroneous in many points. (a) The contemporary French and Portuguese MS. sources are now available for the first time, thanks to the opening of the Paris archives (*sc.* the *Mémoires* of Francois Martin) and the scholarly and devoted work of Chevalier P.S. Pisurlencar among the Goa records. The original history of Manucci has been made accessible in W. Irvine's masterly translation, the *Storia do Mogor*. The travellers' tales in the printed French and Dutch works to which Orme referred with justifiable disappointment, can be totally rejected now. (b) The skeleton chronologies (*Shakāvalis*) in Marāthi supply many reliable dates and facts, after they have been tested with care and a knowledge of other sources. The 91-qalmi *bakhar* is a much earlier and less legendary work than the Chitnis *bakhar* (1810) on which Grant Duff so frequently depended, with the result of falsifying his narrative of Shivaji in many places. (c) The same misfortune attended Grant Duff in connection with his Persian authorities. He used the very late (1735) and traditional history of Khāfi Khan, which must be now rejected equally with the Chitnis *bakhar*. And he had no knowledge of the detailed and absolutely contemporary official histories of Aurangzib (*viz.* *Alamgir-nāmah* and *Māsir-i-Alamgiri*), the Court newsletters (*ākhbārāt*), the

personal memoirs of Bhimsen, and the letters of Jai Singh,—all of which are in Persian and have been fully utilized by me in this work. (d) The Persian and Dingal despatches and letters preserved in Jaipur. To these must be added three contemporary Sanskrit historical poems on Shivaji, which have been printed in our own days.

A synthesis of this vast and varied mass of new materials, made available during the century following the publication of Grant Duff's book, has naturally resulted in the supersession of his chapters on Shivaji on the one hand and of the Marathi *bakhars* (with the exception of the contemporary recollections of Sabhasad) on the other, both of which had so long held the field. The same has been found to be the case in respect of the history of Shambhuji and Rajaram, which I have reconstructed in my *Aurangzib*, volumes 4 and 5, and the history of his father Shāhji, which I have newly told in my *House of Shivaji*.

The critical bibliography at the end of this book discusses the character of the materials that have been rejected as well as that of the authorities followed by me.

Fourth edition (Feb. 1948).—In the present edition full use has been made of the materials brought to light during the nineteen years that have passed since the third edition was printed. The most important of these new sources—and in every respect, historical documents of unique value,—are the Jaipur records relating to Shivaji which were brought to light in 1939, and which have compelled a rewriting of the chapter on Shivaji's interview with Aurangzib and his captive life in Agra. More Portuguese sources have been published during this interval, and they light up Shivaji's activities in 1634 and Shivaji's doings in South Konkan and Kanara. The Shivaji birth-tercentenary held by two differing schools in 1927 and 1930 in Bombay and Puna respectively, has borne fruit in the intensive publication of letters, chronologies and studies in the Marathi language, which have helped me to make a fresh examination of many facts and views contained in my earlier editions. Though I have seen no reason to accept many of the conclusions reached by modern Maratha writers on these materials, the sources thus published have advanced the scholarly investigation of Shivaji's times a good deal, and some of the volumes (especially the *Patra-sār-sangraha*, or chronological

calendar of letters etc. in 3 vols.) will be always helpful to students of history.

In addition to incorporating in the present edition what I hold to be genuine among the newly published materials, I have subjected my book to a minute revision and removed a number of small errors due to hurry in preparing the press copy of the third edition. The variorum *91 Qalmi Bakhar*, published by V. S. Wakaskar (Baroda, 1930) has been here extensively utilised, and therefore all references to its Persian version, the *Tarikh-i-Shivaji*, which was cited up to the third edition, have been omitted.

The aggregate result of these changes is that in this edition a new presentation of the young Shivaji has been given (ch. 2, § 4 and 8), the Jävli and Purandar episodes and also Shahji's captivity (1648-49) entirely rewritten (ch. 2 § 11-13 and App.), the Afzal Khan affair more fully explored, the accounts of Shivaji's audience with Aurangzib and captive life in Agra entirely reconstructed (ch. 6), more details have been given of Netāji Pälkar's life as a forced convert, the second coronation of Shivaji with Tantrik rites has been added as an entirely new story (ch. 9 § 7), his battles with Khawās Khan and Bāji Ghorparé near Kudāl have been described in greater and more correct detail (ch. 10 § 4), and his dealings with the Portuguese amplified (ch. 14 § 9.) The bibliography has been recast and brought up to date, while the Index has been expanded.

The Marathas were only one among the many threads in the tangled web of Deccan history in the seventeenth century. Therefore, to understand the true causes and full consequences of Shivaji's own acts and policy, it is necessary to have a detailed knowledge of the internal affairs of the Mughal empire, Bijapur and Golkonda also. The present work is, therefore, more than a mere biography of Shiva; it frequently deals with the contemporary history of these three Muslim States, though an exhaustive treatment of the subject finds its proper place in my *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. IV. I have printed in a separate volume entitled *The House of Shivaji* (2nd ed. 1948), most of the documents, discussions, and *pieces justificatives* relating to my life of Shivaji, and that work should be studied as a necessary supplement to this.

Fifth edition (Dec. 1952.)

The chief additions in this edition are a full description of Shivaji's ships and naval bases, a Muslim historian's statement that Afzal Khan first struck Shivaji out of a proud design to prove himself "a Bahadur", the succession intrigues in Shivaji's court three years before his death, which explain Shambhuji's desertion to the Mughal side, the disputation between Shivaji and his step-brother for the division of their father's legacy, and new Portuguese information on the Siddis and the Maratha navy. The fragmentary Sanskrit poem of Paramanand discovered in Kolhapur and recently edited by G. S. Sardesai in the Baroda Oriental Series with a Foreword by me, has been fully utilised and this has enabled a human story of Shivaji's domestic life to be constructed. The birth of the last Hindu navy has been studied with the fulness of detail and criticism which the importance of this subject to New India demands. The unceasing kindness of Chevalier Panduranga S. S., Pissurlencar has been supplying me with every scrap of original information on Shivaji and his neighbours that his lifelong search among the State and Church records of Goa has been yielding. The new material has led to an increase of the size of this book by 19 pages.

Jadunath Sarkar.

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SHIVAJI (Valentyn portrait)



SHIVAJI
(drawn by Mir Muhammad
before 1686)



MODERN STATUE

PORTRAITS OF SHIVAJI

We have reliable information about Shivaji's personal appearance in 1664, when he was seen by some Englishmen at Surat. The chaplain Escalot writes, "His person is described by them who have seen him to be of mean [=medium] stature, lower somewhat than I am erect, and of an excellent proportion. Actual [=active] in exercise, [he] seems to smile, a quick and piercing eye, and whiter than any of his people." The cultured Frenchman Thevenot, who travelled in the Deccan from November 1665 to February 1667, says of him, "The Rajah is small [in size] and tawny [in complexion], with quick eyes which indicate abundance of spirit." It is a pity that neither the English factor of Rajapur whose wig Shivaji examined with his fingers in curiosity (March, 1675), nor Henry Oxinden, the English envoy present at Shivaji's coronation (1674), has left any description of his personal appearance. The latter only says that he weighed about 16,000 pagodas, (according to Le Feber, 17,000 pagodas or about 160 pounds). The best old portraits of Shivaji are described below.

1. An engraving in F. Valentyn's *Oud-en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (1724-26), the pictures in which were most probably acquired by the Dutch E. I. Co.'s mission to the Mughal Court in 1712. My frontispiece. The fine steel engraving given in Orme's *Fragments* (1782) is this portrait as retouched by a European etcher.

2. The Italian traveller Manucci in 1706 presented to the Venetian Senate a volume of 56 portraits drawn for him by Mir Muhammad, an artist in the household of Shah Alam, before 1688. This volume (now in Paris) contains a portrait of Shivaji (No. 39 in Blochet's list) which Mr. Irvine has reproduced by photography in his edition of the *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. III., picture No. XXXV. Second portrait in my book.

3. There is a contemporary and authentic portrait of Shivaji preserved in the British Museum, *viz.*, MS. Add. 22,282 (Picture No. 12.) It bears a Dutch inscription, 'Shivaji the late Maratha prince.' This volume of Indian portraits evidently belonged to some Dutch owner who had written the name of each person in Dutch on the portrait before 1707, as Aurangzib's portrait is inscribed, 'the present Great Mughal.' Mr. Irvine holds that the portraits were true to life so far as the artist could make them. They are well executed, in the usual style. The following description of this Shivaji portrait is supplied by Mr. Irvine:—

"Three-quarter length, looking to right,—same face as in Orme's *Fragments*. Black beard and moustache—long hair at sides—gold *pagri*—jewelled aigrette—black plume—white *jigha* (pearls)—flowered coat with white ground—purple silk scarf thrown across shoulder—worked sash—*peshqabz* (dagger) sticking out from waist on left side—right hand hidden it hilt of a *pattah* or rapier—left hand holding a *dhup* or straight sword."

4. A miniature of Shivaji on horseback, hunting a lion with the sword, now preserved in the P. W. Museum, Bombay. (My conjecture of date, about 1725.)

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Portraits of Shivaji

SHIVAJI
AND HIS TIMES

SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES

CHAPTER I.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE.

1. Extent, rainfall, soil and crops.
2. Isolation of the people.
3. Poverty, simplicity and equality of society.
4. Maratha character.
5. Religious teachers.
6. Literature and language.
7. Maratha soldiers and peasants of today.
8. Defects of the Maratha character.

§1. *Extent, rainfall, soil and crops.*

The Census of 1931 showed nearly twenty-one and a quarter millions of people speaking the Marathi language, including its Konkani dialect (the latter being the speech of less than half a million of souls only). Marathi is the language of a little less than one-half (exactly 42.23 per cent) of the population of the Bombay Presidency,* over one-fourth (26.23 p.c.) of that of the Nizam's Dominions, and slightly below one-third (31.22 p.c.) of the inhabitants of the Central Provinces and Berar. Its other speakers are found mostly in the Indian States. This language has been steadily gaining ground since the days of the Peshwas, and its peaceful annexation of the children of ruder and less literary tongues has gone on unabated even during the British period.

But the Marāthā country is not co-extensive with the land where the Marāthī speech prevails to-day. Four centuries ago the name *Mahā-rāshtra* was confined to the western edge of the Deccan plateau, *i.e.*, to a tract bounded

* In 1911 Marathi was spoken by above 86 p.c. of the population of the Konkan division, 85 p.c. of the Deccan division, of the Bombay Presidency, and nearly 54 p.c. of Bombay city.

on the north by the Tāpti, on the south by the upper courses of the Krishnā (probably the Warnā), and on the east by the Sinā.* The cradle-land of Mahārāshtra was, therefore, formed by the Nāsik, Punā and Sātārā districts, parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholāpur, and probably the western corner of Aurangābād,—a rough total of 28,000 square miles. The Marāthā race was also settled in Konkan or the narrow land between the Western Ghāts and the Indian Ocean. Here the districts of Thāna, Kolābā and Ratnagiri and the State of Sāvant-vādi,—with a total area of over 10,000 square miles,—are now predominantly Marāthi-speaking; but in the 16th century a considerable portion of the population, probably one-half, belonged to other races and spoke other tongues.

Four centuries ago the population of Mahārāshtra was very thin and forests covered much of the land. The western edge of the Deccan plateau is subject to a low and uncertain rainfall, cultivation is poor and precarious, and it is only along the narrow margins of the few rivers that the peasant is assured of a good return for his labour. From nearly the whole of the Western Deccan the heavy clouds of the S. W. monsoon are either shut out by the Ghāt range, or, if they surmount this barrier, they sail away to the east leaving the land unwatered and untilled, so that "the Deccan, generally speaking, yields to much labour a bare measure of subsistence."† (*Moral and Mat. Prog.* 1911-12, p. 10.)

* "The word Dekkan expresses the country watered by the upper Godāvari and that lying between that river and the Krishnā. The name Mahārāshtra also seems at one time to have been restricted to this tract. For that country is, in the Purānas and other works, distinguished on the one hand from Northern Konkan and from the regions on either side of the Narmadā and the Tāpti, as well as from Vidarbha" or Berar. (*Bom. Gaz.* i. pt. ii. pp. 184, 587; xxiv. 81.)

† The rain is precipitated on the coast-line [i.e., Konkan] at an average of 100 to 120 inches [in the year.] Once the crest [of the Western Ghāts] is passed, the precipitation decreases very rapidly, until a belt is reached only 35 miles from the hills where the rainfall is very precarious and averages only about 17 inches. Further east again, the S. W. monsoon is nearly

In such a soil rice cultivation is impossible, and wheat and barley grow in very small quantities. The staple crop of most of this region is the hardy millet,—*jawāri*, *bājra* and *rāgi* or maize. But even these cannot always be depended upon. One year the rain would fail, the sprouting plants would be scorched by the sun or the young heads of grain would shrink and wither before they can grow to fulness and ripen, and there would be famine throughout the length and breadth of the land. The soil, covered with bare rock at places and with only a thin layer of mould at others, would be baked to a brown dust, not a green blade would be seen anywhere, and in addition to the human victims the cattle would perish by tens of thousand.

§2. *Isolation of the People*

The broken rocky nature of the country and its abundance of forests, while it kept the population down, also made travelling difficult and unprofitable. There were no rich courts, populous cities or thriving marts to attract merchants. Nor were there regular occasions for the march of large bodies of soldiers, as from one province of a compact and mighty empire to another. The country was cut

spent, but the influence of the N. E. monsoon begins to be felt and the rainfall improves.....South of Khāndesh we get the Deccan proper divided into three tracts [running parallel to the Ghāts and called] the *Dāng* or *Māval* to the west, the *Transition* in the centre, and the *Desh*, or black-soil plain to the east. The soil, however, is not fertile, and there are ranges of bare rocky hills running east and west, spurs so to speak of the Ghāts, which neither store water for cultivation nor attract the rainfall.....The Karnātak [*i.e.*, the Dhārwar, Belgāum, and Bijapur districts] has a more certain and more copious rainfall and more fertile soil." (*Census of India*, 1911, vii. pt. I, pp. 4-6.) The western hilly belt is called *Dāng* in the north (*i.e.*, Baglāna), *Māval* in the centre (*i.e.*, the Nāsik, Punā, and Sātārā districts), and *Mallād* in the south (*i.e.*, Karnātak.) The Konkan, on the other hand, is an area of certain and heavy rainfall, with rice for the predominant crop, "and along the sea-coast, wherever there is any soil.....a fringe of palms, mango-groves and plantain orchards add to the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants. Thāna and Kanārā are forest-clad districts." (*Ibid.*)

up by Nature into small compartments in which the natives lived isolated self-contained lives, the world forgetting and by the world forgot.

This was true in a special degree of the belt of land lying immediately east of the Ghāts. The empires of the central and more level portion of the table-land, both in Hindu times and Muslim, had sent forth their conquering hosts westwards, but the flood of invasion had been broken at the foot of the hills or their numerous spurs, or, where a thin stream of it had poured through the passes, it had retired after a short and unprofitable stay. In their rugged and inhospitable nooks the natives had found safety and peace, while the richer plains had been the scenes of revolution and rapine.

This natural isolation of the western belt was no doubt occasionally broken by the pilgrim, the trader, and the soldier of fortune. Across this rugged tract lay all the routes from the ocean-ports of our western coast to the rich capitals and marts of Central Deccan. Through it alone could the stream of recruits from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, Abyssinia and even Central Asia reach the welcoming Muslim Courts of Kulbargā, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkondā. Through Mahārāshtra alone could the cloth, metal-ware and spices of the upper Godāvari and Krishnā valleys reach their ports of embarkation for Europe.

Then, again, the sterile soil discouraged its sons from the thankless task of tilling it. Strong muscles and stout hearts found greater rewards and a higher position by serving in the armies of the mighty monarchies of the central plateau. An able partisan leader was sure of high pay, noble rank, and it might be the proud position of a king-maker, at any of these Courts, which were constantly at war with their neighbours, and prepared to bid high for the lances of useful *condottieri* from the Desh tract.

But such occasional visitors only brought a breath of the outer world to the sequestered vales of Mahārāshtra; they did not disturb the noiseless tenor of the life of the

natives, for the natives themselves had hardly occasion to move. Even when they went abroad as soldiers, they usually settled there in the fiefs given to them and rarely returned to their barren ancestral homes.

The Marāthā people's inborn love of independence and isolation was greatly helped by Nature, which provided them with many ready-made and easily defensible forts close at hand, where they could quickly flee for refuge and whence they could offer a tenacious resistance. Unlike the Gangetic plain, this country could not be conquered and annexed by one cavalry dash or even one year's campaigning. Here the natives had the chance of making a long struggle against superior numbers and, as often happened, of recovering their own when the invader was worn out. "The whole of the Ghāts and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points of which, as well as detached portions on insulated hills, form natural fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space, which generally lies on the summit. Various princes at different times have cut flights of steps or winding roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance with a succession of gateways, and erected towers to command the approaches; and thus studded the whole of the region about the Ghāts and their branches with forts." "In many of them there are springs of the finest water, and in all a supply can be secured, in tanks or reservoirs, during the periodical rains from May to October." The soft trap rock dissolving has exposed the hard basalt in steep scarped precipices and smooth tops, which form natural forts.*

§3. *Poverty, simplicity and equality of society.*

In such a country no man can afford to lead a sheltered life. There was no parasite class in ancient Mahārāshtra. Even the village headmen, besides attending to their demesne fields, had to work as collectors of revenue, local

* Elphinstone's *History*, 6th ed. 615. Duff. I. 7. *Bom. Gaz.*, xviii, pt. I. pp. 9-10; xix 16.

judges and parochial policemen, to earn the fee on which they lived. There was hardly a rich man, except the trader who was also the only banker of this primitive society. Even the landlords were rich rather in grain-heaps and armed retainers than in gold and silver. Some temples, especially at the chief centres of pilgrimage, had accumulations of wealth, but their income was precarious, entirely dependent on voluntary gift, and incomparably smaller than the riches of the grand temples of Madras.

In a society so circumstanced, every man, and often every woman, has to work and work with the hand. Elegance and refinement cannot grow here. If culture can be rightly defined as the employment of the intellect in pleasure, then there is no room for culture among men who have to sacrifice pleasure to the bare necessities of life. Where Nature enforces a Spartan simplicity, there can be no luxury, no learned leisure (except among the priests), no æsthetic development, no polished manners even.

The Marāthās, when they rose to political power, did not impress the subject population favourably. To the over-polished decadents of the Mughal capitals, the warriors from the South appeared as a race of upstarts, insolent in prosperity, and lacking in grace, refinement and even good manners. They had no taste for the fine arts, no elegance of address, no aptitude for the amenities of social life. Even their horsemanship was awkward and graceless, though eminently practical. The period of Marāthā ascendency has not left India richer by a single grand building, or beautiful picture, or finely written manuscript. Even the palaces of the Peshwās are low, mean-looking, flimsy structures, with small rooms and narrow staircases—relieved from utter insignificance only by their richly carved wooden *façade*.

§4. *Marāthā character.*

But such a country and climate have their compensating advantages, too. They develop self-reliance, courage,

perseverance, a stern simplicity, a rough straightforwardness, a sense of social equality and consequently pride in the dignity of man as man. As early as the 7th century of the Christian era, a learned Chinese traveller thus noted the character of the Marāthā people living in the more prosperous Central Deccan: "The inhabitants are proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards suppliants in distress and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly." "If they are going to seek revenge, they first give their enemy warning." (Beal, *Si Y. K.* ii. 256; Watters's *Yuan Chwang*, ii. 239.)

This racial character was somewhat modified in the course of the next ten centuries. The disappearance of the protective influence of the large Hindu monarchies of the province, the growing rigour of the Muslim occupation of the country, and the ravages of constant warfare between rival States, forced the remnant of the Marāthā population to be more cunning and less chivalrous. Shivāji did not "first give warning" to Āfzal or Shāista Khan.*

But the basis of their character remained the same,—activity, courage, self-reliance, self-respect and love of equality. With the loss of their own cities and capitals on the Godāvari and the Krishnā in the 14th century, they were pressed back to the sterile western edge of the plateau and became poorer and more isolated. In the lonely struggle with Nature and beasts, they developed greater cunning, without losing their valour and hardiness. Indeed, in their combination of courage, cleverness and power of endurance,—in their ability to plan and execute surprises and night-attacks, in the skill of their soldiers to extricate themselves from a tight corner or vary their tactics accord-

* In 1880 an English observer wrote of the Marāthā peasantry (of the Kunbi caste), "They are hard-working, temperate, hospitable, fond of their children and kind to strangers. At the same time they are cruel in revenge, and seldom scruple to cheat either Government or their creditors." (*Bom. Gaz.*, xviii. pt. I. 288.)

ing to the changing phases of a battle, without waiting for guidance from a superior,—the Marāthās resemble the Afghāns most among all Asiatic races.

Social distinctions were fewer and much less sharp among the 16th century Marāthās than among richer and more civilized communities. The rich man was not immeasurably above the poor in such a simple society; and even the poorest man had his value as a fighter or indispensable labourer; at least, he preserved his self-respect, because where few had anything to spare, none was tempted to lead the pampered life of the professional beggars and hangers-on of Agra or Delhi. Poverty and immemorial custom alike preserved the womankind of Mahārāshtra (except among those castes that aspired to be Kshatriyas) from seclusion in the harem, and thus the effective strength of society was doubled, while life gained in health and sweetness from the activities of women in public.

§5. *Religious teachers.*

The same sense of equality was fostered by religion. The Brāhmans, no doubt, tried to maintain their monopoly of the sacred lore and their aloofness from other castes as a sort of spiritual aristocracy. But strong religious movements arose and swept through the length and breadth of the land, teaching the sanctity of conduct as nobler than mere birth, the superiority of a living personal faith to mere ritual, and the oneness of all true believers before God. These popular movements were hostile to the haughty claims of the Brāhman hierarchy, and their chief centre was Pandharpur, one of the most famous seats of pilgrimage in the land.

"Like the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 16th century, there was a religious, social, and literary revival and Reformation in India, but notably in the Deccan in the 15th and 16th centuries. This religious revival was not Brāhmanical in its orthodoxy; it was hetero-

dox in its spirit of protest against forms and ceremonies and class distinctions based on birth, and ethical in its preference of a pure heart, and of the law of love, to all other acquired merits and good works. This religious revival was the work also of the people, of the masses, and not of the classes. At its head were saints and prophets, poets and philosophers, who sprang chiefly from the lower orders of society,—tailors, carpenters, potters, gardeners, shopkeepers, barbers, and even *mahārs* (scavengers)—more often than Brāhmans. The names of Tukārām [born about 1568], of Rāmdās [b. 1608], of Vāman Pandit [b. 1636], and of Eknāth [b. 1528] still retain their ascendancy over the minds of the people of Mahārāshtra." (Rānādē, 10; also *Bom. Gaz.* xx. 473.)

The fairs held at the chief places of pilgrimage on particular holy days tended to foster a sense of Hindu unity, like the national games of ancient Greece, though to a lesser extent, because caste has always remained with us a disintegrating force. These shrines became distributing centres of cult and culture, and tended to break down tribal or parochial narrowness, though imperceptibly.

§6. *Literature and Language.*

Literature afforded another bond of union in Mahārāshtra. Its themes were taken from the ancient scriptures and epics which are the common heritage of all the Hindus. The devotional songs and moral maxims of popular teachers like Tukārām and Rāmdās, Vāman Pandit and Moro Pant, made their way to every home where Marathi letters could be read. "In every town and village in the Deccan and Konkan, especially during the rains, the pious Marāthā will be found enjoying with his family and friends the recitation of the *Pothi* of Shridhar [b. 1679], and enjoying it indeed. Except an occasional gentle laugh, or a sigh, or a tear, not a sound disturbs the rapt silence of the audience, unless when one of those passages of supreme pathos is

reached, which affects the whole of the listeners simultaneously with an outburst of emotion which drowns the voice of the reader." (Acworth's *Ballads*, xxvii.)

The simplicity and uniformity of early Marāthā society are also reflected in the language. Their poetry consisted of short jingles and apophthegms or monotonous metrical couplets as in the epics,—with no lyric outburst, no long-flowing sonorous verses, no delicate play on the whole gamut of sounds. Like the other daughters of Sanskrit, the Marāthi vernacular had no literary prose till well into the 18th century. The prose that was created by the official class in their letters and chronicles, was a barbarous jargon composed nearly three-fourths of Persian words and grotesque literal translations of Persian idioms. The highly Sanskritized, elegant and varied prose that is now used, is a creation of the British period. (Rājwādē, viii, Intro., fully discusses the Persian element.)

"On the whole it may be said that the written [Marāthi] poetry, consisting as it does in such very large measure of moral disquisitions and reflections, and the praises of this deity or that, is little known to the ryots and the Māvalis of Mahārāshtra, and that it would not command their attention or admiration if it were known. . . . In Mahārāshtra, where the immense majority of the peasantry can neither read nor write, it is a mere truism to say that the literature of their country is absolutely unknown to them.* It is not to be supposed, however, that they are without a poetry of their own. With the Marāthās, the feelings of the commons have taken shape in the ballads, which are the genuine embodiment of national enthusiasm. . . . Over the plains of the Deccan, and the deep valleys and bold ridges of the Sahyādris, from village to village, the humble *Gondhāli* (minstrel) still travels, and still to rapt and excited audiences sings of the great days when the

* But the entire mass of legends and traditions of the race was the common property of all classes of people throughout the land and gave them cultural homogeneity.

armed fathers of the men around him gave laws at the spear's point to all the princes of India, or retreated wounded and dismayed before the sword of the sea-dwelling stranger." (Acworth and Shaligrām, *Powādās*, i and ii.) But this national ballad literature was the creation of the age of Shivāji and his successors.

Not only was their literature poor, but their popular spoken tongue was a rough practical speech, incapable of expressing the ceremonious courtesy, indirectness, and delicate shades of meaning of the highly developed Urdu language. The democratic temper of the Marāthā people is shown by their having no respectful mode of address like the *āp* ("your honour") of Northern India; all ranks are *theed* and *thoued*.

Thus, a remarkable community of language, creed, and life was attained in Mahārāshtra in the 17th century, even before political unity was conferred by Shivāji. What little was wanting to the solidarity of the people was supplied by his creation of a national State, the long struggle with the invader from Delhi under his sons, and the imperial expansion of the race under the Peshwās. Thus, in the end a tribe,—or rather a collection of tribes and castes,—was fused into a *nation*,* and by the end of the 18th century a Marāthā *people* in the political and cultural senses of the term had been formed, though caste distinctions still remained. Thus history has moulded society.

§7. *Marāthā soldiers and peasants of to-day*

The backbone of Shivāji's army was composed of the peasantry, who belonged to two low castes, named *Marāthā* and *Kunbi*. The *Marāthā* caste,—a name which should not be applied to all Marāthi-speaking people in general,—numbered five millions and the *Kunbis* (of the Bombay

* "The Marāthās are a nation, and from the Brāhman to the ryot they glory in the fact." (Acworth and Shaligram's *Powadas*, iii.)

Presidency alone), two and a half millions, in 1911, and they bear the following character in our times:

"As a class, Marāthās (*i.e.*, the caste so called) are simple, frank, independent and liberal, courteous, and, when kindly treated, trusting. They are a manly and intelligent race, proud of their former greatness, fond of show, and careful to hide poverty. . . . Stronger, more active, and better made than the Kunbis, many of the Marāthās, even among the poorer classes, have an air of refinement. (They take animal food, including fowls, and drink toddy and other liquors, like the Kunbis.) No caste supplies the Bombay army with so many recruits as the Ratnagiri Marāthās. Others go into the police or find employment as messengers. Like the Kunbis, orderly, well-behaved, and good-tempered, the Marāthās surpass them in courage and generosity. Very frugal, unassuming, respectable and temperate, . . . they are a very religious class."

"The Deccan Kunbis are [now] all cultivators, steady and hard-working. . . . A very quiet, easy-tempered and orderly class, singularly free from crime, they have much respect for the gods. In the Deccan they are strong, hardy, enduring and muscular, [but in Konkan, smaller, darker and more slightly made.] The Kunbi women, like their husbands, are strong and hardy, but the veiled Marāthā women are generally weak. . . . Widows are generally allowed to marry." (*Bom. Gaz.*, xxiv. 70; x. 123, 121; xviii. pt. i, 285, 307.)

§8. *Defects of the Marāthā character.*

We shall now turn to the other traits of the Marāthā character. When a Government lives on plunder as a regular source of supply, its officers naturally see no immorality in taking bribes for themselves. The ethics of the servant easily slides into the ethics of the master. These Indian Spartans with their simplicity, hardiness and sense of equality, were no more proof against corruption than the

Spartans of ancient Greece. Contemporary travellers have noticed how greedy of bribes the Brāhmaṇ officers of the Marāthā State were, even under the great Shivāji.

The chief defect of the Marāthās, which has disastrously reacted on their political history, is their lack of business capacity. This race has produced no great banker, trader, captain of industry, or even commissariat organizer or contractor. Hence, on the economic side, in the broadest sense of the term, the Marāthā administration was very weak. The Peshwās, in spite of the dazzling brilliancy of their political success, were bankrupts from the days of the great Bāji Rāo I onwards. Even Shivāji had repeated money difficulties during his short reign—though in his case it was due not so much to real insolvency, as to his aversion to touch his hoarded treasure for the normal expenses of his army.

But the Marāthās have a historic advantage of unique importance in the India of to-day. Their near ancestors had faced death in a hundred battle-fields, had led armies and debated in the chamber of diplomacy, had managed the finances of kingdoms and grappled with the problems of empire; they had helped to make Indian history in the immediate and not yet forgotten past. The memory of these things is a priceless asset to their race. In the combination of intellectual keenness, patient industry, simplicity of life, devotion to the nobler ideals of man, in the courage necessary for translating thought into deed, in the spirit of sacrifice, grit of character, and a diffused sense of democratic equality, the vast middle class of modern Mahārāshtra have no superior and hardly any equal among the other races of India. Would that they possessed also the organizing skill, the spirit of team work, the tact in the management of instruments and colleagues, the foresight, and the saving common sense of the Anglo-Saxon race!

CHAPTER II.

BOYHOOD AND YOUTH, 1627-1656.

1. Shivaji's ancestors.
2. Rise of Shahji Bhonslé.
3. Shivaji's birth and infancy.
4. Reconstruction of the story of Shivaji's early life.
5. Condition of the Puna jagir, 1637.
6. Shivaji's education.
7. Mavals occupied.
8. Social atmosphere in which young Shivaji worked.
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10. Shivaji's early conquest of forts.
11. Adil Shah imprisons Shahji.
12. Capture of Purandar, 1648.
13. Conquest of Javli and Raigarh, 1656.
14. Shivaji's further gains.
App. Morés of Jävli.

§1. *Shivaji's ancestors.*

The Bhonslé clan of the Maratha caste was made up of many families, scattered over various places in Western India. Unlike a Rajput or Scottish clan, they had no union under a common and generally-recognized chieftain, nor even social solidarity, but merely bore the same surname and married into other Maratha families. Agriculture was their original occupation, as with most members of the Maratha caste. But the break up of the large monarchies of Western India, (namely, the Bahmani at the end of the 15th century and the Nizam Shahi at the beginning of the 17th) opened to the ablest men among them the chance of rising to military power and lordship over land. The history of Shivaji's family illustrates this transformation of the tiller of the soil by successive stages into the bandit, the captain of mercenaries, the feudal baron, and the sovereign ruler, which was so frequent in India during the troubled times that followed the downfall of central powers like the Bahmani or the Delhi empire and ended only with the establishment of British paramountcy and British peace.

In the middle of the 16th century, a Bhonslé named Bābāji was living peacefully on the humble gains of agriculture and the dues of his office as headman (*patil*) of the villages of Hingani Beradi and Diwalgāon in the Punā district (Patas sub-division), which was then under the Nizām Shah of Ahmadnagar. His two sons, Māloji and Vitoji, happened to disagree with the other people of the place and migrated with their wives to the village of Verul (Ellorā) at the foot of the Daulatābād hills. The prospects of agriculture here were unpromising and the two brothers went in search of employment to Jādav Rao of Sindhkher, a Nizām Shahi noble, and entered his service as common soldiers (*bārgirs*). The tradition runs that at a festive gathering in his house, Jādav Rao praised the beauty of Māloji's little boy Shāhji and his own daughter Jijā Bāi, drew them together on his knees, and cried out in admiration that they would form an excellent match, and that Māloji immediately stood up and called upon the other guests to witness that his master had betrothed his daughter to his son,—for which presumptuous claim he was forthwith dismissed by Jādav Rao.

So, the two brothers came back to their home at Ellorā and lived there by agriculture for the next few years. One night Māloji, while watching his crops in the field, noticed a big snake coming out of a hole, and following the popular belief that snakes guard buried treasure he dug the place up and discovered seven pots full of gold coins underground. Here at last were the means of gratifying their ambition. Lodging the treasure with an honest banker named Pundé at Chamārgundā, they bought horses, saddles, arms and tents and equipped a force of one thousand troopers, at whose head they offered their swords to any master that would pay them. Joining a leader of banditti named Nimbālkar (of Phaltan), they soon gained so much importance and power that the decadent Nizām-Shāhi Government was glad to enrol them among its captains. This happened at the beginning of the 17th century, when

Akbar's conquest of the capital Ahmadnagar had thrown that monarchy into confusion and disruption, which raised the value of able mercenary bands and offered unlimited opportunities of advancement to their captains. Jādav Rao had no objection now to giving his daughter in marriage to the son of the newly-exalted Bhonslē.

Māloji wisely spent a portion of his treasure trove in building temples, giving alms to Brahmans, and excavating a large tank on the arid Shambhu Mahādev hill, in the Sātārā district, which was a great boon to the tens of thousands of pilgrims who annually flocked to that shrine. These pious investments of his money brought him a good return by raising him immensely in social esteem. When he died, the family contingent of troops,—now greatly increased in number from the original thousand men,—was commanded in the Nizām Shāhi service by his younger brother Vitoji, and after Vitoji's death (probably in 1623), by Shāhji, the eldest son of Māloji.*

§2. *The Rise of Shāhji Bhonslē, 1625-36.*

Shāhji's name first occurs in recorded history in 1628, two years after the death of Malik Ambar, when he was sent forth by Fath Khan, the son and successor of that Nizām Shāhi *wazir*, to raid East Khandesh in the rear of a Mughal invading force. Soon afterwards, the plots of the Nizām Shāh and his new *wazir* against each other, the imprisonment of Fath Khan by his king (c. April 1630), the murder of Lakhji Jādav Rao at Court (c. 1630), the treacherous surrender of the Mughal portion of Ahmadnagar territory by the viceroy Khan-i-Jahān Lodi, (1627), a fresh Mughal invasion of the country (1628), and the Bijapuri efforts to

* The accounts of the family given in the Persian histories of Delhi and Bijapur have been summarized in my book *The House of Shivaji*. The exaggerations of Marathi Court-poets, in Sanskrit, have been rejected. Of the eight sons of Vitoji (the younger brother of Maloji I.) four are found in the Mughal service at the beginning of Shah Jahan's reign, viz., Khelaji, Pārsuji, Māloji II and Mambāji. (Abdul Hamid, i.A.]

seize as much of the wrecks of the Ahmadnagar kingdom as possible,—all combined to throw the Nizām Shāhi Government into unspeakable weakness and confusion. This was a golden opportunity for an able enterprising and ambitious man like Shāhji. After the murder of his father-in-law Jādav Rao, he left the Nizām Shah, got a band of men together, and tried to seize the country from Junnar to Ahmadnagar, creating a great disturbance at that ill-defined and ill-guarded meeting point of three kingdoms. Then he entered the Mughal service with his eldest son and younger brother (end of 1630), but deserted after a year and a half (June 1632) and went over to the service of the Ādil Shah of Bijapur, where he completely fascinated Murāri Jagadev, the right-hand man of the wazir Khawās Khan.

The murder of Burhān Nizām Shah (c. Feb. 1632) by his wazir Fath Khan and the Mughal capture of Daulatabad (the new capital) with his successor Husain Nizām Shah in it (17th June 1633), were followed by the final dismemberment of the once glorious Ahmadnagar kingdom. Its local governors declared their independence. Shāhji now seized all the Nizām-shahi territory from Punā and Chākan to the environs of Ahmadnagar and Nāsik, and plundered right and left. With Bijapuri assistance he crowned a boy Nizām Shah in Premgarh (renamed Shāhgarh) in August 1633, and carried on the government in the name of this puppet for three years,—seizing districts (including North Konkan), enlisting soldiers (especially 12,000 Nizām-Shahi troopers who had been disbanded after the fall of Daulatabad), and raiding the country as far as Bidar and Daulatabad, to the great harassment of the Mughals. In 1634 we find him possessed of one-fourth of the total territory of the old Nizām-Shahi kingdom (with an annual revenue of 20 lakhs of *hun*), and in concert with the Bijapuris thwarting the Mughal siege of Parenda.

But the imperialists launched vast forces against him in February 1636. The campaign, after much hard riding and fighting, ended next October in the completest defeat

of Shahji, who was compelled to surrender to the victors his puppet Nizām Shah and seven of his forts, enter Bijapur service, and transfer his irrepressible ambition and disturbing activity to regions far away from Mahārāshtra proper. He next carved out a vast estate for himself on the Mysore plateau and the Eastern Karnātak and rose to be the foremost Hindu vassal of Adil Shah. [See my *House of Shivaji* for his full life.]

§3. *Shivaji's birth and infancy.*

Shahji Bhonsle's first wife Jijā Bāī bore him two sons, Shambhuji and Shivāji. As the elder one worked far away from Mahārāshtra and died in early youth, this history is not concerned with him. Shivāji, their second son, was born in the hill-fort of Shivner, which towers over the city of Junnar, in the extreme north of the Punā district. His mother had prayed to the local goddess, Shivāi Devi, for the good of her expected child, and she therefore named him after that deity.

Of the exact date of his birth* there is no reliable contemporary record. Even his son's courtier, Krishnāji Anant Sabhāsād, writing in 1697, is silent on the point.

Of the two different dates of his birth given by two different groups of writers, I am inclined to prefer Monday, 10th April 1627.

The stories told in the later Marathi *bakhars* about the history of his parents during the year preceding his birth and the events of his life up to the age of twenty, are in many points contrary to authentic history, and in others improbable, or at all events unsupported by any evidence.

* The question of the true date of Shivāji's birth has been fully and fairly discussed by V. S. Wākaskar in his edition of the 91 *Qalmi Bakhar*, pp. 27-28 *n.*, and V. K. Rājwādē and B. G. Tilak in *Shiva-charitrapradip* (reprint). They accept the month and year April 1627, while those who pin their faith to the mutually-inconsistent *Jedhe Shakāvali* and *Suryavamsham* hold it to be 19 March 1630. See also *Shivaji Souvenir* (ed. G. S. Sardesai), Marathi section; ch. 5.

We know from the contemporary Persian histories that during much of the period from 1630 to 1636 Shahji led a roving life, subject to frequent contests with diverse enemies and change of residence. Under these circumstances, he would naturally have left his wife and infant son for safety in a stronghold like Shivner. But in reality they seem to have both fallen under his neglect. It is a fair inference from the known facts that by the year 1630 or thereabout Jijā Bai lost her husband's love, probably with the loss of her youth, and Shahji forsook her and her little son Shivaji and took a younger and more beautiful wife, Tukā Bai Mohité, on whom and whose son Vyānkoji he henceforth lavished his society and all his gains.

It is expressly stated in the contemporary Persian history *Pādishāhnāmah* (i. B. 150) that in March 1636 Shahji's family was living at Shivner. As Shivner was one of the seven forts ceded by Shahji to the Mughals in the terms of the treaty of October 1636, Shivaji could not have continued to live in that fort after the end of that year. Shahji himself immediately after his defeat went to Bijapur and entering the Ādil Shahi service was sent on campaign further south. He secured from that Government a grant of the Punā district from Chākan to Indāpur and Shirwal as his jāgir, and appointed Dādāji Kond-dev to administer the tract, telling him, "My wife Jijā Bāi is living in the fort of Shivner and has brought forth a son named Shivaji. Bring her and her son away and keep them in your charge [at Punā] and supply them with money for their necessary expenses."

Thus Shivaji took up his residence at Punā, probably at the end of 1637. He was, therefore, practically a stranger to his father for several years after his birth (if we leave out of our account Shahji's visits to Shivner in the intervals of his campaigns), and he became totally so after this removal to Punā.*

* About 1641 Jija Bai and Shivaji in the company of Dadaji paid a visit to Shahji at Bangalore, but were sent back to Punā with the same guardian. (Sabh. 3-4).

Her husband's neglect drove the mind of Jija Bai inwards and deepened her natural religious spirit, which she imparted to her son. Shiva grew up in solitude, a mateless child, without brother, sister or father. The isolation of their life drew mother and son very close together and intensified his love for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. From a very early age, he was naturally thrown on his own resources, and learnt to carry out his own ideas unaided, and to take the initiative without any sense of subordination or responsibility to some higher authority. In the condition of the homes of their boyhood, their early life and training, and the development of their character,—even as in the steps by which they mounted to the throne,—the forsaken son of Shahji Bhonsle was the exact parallel of the forsaken son of Hasan Sur. Shivaji and Sher Shah were not only alike in character and genius, but also grew up amidst like circumstances.

§4. *My reconstruction of the story of Shivaji's early life.*

In the absolute want of any contemporary evidence, and even of later records of a reliable character, it is impossible now to construct a narrative of Shivaji's early life with any degree of certainty as to dates and events. But by drawing inferences from certain known facts of the time and balancing probabilities against one another, I offer the following account as a fair approximation to truth.

When in October 1636 Shāhji was expelled from Mahārāshtra, he had to go to a distant scene, but not exactly to begin life afresh at the age of forty. He had rights to a medium-sized estate, earned by his forefathers and himself in the Punā district, and the command of a small but very efficient and devoted army and civil service, ready to follow him anywhere. He first of all secured from Ādil Shah (the now recognised heir of the extinct Nizām Shah) a formal confirmation of the grant of the Punā jāgir, (dated 25 February 1637). As he was not permitted to live there

himself, he invited an exceptionally competent and honest manager, Dādāji Kond-dev, (a former *kulkarni* of Malthan) to administer his Punā jāgir for him, and also to bring his neglected wife Jijā Bāi and her son Shivāji away from their refuge in Shivner to Punā and maintain them there.

Punā had been a desolate place for several years past, with only a scanty pauperised migratory population and a few straw huts. Shahji's new land-steward probably *at first* resided in Khédé-bāré village, where he laid out a new hamlet, named Shivāpur, and gardens; and here he lodged Jijā Bāi and her son, while a suitable house for them (the Lāl Mahal) and administrative offices were being built at Punā, and the country round was being reclaimed to cultivation by his far-sighted and tactful policy.

Thus Shivaji first came to Punā not earlier than 1638; and there is no evidence that the Punā jāgir of Shāhji was quite so early assigned to Shivāji as his heritage. The surviving papers prove that he and his mother were to get their subsistence allowance from this estate, but not *as yet* to exercise any authority over it,—for this latter purpose Dādāji was directly under Shāhji and officially *his* agent with *full* power (*mutāliq*).

There is no record of Shāhji's doings and status under the Bijapuri Government during 1637 and 1638. It was only in October 1638, when Ādil Shah began a series of annual invasions of Karnātak (Mysore and the East Coast) that Shāhji got the chance of his *second* rise, under his appreciative commander, Randaula Khan (now created Rustam-i-Zamān). In the campaign of 1639, Bangalore was gained by the Bijapuris and it was granted to Shāhji to form the capital of his new jāgir. It took him some months to set up his establishments here; but now (early in 1640) Shāhji after long wanderings since 1636, had at last found a *new home*.

Shivaji was then full twelve years old, past the usual age for the marriage of a Maratha noble's son, and Jijā Bāi wrote urging her husband to marry Shivā and make a

regular provision for him worthy of a first-grade nobleman's son ; he could not be left to vegetate on a mere "food allowance" like an illegitimate child. So, the mother and the son were called up to Bangalore (*not* to Bijapur as imagined by nineteenth century romancists misnamed *bakharkars*), in 1640 or 1641. A man with knowledge of the world can easily imagine the stormy scene in the harem of Shāhji, as the rival wives faced each other and fought for their respective sons.

Jijā Bāi rightly argued that all the new wealth and power of the lord of Bangalore would pass on to Tukā Bāi Mohité's son Vyānkoji, who lived with Shāhji, while her own son Shivāji had got nothing from his father ; out of sight, out of mind. (Her elder boy Shambhuji lived with his father apart from his mother, and she gained nothing from him.)

A sensible compromise was made. The Punā jāgir (yielding 40,000 *hun* or about a lakh and a half of rupees annually, on paper), was *now* formally bestowed on Shivaji as Shāhji's agent while he lived, and as full owner after his death. At this time Shivaji was married at Bangalore to Sai Bāi Nimbālkar, and sent back to Punā with a set of four heads of the administrative departments to be created under him, though Dādāji Kond-dev, as the guardian of the minor, still controlled him. From this time Dādāji presided over the Punā "Cabinet" and Public Courts (*mahazar*) along with Shivāji and Jijā Bāi, (and latterly Shivā only). This new administrative arrangement came into operation in 1642 when Shivaji had just reached his 16th year. He was fully in the saddle as the master of the Punā jāgir only after Dādāji's death in 1647. Thereafter his career is well-known, though some of the dates are doubtful.

§5. Condition of the Punā jāgir, 1637.

Shahji's jāgir of Punā and Supā, formerly held under Nizām Shah and henceforth under Ādil Shah, included the

Punā district from Chākan to Indāpur, Supā, Shirwal and the frontier of Wāi, or a tract bounded on the west by the Bhimā, and on the south by the Nirā river.

The Punā district that Dādāji took over was in a sadly ruined condition. Six years of warfare had desolated the land, and the work of the invading soldiery had been completed after their departure by robber chiefs who tried to profit by the anarchy. Indeed, the province had so recently passed from the Nizām-shahi ownership to that of Bijapur that the authority of the new Government had not yet taken root there. It was only the rule of a strong jāgirdār that could have given peace and prosperity to the district; but during the years 1630-1636 Shahji had been forced to lead a life of constant movement, danger and warfare. The Punā and Thānā districts at the extreme north-western corner of the kingdom of Bijapur, therefore, formed a No man's Land, with none to administer and defend them.

In 1630 Shahji had plundered and seized the Nizām-Shahi country round Punā. Soon afterwards a Bijapuri army had looted and burnt Punā, Indapur and other villages of Shahji and "totally desolated them". Next he had recovered possession of them by force. Then had followed the famine of 1630-1631, the most terrible in the sad history of the Deccan. The Junnar or North Punā tract was the scene of repeated Mughal invasions in 1634-36. Khan-i-Zamān in the course of his campaign against Shahji (July—October 1636) penetrated to Punā, but there was probably nothing left for him to plunder or burn there. During the dissolution of the Ahmadnagar sultanate, a revenue accountant (*deshpāndē*) named Moro Tandev Honap, "a proud rebel, well acquainted with the country round the Bhimā, had raised a tumult and seized the neighbourhood of Punā. All these disorders had devastated the whole kingdom from Ahmadnagar to the boundary of Wāi and Shirwal".

The desolation caused by man preying on his species favoured the growth of wild beasts. The Punā district, especially the Sahyādri hill-side forming its western border, was now infested by large numbers of wolves, which thinned the population and hindered cultivation. Dādāji Kond-dev offered rewards to the hillmen for killing the wolves and thus cleared the whole tract of these pests in a short time. He conciliated the hillmen and induced them to settle in the valleys and extend cultivation by offering very liberal terms. "Leases were granted to the effect that the new tenants should pay a rent of only one-twelfth of an anna per *bighā* in the first year, one-fourth of an anna in the second, half an anna in the third, three-fourths of an anna in the fourth, four annas in the fifth, eight annas in the sixth, one rupee in the 7th year, and at the rate of Malik Ambar's land settlement from the 8th year onwards. Thus the whole country was brought under tillage."* When Dādāji took charge of the Punā jāgir, its revenue on paper was only 40,000 *hun*, or Rs. 1,40,000, according to the current rate of exchange. But only a fraction of this amount was actually collected.

The memory of his able and beneficent administration was long preserved, and a later chronicle tells us, "He did such strict justice that the very name of robbers and usurpers disappeared from the district." An anecdote illustrates his punctilious sense of justice: "He planted a garden of fruit trees, named it after Shahji, and gave strict orders that if any one plucked even a leaf from the trees, he would be punished. One day Dādāji with his own hand plucked a mango from a tree. For this offence he was about

* 91 Q. B. sec. 21. The word *rukā* of the Marathi original which was mistaken for *rupee* by the translator of this *Bakhar* into Persian, really means one-twelfth part of an anna, or the British Indian copper pie. The Adil Shahi *bighā* (which I suppose to have prevailed in Punā in 1637) was equal to 4383 sq. yards, or just a little over nine-tenths of an English acre (=4840 sq. yd.) Wilson's *Glossary*, 85. I have here corrected my earlier editions.

to cut off the hand when the other people prevented him. To show his respect for the rules, however, he wore an iron chain round his neck", or according to another account, "kept the offending arm confined in a long glove!"*

§6. *Shivaji's Education.*

On the subject of Shivaji's education, *Sabhasad* is silent. The 91 *Qalmi Bakhar*, 21, tells us that "Dādāji trained Shivaji and appointed an excellent teacher for him. In a short time Shiva became skilled in wrestling, riding and other accomplishments". The weight of evidence is in favour of the view that Shivaji was unlettered, like three other heroes of mediæval India,—Akbar, Haidar Ali, and Ranjit Singh. The many Europeans who visited him never saw him write anything; when they presented any petition to him the Rajah always passed it on to his ministers to be read to him. No piece of writing in his own hand is known to exist.

But though he may not have been able to read books, he certainly mastered the contents of the two great Hindu epics by listening to recitations and story-tellings. The noble examples of doing and suffering, of action and sacrifice, of military skill and statecraft, which the stories of Rāma and the Pāndavas afford, the political lessons and moral maxims with which these epics are filled, deeply impressed his young mind. He loved to distraction religious readings and songs (*kirtan*) and sought the society of Hindu and Muslim saints wherever he went. The want of book-learning, therefore, did not leave his mind a dull and sterile soil, nor impair his efficiency as a man of action in a world that was mediæval.

* Shahji's Punā jāgir, extent, 91 *Q. B.* sec. 20; its revenue, *Sabhasad*, 104. Moro Tandev Honap punished, 91 *Q. B.* 20; re-employed in revenue collection by Dādāji, *ibid.* 21. How Dadaji promoted cultivation, *ibid.* 21. Dadaji's character and reputation, *ibid.* 21 and 24. Previous desolation of Punā, *ibid.* 20, *Basātin* 5, 287, *Abd. Ham.* i. A. 362.

§7. *The Māvals occupied.*

The western belt of the Punā district, running along the Western Ghāts for a length of 90 miles and a breadth of 12 to 24 miles, is known as *Māval* or the Sunset Land. "It is extremely rugged, a series of table-lands cut on every side by deep winding valleys. From the valleys, hills of various heights and forms rise, terrace above terrace, with steep sides often strewn with black basalt boulders. Where the trees have been spared, they clothe the hill-sides with a dense growth mixed with almost impassable brush-wood. Here and there are patches of ancient evergreen forests. The people in the northern valleys are Kolis and in the southern valleys Marathas. They have a strong strain of hill-blood and are dark, wiry and sallow. The climate is dry and invigorating, the air is lighter, and the heat less oppressive than in most parts of Western or Southern India." (*Bom. Gaz.* xviii. pt. I, pp. 2, 13, 15.)

In popular speech, the valleys into which this western belt is divided are collectively known as the *twelve Māvals*, though their names end with the words *ner* and *khoré* as well as *māval*, and their number exceeds twelve. A Marathi ballad speaks of 12 Māvals under Junnar and twelve others under Punā.

The Māval country is a purely agricultural region with no city and little trade. Its common people differed from the Marathas and Kunbis of the plains only by being stronger built, harder, simpler, and less enervated by luxury or vice. Their social organization was neither tribal nor patriarchal (as with the hillmen of Scotland and Rajputana), but that of the ancient village community of the Deccan, in which each village formed a miniature self-complete republic of various castes and professions. Every sub-division of the province was under a *deshmukh*, who might be called a landed baron or, more correctly, the king's local agent. He took from the peasants through the headmen (*patils*) of the different villages the royal revenue and

his own remuneration in the form of a percentage on it, besides enjoying the produce of certain *de mesne* villages (or fields) which he owned free of rent.

These petty chieftains (*deshmukhs*) were mostly Marathas or members of the same caste as Shivaji. They entrusted the management of their affairs to Brahman stewards (*kārbhāris*) and the accounts and correspondence work to clerks of the Kāyastha (Prabhu) caste, as elsewhere in Maharashtra. Each Māval *deshmukh* had to maintain an armed force, almost entirely recruited from his tenants, for the defence of his charge against the encroachments of his neighbours and the incursions of robber bands. In addition, he was often requested by his sovereign to raise troops for the royal service in times of need, and for this extra duty he was rewarded with cash bounties and grants of fresh villages.

Thus, the rise of Shivaji opened a wide field of employment all over that region to the Māvlé landlords and their sturdy tenantry as instruments of his raids and conquests, and brought them wealth, power and honour far beyond what the plough could have yielded them at home. Their ambition became inseparably linked with his, and the tie was strengthened by Shivaji's frequent tours through this tract and good comradeship with its people,—till the Māvlés came to regard him almost as their Little Corporal, for whom they would do and dare to the point of death. The Māval country was the cradle of Shivaji's power and the Māvlés formed the backbone of his army.

Dādāji established complete mastery over the Māvals adjacent to the Punā district. The local chiefs (*deshmukhs*) were mostly won over by tactful handling and rewards. Those who defied his authority were attacked and forced to submit.* Thus peace and prosperity were established in

* Raj. xv. 316 and 383 records the story of one of his reverses: "Dadaji Kond-dev came to Shivapur. Among the 12 Mavals, Krishnaji Nayak Bandal, the deshmukh of Hirdas Maval, had seized another man's lands and refused to give them up. Dadaji marched against him, but

that region and it became a source of wealth and strength to the owner of Punā, instead of being an unprofitable and even dangerous possession. From this region Shivaji drew his best soldiers, his earliest comrades, and his most devoted followers. Yesāji Kank and Bāji Pāsalkar were *Māvlé* chieftains of his own age ; they gathered round him very early and were enrolled as his first captains. So, also, were Tānāji Mālusaré and his brother Suryāji. Shivaji's earliest adherents were two *Māvlé* deshmukhs, Jédhé Nayak of Kāri and Bāndal Nayak of Hirdas Māval. They served him with such devotion that a popular ballad says, "As Angad and Hanumant were to Rāmchandra, so were Jédhé and Bāndal to Shivā." Among others who joined his banners were the Silimbakar Nayaks of Gunjan Māval (title Haibat Rao) and the Maral deshmukhs of Kānad-khoré (title Jhujhār Rāo).

§8. *Social atmosphere in which young Shivaji worked.*

The social background on which Shivaji first worked, and which made his rise to kingship possible and easy, can be clearly pictured from the thousands of family papers of the village headmen of Maharashtra which have been now printed. The Punā district was covered with hundreds of petty masters, each holding a certain village by right or usurpation, and then fighting his neighbouring chieftains or robbing the peasantry around. In that dissolution of civil administration and social order which marked the twilight before the emergence of Shivaji as an independent king,—no justice could be had, and no legal right enforced by normal peaceful agency, because such agencies had perished. The strong alone could hold their own, but they did not stop with self-defence and usually turned into usurpers of other people's rights.

was defeated and forced to retreat to Shivapur. He then sent Kanhoji Nayak Jedhe to persuade Krishnaji and other Maval deshmukhs to come for an interview." The *Jedhe Karina* gives an inner view of the state of affairs in one part of this tract. *Sabhasad*, p. 4.

On this scene, first Dādāji on a limited scale and then Shivaji in a steadily expanding degree, appeared as the honest judge and strong magistrate. These two alone could be counted upon to give impartial legal decisions, after following the immemorial custom of consulting a fact-finding jury (*mahazar*) of local villagers, when disputes about the partition (*bāntni*) of ancestral landed property or right to official fees as hereditary revenue-collecting agents or servants of the village community, arose between one family and another, or between brothers and cousins in the same family.

In the numberless villages of Maharashtra the possession of land or of a hereditary office in the village administration (with its emoluments fixed by custom), was the highest ambition, and often the sole means of livelihood, of most higher class Maratha families ; it was their pride, and their only means of rising in social esteem ; and the striving to achieve it called forth all the best energies of a man. The family estate called *watan* (or home), even when limited to a single village, had an indescribable sacredness in the eyes of the Marathas. Shāhu Chhatrapati, when sending forth his conquering generals north and south, east and west into the Mughal empire, held his ancestral *deshmukhi* of Punā (*i.e.*, revenue-collectorship plus magistrate's fees of a single district) as dearer to him than the *chauth* of Malwa or Gujrāt. Mahadji Sindhia, when acting as the Delhi Padishah's keeper and the maker of his wazirs, clung passionately to his hereditary patil-ship of the petty village of Jāmbgāon.

For their *watan* the Maratha deshmukh or patil's sons were ready to do and die,—and also to commit any crime. In each generation, with the growth of families it became necessary to split up this right to the village headman's lands and dues between brothers or cousins, (*nibād*). Such law-suits were fairly decided by Dādāji and Shivaji, and they were the only governors who had the will and the military strength to enforce their awards by crushing out

defeated suitors when they tried to disturb the legitimate heir's possession.

Thus Shivaji came to supply a country-wide social need, and his successful rise was due to the moral support which he gained from the public around him. As the fame of his justice, firmness, and stand for the weak was noised abroad from village to village in Maharashtra, more and more people looked up to him as their protector and longed to come under his rule. His dominion spread first of all through the conquest of hearts which the honest and strong administrator alone can achieve among a simple rustic population. And then came his appeal to their individual ambition by providing them with undreamt of opportunities of advancement from the status of common soldiers to that of barons, under his banners. In the end, the corporate spirit of the Marathas was kindled and sublimated; they gloried in the evident fact that they were a nation at last rousing itself like a strong man after a long and painful sleep under Muslim tyranny, or like "an eagle mewing its mighty youth". Shivaji succeeded because he was his people's hero as king.

It was only a "great king" with a compact far-stretching dominion, a body of organised and able civil administrators under his watchful control, and an army strong enough to crush opposition, who could give that security to property and peace in rural society for which every man in Maharashtra was sighing in vain during the agony of the expansion of the rival Muhammadan sultanates of the Deccan or the still greater agony of the dissolution of government during their dying years. That king was Shivaji.

This high praise, however, is due to the full-blown Shivaji, but the hero in the bud was of no such immaculate character. During Dādāji Kond-dev's life time, he was being a little initiated in administrative work, but was still in his teens, a lad too young and too little charged with responsibility to take a serious view of his future position. The

Robin Hood type of life fascinated his youthful heart. When he found time hanging heavy on his hands, he loved to roam about in the country round with young Māvlé chiefs of his own age, and now and then to levy forced contribution by raiding some petty village outside his own estate or to 'hold up' some Government revenue officer in transit,—which he considered fair game. But there is no contemporary evidence that he robbed innocent travellers on the highway. The total disappearance of law and order in that region with the extinction of the Ahmadnagar dynasty, tempted daring souls to undertake such adventures ; it was so easy and safe. We can well believe the story of his servants who wrote his earliest biography, that these activities of Shivaji moved his guardian Dādāji to grief and condemnation,—probably not so much on account of their illegal character, as for their being beneath the dignity of a first-grade nobleman's son and heir. (91 Q.B. sec. 24.)

§9. *Shivaji's choice of a career.*

With his Māvlés young Shivaji wandered over the hills and forests of the Sahyādri range, and along the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion, as well as getting an intimate knowledge of the country and its people. During his residence at Punā his plastic mind was profoundly influenced by the readings from the Hindu epics and sacred books given by his guardian and other Brahmans, and still more by the teaching of his mother. The deeply religious, almost ascetic, life that Jijā Bāi led amidst neglect and solitude imparted by its example, even more than by her precepts, a stoical earnestness mingled with religious fervour to the character of Shivā. He began to love independence and loathe a life of servile luxury in the pay of some Muslim king. It is, however, extremely doubtful if at this time he conceived any design of freeing the Hindus in general from the insults and outrages to which they were

often subjected by the dominant Muslim sect.* An independent sovereignty for himself he certainly coveted ; but he never posed as the liberator of the Hindus all over the country, at all events not till long afterwards.

The inconstancy, intrigue and bloodshed which stained the Court of Bijapur in those days foreboded for it a downfall like that of Ahmadnagar. Mughal service was a no better alternative to Shivaji. The imperialists had killed Kheloji Bhonslé, his uncle, and their superior resources and organization made it unlikely for the Hindus of the Deccan to enjoy greater toleration or power under them than under the weaker and smaller sultanates close at hand. Moreover, to the Deccanis, both Hindu and Muhammadan, Delhi was a far off city, with an alien speech and an alien ruling race, who would pitilessly discard their southern instruments after service had been taken from them. A career of independence was no doubt risky to Shivaji, but it had undreamt of advantages to compensate for the risks, if only he could succeed.

Dādāji died at a great age, on 7th March 1647 and Shivaji became his own master at the age of twenty.

As heir to the regent of the last Ahmadnagar Sultān, Shivaji felt that he had the best right to hold what Shāhji had held in 1634 in agreement with the Bijapuri Government. In that year the Nizām Shāhi kingdom lay partitioned thus: Out of its total territory yielding a revenue of 84 lakhs of hun, the Mughals had seized 21 lakhs worth, and Ādil Shah $20\frac{1}{4}$ lakhs worth (besides Sholāpur and Ausā, worth 7 and one lakhs respectively, held by two of his independent nobles), while Shāhji held $20\frac{3}{4}$ lakhs worth. Shāhji's possessions then included Junnar (three lakhs of hun), Shāhgarh (one lakh), Nāsik Trimbak (one lakh), Chākan (one lakh), Chamārgondā (75,000), nearly three-fourths of Konkan (eleven lakhs), and minor places (3 lakhs),

* *Basātin-us-Salātin*, 350—355, frankly describes in detail how the Hindus were depressed as a deliberate policy of the State of Bijapur in the palmy days of Muhammad Ādil Shah.

but not Punā (75,000), nor Indāpur (50,000), nor Nilang (one lakh), which then lay in Ādil Shah's share. Of Konkan about a quarter yielding three lakhs of hun and including Chaul, had been ceded by Shāhji to Ādil Shah. (*Diary of the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa*, recording the despatches of his Brahman spy in Bijapur. Pissurlencar's *Antigualhas*, vol. 1, fasc. 1, p. 52).

But two years later, the usurper from the north had coerced Ādil Shah and dictated a new partition treaty totally robbing Shāhji of his dominions and sharing them with the Bijapur Sultan. The sword alone supported this arbitrary award, and with the sword Shivaji decided to undo it.

Shivaji felt that he had as much legal right to seize the floating wreckage of the extinct Ahmadnagar kingdom and create an independent national State in his homeland as Ādil Shah had. Or rather more ; because his father had been the regent of the last Nizām Shah and reviver of his Government, while the Ādil Shāhs had been the rivals and enemies of the Nizām Shāhi Sultāns throughout their history. European historians have given Shivaji the title of the Grand Rebel. But against whom can the young Shivaji be called a *rebel*? Not certainly against the ghost of a Nizām Shah now dead for ten years. Nor against the Bijapuri Sultan who was an intruder by force in Mahārāshtra.

§10. *Shivaji's early conquest of forts.*

The death of Dādāji Kond-dev found Shivā ready for his task. He had already been trained in martial exercises and civil administration ; he had familiarized himself with the troops of his father's western jāgir and the people he would have to govern. Initiative and power of command had been freely developed in him without check or interference from his guardian. Administrative orders had in some cases been issued in his name, as his father's representative. Shivaji had also taken part, with his mother or

his guardian, in some judicial investigations and public decisions of legal disputes (*mahazar*).

The band of officers already gathered round him were men of tried ability and devotion to him. Shyāmrāj Nilkanth Ranjhékar was the Chancellor (*peshwā*); Bālkrishna Hanumanté was Accountant-General (*majmuādār*); Sonāji Pant was secretary (*dabir*), and Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé was paymaster (*sabnis*). These four officers had been sent to Punā by Shāhji about 1642. To them Shivaji now added Tukoji Chor Maratha as Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat*) and Nārāyan Pant as divisional paymaster. (Sabh. 3 and 4; 91 Q. sec. 24.)

The year 1646 marks a crisis in the history of Bijapur. The king fell seriously ill, and for some time his life was despaired of. Though he lingered on for ten years more, these years were by popular belief held to be a portion of the life of the saint Shāh Hāshim Uluvi, given away by that holy man to the king. During this time no serious business was attended to by Muhammad 'Ādil Shah. The expansion of territory in the Karnātak went on under some of the nobles, but at the capital the king was inert, and the administration fell into the hands of the queen Bāri Sāhibā. The official history of Bijapur is significantly silent about Muhammad 'Ādil Shah's doings from 1646 to his death in 1656. (B.S. 312.)

This was Shivaji's opportunity. Even before the death of Dādāji, he had begun his annexations. About 1646 he had taken Tornā fort from its Bijapuri commandant by some cunning device without fighting. Here he found Government treasure amounting to 2 *lakhs of hun*. The captured fort was newly named Prachandgarh, a name which it soon lost. Five miles east of it, on the crest of the same spur of hills, he built a new fort named Rājgarh and three walled redoubts (*māchi*) on the lower terraces of the hill-side. (Sabh. 6; 91 Q. sec. 29.)

These acts of aggression were reported to Bijapur. But Shivaji secured friends at Court by bribing the ministers,

and they sided with him against the local *jāgirdārs* whom he had dispossessed. (K. K. ii. 114.)

After the death of Dādāji Kond-dev it was naturally the aim of Shivaji to bring all parts of Shahji's western *jāgir* under his own control, so as to form a compact State ruled by one authority. But this was effected gradually and took years to complete, as it was not wise for him then to employ force on all sides.

The fort of Chākan, guarding the road to Punā from the north, had been entrusted by Dādāji Kond-dev to Firangji Narsālā. This officer was induced to profess obedience to Shivaji and was confirmed in his post. The petty officers of the *thānahs* of Bārāmati and Indāpur on the eastern margin of the *jāgir*, peacefully submitted to Shiva's authority. The fort of Kondānā, 11 miles southwest of Punā, was next secured by bribing its Ādil-Shāhi governor.*

§11. *Adil Shah imprisons Shahji, 1648.*

Shivaji's first small beginnings of territorial expansion were suddenly checked about the middle of 1648 by alarming news from the Karnātak. There on 25th July his father was arrested and all his property and contingent attached by the Bijapuri commander-in-chief, Mustafa Khan, then investing Jinji in the South Arcot district.

Zahur, son of Zahuri, in his *Muhammad-nāmah* written by order of Muhammad Ādil Shah, gives the following earliest and most correct account of the incident:—“When the siege of Jinji was protracted and fighting continued long, the cunning Shahji sent an agent to Nawab Mustafa Khan begging leave to go to his own country and

* 91 Q. sec. 29. Sabh. 4-5. The dates of the acquisition of Chākan and Kondānā are not known. The *Shivāpur Deshpāndé Bahi* gives the year 1647 for the latter event, and names Bāpuji Pant as the agent who effected the transfer to Shivaji; but the *Jedhē S.*, from which most part of it is copied, is silent on this point. The year 1647 is indicated by *Muhammadnāmah*.

give repose to his troops. The Nawab replied that to retire then would be equivalent to disturbing [the work of the siege]. Then Shahji sent to say that grain was very dear in the camp, that his soldiers could not bear the privation and labour any longer, and that he would retire to his own country without waiting for permission [from the commander-in-chief]. The Nawab, being convinced that Shahji meant mischief and would show fight, had him arrested with such extreme cleverness and good arrangement that no part of his property was plundered, but the whole was confiscated to Government." [Pp. 371-372.]

A later but very reliable Persian history of Bijapur, *viz.*, *Basātin-us-Salātin*, supplies some additional information:—"Shahji, withdrawing his head from obedience to the Nawab Mustafa Khan, began to oppose him, till at last the Nawab decided to arrest him. One day he made Bāji Rao Ghorparé and Jaswant Rao Āsad Khani get their forces ready and sent them very early in the morning to Shahji's camp. Shahji, having passed the preceding night in mirth and revelry, was still sleeping in bed. As soon as the two Raos arrived and he learnt of their purpose, he in utter bewilderment took horse and galloped away from his house alone. Baji Ghorparé gave chase, caught him, and brought him before the Nawab, who threw him into confinement. His contingent of 3,000 cavalry was dispersed, and his camp was thoroughly looted. . . . Ādil Shah on hearing of it . . . sent from his Court Āfzal Khan to bring Shahji away and an eunuch to attach his property." [Pp. 325-327.]

Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma. He could only resort to diplomacy for rescuing his father, and diplomacy pointed to only one path as open to a man in his position. The Mughal Emperor was the hereditary enemy of Ādil Shah, and every rebel against Bijapur was sure to gain the Emperor's patronage if he could hold forth the chance of strengthening the imperial cause in the Deccan by the adhesion of his followers. The Mughal Emperor alone was strong enough to intimidate Ādil Shah.

Shivaji first wrote to Prince Murād Bakhsh,* the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him to secure the Emperor's pardon for Shāhji's past conduct and protection for him and his sons in future, and offering to come and join the Mughal service if he was given a written assurance of safety (*qaul*). To this Murād replied on 14th March 1649, telling him to send a trusty agent first to report his demands. This was evidently done, and Murād after reporting the case to the Emperor and getting his assent, wrote to Shivā on 14th August asking him to come to Court with his father and kinsmen, that he might be created a 5-hazāri, while Shāhji would get back the rank he had once held in the Mughal peerage. Still later, on 31st October, Murād wrote directly to Shahji to inform him that he had received Shivaji's appeal for his father's release and that as he was soon going back to the imperial Court, he would there report the prayers of Shahji to the Emperor and take his orders. He asked the Maratha chief to send his agent to Court to receive the Emperor's *farmān* and assurance of safety, and on his own behalf presented him with a robe of honour. In this letter Shambhuji and other sons of Shahji are spoken of as not yet released.

Shivaji then sent Raghunāth Kordé as his envoy to the Prince to ask for the *deshmukhi* of the Junnar and Ahmadnagar parganas. Murād, on 30th November, 1649, promised to try to secure these rights for him after reaching the Emperor's presence. Shah Jahan never consented to put pressure on Ādil Shah to release Shahji.

Shahji's release was brought about by other means than the Delhi Emperor's intervention. He was kept under detention in the camp before Jinji for six months; and when that fort fell to the Ādil-Shahi army on 28th Decem-

* Shivaji neither wrote nor sent any envoy to Shah Jahān. All his negotiations about his father were conducted with Murād, as the four original Persian letters of Murād in Parasnīs's possession show. Rājwadé, viii, 2-3, wrongly represents these letters as coming from Shah Jahān, but he is quite correct in ix, last section. The Emperor never interfered for the release of Shahji.

ber, he was conveyed to Bijapur in fetters, but with every care, by Afzal Khan, travelling slowly with the elephants and other spoils of Jinji.

Meantime, while Shahji was still under detention in the far off Karnātak, the Ādil-Shahi Government tried to make use of the opportunity and wrest Bangalore and Kondānā from him. Two forces were sent out from Bijapur against these two forts ; but the main Ādil Shahi army being still entangled in the far-off Karnātak, only small detachments could be sent from the capital on these expeditions and they were made up of raw levies and half-efficient local militia. The two forts were impregnable and held by two youngmen of extraordinary capacity ; and both the attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. Shahji's eldest son, Shambhuji successfully defended Bangalore against Farhād Khan and Tānāji Duré. Another army under Fath Khan with local Maratha helpers marched against Shivaji, who was living in Purandar. Fath Khan occupied Belsar (near the village of Khalad), while his ally Bālāji Haibat Rao advanced and set up his outpost at Shirwal ; but Shivaji's general Kāvji attacked and drove the Bijapuris out of Shirwal after slaying their commander. Finally Fath Khan himself marched against Shivaji and arriving at the foot of Purandar attempted an assault, but he was defeated and his army put to flight.

Thus force having failed in both theatres of war, Ādil Shah had no help but to try persuasion for gaining his desires. The captive Shahji, on his arrival at Bijapur, was not cast into prison, but handed over to the care of a brother noble of first eminence, Ahmad Khan (? Mullā Ahmad Navāyat of Kaliān) with instructions to conciliate him by every possible means. Terms were soon settled. Shahji wrote to his two sons to restore Bangalore (along with Kandarpī, 40 miles east of Chittaldurg) and Kondānā to the Bijapuri officers. They obeyed at once, and on 16th May 1649, Shahji was called by Ādil Shah to an audience, invested with a robe of honour and set free with the restora-

tion of all his estates and dignities. A son and heir had been born to Muhammad Adil Shah on 5th May 1649, and this joyous event was diplomatically used as a plea for the "pardon" of Shahji. (*Muham.* 389-395; *Jédhé Karinā*; *Surya-Vamsham*, cantos 13-15.)

§12. *Capture of Purandar fort, 1648.*

Mahādji, a Brahman bearing the family title of Nilkanth Rao, was the hereditary *nāyakwār* or headman of the country round the fort of Purandar, 18 miles south-east by south of Punā, under the Bijapuri Government, and enjoyed some rent-free villages there as his official remuneration. In the confusion caused by the extinction of the Nizām-Shahi dynasty and the decay of its successor the Ādil Shahi during Muhammad Ādil Shah's long illness, he asserted his independence, seized the fort whose defences were out of repair and garrison was reduced and starving through the neglect of the Sultan, and then began to levy contributions from the neighbouring villages which did not legally belong to him, or plunder them in case of refusal. When he died, his eldest son Niloji Nilkanth Rao began to administer the family estate.

About June 1648, Shivaji, foreseeing the storm coming upon his own house from the Bijapur Government, wrote to Niloji begging for an asylum for himself and his family during the monsoon season in the village under shelter of the fort. As Shāhji was an old friend of the family, the request was readily granted, and Shivaji cantoned for the rains in the village lying at the foot of Purandar, while his troops found quarters near about. Niloji delegated his youngest brother Shankarāji to look after their honoured guest.

Now, this Niloji was a hard grasping man, who denied his younger brothers, Pilāji and Shankarāji, any share of his power or of the income of their paternal estate. They resented this exclusion from their birthright, and appealed

to Shivaji to arbitrate and right their wrongs. A friendship sprang up between Shivaji and Shankarāji from their close personal contact, and the latter opened his heart to Shivaji and begged for his help in ousting his eldest brother from the control of the fort, so that the other two brothers might enjoy their patrimony. Shivaji entered into the conspiracy. Through the treacherous contrivance of Shankarāji, he secured from Niloji an invitation to enter the fort with his family and escort and share in the Dewāli festivities, (the Feast of Lamps falling that year on 5th October.) But on the night of the 8th, Shivaji, guided by Shankarāji surprised the sleeping Niloji in his bed-chamber and threw him into chains. His own troops took possession of the fort gates and turned out the ragged retainers of Niloji.*

The two disloyal brothers soon had their reward ; on refusing to give up Purandar to their ally, they too were imprisoned. But after a few days all the three brothers accepted their fate and were set free. The village of Chāmli was granted to them in perpetuity for their maintenance, and their descendants still enjoy it. The second brother, Pilāji Nilkanth, was employed by Shivaji in his army in the Konkan expedition and thus given a chance of advancement. Shivaji's Māvlés garrisoned the fort for him, and he settled some families of Rāmusis there, to strengthen his hold. Purandar henceforth became the haven of refuge of the masters of Punā whenever threatened with invasion.

Thus we see how a number of jackals came out of their holes and were grabbing at the dead body of the Ahmad-

* My account is based on a letter printed in *Shiva-Charita Sāhitya*, vol. 3 (letter No. 399), written by Hari Nārāyan Nilkanth Rao, Nāyak of Chāmli, and dated 29 Aug. 1674. It has been closely copied in the Wāqnis-Malkaré Bakhar (known as the 91 *Qalmi*). From the family records studied by V. L. Bhāvē, it appears that the village of Chāmli was given to Shankarāji, while Niloji was left to inherit the ancestral *inām* village as Nāyakwār. *Sabhasad* (p. 5) briefly tells us—"Nilkanth Rao a Brahman, was the master of the Adil Shahi fort of Purandar. He died. His two sons began to quarrel between themselves. Shivaji went to Purandar for settling the quarrel. Then confining the two brothers, he took the fort for himself and set up his own *thānah* there".

nagar kingdom, when a tiger appeared on the scene ; the few jackals that dared to face him were struck down by his paw, a few fled away to foreign parts, but most others were glad to walk tamely behind his tail ; and Shivaji was left in sole possession of the Nizām Shāhi carcase, tossing away a few morsels of it to his faithful followers.

§13. *Conquest of Jāvli and Rāigarh, 1656.*

At the extreme north-western corner of the Sātārā district lies the village of Jāvli, which was then the centre of a fairly large principality including nearly the whole of that district. The sub-division of Jāvli is "throughout hilly and thickly wooded with evergreen trees. . . . The narrow rugged and steep crest of the Sahyādris, rising 4,000 feet or more above sea-level, forms its western wall ; and in the valleys the tree growth is luxuriant, forming high forests." (*Bom. Gaz.* xix. 3.) Within a length of 60 miles as many as 8 passes cross the range, two of them being fit for carts and now transporting a large traffic from the Deccan plateau to Mahād in Kolābā and Chiplun in Ratnagiri. There are, besides, countless gorges and foot-tracks leading from Jāvli to Konkan.

A Marātha family named Moré had received a grant of the State of Jāvli from the first Sultan of Bijapur early in the 16th century, and made the claim good by their sword. For eight generations they had conquered the petty chieftains around and amassed a vast treasure by raising forced contributions. They kept 12,000 infantry, mostly sturdy hillmen of the southern Māvals, and succeeded in getting possession of the entire district of Sātārā and parts of Konkan. The head of the family bore the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, conferred by a Bijapur king in recognition of the founder's personal strength and courage. The younger branches enjoyed estates scattered through the villages of the district.

The State of Jāvli, by its position, barred the path of

Shivaji's expansion in the south and south-west. Chandra Rao thwarted Shivaji's policy of drawing the various Māvle headmen to his side, and tried to form in that locality an anti-Shivaji coalition in concert with the neighbouring Ādil Shahi governor, because the progress of Shivaji in that region would have naturally led to the loss of the Morés' power and independence. In other words, here was the inevitable clash between the newly-born dynamic force of Shivaji's ambition and the older, inefficient and static power of the Morés. Generations of the enjoyment of wealth and authority had turned the last Chandra Rao into a proud, indolent drunkard, whose affairs were left uncared for.

Shivaji told Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé (his *sabnis* or paymaster), "Unless Chandra Rao Moré is killed, the kingdom cannot be gained. None but you can do this deed. I send you to him as my envoy". The Prabhu went to Jāvli with a picked escort of 125 expert swordsmen, on the pretext of carrying some important diplomatic proposals from Shivaji to Chandra Rao. On the first day the envoy held the usual formal conversations. Finding out the ins and outs of the place and learning that Chandra Rao usually lived in a careless unguarded manner, Raghunāth formed his plan of action. The second interview with Chandra Rao was held in a private chamber. Raghunāth talked for some time, and then drew his dagger all of a sudden and stabbed Chandra Rao and his brother Surya Rao. The assassins promptly rushed out of the gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused guards, beat back the small and hurriedly gathered band of pursuers and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest.

Shivaji had kept himself ready to follow up his agent's crime. Immediately on hearing of the murder of the Morés, he arrived and assaulted Jāvli (15 Jan. 1656.) The leaderless garrison defended themselves for six hours and were then overcome. Chandra Rao's two sons and entire family fled to Rairi. But his kinsman and manager, Hanumant Rao Moré, rallied the partisans of the house and held a

neighbouring village in force, menacing Shivaji's new conquest. Shiva found that "unless he murdered Hanumant, the thorn would not be removed from Jāvli." So, he sent to him a Maratha officer of his household named Shambhuji Kāvji with a pretended proposal for the hand of Hanumant Rao's daughter. Hanumant was then stabbed to death at a private interview.

Shivaji himself remained at Jāvli for about six weeks, making arrangements for holding the newly-won kingdom, and then, on 30th March marched to invest Rāiri where the late Chandra Rao Moré's sons Krishnāji and Bāji and many women of the family had taken refuge. Rāiri was then a very lofty and almost inaccessible plateau, without the fortifications with which Shivaji later strengthened it when he named it Rāigarh. The siege was a short one; want of a leader and exhaustion of provisions forced the young Morés to agree to a surrender through the mediation of two of Shivaji's Māvlé followers, (April 1656). Thus the whole kingdom of Jāvli passed into Shivaji's undisputed possession, and he was free to invade South Konkan with ease or extend his dominion southwards into the Kolhāpur district.

The two Moré boys, the elder of whom (Krishnāji) had assumed the title of Chandra Rao after his father's death, were taken to Punā and kept in confinement. After some months this Chandra Rao was beheaded by order of Shivaji, on the charge of having opened a secret correspondence with the Ādil Shahi Government for recovering his heritage,—which would be a quite natural and legitimate desire. The younger boy, Bāji, escaped (on 28th August, according to the *Shivapur Daftar Yādi*), assumed the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, and in March 1665 joined Jai Singh for war against Shivaji. With him came Ambāji Govind Rao Moré. [H. Anjuman, Paris MS. 113a, 123a.]

The acquisition of Jāvli was the result of deliberate murder and organized treachery on the part of Shivaji. His power was then in its infancy, and he could not afford to be scrupulous in the choice of the means of strengthening him-

self. In exactly similar circumstances, Sher Shah, his historic parallel, used similar treachery to gain forts in South Bihar as the first step to a throne.

The only redeeming feature of this dark episode in his life is that the crime was not aggravated by hypocrisy. All his old Hindu biographers are agreed that it was an act of premeditated murder for personal gain and not a pardonable homicide done in self-defence or in the heated blood of an open fight. Even Shivaji never pretended that the murder of the three Morés was prompted by a desire to found a "*Hindu swarāj*", or to remove from his path a treacherous enemy who had repeatedly abused his generous leniency.*

§14. *Shivaji's further gains.*

The annexation of Jāvli not only opened to Shivaji a door for the conquest of the south and the west, but brought a very important accession to his strength, in the form of many thousands of Māvlé infantrymen from among the subjects and former retainers of Chandra Rao. In short, his recruiting ground for these excellent fighters along the Sahyādri range was now doubled. The Morés had accumulated a vast treasure in eight generations of undisturbed and expanding rule, and the whole of it fell into Shivaji's hands.

Two miles west of Jāvli he built a new fort named Pratapgarh, and here he set up an image of his patron goddess Bhavāni, as the more ancient Bhavāni of Tuljāpur was beyond easy reach. On her he lavished his wealth in costly ornaments and trappings, and to this shrine he made repeated pilgrimages. (Sabh. 23.)

Shivaji followed up his conquest of Jāvli (15th January 1656), by taking from Chandra Rao Moré in April his last refuge, the stupendous hill-fort of Rāigarh, which was

* For the desperate and fantastic special pleading of Mr. C. V. Vaidya, LL.B., the reader is referred to the *Mahratta* (31 Aug. 1924).

destined to become the capital of the Maratha king. On 24th September of the same year he acquired Supā about 35 miles s. e. of Punā, by one of his usual *coups d'etat*. Sham-bhuji Mohité, the brother of Shahji's second wife, had been left by that chief as his agent in the Supā sub-division, in independence of the administrator of Punā. But Shivaji paid him a friendly visit on a Hindu holy day of rejoicing, overpowered his guards by a surprise attack and attached all his property. The displaced officer was packed off to Shahji with his personal effects, as he refused to serve under his nephew. Thus, the Supā sub-district was annexed. (Sabh. 4 ; 91 Q. 28.)

The possession of Supā, Bārāmati and Indāpur rounded off the south-eastern corner of the Punā district, while the acquisition of Purandar, Rājgarh, Kondāna and Tornā secured Shivaji's territory by a strong chain of hill-forts on the south. Another fort in that quarter was Rohidā, gained on some unknown date. North-west of Punā he acquired the forts of Tikonā, Lohgarh, and Rājmāchi,—the last of which stood on the Sahyādri crest (6 miles north of the Bor pass) and overlooked the Konkan plain on the west.

On 4th November 1656, Muhammad Ādil Shah died, and a new scene opened in which Shivaji greatly profited, as will be described in the next chapter.

APPENDIX I.

THE MORÉS OF JĀVLI.

Jāvli was the earliest territorial conquest of Shivaji and it was gained at a time when his power was in its infancy. Naturally the details of this affair were soon forgotten and got confused in the public memory amidst the numberless victories and far-flung acquisitions of his rapidly expanding new kingdom. But the main outline of the story is clear, though the extant sources differ as to minor details. The slaying of the four Morés really took place at different places

and at different times, and this part of the story is confused. I follow the *Sabhāsād Bakhar* in the main, taking only a few details from the *91 Qalmi Bakhar*, (sec. 29-30). These two sources were the earliest and give the version of this affair as believed by Shivaji's Brahman and Prabhu officers in the generation immediately following his death. My dates and names are from the absolutely contemporary *Shahāvalis* (chronologies preserved by landed families) and despatches of Jai Singh I. These latter enable us to refute the traditions embodied in the anonymous, undated, unauthenticated *Moré Bakhar* and other gossipy sources on certain definite points, and thus prove the general untrustworthiness of such traditions. The Sanskrit poem *Surya Vamsham* also has to be rejected as merely legendary and in no sense a history.

We can easily believe the popular tradition that Chandra Rao Moré despised Shivaji as an upstart. It is known from inscriptions that a family named *Moria* ruled over Konkan at the end of the 5th century A.D. (*Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. i, pt. 2, 282-284, 541). They were almost certainly a branch of the historic house of Asoka *Maurya* and had declared themselves independent in that province where they had once been mere viceroys, when Asoka's empire broke up. A similar thing is known to have happened on the dissolution of the great Gupta empire in the 5th century A.D. It requires no stretch of the imagination to suppose that the *Morés* of Jāvli boasted of lineal descent from the royal *Morias* of Konkan and the still more ancient imperial *Mauryas* of Magadh. The first Moré to win the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, came of a line of barons who had fought under the Vijaynagar emperors in the central part of the Deccan plateau, in Telingānā, and later entered the service of Ādil Shah (or more probably that of Bahari Nizām Shah, as I hold).

In a legal document dated 23rd Dec. 1657 (only a copy of the original preserved), the three Chandra Raos who successively ruled Jāvli before Shivaji's conquest, are named "Bālāji, his son [or sons] Daulat Rao and Yesāji Sur Rao

Chandra Rao". [Shiva Charitra Sāhitya, iii. No. 639.] Was the last-named Yashwant the son of Surya Rao Moré? Sabhasad (p. 6) says that Shivaji's agent first murdered "Chandra Rao [name not stated] and his brother or cousin *bhāu*] Suryāji Rao both". In the traditional account preserved in the *Moré Bakhar*, the Chandra Rao Moré whom Shivaji killed is named Yashwant Rao (who had been adopted as a son by the preceding Chandra Rao's widow about 1648-49). The Sanskrit poem *Surya Vamsham* states that Shivaji gained Jāvli after slaying in battle "Bāji-Rāj and Krishna-Raj and their father Chandra-Rāj," that he also "slew Chandra-Raj's helpers and relatives (evidently meaning Hanumant Rao Moré, the diwān), and that Pratāp Varmā, the *bāndhav* (brother, or more usually cousin) of Chandra Rao fled to the Ādil Shah" and later joined Āfzal Khan in 1659, (canto 18, v. 4-9). Now, we know definitely from Jai Singh's despatches that Bāji Chandra Rao was alive and present in Bijapur in 1665, and allied himself with Mirzā Raja Jai Singh. His father and brother (as well as the family diwān Hanumant Rao Moré) were, according to all accounts killed by Shivaji, but not Bāji Rao Moré. This Chandra Rao's escape from Shivaji's prison dated 28 Aug. 1656 in the *Shivāpur Yādi*; so he could not have been beheaded by Shivaji in Punā, as some stories allege.

That this Bāji is called *Pratāp* by Paramānand throughout, proves how unreliable the Sanskrit poem is.

CHAPTER III.

RAPID EXTENSION OF TERRITORY AND FIRST WARS WITH MUGHALS AND BIJAPUR, 1657-1659.

1. Relations with Mughals to 1657.
2. Shivaji's first raid into Mughal Deccan.
3. Aurangzib's defensive measures.
4. Shivaji makes peace with Mughals.
5. Shivaji invades Konkan 1657.
6. Bijapuri plans: Afzal Khan sent.
7. Afzal Kh's plan of war and policy towards Shivaji.
8. Shivaji's danger and perplexity.
9. Plots and counter-plots.
10. Interview between Shiva and Afzal.
11. Afzal's army routed.
12. Legends about Afzal Kh.
App. Affair of Afzal Khan.

§1. *Relations with the Mughals up to 1657.*

For many years after his first assertion of independence, Shivāji carefully maintained peace with the Mughals. For one thing, his power was not yet secure, and it would have been the height of folly to provoke both Bijapur and Delhi at the same time. Secondly, from 1653 onwards Mughal Deccan was governed by Prince Aurangzib with singular efficiency and vigour, and his neighbours rightly dreaded giving him any offence. When Aurangzib was involved in war with Golkondā (January-March 1656), Shivaji was too busy organizing his conquests in Jāvli and the northern Ratnagiri district to raid Mughal territory during that Prince's absence from his charge.

On the death of Muhammad Ādil Shah (4 Nov. 1656), Aurangzib began active preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, and tried to seduce as many Ādil-Shāhi nobles and vassals as he could. Shivāji then wrote a letter to Multafat Khan, the Mughal governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the imperialists if his desires were granted. To this a conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with Aurangzib's

instructions to "keep the path of correspondence with him open." (*Ādāb.* 144b.)

§2. *Shivāji's first raid into Mughal Deccan.*

Shivāji also wrote directly to Aurangzib. His envoy Sonāji reached the Prince's siege-camp before Bidar (in March 1657) and was assured that the Mughal Government would grant all the prayers of the Marātha chief, namely (i) a formal recognition of his right to all the Bijapuri forts and villages actually in his possession and (ii) the annexation of the port of Dābhol and the territory appertaining to it. A reply in these terms was also written to Shivāji by Aurangzib on 23rd April, 1657, when about to start for the siege of Kaliāni, and Shivāji was urged to prove his devotion by rendering armed help to the Mughal cause. [Parasnīs MS., letter No. 5; *Ādāb.* 146 a.]

But long before this date, Shivāji had already decided on the different policy of fighting for his own hand. The vague promises of the Mughal Prince could not satisfy him. Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the imperialists would be over. He considered it more profitable to make a diversion in favour of Bijapur by raiding the south-western corner of Mughal Deccan while Aurangzib's forces were concentrated at the siege of Kaliāni, beyond his south-eastern frontier. He had cunningly prepared for action by quietly recalling his envoy from Aurangzeb's camp, on the pretext of consultation, (about the middle of April); and he launched on war immediately afterwards.

Two Marātha captains, Mināji Bhonslē at the head of 3,000 horse and Kāshi, crossed the Bhimā and plundered the Mughal villages in the Chamārgundā and Rāsin subdivisions respectively. They carried devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the chief city of Mughal Deccan. [Kambu, 3b; *Ādāb.* 148a.]

A Marātha attempt to loot the city (*peth*) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was defeated, by a timely sortie of the garrison ; but so great was the alarm it caused that Multafat Khan, the *qiladār* of the fort, removed the property of the inhabitants for greater safety within the fort. (*Ādab.* 148b.)

While Mināji was raiding the Ahmednagar district in the east, Shivāji was busy looting the Junnar sub-division in the north. In the dark night of 30th April, he silently scaled the walls of Junnar City with rope-ladders and after slaughtering the guards, carried off 300,000 *hun* in cash, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewellery. The success of the Marātha raiders was due to the negligence of the local Mughal officers (as the Delhi historian Kambu asserts) and probably also to their military weakness. Aurangzib, on hearing of these disturbances, censured the *thānahdārs* and poured reinforcements into the Ahmadnagar district. (Sabh. 5: *Adāb.* 153b.)

§3. Aurangzib's defensive measures.

Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and some other officers at the head of 3,000 cavalry were ordered there. Rāo Karn, who was coming from Aurangabad to Bidar, was diverted from the way to the same place. Shāista Khan was ordered to detach 1,000 men from his contingent there. But Nasiri Khan's movements were provokingly slow. On 30th April he entered the pargana of Bir and four days later marched towards Āshti.* Thus, there was a great delay in his going to Ahmadnagar and Junnar, expelling the enemy, and ravaging Shivāji's territory, as ordered by Aurangib. (Kambu, 3b ; *Ādab.* 147a, 153a, 154b.)

Meantime, Multafat Khan had issued from the fort of Ahmadnagar and relieved the beleaguered outpost at Chamārgundā by defeating Mināji, (28th April.) But the

* Bir (or Bid) is 68 m. e. and Ashti is 35 m. s. e. of Ahmadnagar. Chamārgundā (or Shrigunda) is 33 m. s. of Ahmadnagar. (Ind. At. 39 N. E.) Raisin is 20 m. s. e. of Chamārgundā.

Marāthas continued to rove about the pargana for some time longer. However, the retainers of Multafat and Mirzā Khan followed up their victory and at last cleared the Chamārgundā sub-division. (*Ādāb.* 110b, 153b, 154a.)

Shivāji had stayed in the Junnar sub-division for some time, robbing the villages, as the Mughal reinforcements were late in arriving there and he found the field clear. But, at the approach of Rāo Karn and Shāista Khan, he fled from the neighbourhood of Junnar city and wandered over the district for some time, as he could not be caught and crushed. But when the pressure became too great, he slipped away to the Ahmadnagar district and began to plunder it. By this time (end of May), however, Nasiri Khan had reached the scene. By a forced march he surprised Shivā's army and nearly encircled it. Many of the Marāthas were slain, many wounded, and the rest put to flight, (4 June.) But there was no pursuit, as the Mughal horses were too tired. (*Kambu*, 4b; *Ādāb.* 110b, 111b, 112a, 154a, 156b.)

Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and other officers breathed fury and revenge; they must beat the raiders back from the imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shivā's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme"; Shivāji's possessions, Punā and Chākan, must be utterly ruined, and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people; the village headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without pity. (*Ādāb.* 147 a and b, 148a.)

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding his south-western frontier showed excellent combination and judgment. Kār Talab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namunā, and Nasiri Khan and Rāo Karn at Panda "opposite Parendā fort," to guard the Chamārgundā, Kara and Āshti parganas.* These officers stood

* *Panda* (in Pers. text, *pandeh*) is 16 m. n. w. of Parenda and 3 m. s. of Karmālā. Kara is 9 m. n. w. of Ashti. I have followed Aurangzib's

facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the imperial ryots behind them might enjoy safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. (*Ādāb.* 147b, 148b.)

After Nasiri Khan's victory over Shivā in the Ahmadnagar district, he was ordered by Aurangzib to "pursue the Marāthas and extirpate them." But this could not be done. The rains now set in with the full violence of the monsoons, and the campaign had to be closed. Shivā retreated to his own country and the Mughal officers fell back on their appointed stations, watching the frontier. "There was peace in the whole district." (*Ādāb.* 156a, 149a.)

June, July and August 1657 passed in enforced idleness for the imperial troops. In September the situation was complicated by the illness of Shah Jahan and the preparations for a War of Succession among his sons. Bijapur made peace with the Mughals. But throughout the month of September Aurangzib continued to urge his officers not to relax their vigilance, but hold the s. w. frontier in force, lest Shivā should renew his raids. About the middle of October he wrote to the governor of Ahmadnagar to take care of the city and keep his troops in readiness, lest when Nasiri Khan went back, Shivā finding the field clear should begin to plunder again. (*Ādāb.* 149b, 157b.) At this very time (mid October 1657), Muhammad Yusuf, the Mughal faujdār of Junnar, made a forced march from Kaliān, defeated and beheaded Habsh Khan, a rebel sardār of that region, and came up against a small band of Shivāji's horsemen, who had arrived too late to aid that Abyssinian. After a stiff fight in which he lost many men

letters (in *Adab*) above ; but Kambu omits Garh Namunā and says that Abdul Munim was posted at Chamārgundā. I have failed to trace *Garh Namunā*, unless it was a name given to the old and ruined outpost at *Pedgāon*, 8 m. s. of Chamārgundā.

in killed and wounded, Yusuf was forced to retreat to Junnar. Immediately afterwards (on 24th October) the city of Kaliān was taken by Shivaji. (*Ādāb*. 199b; *Jedhe S.*)

§4. *Shivāji makes peace with the Mughals.*

When his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace with the imperialists in September, Shivāji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he wrote to Nasiri Khan offering submission, and the Khan replied in a conciliatory tone. Then Shivā, as requested, sent a trusty agent to the Khan to state his demands. These were reported to Aurangzib; but no definite agreement followed. Shivāji now sent Raghunāth Pant to Aurangzib directly. The Prince was just then starting on his march to Northern India (25 Jan., 1658) and wrote to Shivā in reply, "Though your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have repented. You propose that if you are granted all the villages belonging to your home [i.e., Shāhji's old jāgir] together with the forts and territory of Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizām-Shāhi territory now in the hands of Ādil Shah,—you will send Sonā Pandit as your envoy to my Court and a contingent of 500 horse under one of your officers to serve me, and you will protect the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to send Sonāji, and your prayers will be granted."*

But while Aurangzib received Shivā's submission with outward pleasure, his mind was not really composed about him. He omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Marātha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled

* This letter, dated 24th February 1658, was not actually sent to Shivaji till after the battle of Dharmāt (15 April), as a postscript reports Aurangzib's victory there. (Parasnīs MS., letter No. 6). *Ādāb*, 156b, 157a.

by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received. He wrote to Mir Jumla (December, 1657), "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the *son of a dog* is waiting for his opportunity." Adil Shah was thus urged by the Prince: "Protect this country. Expel Shivā who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnātak, far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them." (*Ādāb.* 92a, 163a.)

Aurangzib, therefore, left the Deccan without granting peace and pardon to Shivāji. The Mughals also repaired and garrisoned the old and ruined fort of Pedgāon, as a convenient outpost for operations against Punā. But Shivā was freed from all fear of the Mughals by the War of Succession which kept Aurangzib busy for the next two years, 1658 and 1659. [*Ādāb.* 157b.]

§5. *Shivāji invades Konkan, 1657.*

In the second half of the year 1657, the northward retreat of Prince Aurangzib, the likelihood of a civil war for the throne of Delhi, and the wrangles among the Bijapuri nobles about responsibility for their ill-success in the recent war with the Mughals (which culminated in the murder of the *wazir* Khan Muhammad),—all combined to remove the only checks on Shivāji's ambition, and he now launched forth on a fresh career of conquest and plunder unhampered by any fear or caution.

On 31st July he despatched Raghunāth Pant to reinforce his attack on the Siddis of Janjirā. And when the rains ceased and the dry season for campaigning began again (in October), he himself hastened to a new field. Crossing the Western Ghāts he burst into Konkan. The northern part of this coast-strip formed the Kaliān (modern

Thānā) district and was then held by an Arab named Mullā Ahmad of the Navāyat (emigrant) clan, one of the leading nobles of Bijapur. The protracted illness of Muhammad Ādil Shah had detained this governor at Bijapur for a long time, and during his absence the defence of his jāgir had grown slack and inefficient. A considerable amount of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed among the petty chieftains of the district, which was a recent acquisition from the Nizām-Shahi State and where the authority of the new Government sat loose. [A.N. 576. 91 Q. sec. 36.]

He easily seized the rich towns of Kaliān and Bhivandi (24 Oct. 1657), which were then without walls, and there took much wealth and costly merchandise. The fort of Māhuli, which had once been the last refuge of Shāhji, was next captured (8 Jan. 1658). The Kaliān subdivision with some other parts of the Thānā district, thus passed into Shivā's possession, and he got a firm footing in Northern Konkan, which he rapidly improved in the course of the year. His progress southwards into the Kolābā district seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and wrote inviting him to come. Surgarh (8 miles east), Birwādi (5 miles west), Talā (10 miles south), Ghosālgarh (5 m. s. w.), Bhurap or Sudhāgarh (15 miles east of Rohā town), Kāngori (12 miles east of Mahād), and above all the impregnable fortress of Rāiri (Rāigarh) which was to be his future capital, all passed into his hands, and thus the Abyssinians of Janjirā lost the eastern half of the Kolābā district to him. At Birwādi and Lingānā (5 miles east of Rāigarh) he built strong forts. From the base of Kaliān, his troops plundered the neighbouring Portuguese territory (belonging to the province of Dāman, called "the North" in their records), and established themselves in the fort of Aseri (midway between Māhim and Jawhār) as a permanent menace. The Portuguese are said to have bought his forbearance by promising an annual tribute. Kaliān and

Bhivandi were immediately turned into naval bases and dockyards by Shivāji.*

After the capture of Kaliān, Ābāji Sondev was appointed to manage the whole district. He captured a beautiful Muslim girl and offered her to Shivāji as a present. But the Raja said to her, "If my mother Jijā Bāi had possessed your beauty, I too should have looked as handsome." He thus delicately removed her fear of dishonour by ranking her with his own mother, gave her ornaments and dresses, and sent her to her people in Bijapur under escort of 500 of his horsemen. She is said to have been the daughter-in-law of Mullā Āhmad Navāyat, the former Bijapuri subahdār of Kaliān. The orthodox Muslim historian Khāfi Khan praises Shivāji's chivalry and scrupulous regard for the honour of women. (91 Q.B., sec. 30, K.K. ii, 272. In *Chitnis Bakhar*, "Maulānā Hāyāti" is a mistake for "Mullā Yahia", the younger brother of Mullā Āhmad.)

But he did not occupy Mahād or the country south of that town in this campaign. Ābāji Sondev was created viceroy of the province thus won in North Konkan, which included the eastern part of the Thānā and Kolābā districts. The history of the Marātha conflict with the Siddis of Janjirā in this province will be narrated in Chapter 11.

We may conveniently pause here and take note of the exact size of the infant Marātha kingdom. At the cautious outset of his independent career (1647-48), Shivāji's territory embraced most parts of his father's western jagir and his own early annexations from Bijapur. These together covered the southern half of the Punā district, and their northern boundary was the old Mughal frontier,—a line

* *Jedhe S.* Shivāji's chivalry to a Muhammadan girl (the daughter-in-law of Mullā Ahmad) captured in the Kaliān campaign, 91 Q. 30. Tavernier (ii. 205) reports the rumour that Shivā discovered buried treasure at Kaliān; 91 Q. 30, says at Pradhāngarh.

On the Portuguese relations with Shivāji,—Pissurlencar, i. 4 (letter from Viceroy to King of Portugal, 15 May, 1658), also letter of 16 August, 1659. *Jédhé Karinā* unreliable.

running diagonally from the north-western to near the south-eastern corner of that district and avoiding the Mughal forts at Junnar, Visāpur, and Pārner, *i.e.*, for some distance the Ghod river divided the two dominions in the north ; Junnar and Chamārgundā belonged to the Mughals and Chākan to Shīvāji. His southern boundary was marked by the outposts of Indāpur and Bārāmati, and the forts of Rājgarh and Tornā, (Kondānā was restored to Bijapur in 1649.)

The above was his position in 1648. But by the year 1659 he had extended his dominions in the uplands or *Desh* to the southern limit of the Sātārā district, and in Konkan from Māhuli to near Mahād. Thus he now became master of the whole of North Konkan except the ports and adjacent lands on the west coast (which belonged to Bijapur, the Siddis, and the Portuguese) and the extreme north of the Thānā district, while the country from Mahād southwards was yet to be won.

The greatly expanded Maratha kingdom was now organized on a stronger and more elaborate plan : Moro Trimbak Pinglē was appointed Chancellor (*Peshwā*) in the place of the incompetent Shyāmrāj Nilkanth, Nilo Sondev Accountant-General (*majmuādār*) vice Balkrishna Pant, and Netāji Pālkar as Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat*). Two new posts, those of *Surnis* (Superintendent of Correspondence) and *Wāqnis* (News-writer) were created and given to Ābāji Sondev and Gangāji Mangāji respectively.* The cavalry now mustered 10,000, out of whom 7,000 were mounted on Government horses and the rest on the troopers' own ; the Māvlé infantry numbered 10,000 and their commander was Yesāji Kank. The forts, old and newly acquired, held by Shīvāji in 1659 numbered forty.

* The reading of the Mahād MS. of *Sabh.* (7n) has been accepted here. *Jedhē S.* says that Narahari Anand Rao was created *Peshwā* on 21 Aug. 1661 (91 Q. 29), and Moro Pant *Majmuadar* on Jan. 1661 and *Peshwā* on 3 Apr. 1662, when Nilo succeeded him as *Majmuadar*. *Sabh.* B. 7-8. A.N. 576.

On 14 May, 1657 the newly-founded kingdom was blessed with the birth of an heir to the throne, the ill-fated Shambhuji.

§6. Bijapur plans to subdue Shivāji ; Āfzal Khan sent.

After the Mughal invasion of 1657 had rolled back and Aurangzib had marched away to Northern India, the Bijapur Government gained respite and some accession of vigour. True, the old prime-minister, Khan Muhammad, was murdered (11 Nov., 1657) on the false suspicion of collusion with Aurangzib during the late war ; but his successor, Khawās Khan, was an able administrator. The Queen Mother, Bari Sahibā, who virtually ruled the State till her pious journey to Mecca (1660), was a woman of masterful spirit and experienced in the conduct of business. Freed for the time being from the constant menace of the Mughals on the frontier, the Bijapur Government now began to call its refractory vassals to account. Shāhji was asked to punish Shivaji, but he frankly repudiated all responsibility for the conduct of his disobedient son and left the Government free to punish him without any consideration for his father's feelings. Measures had, therefore, to be taken for crushing Shivaji by force.

This was, however, no easy task. Shiva's military strength was far from despicable ; and the Bijapuri nobles shrank from the idea of a campaign among the hills and jungles of the Western Ghats. The command of the expedition against him went abegging at the Bijapur Court, till Afzal Khan accepted it. (Sabh. 9-10 ; *Jedhē S* ; 91 Q. 31.)

Abdullah Bhatāri, surnamed Āfzal Khan, was a noble of the first rank, who had risen to power and honour under the late Sultan of Bijapur. As a general he was of the highest standing in the kingdom, being the peer of Bahlool Khan and Randaula Khan, and he had fought with conspicuous bravery and skill in the recent war with the Mughals. But the resources of Bijapur had been crippled by that war and the disorder and impoverishment natural

in a regency under a veiled woman. Only 10,000 cavalry* could be spared to accompany Afzal, while popular report had raised the strength of Shiva's Māvlé infantry to 60,000 men as the result of his conquest of Jāvli, and he had also enlisted a regiment of valuable Pathān mercenaries from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. Afzal Khan, therefore, shrank from an open contest of force, with Shiva. Indeed, he was instructed by the Dowager Queen to effect the capture or murder of Shiva by "pretending friendship" with him and offering to secure his pardon from Adil Shah.†

The Bijapuri general had accepted the command in a spirit of bravado, and even boasted in open Court that he would bring Shiva back a captive in chains without having once to dismount from his own horse. But his mind must have been oppressed by the heaviness of his task. He planned to effect his purpose if possible by diplomacy and raising the Māval chiefs against Shivaji.

As early as April, the Bijapur Government had sent a circular letter to all the *deshmukhs* of Māval to join Āfzal Khan with their contingents and help him in subduing Shivaji. As vassals of Ādil Shah, they were bound in law to obey his orders, if they did not wish their hereditary land (*watan*) and office to be forfeited. The letter had some effect. Khandoji Khopdē, the *deshmukh* of Utroli and the rival of Kānhoji Jedhē (of Bhor) for the *deshmukhi* of Rohidkhoré, waited on Afzal at Wai and gave him a written undertaking to arrest Shiva on condition of being granted

* This is the strength of Afzal's army as given by contemporaries, *viz.*, *Tarikh-i-Ali II.* 76 and the English letter quoted in the next note. The Maratha accounts, all very much later, put it at 12,000 cavalry besides infantry. *91 Q. 32*; *Sabh. 9*. In *A.N. 577*, *du hazar* is evidently a misprint for *dah hazar*. The letter in *Shed. 25* is a fabrication.

† "Against Shivaji the Queen this year sent Abdullah Khan with an army of 10,000 horse and foot, and because she knew with that strength he was not able to resist Shivaji, she counselled him to *pretend friendship* with his enemy, which he did. And the other [*i.e.* Shivaji], whether through intelligence or suspicion it is not known, dissembled his love toward him &c." (Revington at Rajapur to Company, 10 Dec. 1659, *F. R. Rajapur*). Dismissed men from Bijapur enlisted, *91 Q. 29*.

the coveted *deshmukhi*. He was placed with his strong Māylé contingent in command of Āfzal's vanguard. The other Māval deshmukhs were frightened and perplexed as to what they should do. But Shivaji won seven of them over to his side with solemn promises of protection and reward. [Raj. xvii. 31, xv. 393 and 317; *Jedhé S*; 91 Q. 32.]

§7. *Āfzal Khan's plan of war and policy towards Shivaji.*

Āfzal Khan's first step was to raise money for his campaign. His ten thousand cavalry cost him Rupees two and a half lakhs every month in the troopers' pay and fodder allowances, besides the salary of the officers. And money was within easy reach of a general who was not restrained by conscience or pity. The famous Hindu temples were known to possess immense wealth of their own, besides having the residences of rich merchants and bankers around the holy precincts. Afzal determined to make war pay for war, by first of all carrying out rapid cavalry raids on these holy cities, sacking the temples, demolishing the sacred images, and holding the high priests to ransom.

Leaving Bijapur, as the dry season commenced after the monsoons at the beginning of September 1659, Afzal Khan first rode to the famous shrine of Vitobā at Pandhārpur on the Bhimā, some 65 miles north of Bijapur. Here he sacked the temple and demolished the images. Then continuing to march westwards, along the south banks of the Bhimā and Nirā rivers, he entered the Phaltan district and alighted at the village of Malvadi (*Malowri* of the Survey map), twelve miles south-west of Phaltan town, on the road from Phaltan to Wāi. This Wai was the head-quarters town of Afzal Khan's government, and here he had his allies and old officers. At Malvadi he made a halt, maturing his plan of campaign and collecting money. Here he seized Bajāji Nayak Nimbālkar, the deshmukh of Phaltan, and threatened to have him trampled to death by elephants for

his having been in concert with Shivaji. Nimbālkar ransomed himself by paying a fine of two lakhs of rupees.*

Encamped at Malvadi, Afzal Khan pursued his policy of frightfulness in the hope of cowering Shivaji into submission. He sent out strong detachments of his cavalry to rob and desecrate the famous Hindu temples of the country round. In this way Jejuri, Tuljāpur, and other holy cities were violated and their people put under forced contribution. At the same time the story of Afzal Khan's ferocity and religious bigotry spread around. As the Ādil Shāhi Court historian writes, "in a short time the Khan made the country seized by Shivaji the riding ground (*jaulān-gāh*) of his troops." "The dust raised by the horses' hoofs of our heroes blinded the eyes of the enemy. . . . Many of the latter were slain and the rest fled into holes". But these atrocities only served to stiffen the Maratha resistance to an enemy of man and the gods alike. Their war of political liberation was changed into a crusade.

Afzal's original intention was to march northwards to Punā and attack Shivaji in his home, while his Moré allies and friendly Māvlé headmen would wrest the southern Māval country from Shivaji's agents, so that the Maratha rebel would be pinned down to the level country near Punā and easily subdued. But on hearing of Afzal's movements, Shivaji quickly withdrew from the disadvantageous terrain of Punā and took post in the broken and jungly Jāvli district, where all his troops were now concentrated. Here he was joined by those Māvlé headmen whose adhesion he had secured by his wise diplomacy. This unexpected strategy of Shiva forced a change on Afzal's plan of campaign. When Shivaji annexed Jāvli, many members of the old

* This amount, 60,000 *hun*, was borrowed from two bankers by mortgaging the *deshmukhi* revenue of Phaltan, and it was repaid in 1675. Bajāji had been forcibly converted to Islām some years ago, but about 1657 Shivaji had helped him to be purged of his apostacy and made a Hindu again,—as Netāji Pālkar was to be in 1676. Shivaji gave his daughter Sakhu Bāi in marriage to Mahdāji, the son of this Bajāji Nāyak (*Shiva Patra Sār Sangraha*, Nos. 796 and 1797).

ruling family of that little barony took refuge in Bijapur, and these men had joined Afzal Khan's expedition promising to help him with their local knowledge and influence to wrest that district from Shivaji's hands. Afzal Khan had hoped to make an easy penetration into Shivaji's Māval territory in this way, and with the help of other loyal Māvlé headmen carry on a northward drive to the more open country around Punā.

But now, with the full force of Shivaji facing him close at hand, Afzal felt that the heavy cavalry who formed the spearhead of his army would lose their superiority among the hills and forests of Jāvli,* while Shivaji's infantry, fighting under cover or darting out of ambushes, could paralyse more than their own number of invaders. In numbers too, Shivā had a clear superiority.

Afzal therefore wisely shrank from entering into this broken country to drive Shivā out by force. His policy now was to employ diplomacy and lure Shivaji into a trap and then seize or kill him. (Sabhāsād 14.)

That chief had taken up his residence at Pratāpgarh, some time before. Afzal sent his land-steward Krishnāji Bhāskar to Shivaji with a very alluring message, saying, "Your father has long been a great friend† of mine, and you are, therefore, no stranger to me. Come and see me, and I shall use my influence to make Ādil Shah confirm your possession of Konkan and the forts you now hold. I shall secure for you further distinctions and military equipment from our Government. If you wish to attend the Court, you will be welcomed. Or, if you want to be excused personal attendance there, you will be exempted." (Sabh. 10.)

* The extremely difficult and broken ground which Afzal had to traverse before reaching the place of interview below Pratāpgarh, is described by Nurullah, p. 80 of my Ms.

† This was a false claim, as Shāhji belonged to the party of Siddi Raihān (Khan Muhammad) at the Adil Shahi court, and we know that Afzal Kh. was the mortal enemy of that minister. (Haidarabad, *Select Doc.*, Sh. J's reign, pp. 125 and 129.)

§8. *Shivaji's danger and perplexity.*

Meantime, the news of Afzal's coming had caused great terror and perplexity among Shiva's followers. Hitherto they had surprised obscure forts, looted isolated convoys, or fought skirmishes with the small irregular forces of private jagirdars. Here was their first encounter with the regular forces of Bijapur, led by a famous general, and numbering 10,000 horsemen with artillery, transport, and all the other material of the best-equipped armies of that age. Moreover, Afzal's march from Bijapur to Wai had been an unbroken success; the Marathas had not ventured to oppose him in the open, and he had freely looted and laid waste the territory of Shiva that he had crossed. Tales of his irresistible strength and ruthlessness had reached the Maratha camp. Shivaji's officers naturally shrank from the idea of resistance. At the first council of war which he held, they urged him to make peace, as the enemy was too strong and hostilities would only cause a great loss of life to their side. (Sabh. 10.)

But would a tame surrender really bring him peace and safety? Afzal Khan's past career caused him to be dreaded like an ogre,—a bold bad man who would shrink from no act of cruelty or treachery. In 1639 he had faithlessly murdered Kasturi Ranga, the Raja of Serā, who had been invited to his tent under a promise of safety to make his submission.* Again, in November 1657, this Afzal Khan had contrived the murder of the Bijapuri wazir Khan

* *Muhammadnamah*, p. 163. "At the time of the interview Kasturi Ranga manifested an improper conduct which was indicative of disturbance, and Afzal Khan at once put him to death". In exactly similar circumstances, Khan-i-Daurān, the Mughal governor of Orissā had (1660) murdered Krishna Bhanja (the Raja of Mayurbhanj) who had come to interview him and settle his peace terms, and then the viceroy had given out that the Raja had drawn his sword upon the Khan! But the Dutch factors of Balasore reported that this allegation was falsely made to cover the Khan's own act of treacherous murder. A defeated and submissive chieftain, away from his own army, does not attempt murder in his enemy's den; he humbly seeks peace by every means in his power.

Muhammad. At the close of Aurangzib's invasion of Bijapur (1656-57) Afzal Khan had suddenly left the Ādil Shahi camp, returned to the capital and falsely denounced Khan Muhammad to the queen regent Bari Sahibā as a traitor in the pay of the Mughals. She had recalled the premier, and as he was coming to wait on her, he was stabbed to death in the streets of the capital. His murderer was not punished. Afzal Khan belonged to this Begam's party and was her favoured general. It was a legitimate inference from the known facts that he had engineered the plot for the murder of Khan Muhammad.

Could any reasonable man believe in the soothing assurances of such a double-dyed murderer? It was therefore Shivaji's business to find out the secret intentions of Afzal Khan through every available source, and take every possible precaution against treachery.

This was the most critical moment in the career of Shivaji. If he capitulated to Afzal Khan, all his hopes of independence and future greatness would be gone for ever, and he would have to end his days as a tame vassal of Bijapur, even if he escaped his sovereign's vengeance for his late rebellion. Yet, the open defiance of Bijapur authority now would for ever close the door to reconciliation with that State, and he must be prepared ever afterwards to defend his life and independence against the power of that kingdom and of the Mughals and other enemies, without a single friend or protector to turn to in the wide world. His ministers and generals advocated the more ignoble policy. Shiva himself was in a terrible dilemma. For a night he pondered on his life's choice and then chose the manlier part. A legend, dating from his lifetime, tells us that the care-worn chieftain's sleep was broken by a vision of the goddess Bhavāni who urged him to confront Afzal boldly and promised him victory and her full protection. (Sabh. 11.)

His mind was made up. Next morning the council met again. Moved by Shiva's manly words, appeal to their sense of honour, and report of the goddess's blessings, they resolved

on war. He now made his dispositions for the contest with the utmost forethought and skill. He took counsel of his mother, who blessed him and foretold his success, and then he left minute instructions for carrying on the government in the event of his being killed. The armies under Moro Trimbak Pinglé and Netāji Pālkar were summoned from Konkan and the Ghāts respectively, and ordered to take post within easy reach of Pratāpgarh. (Sabh. 12.)

§9. *Plots and counter-plots*

Then came Afzal's envoy, Krishnāji Bhāskar, with the invitation to a parley. Shiva treated him with respect, and at night met him in secrecy and solemnly appealed to him as a Hindu and a priest too tell him of the Khan's real intentions. Krishnāji yielded so far as to hint that the Khan seemed to harbour some plan of mischief. Shivaji then sent the envoy back with Pantāji Gopināth, his own agent, agreeing to Afzal's proposal of an interview, provided that the Khan gave him a solemn assurance of safety. Gopināth's real mission was to find out the strength of Afzal's army and other useful information about it and learn for himself what the Khan's real aim was. Through Gopināth Shiva vowed that no harm would be done to Afzal during the interview, and Afzal, on his part, gave similar assurances of his honesty of purpose. But Gopināth learnt by a liberal use of bribes that Afzal's officers were convinced that "he had so arranged matters that Shiva would be arrested at the interview, as he was too cunning to be caught by open fight." On his return, Gopināth told it all to Shiva and urged him to anticipate the treacherous attack on himself by murdering Afzal at a lonely meeting and then surprising his army. (Sabh. 12-15.)

Shiva, taking the hint from Gopināth, feigned terror and refused to visit Wai, unless the Khan met him nearer home and personally promised him safety and future protection. Afzal agreed to make this concession. By Shiva's orders a path was cut through the dense forest all the way from Wai to Pratāpgarh and food and drink were kept

ready for the Bijapur army at various points of it. By way of the Radtondi pass (below 'Bombay Point' of the Mahābaleshwar plateau), Afzal Khan marched to Pār, a village lying one mile below Pratāpgarh on the south, and his men encamped there in scattered groups, deep down in the valley near every pool of water at the source of the Koynā.

Gopināth was sent up the hill to report the Khan's arrival. The meeting was arranged to take place next day. The place chosen for the interview was the crest of an eminence, below the fort of Pratāpgarh, and over-looking the valley of the Koynā. On both sides of the forest-path leading up the hill-side to the pavilion picked soldiers were posted in ambush at intervals by Shivaji. Here he erected tents and set up a richly decorated canopy with gorgeous carpets and cushions worthy of a royal guest.

Then he prepared himself for the meeting. Under his tunic he wore a coat of chain armour and below his turban he placed a steel cap for the protection of his skull. What offensive arms he had, nobody could see; but concealed in his left hand was a set of steel claws (*bāghnakh*) fastened to the fingers by a pair of rings, and up his right sleeve lay hidden a thin sharp dagger called the scorpion (*bichwā*). His companions were only two, but both men of extraordinary courage and agility,—Jiv Mahālā, an expert swordsman, and Shambhuji Kāvji, the murderer of Hanumant Rao Moré. Each of them carried two swords and a shield.

As the party was about to descend from the fort a saintly female figure appeared in their midst. It was Jijā Bāi. Shiva bowed to his mother. She blessed him saying, "Victory be yours!" and solemnly charged his companions to keep him safe; they vowed obedience. Then they walked down to the foot of the fort and waited.

§10. *Interview between Shiva and Afzal.*

Meanwhile Afzal Khan had started from his camp at Pār, with a strong escort of more than a thousand musketeers.

Gopināth objected to it, saying that such a display of force would scare away Shiva from the interview, and that the Khan should, therefore, take with himself only two body-guards exactly as Shiva had done. So, he left his troops some distance behind and made his way up the hill-path in a *pālki* accompanied by two soldiers and a famous swordsman named Sayyid Bānda, as well as the two Brahman envoys, Gopināth and Krishnāji. Arrived in the tent, Afzal Khan angrily remarked on its princely furniture and decorations as far above the proper style of a jagirdar's son. But Gopināth soothed him by saying that all these rich things were meant to be soon sent to the Bijapur palace as the first fruits of Shiva's submission.

Messengers were sent to hurry up Shiva, who was waiting below the fort. He advanced slowly, then halted on seeing Sayyid Banda, and sent to demand that the man should be removed from the tent. This was done, and at last Shivaji entered the pavilion. On each side four men were present,—the principal, two armed retainers and an envoy. But Shiva was seemingly unarmed,* like a rebel who had come to surrender, while the Khan had his sword and dagger at his side.

The attendants stood below. Shiva mounted the raised platform and bowed to Afzal. The Khan rose from his seat, advanced a few steps, and opened his arms to receive Shiva in his embrace. The short slim Maratha's head only came up to the shoulders of his opponent. Suddenly Afzal tightened his clasp, and held Shiva's neck fast in his left arm with an iron grip, while with his right hand he drew his long straight-bladed dagger and struck at the side of Shiva. The hidden armour rendered the blow harmless. Shiva groaned in agony as he felt himself being strangled. But in a moment he recovered from the surprise, passed his left

* Khafi Khan, ii. 116, states that both Afzal and Shivaji came to the interview unarmed. But *kamar wa karda*, 'with no sword girt on the waist', was the customary attitude of the defeated party, so often described in Persian histories, and Afzal was not in that humiliating position.

arm round the Khan's waist and tore his bowels open with a blow of the steel claws. Then with the right hand he drove the *bichwā* into Afzal's side. The wounded man relaxed his hold, and Shivaji wrested himself free, jumped down from the platform, and ran towards his own men outside.

The Khan cried out, "Treachery! Murder! Help! Help!" The attendants ran up from both sides. Sayyid Banda faced Shiva with his long straight sword and cut his turban in twain, making a deep dint in the steel cap beneath. Shiva quickly took a rapier from Jiv Mahālā and began to parry. But Jiv Mahālā came round with his other sword, hacked off the right arm of the Sayyid, and then killed him, (10th November, 1659.)

Meanwhile the bearers had placed the wounded Khan in his *pālki*, and started for his camp. But Shambhuji Kāvji slashed at their legs, made them drop the *pālki*, and then cut off Afzal's head, which he carried in triumph to Shiva.*

§11. Afzal's army routed and plundered.

Freed from danger, Shivaji and his two comrades then made their way to the summit of Pratāpgarh, and fired a cannon. This was the signal for which his troops were waiting in their ambush in the valleys below. At once the armies of Moro Trimbak and Netāji Pālkar and the thousands of Māvlés rushed on the Bijapuri camp from four sides. Afzal's officers and soldiers alike were panic-stricken at the news of their chief's death and this unexpected attack, in that unknown region, where every bush seemed to be alive with enemies. But the way of escape was closed and they had perforce to fight. For three hours many of the entrapped soldiers made a desperate defence, evidently in isolated groups, without any common plan or superior

* The head was buried beneath a tower (called *Abdullah burj*) in an outwork on the south-eastern side of the lower fort. A short distance from it is the temple of Bhavāni built by Shivaji. (Bom. Gaz. xix, 546-547.) For illustrations, see Parasnī's *Mahabaleshwar*, 143 and 144.

guidance. The Marathas fought on their own ground, in the full flush of their initial triumph, confident of succour close behind, and led by eminent chiefs. The carnage in the Bijapuri army was terrible. "All who begged quarters holding grass between their teeth [as a mark of humility] were spared, the rest were put to the sword." 3,000 men were killed, according to the report that reached the English factory at Rājapur a few days later. The Māvlé infantry hacked at the fleeing elephants, "severing the tails, breaking the tusks, or chopping off the legs." Even camels were cut down as they crossed the path of the assailants.

The booty taken was immense: all the artillery, waggons, ammunition, treasure, tents and equipage, transport-cattle and baggage of an entire army, fell into the victors' hands. Among them were 65 elephants, 4,000 horses, 1,200 camels, 2,000 bundles of clothing, and 10 *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and jewellery.

The prisoners included one sardar of high rank, two sons of Afzal, and two Maratha chiefs namely Lambaji Bhonslé and Jhujhar Rao Ghatgé. All the captured women, children, Brahmans, and camp-followers were immediately released. One section of the beaten army, consisting of Afzal Khan's wives and eldest son, Fazl Khan, escaped round the source of the Koynā, under the guidance of Khandoji Khopdé and his contingent of Māvlé friendlies.*

A grand review was held by Shivaji below Pratāpgarh. The captured enemy, both officers and men, were set free and sent back to their homes with money, food and other

* Meeting with Afzal Khan: *Sabh.* 17-19; *Jedhe S.*; 91 *Q.* 34, *A. N.* 577; *Dilkasha* 19; *K. K.* ii. 116-118; *Rajapur Factory Records*; *Fryer*, ii. 61; *Powadas*, 12-18. Plunder of his army: *Sabh.* 20-21; 91 *Q.* sec. 35; *Powadas*, 19-20. Escape of Fazl Khan: *Sabh.* 21. *Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II.*, 76-81, contains a maximum of mere words and rhetorical flourishes but few facts. *B. S.* 370 is even more meagre in details, but concise. *Jedhe S.* and 91 *Q.* 35, say that Khandoji Khopde was caught and beheaded by Shivaji; but *J. Karina* (recent) alleges that he was only mutilated of one arm and one leg (by order of Shivaji). The *Akhbarat* proves that he was beheaded. The Khan's artillery is said to have been left at Wai and captured the next day.

gifts. The Maratha soldiers who had fought so gallantly were rewarded ; if the fallen warriors had grown-up sons, they were enlisted in their fathers' places ; if otherwise, their widows were given pensions amounting to half their pay. The wounded received rewards from 25 to 200 *hun* according to the severity of their hurt. The officers were presented with elephants, horses, robes, jewellery and grants of land. (Sabh. 21.)

§12. *Legends about Afzal Khan.*

The tragic fate of Afzal Khan has most profoundly stirred the popular imagination in his own country and in that of his enemy. At his village of Afzalpurā, close to Bijapur city, the gloomy legend sprang up that before starting on this fatal expedition, he had a premonition of his coming end, and killed and buried all his 63 wives, lest they should share another man's bed after his death. The peasants still point to the height from which these hapless victims of man's jealousy were hurled into a deep pool of water, the channel through which their drowned bodies were dragged out with hooks, the place where they were shrouded, and the 63 tombs, of the same shape, size and age, standing close together in regular rows on the same platform, where they were laid in rest. Utter desolation has settled on the spot. Where his mansion once stood with its teeming population, the traveller now beholds a lonely wilderness of tall grass, brambles and broken buildings, the fittest emblem of his ruined greatness. The only form of life visible is the solitary bird, startled by the unwonted presence of a human visitor.* Other traditions tell us that

* This was the appearance of Afzalpurā when I visited it in Oct., 1916. The French traveller Abbé Carré, who visited the place in 1673, states that he found a large number of workmen engaged in cutting the stones which were to be used in the mausoleum of Afzal Khan, and he was 'surprised [to note] that in the epitaph were mention the [200] women of his harem whose throats he had caused to be cut.' [Voyage, ii. 76 and 11.]

ill omens dogged his steps from the very outset of his campaign against Shivaji. (*Powadas*, 7, 11.)

Among the Marathas the destruction of Afzal Khan caused the wildest exultation; it marked the dawn of their national independence. The defeat of Bijapur was complete: the chief had fallen, his army had ceased to exist, and the victory, both in respect of carnage and of booty, was the most complete possible. The incident caught hold of the public imagination of Mahārāshtra as the most glorious event in the history of the race. Ballads were composed by the wandering bards (*gondhālis*), in response to the popular demand, to celebrate the victory. The earliest and most valuable of them is lost (except for a single couplet.) Another, but much later and quite untrustworthy, poem has been preserved, which expands the contest into a Homeric duel with all its details and supernatural adjuncts. Every class of Marathas, from the officers of Shambhuji's Court to the soldiers in their camps and the peasants in their hamlets, welcomed the minstrel and crowded together to listen to this story of the first triumph of their national hero, set forth with graphic details which made the whole scene live before their eyes. The short ringing lines of the ballad (*powada*) almost reproduce the tramp of the soldiery, the journeys of the rival chiefs, their meeting, the exchange of abuse (quite in the style of the *Mahābhārat!*), the death-grapple, the battle at Pār, and the triumph of the Maratha army. As the bard's narrative passes rapidly from stage to stage of the whole contest, the audience follow him with breathless attention; their blood courses in unison with the verses, and they are wound up to a high pitch of excitement as the spirit of the actual march or fight seizes them.

To the Marathas the fight with Afzal has always appeared as at once a war of national liberation and a crusade against the desecrator of temples. To them Afzal Khan typifies the bold bad man, who combines treachery with frightfulness, and defies God and man alike. Their

historians from the earliest times have seen no element of murder in the incident, but always described it as a glorious example of the sagacity, courage and agility with which their national hero averted a treacherous plot against his own life, made the treachery recoil on the plotter's head, and avenged the outraged shrines of their gods.

Flushed with their victory over Afzal Khan (10 November, 1659) and the destruction of his army, the Marathas poured into South Konkan and the Kolhāpur district, capturing the fort of Panhālā, defeating another Bijapuri army, and making extensive conquests (December 1659—February, 1660),* which will be described in Chapter 10. But in the following March Shivaji was called upon to meet a dangerous attack on his own dominions by a combination of the most powerful of his enemies.

APPENDIX

AFFAIR OF AFZAL KHAN

Was the slaying of Afzal Khan a treacherous murder or an act of self-defence on the part of Shivaji? No careful student of the sources can deny that Afzal Khan intended to arrest or kill Shivaji by treachery at the interview. The absolutely contemporary and impartial English factory record (Rajapur letter, 10 Dec. 1659) tells us that Afzal Khan was instructed by his Government to secure Shivaji by "pretending friendship with him" as he could not be resisted by armed strength, and that the latter, learning of the design, made the intended treachery recoil on the Khan's head. This exactly supports the Marathi chronicles on the point that Shivaji's spies learnt, from Afzal's officers, about the Khan's plan to arrest him by treachery at the proposed interview, and that Afzal's envoy Krishnaji Bhaskar was also induced to divulge this secret intention of his master.

Who struck the first blow at the interview? The old Maratha chroniclers (as distinct from the English-educated 20th century apologists of the national hero) all assert that it was Afzal. These genuine old historians never shrink from charging Shivaji with murder or treachery whenever they know him to have been really guilty. They wrote long before Grant Duff's

* The *Shiva-bharat* gives a detailed and romantic description of these operations as well as the affray with Afzal Kh., which, from the character of this poem, I have been unable to accept as historical.

book had roused public indignation against Shivaji's alleged murder of an invited guest. It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the story of Afzal having struck the first blow was an invention of the modern Marathas after English education had wakened their conscience to the wickedness of pre-meditated political murders. *Sabhasad* (1697) and *Waqnis* (? 1685) at least cannot be suspected of any design to whitewash their hero's character by falsifying history. In saying that Afzal struck the first blow, they truly record a genuine old tradition and not a modern nationalist invention.

Shivaji's elaborate protection of his person before going to the interview and his placing an ambush round Afzal's forces cannot be taken as proofs of a treacherous intention. Secret assassination is the favourite weapon of decadent monarchies, and many such murders had taken place in the sultanates of the Deccan before this time, as I showed in detail in the *Modern Review*, (Vol. I, 1907, p. 441). Shivaji was fully convinced—and with good reason, as we know,—that Afzal meant treachery. He would have been wanting in common prudence if he had not taken these precautions to save himself.

A friend (Prof. A. Rahman) has asked me, "If Afzal meant treachery why did he not keep his troops in readiness for delivering an assault or at least for defending themselves?" My answer is that Afzal believed that the death of Shivaji would lead to the immediate collapse of his upstart power and no attack on his leaderless troops would be necessary. He was, moreover, ignorant of the position and strength of the enemy's forces and did not know that two large Maratha armies had arrived by rapid marches in his immediate neighbourhood, under Netaji and Moro Pant. He expected to repeat his treacherous *coup* against Raja Kasturi Ranga of Sera with equal success. Nurullah, the author of the official History of Ali Adil Shah II., thus describes the Bijapur Government's instructions to Afzal Kh.: "Ali Adil Shah, on seeing that the prevalence of the Muhammadan religion was not possible unless the bramble of Infidelity was burnt up in the fire of the enemy-consuming sword, appointed Afzal Kh. with 10,000 horsemen, to chastise and extirpate that wicked man Shivaji [*tambih wa istisāl-i-ān shaqīl*] At the time of giving *congē* to Afzal Kh., Adil Shah had instructed him that in case Shivaji on being hard pressed by the Bijapuri forces, in his habitual deceptive manner offered to make a peaceful submission, the Khan must not listen to him but follow no other policy than that of flinging the fire of *death* on the harvest of his *life*." [My Persian ms. pp. 75-80.]

This is supported by the *farmān* issued by Adil Shah to Khanhoji Jedhē, on 16 June 1659, ordering him as a loyal vassal, to assist Afzal Kh., the newly appointed subahdar of Nizamshahi Konkan, in defeating and rooting out Shivaji, giving no shelter to Shiva's followers but slaying them outright [*Shiva K. Patra Sār*, i. No. 774.]

Mir Alam, the famous minister of Nizam-ul-mulk and historian, tells the following story of the fatal interview:—

As soon as Abdullah Kh. stepped into the tent, Shivaji appeared for meeting him and made a *salam*. Abdullah, who did not know him, asked

his diwān Krishnaji, "Is this man Shivaji?" On learning that it was so, he asked, "How is it that you have desolated the land and seized the forts of our sovereign?" Shiva replied, "Before this, the country and forts were occupied by lawless men and robbers, but I have swept them clean of disturbance, and by my good service and exertion caused them to prosper. In return for this good service I deserve praise and not rebuke and punishment." The Khan rejoined, "Very well, what is past is past. You must now deliver to me all the forts [in your possession] and go with me to have audience of His Majesty." Shiva replied, "If a royal letter (*farmān*) to that effect is issued in my name, I shall place it on my head and carry out the order."

At this diwān Krishnaji broke in, "You have now come under the protection of the Khan Sāhib; so, you should first get your offences pardoned by him and thereafter expect a royal edict in your own name." Shiva replied, "The Khan and I are both servants of His Majesty. How can the Khan grant a pardon for my faults? But as I cannot reject your advice, I shall lay my head in his lap." Saying this he embraced the Khan. The Khan who was strong-limbed and intoxicated with the pride of being a hero [*nishā-i-bahāduri dar sar dāshf*], gripped Shivaji very hard in the act of embracing and struck him with his belt-dagger. But as Shiva wore a coat of chain-armour, the blow failed of effect. Shivaji twisted himself and with a blow of his crooked dagger (*bichua*) ripped open the bowels of Abdullah, and released himself from his grasp. The Khan, bandaging his belly with his shawl, hit Shiva on the head with his sword, so hard that his helmet was cut into two and a slight injury inflicted on his skull. Shiva with a blow of his long sword (*batta*) cut the Khan into two.

On seeing this, Krishnaji struck at the head of Shiva with his own sword, when Yesāji, a comrade of Shiva, overthrew the diwān. In this scrimmage, two or three blows reached the person of Gopinath, but he was not harmed. [*Hadīqā-i-Alam*, litho., ii. 226.] Exactly the same statement is made in L. N. Shafiq Aurangabadi's *Maāsir-i-Asafi* (wr. 1792) i. 320 of my ms.

The weight of recorded evidence as well as the probabilities of the case supports the view that Afzal Khan struck the first blow and that Shivaji only committed what Burke calls, a 'preventive murder'. It was, as I wrote in the *Modern Review* in 1907, "a case of diamond cut diamond."

CHAPTER IV.

STRENUOUS WARFARE, 1660-1664.

1. Shaista Kh. sent against Shivaji.	7. Surat described.
2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort.	8. Heroic defence by the English.
3. Shaista Kh. occupies Puna.	9. First loot of Surat, 1664.
4. Shaista captures Chakan, 1660.	10. Attempt to murder Shivaji.
5. Shiva conquers Ratnagiri district, 1661.	11. How money was extorted.
6. Night attack on Shaista Kh., 1663.	12. Shivaji's doings in 1664. <i>Appendix.</i> Sufferings of Surat citizens.

§1. *Shāista Khan sent against Shivaji.*

Among the administrative changes made by Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was the posting of Shāista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. This able and spirited general had already governed Mālwa and the Deccan and had taken a distinguished part in Aurangzib's recent invasion of Golkondā. Chief among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was fortunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide his army into two and therefore to be defeated in both the theatres of war.

After Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal Khan's leaderless army by defeating the combined forces of Rustam-i-Zamān and Fazl Khan, and taking Panhālā in the Kolhāpur district and many places in Ratnagiri, Ali Ādil Shah II felt it necessary to march in person against the audacious rebel. But just at this time Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave who had usurped the fief of Karnul and defied the royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to

make his submission if his position was recognized. The Sultān agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salābat Khan, and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. Jauhar easily swept away the Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji into Panhālā (2nd March 1660), which he besieged with a force of 15,000 men.

§2. *Shivaji besieged in Panhālā fort.*

The siege dragged on for nearly five months ; all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. So, he wrote a secret letter to Jauhar, deceitfully begging his protection and offering to make an alliance with him. In order to negotiate for the terms he asked for a passport. Jauhar, "who was both fool and traitor," swallowed the bait ; he assured Shivaji of his protection, gave him a safe conduct, and flattered himself that with Shiva for an ally he would be able to create a kingdom of his own in independence of Ādil Shah. Next day Shivaji with only two or three followers visited Jauhar at midnight, and was received in *darbār*. After oaths of co-operation had been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned quickly to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued.

But there was one relentless enemy of Shivaji in the Bijapuri army. Fazl Khan, the son of Āfzal, and his chief retainer Siddi Halāl, pressed the siege in earnest. A huge fort like Panhālā could not, however, be taken by 15,000 men, even if all of them put their hearts into the work. Shivaji had made some sorties and broken up the siege-trenches with heavy slaughter, forcing the Bijapuris to remove their camp to a safe distance from the fort. But these night-attacks were not decisive ; the siege was merely turned into a blockade in consequence of them. The Bijapuri army was terrified, and Fazl Khan henceforth avoided confronting Shivaji himself and directed his operations against the neighbouring fort of Pavangarh. Seizing a hillock near

it, he mounted guns and with some Englishmen's help began to throw shells into the fort. The Maratha commandant of Pavangarh found his position untenable and pressed Shivaji for relief.

Shivaji found that further delay would ruin him by making his escape from that fatal trap impossible. With Pavangarh lost, Panhālā could be easily starved into surrender. So, one dark night (13th July), leaving a part of his forces to hold Panhālā as long as possible, he slipped out of it with the rest of his men, fell on the Bijapuri trenches below Pavangarh, and in the ensuing confusion took the road to Vishālgarh, 27 miles to the west.

His escape was soon detected and a strong Bijapuri force under Fazl Khan and Siddi Halāl set out in pursuit. The day broke while the fugitives were still at Gajapur, eight miles short of their destination, and it was discovered that the pursuers had kept up with them by marching all night with the aid of Bengal lights (*māhtābs.*) Shivaji was hopelessly outnumbered and his escort was worn out. Happily for him, the road here led through a narrow ravine which a few desperate men could hold against odds. Bāji Prabhu, the *deshpāndē* of Hirdas Māval, agreed to defend the mouth of the pass with half the troops till Shivaji should reach Vishālgarh with the other half and signal his safe arrival by gun-fire. The Bijapuris delivered three bloody assaults on the heroic rear-guard, all of which were beaten off. For five hours after dawn, the obstinate struggle was maintained, with a loss of 700 men to the defenders. Then the signal gun was heard, announcing Shivaji's safe arrival in his asylum. But Bāji Prabhu was lying down mortally wounded. The faithful servant had carried out his task, at the cost of his life, and the knowledge cheered his last moments. Karnātaki musketeers are said to have at last cleared the pass with their fire, and the remnant of the defending Māvlés fled to the hills with the body of their chief. The Bijapuris pushed on to Vishālgarh, but wisely

gave up the thought of undertaking a siege in that terrible region. They fell back on Panhālā and thence on Bijapur.*

When the news of Jauhar's treacherous coqueting with Shivaji reached the ears of Ali Ādil Shah, that king burst into anger, and left his capital (on 5th August) for the Panhālā district in order "to punish both the rebels." He halted at Miraj and sent his vanguard towards Panhālā. Jauhar now found that his master could not be befooled any longer. So, he made the Marathas at last give up Panhālā to him (on 22nd September), and put an end to the long siege. The fort was soon afterwards handed over by Jauhar to the agents of Āli Shah.

A month after Shivaji had been forced to quit Panhālā in the extreme south of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster in the extreme north. On 15th August, his fort of Chākan, 18 miles north of Punā, was captured by the Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall have to trace the course of the war in that quarter from its commencement.

§3. *Shāista Khan occupies Punā.*

Early in 1660, Shāista Khan opened the campaign against Shivaji from the north, after arranging for an attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmadnagar with a vast

* Siege of Panhala, Foster, X. 251, 370-387; *Tarikh-i-Ali II*, 82-93; B. S. 371-376; 91 Q. 37-39; Jedhe gives the dates thus: "2 March, Shivaji again comes to Panhala and is there besieged by Siddi Jauhar. 13 July, Shivaji descends from Panhala and goes to Khelna, pursued by Jauhar's forces, Bāji Prabhu being slain; 22 Sep., Shivaji cedes Panhālā to Jauhar and makes peace with him."

I accept the English factory numbers,—15,000 besiegers and five or six thousand besieged,—as against the Marathi exaggeration of eighty thousand Bijapuris and sixty thousand Mavles. *Dilkasha*, i. 37, says that Shiva had only 3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry when besieged in Panhala. Jauhar established his head-quarters at Kolhapur. The English factor Revington tried to sell him some ordnance and ammunition and personally took a mortar and some shells to Jauhar's camp, early in April.

army on 25th February, the Khan marched southwards along the eastern side of the Punā district, methodically capturing and garrisoning all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to Punā on the east and south.

The Marathas at first retreated before him without risking a battle. By way of Sonwādi (close to the Dhond railway station) and Supā (16 miles south west of Dhond), he reached Bārāmati (18 miles south-east of Supā) on 5th April. At the last two places were mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nirā river, by way of Hol, reaching Shirwal, 26 miles south of Punā, on 18th April. Like a wise general, Shāista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, to guard his line of communication and hold the forts. A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages round Rājgarh (22 miles due west.)

From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the Nirā river 16 miles northwards to Shivāpur (near Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garārā, arriving at Sāswad (13 miles east of Shivāpuri and 18 miles south-east of Punā) on 1st May.

Up to this point the Mughal advance had been unopposed, the Marathas only hovering at a distance to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging parties. They made their first stand near the pass leading from Shivāpur to Garārā. On 30th April a body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal rear-guard under Rao Bhāo Singh, but were attacked and routed after a long fight.

From Sāswad a small Mughal detachment raided the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they lost 50 in killed

He promised that these shells "would undoubtedly be the chiefest disturbers of the besieged." But the mortar had not the desired effect at trial, and Jauhar refused to pay for the munitions, though the English traders continued to stay, some at Panhala, others at Kolhapur, as late as October 1660.

and wounded. Reinforcements arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass at a gallop, in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort-walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. The victors returned to their camp at Sāswad in the evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rājwah, they entered Punā on 9th May.

§4. *Shāista Khan captures Chākan.*

Shāista Khan had decided to pass the rainy season with his army at Punā, then a small hamlet. But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally destroyed the grain and fodder in the country round Punā and Chākan and removed all traces of habitation. And now the many rivers between Punā and the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to remove his camp from Punā to Chākan, 18 miles northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the Mughal dominions, whence supplies could more easily reach him. (A. N. 584-'5.)

Chākan is a place of great strategic importance. On the east it is separated from the imperial territory by the shallow upper courses of the Bhimā and Ghod rivers only, with no difficult mountain pass to cross. Its possession would have greatly shortened Shāista Khan's line of communication with his base of supplies at Ahmadnagar and also secured his camp against any attack from the north. Moreover, Chākan is only 31 miles due east of the Borghāt pass and commands the shortest route leading from Ahmadnagar to Konkan.

Leaving Punā on 19th June, the Khan arrived in the vicinity of Chākan on the 21st, reconnoitred the fort and distributed the lines of investment among his officers. The fort of Chākan is a square enclosure with bastioned fronts

and towers at the four corners. The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern face, and passes through five or six gateways. Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification. (*Bom. Gaz.* xviii, pt. iii, p. 121; *Ind. Antiq.* ii. 43, iv. 352.)

Shāista Khan, after throwing up defensive earth-works round the positions taken up by the four divisions of his army, began to run trenches towards the fort-walls, construct raised platforms at suitable points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan. Though the heavy showers of the rainy season hampered his work and the defenders kept up a galling fire, he pressed the siege vigorously. After 54 days of hard labour a mine was carried from his own position in the north to under the tower at the north-eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 p.m. on 14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were blown up; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but found to their surprise that behind the breach the enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth which they held in force and from the shelter of which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket-shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood-stained ground for the night.

Next morning (15th August) they resumed the attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 268 killed and 600 wounded. [A. N. 585-588; Tavernier, i. 409 confused.]

Firangji Narsālā, an old officer of the days of Shāhji, had been left by Shiva in charge of Chākan, with orders to hold out as long as he could, but to surrender when driven to extremities, because it was impossible for Shiva, then battling with the Bijapuris near Panhālā, to divert

any force for the relief of Chākan, 140 miles away in the north. For nearly two months Firangji had defended his post with tireless energy, "incessantly showering shots, bullets and rockets at the besiegers." He had disputed every inch of the ground on the two days of assault. And now, hopeless of aid, he capitulated with honour. Shāista Khan greatly admired the gallant *qiladār* and pressed him to enter the imperial service on high pay. But Firangji refused to prove false to his salt, and was allowed to go back to his master with his troops.

§5. *The fighting in 1661-63 and Shivaji's conquest of Ratnagiri district.*

Shivaji's defeat at Chākan and Panhālā was followed by a lull in the war during the last three months of the year 1660, which he spent quietly at Rājgarh, in planning how to compensate himself for these losses in the Desh country by transferring the war to another part of Bijapuri territory, namely Konkan, or the country west of the Sahyādri range, where the government was very weakly exercised by countless petty vassal Rajahs and Bijapuri city-governors. There was in that province no single powerful viceroy with an army of his own, able to unite the local feudatories under one central authority, exact loyal service from them, and thus successfully oppose an invader like Shivaji, who was his own master and could direct all his resources with absolute unity of command and policy.

Shāista Khan, too, on his return to Punā (end of August, 1660) after the capture of Chākan, spent the rainy season there in enforced inactivity. Nor was he eager to lay siege to any more Maratha forts, as even the small and comparatively weak castle of Chākan, situated in the plain, had cost him nearly nine hundred men to take it. He employed his time more usefully in inducing Ghālib, the Bijapuri commandant of Parenḍā, to surrender that fort to

Aurangzib for a high price. The terms were approved by the Emperor, and large Mughal forces were detached from Punā to Parendā to take possession of it (20th November), overawe any opposition that might be made at the last moment, and occupy the district around it.

At the beginning of next year (1661), Shāista Khan turned his attention to the Kaliān district or North Konkan. Here a small Mughal force, only 3,000 strong, under Ismāil, had been operating since April last and had occupied a part of the country, though the important cities and forts (like Kaliān) remained unconquered. These gains had been placed under a faujdar named Salābat Khan Deccani, with a contingent of friendly Marathas, among whom Bābāji Bhonslē, Raghūji, Shambhuji Kāvji and Bābāji Rām (or Rānā) Honap,—a former *deshpāndē* of Punā,—are named. [A. N. 594; 91 Q. 42.]

But local levies could effect little, and it was necessary to complete the Mughal conquest of Konkan and extinguish the last traces of Shivaji's power there by pouring into the country large reinforcements of imperial troops under a high commander. The general chosen for this purpose was Kār Talab Khan, an Uzbak, who had attained to the rank of a 4-*hazāri* as early as the battle of Dharmāt (1658), and had recently commanded a division in the Parendā district. With him Shāista Khān sent many of his own Rajput and Muslim subordinates and local allies (such as Rāi Bāghini, the heroic widow of Udāji Rām, the jagirdar of Māhur in Berār.)

Marching from Punā by way of Lohgarh, Kār Talab Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of the Borghāt. While his soldiers, encumbered with artillery and baggage, struggled painfully and in alarm through the dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads on to Umbarkhind (about 15 miles due east of Pen), Shivaji by secret and rapid marches came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike. Kār Talab had to offer battle under these adverse conditions and

suffered heavy losses. His army seemed doomed to perish from thirst, without having the power to move. In despair he gave up all the property in his camp and paid a large ransom to Shivaji and thus bought a safe retreat for his army (3rd February, 1661.)

The victorious Shivaji now divided his forces ; and while one army under Netāji was detached to act against the Mughals, he himself with the other invaded Bijapuri territory in Konkan, "to avenge the loss of Panhālā." The Kaliān district having been thus freed from the new enemies, Shivaji left it alone, and marched southwards, easily capturing city after city, till all the coast strip from Dāndā-Rājpuri to Khārépatan was commanded by him, and the country further south, as far as Goa, seemed to lie at his mercy, when he would renew the campaign next dry season. His movements were so rapid, the local authorities were so divided and unprepared for defence, that no resistance was offered, but the Rajahs and city-governors fled in consternation before the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion. The wiser among them recognized resistance to him as futile and expectation of support from Bijapur vain, and so made their peace with him by offering him obedience and tribute.

Nizāmpur (22 miles due east of Janjirā) was raided, and then the port of Dābhol belonging to a chieftain surnamed Dalvē was captured and placed under an agent of Shivaji (Feb. 1661.) Jaswant Rao, the Rajah of Pallivana, who had loyally helped Jauhar during the Panhālā campaign, took refuge with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Prabhāvali, (its chief town being Shringārpur.)* The

* I take it that *Pallivana* is the Sanskritized form of *Palavna*, a town (giving its name to a district) situated 12 m.n. of Dapoli, while Mandangarh is 5 m.n. of Palavna. The fort of *Palgarh* (built by Shivaji) is in the Khed sub-division, 6 m.n. of Khed. *Sangameshwar* is a well-known holy city, 10 m.n.w. of Devrukh. *Shringārpur* is 8 m.n.e. of Sangameshwar, and is overlooked by *Prachitgarh*, 2 m. to its east ; the Tivra pass being 4 m.s. of it. [Degree sheet 47 G.] *Prabhāvali* or *Pravanvalli* is just below Vishal-

Muslim governor of Sangameshwar fled away, and so did all the inhabitants who had anything to lose. The town was thrown into the greatest disorder and alarm. Shivaji therefore sent Pilāji Nilkanth and Tānāji Mālusaré with a small force to take possession of it, while he ordered Surya Rao to support this detachment. He himself pushed on to Devrukh by way of Chiplun (where he performed the pilgrimage to the shrine of Parashurām and made large gifts to the Brahmins.) His victorious march was continued to Rājapur, which he now sacked for the second time and finally occupied, on 3rd March,—and even further south to Khārépatan (on the Vāghotan river, 16°33' N.) Most of the cities of the Ratnagiri district saved themselves from plunder by paying him blackmail (*chauth*).

Meantime, under pressure from his sovereign Ādil Shah, the Rajah of Shringārpur had made a night-attack on Shivaji's detachment in Sangameshwar, but had been repulsed by the gallant Tānāji Mālusaré. Shivaji now turned back northwards and conquered the Palli-vana State, conciliated and recalled the fugitive population, and restored cultivation and trade. For protecting this conquest, he fortified Chirdurg and named it Mandangarh, and built a second fort, Pālgarh.

He was now free to settle accounts with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Shringārpur, who had tried to save himself by promising homage to Shivaji ever since the fall of Jāvli (1656) and repeatedly broken his faith in fear of his Bijapuri master. Punishment swiftly overtook the double-dealer. Shivaji now invaded Shringārpur by such a rapid march from Palli-vana that Surya Rao was taken entirely by surprise; he had not anticipated the blow and made no preparation for defence; even his captains were enjoying leave home! The Rajah had barely time to escape with his life, while Shivaji entered his city in triumph (29th April.) The

garh to the s.w. In old records Dābhōl and Prabhāvali are coupled together, though the two towns are far apart.

rest of the small State was easily occupied and placed under Trimbak Bhāskar as Governor, while the neighbouring hill-fort of Pratitgarh (= Prachitgarh) was put in repairs to protect the city.*

The ferocity and greed of the Maratha troops, no less than their valour and rapidity of movement, had spread the wildest terror among the people of the invaded districts and all who could had fled away from the path of the invaders. Shivaji now very wisely won over Shirké, the minister and virtual ruler of Shringārpur, enlisted him in his own service, afterwards marrying into his family,—made large gifts to the local Brahmans, and thus induced the population to return to their homes and usual occupations and submit to the new government.

But these successes were chequered by a great defeat. In May 1661 the Mughals wrested Kaliān from the Marathas, and though Shivaji mustered an army in Mahād to attempt its recovery, his efforts did not bear fruit and this capital city remained in Mughal hands for nine years more. So, late in June, Shivaji retired to his fort of Wardhangarh, where he spent the entire summer in quiet. The fort of Deiri, in the Pen sub-division, was besieged by a Muslim general named Bulāki, but a Maratha relieving force under Kāvji Kodhalkar drove him away after slaying 400 of his men (21 August 1661.)

Maratha activities were resumed at the beginning of 1662. Shivaji attacked Nāmdār Khan, at Mirā Dongar (6 miles south-east of Pen), and then raided the rich city of Pen. The Mughal defence was obstinate and Shivaji's forces suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded.

On the whole, throughout the year 1662 and the first quarter of 1663, some Mughal generals (especially Nāmdār Khan) showed great activity and success in attacking the Marathas, making reprisals into their territory, and spoiling

* Several details of this campaign in the Ratnagiri district have been taken from the *Surya-vamsham*. The dates are from *Jedhe S.*

their raids by close pursuit. In March 1663 we find two large and mobile divisions of Mughal horse,—12,000 and 7,000 strong,—posted at Upper Chaul and Rahamatpur respectively for these duties, while Kaliān was held by a permanent garrison too large to be easily attacked.

The net result of the operations of these two years was that the Mughals kept their grip on the extreme north of Konkan, including the city and district of Kaliān,—barring occasional raids into that debatable land the Pen sub-division,—while Shivaji remained master of the southern part, namely the south eastern corner of the Kolābā district and nearly the whole of the Ratnagiri district, or roughly 18° to 16°30 North latitude.

In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netāji, the Master of the Horse in Shiva's army. He had led his cavalry in a raid into the imperial territory, but a Mughal force of 7,000 horse pursued him so closely that "he was fain to travel 45 or 50 miles a day and yet [had] much ado to escape with a small [part of the] booty he had got. They left not the pursuit till they came within five leagues of Bijapur." But Rustam-i-Zamān met the Mughals and induced them to give up the pursuit, "by telling them that the country was dangerous for any strange army to march in and also promising to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netāji got away, though not without loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." (F. R. Surat, vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 30 March, and 8 April 1663.)

But within a month of meeting with this reverse to his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals,—a blow whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and belief in his possession of magical powers, as his *coup* against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart

of his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner ring of his body-guards and female slaves.*

§6. *Shivaji's night-attack on Shāista Khan.*

Shāista Khan had, as we have seen, occupied Punā in May 1660 and retired there after the capture of Chākan in the following August. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band-room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieutenant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men.

To surprise the Khan here was a task that required no less agility and cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him, while two supporting divisions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Māvlés) under Netāji Pālkar and Moro Pant the *Peshwā*, were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance from its outer side. Bābāji Bāpuji and Chimnāji Bāpuji, of Khed, accompanied Shiva as his body-guards and right-hand men in this enterprise.

The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Punā after nightfall (Sunday, 5th April 1663.) With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the

* Night-attack on Shāista Khan: the earliest records are Gyffard to Surat 12 April, 24 May, 1663 (*F. R. Surat*, vol. 103) containing Shivaji's own version; Bernier, 187; *A. N.* 819 (only one sentence!); *Storia*, ii. 104-106; Sabh. 35-37; *Dil.* 44-46. Khafi Khan (ii. 172-5) reports the narration of his father, a servant of Shaista Khan, but he wrote after 1730. *Jedhe*, 91 *Q.* 46-47.

imperial army going to take up their appointed posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khan's quarters at mid-night. Shiva knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his boyhood and youth.

It was the 6th day of Ramzān, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the Nawab's household had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from their beds to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the month of Ramzān, were despatched by the Marathas without any noise. The wall dividing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle.

Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnāji Bāpuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water; and the confusion that followed was used by Shāista Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of

slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding many of the Khan's women, without knowing their sex.

Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Bābāji Bāpuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying out in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bandsmen, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now grew so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy are on us," they began to take up their arms.

Abul Fath, a son of Shāista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed.

Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were fruitlessly searched all their camp.

This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shāista Khan's, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shāista Khan himself.*

* Gyffard Rajapur wrote to Surat on 12th April 1663: "Yesterday arrived a letter from the Rajah written himself to Ravji [Pandit], giving

The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan ; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him ; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (*āmir-ul-umara*) of his empire.

This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shāista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shāista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them!" Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivāji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant. Shivaji, however, asserted that this astonishing feat was performed by him under the inspiration of his God and not of any human counsellor. Immediately after his return from it, he wrote to Rāoji Pandit, his agent at Rājāpur, boasting how he had been

him an account how that he himself with 400 choice men went to Shaista Khan's camp. There, upon some pretence, he got into his tent to salam, and presently slew all the watch, wounded Shaista Khan with his own hand, [one son was killed outright, two wounded, six women killed, eight more wounded, and 40 persons attending their general left dead in the place.] After all this Shivaji returns, losing but six men [killed] and forty wounded, 10,000 horse under Rajah Jaswant Singh standing still and never offered to pursue him ; so it is generally believed it was done with his consent, though Shivaji tells his men his Permisera (*Parameshwar*, the great God) bid him do it." The figures for the loss suffered by Shaista Khan given in this letter have been replaced, within square brackets above, by the corrections made in Gyffard's letter of 24th May.

the chief actor in this business and had himself wounded Shāista Khan.

The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on his way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his displeasure, he transferred Shāista Khan to the government of Bengal (1 Dec. 1663), which was then regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam.

§7. *Surat described.*

While this change of governors was going on at Aurangabad, Shivaji performed a feat of even greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat, the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, who here embarked for the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The *fort* of Surat stood on the south bank of the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable to a body of light raiders like Shiva's troopers. But the *city* close to the fort offered a rich and defenceless prize. It had, at that time, no wall to protect it. Its wealth was boundless. The imperial customs alone yielded a revenue of 12 *lakhs* of Rupees a year (in 1666, according to Thevenot, v. 81.)

The city of Surat covered nearly four square miles including gardens and open spaces, and had a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were narrow and crooked; the houses of the rich were near the river-side and substantially built; but the town was mainly composed of poor men's huts built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and

with floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of the town scarcely two or three brick-houses were to be seen in a street, and in some parts . . . not one for many streets together. The whole town was unfortified either by art or nature and its situation was upon a large plain of many miles' extent. They had only made against the chief avenues of the town some weak and ill-built gates [more for show than for defence.] In some parts there was a dry ditch easily passable by a footman, with no wall on the inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely any sign of a ditch was perceptible." (*Bom. Gaz.*, ii. 301, 90-91; Letter from the English chaplain Escalot to Sir T. Browne.)

Early in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 1664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 miles southwards, and was advancing to plunder the town.* At once the people were seized with panic, and began to flee away with their wives and children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and at night it was learnt that he had halted only five miles from Surat. Ināyet Khan, the governor of the town—who was quite distinct from the commandant of the fort,—had sent out an agent to treat with Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money without maintaining a

* First sack of Surat: The most minute details and graphic accounts are found in the factory records: Log of the *Loyal Merchant* (*Orme MSS.* vol. 263, pp. 23-24); *F. R. Surat* 2 (Surat Consult. 6 Jan. 1664), vol. 86 (Surat to Persia; Surat to Co. 18 and 28 Jan. and 4 April); *Dutch Records*, vol. 27, Nos. 711 and 719. Letter of Escalot very valuable. Bernier, 188-190; *Storia*, ii. 29, 112, 120, 132, iv. 428. Ishwardas 52a. (A.N., K.K., and Tavernier silent). For a good description of the city and fort, Kaepelin, 52n, and Carré, i. 16-49.

proper force. His cowardice also prevented him from organizing a defence or even from standing at his post.

The townspeople were sheep worthy of such a shepherd. A population composed mostly of money-loving traders, poor artisans, punctilious fire-worshippers and tender-souled Jains, cannot readily take to war even in self-defence. The richest merchants, though owning millions of Rupees, had not the sense to hire guards for the protection of their wealth, though they might have done so at only a twentieth part of what they were soon to lose through pillage.

§8. *Heroic defence of the English at Surat.*

The shame of this cowardice in high and low alike was deepened by the contrast afforded by the manly spirit of a handful of foreigners. The English and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own factories at all costs, though these were open houses, not built to stand an attack. They might have sought safety by escaping to their ships at Swâlly on the coast, 10 miles west of Surat ; but "it was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight to leave money, goods, house to merciless people."

Sir George Oxenden, the English President, and his Council stood at their posts in Surat, and improvised a defence of the factory. They procured two small brass guns from a merchant in the town and four others from their own vessels. With the armed sailors promptly sent up from the English ships at Swâlly, they mustered in the factory 150 Englishmen and 60 *peons*, a total of 210 defenders. Four of the guns were mounted on the roof to scour two broad streets and command the large and lofty house of Hâji Said Beg, adjacent to theirs. Two other guns were posted behind the front gate, in which port-holes were cut for firing into the passage leading to the factory. What provisions, water and powder could be got were hurriedly laid in. "Some were set to melt lead and make bullets,

others with chisels to cut lead into slugs ; no hand idle but all employed to strengthen every place. Captains were appointed and every man quartered and order taken for relieving one another upon necessity. To secure the approaches to the factory, the English went outside and took possession of a temple just under their house, and cleared it of its refugees, and also shut up a mosque on another side, whose windows looked into the outer court-yard of the factory. President Oxenden at the head of his 200 soldiers "drawn out in rank and file, with drum and trumpet," publicly marched through the town in the morning of the 6th, "declaring that he intended to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men."

The Dutch, too, defended their house, though its distance of a mile from the English factory made mutual aid between the two nations impossible. The example of the Europeans also heartened a body of Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their property in their *sarāi*, close to the English factory.

§9. *First loot of Surat, 1664.*

Shivaji had been heard of at Bassein, twenty-four miles north of Bombay, only nine days before. But he had made a forced march to Surat with 4,000 men mounted on choice horses with such speed and secrecy that he was at Surat only a day after his approach had been detected. His route lay by the forts of Nar-durg (6 m. s. e. of Murbād), Māhuli, and Kohaj and then across the zamindaris of Jawhār, Rāmnagar and Lokendra (a Koli State) north of the Thānā district. Two Rajahs had joined him on the way with their contingents in the hope of sharing the plunder, and his army now mustered 10,000.

At 11 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside the Burhānpur or eastern gate. The night before he had sent two

messengers with a letter requiring the governor and the three most eminent merchants and richest men in the city, *viz.*, Hāji Said Beg, Baharji, Borāh, and Hāji Qāsim, to come to him in person immediately and make terms, otherwise he threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No answer had been given to the demand, and the Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire to them. A body of Shivaji's musketeers was set "to play upon the castle, with no expectation to take it, but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest that had got in, as also [to prevent] the soldiers of the castle from sallying out upon them whilst the others plundered and fired [the houses.]" The garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort-guns inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was continued, every day new fires being raised, so that thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English chaplain wrote, "Thursday and Friday nights were the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time had turned day into night, rising so thick that it darkened the sun like a great cloud."

Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion of Baharji Borāh, then "reputed the richest merchant in the world," his property having been estimated at 80 *lakhs* of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at leisure day and night till Friday evening, when having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire to it. From this house they took away 28 *seers* of large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds and "an incredible amount of money."

Close to the English factory were the lofty residence and extensive warehouses of another very rich merchant, Hāji Said Beg, who, too, had fled away to the fort, leaving his property without a defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday and till past the noon of Thursday,

the Marathas continued to break open his doors and chests and carry off as much money as they could. Entering one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which the English had made into the street to drive away a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly.

The English merchants next day put a guard of their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the English at being balked of his prey, and in the afternoon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon them to pay him three *lakhs* of Rupees or else let his men freely loot the Hāji's house, and threatening that in case they refused to do either he would come in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden took time to consider the proposal till next morning (Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come and do his worst, saying, "We are ready for you and resolved not to go away. But come when you please; and [as] you have, as you say, resolved to come, I ask you to come one *prahar* sooner than you intend." To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed behind defences and served by resolute and disciplined men, for the sake of a few *lakhs* more.

§10. *Attempt to murder Shivaji.*

The cowardly governor Ināyet Khan, who had run into the fort on Tuesday night, formed an infamous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he sent a young

follower of his to Shivaji with pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly unreasonable that Shiva scornfully asked the envoy, "Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like a woman. Does he think of me too as a woman that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" The young man immediately replied, "We are not women; I have something more to say to you;" and whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at Shivaji's breast. A Maratha body-guard that stood before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was the force of the desperado's rush that he did not stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shiva's person and the two rolled on the ground together. The blood being seen on Shiva's dress, his followers imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the same guardsman clove the assassin's skull; Shiva rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 24 others from among them at his caprice, but spared the rest.

Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the English E. I. Company, was seized on landing at the Dutch jetty and kept a prisoner in the Maratha camp for three days. Along with other prisoners, his right hand was ordered to be cut off, at which he cried out to Shivaji in Hindusthani to cut off his head instead. But on his hat being taken off, he was recognized as an Englishman and spared. On Friday afternoon he was sent to the English factory with a message from Shiva, but President Oxenden detained him there. He was ransomed for Rs. 350.

§11. *How money was extorted.*

The plunder of Surat yielded him above a *kror* of Rupees, the city "not having been so rich [as then] in many years before." The looting was unresisted, and extended

over fully four days and nights, and he "scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious ware." (*Log of the Loyal Merchant.*)

On reaching Surat, Shivaji had publicly declared that he had not come to do any personal hurt to the English or other merchants, but only to revenge himself on Aurangzib for having invaded his country and killed some of his relations. But money was really his sole aim.* He had to make the most of his four days' free run at Surat and shrank from no cruelty to extort money as quickly as possible. As the English chaplain wrote "His desire of money is so great that he spares no barbarous cruelty to extort confessions from his prisoners, whips them most cruelly, threatens death and often executes it if they do not produce so much as he thinks they may or desires they should ;—at least cuts off one hand, sometimes both."

At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve miles off and then retreated by rapid marches to Konkan.

For some days afterwards the fear of his return prevented the townspeople from coming back to their desolated homes. But the imperial army reached Surat on the 17th and then the cowardly governor ventured to return from the fort. The people hooted at him and flung dirt on him,

* An old merchant who had brought 40 ox-loads of cloth from near Agra but sold none, tried to propitiate Shivaji by offering it to him. But on his answering that he had no ready money, his right hand was cut off by Shivaji's order, he was driven away, and his cloth burnt by the Marathas. (*Letter of Escalot.*) Bernier, 190, for the narrow escape of a Jewish ruby-merchant from the death threatened by Shivaji to extort his wealth. "Mr. Smith was present when he cut off more than 26 hands in one day, and as many heads ; whoever he was that was taken and brought before him that could not redeem himself, lost either his hand or his head ; and his manner was first to plunder and then to cause the owner of the house to give him something over and above to redeem his house from being burnt, and yet that perfidious villain would fire it afterwards, though he had obliged himself to the contrary." (*Surat to Co., 28 Jan.*)

for which his son in anger shot a poor innocent Hindu trader dead. Sir George Oxenden, the English President, won the people's praise and admiration for having made a gallant stand and saved not only the Company's property, but also the quarter of the town situated round the English factory.*

The Emperor showed his sympathy with the afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, and he rewarded the valour of the English and the Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one-half per cent. from the normal import duties on their merchandise in future.

§12. *Shivaji's doings in 1664.*

The year 1664 that lay between the departure of Shāista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy, Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad caring only for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, Maharajah Jaswant Singh, was posted at Punā. From this place he marched out and besieged Kondānā (Nov. 1663.) The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and Jaswant, after wasting six months before the fort, delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing

* As he wrote to the Company, 28th January 1664, (*F. R. Surat* 86): "The townspeople cry out in thousands for a reward from the King to the English that had by their courage preserved them. We were with the noblemen of the army that came to our relief, from whom we received great thanks for the good service we did the King and the country, whereupon your President, having a pistol in his hand, laid it before the chief, saying.....he now laid down his arms, leaving the future care and protection of the city to them : which was exceedingly well taken, [the general] telling the President [that] he accepted it, and he must give him a vest, a horse and gird a sword about him. But your President told him they were things becoming a soldier, but we were merchants and expected favour from the King in our trade."

The reduction of the import duty in favour of the English and the Dutch was withdrawn in Nov. 1679. [*Aurangzib*, v. ch. 60 §5.]

to a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarreled with his brother-in-law Bhāo Singh Hādā, evidently on the question of responsibility for the failure, and the two officers abandoned the siege (28 May 1664) and with their armies retired to Aurangabad to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended in absolutely no gain. (*Dil. 47; A. N. 867; Jedhe.*)

The field being clear, Shivaji ranged at liberty in spite of the height of the rainy season, and plundered Ahmadnagar, (Karwar to Surat, 8th August, 1664. *F. R. Surat*, vol. 104.)

On 26th June the English factors write, "Shivaji is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that Report hath made him an airy body, and added wings, or else it were impossible he could be at so many places as he is said to be at, all at one time. . . . They ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all conditions of people. . . . That he will lay siege to Goa we do hardly believe, in regard it is none of his business to lay siege to any place that is fortified against him, for it will not turn him to account. He is, and ever was, for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence nor guard." (Surat to Karwar. *F. R. Surat* 86.)

And, again, on 26th November, "Deccan [*i.e.*, Bijapur] and all the South coast [*i.e.*, Kanārā] are all embroiled in civil wars, . . . and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength. . . . He is very nimble and active, imposing strange labour upon himself that he may endure hardship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he flies to and fro with incredible dexterity." (Surat to Co., *F.R. Surat* 86). At the end of the monsoons, *i.e.*, in October, he burst into Kanārā. (See Ch. 10.)

On 23rd January, 1664, Shahji died as the result of a hunting accident on the bank of the Tungabhadrā, in the Bāsavapatan district. His younger son Vyānkoji

succeeded to all his personal effects and territories in Mysore and the Eastern Karnātak.

APPENDIX.

The eye-witness of the bloody reprisal in Shivaji's camp after the Muslim attempt to murder him by treachery, was Anthony Smith, an English merchant then detained there as a prisoner for ransom. (He was mistaken for an Armenian or Turk.) A modern writer has tried to discredit Smith's evidence on the ground that the President of the Surat English factory reported to the Company in London that Smith had injured the Company's interests by telling some lies to the Marathas during his captivity. Evidently the charge was disproved, for we find Smith still in the service of the Company three years after this date. (This information was traced by Sir W. Foster among the India Office records, at my request.) Therefore Smith's veracity as to what Shivaji did in his camp at the time cannot be questioned. These atrocities are inevitable in the sack of cities.

Smith's evidence is corroborated by Rustam Manakji, whose Persian life (the *Qissah*) by J. Kaikubad has been printed (Dr. J. J. Modi in his *Asiatic Papers*, Part IV, 281-309). This Manakji was present in Surat during the sack, and he relieved the distressed Parsis of the city who had been robbed and whose houses had been burnt down, and also paid Rs. 10,000 to secure the release of the Parsis detained for ransom by the Marathas. The Zoroastrians in Surat were a helpless, unarmed and inoffensive people, and yet as the *Qissah* tells us (p. 290), "The two chiefs of Shivaji's army were enemies of all the Zoroastrians. They desolated all the *mauza* and country by their pillage. From every house they took away gold, ornaments, clothing, and grain, and then set fire to the houses. In them they killed some men, and carried away others with their hands tied behind them like convicts in chains."

CHAPTER V.

SHIVAJI AND JAI SINGH, 1665.

1. Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.	12. Maratha efforts.
2. Character of Jai Singh.	13. Purandar outworks stormed.
3. Jai Singh's anxieties and preparations.	14. Death of Murār Bāji.
4. Coalition of Shivaji's enemies.	15. Shiva negotiates.
5. Theatre of war described.	16. Shiva interviews Jai Singh.
6. Mughals set up outposts.	17. Treaty of Purandar, 1665.
7. Jai Singh opens campaign.	18. Shivaji receives Mughal favours.
8. Purandar described.	19. Shivaji assists Mughals in invasion of Bijapur.
9. Siege opened.	
10. Vajragarh captured.	20. Shiva fails against Panhala.
11. Flying columns ravage villages.	

§1. *Jai Singh sent against Shivaji.*

The failure of Shāista Khan and the sack of Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib and his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu and Muhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among the promotions and transfer on his birthday, 30th September, 1664, the Emperor appointed Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were deputed Dilir Khan, Dāud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rāi Singh Sisodiā, Ihtishām Khan Shaikhzāda, Qubād Khān, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundelā, Kirat Singh (a son of Jai Singh), Mullā Yahia Navāyat (a Bijapuri noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many other officers, with 14,000 troopers. (A. N. 868; *Storia*, ii. 120.)

After making the necessary preparations, and collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India and crossed the Narmadā at Hāndiā on 9th January, 1665. He pushed rapidly on, never wasting a day by halting, except when strong necessity compelled him. On 10th February he arrived at Aurangabad, where Prince Muazzam was holding Court as viceroy of the Deccan. In three days Jai Singh

finished the work of waiting on the Prince, receiving and returning the visits of the local officers and nobles, and settling some points connected with his expedition. Then, leaving Aurangabad on 13th February, he arrived at Punā on 3rd March and took over charge from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by the Emperor. (H. A. Paris MS. 110b, 112a, 114b, 116a.)

§2. *Character of Jai Singh.*

Jai Singh's career had been one of the undimmed brilliancy almost from the day when he, an orphan of eight, received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617.) Since succeeding to the throne of Amber in 1622, when only 13 years old, he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire,—from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, and from Qandahār in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service somewhere and received some promotion for conspicuous merit. His marked ability had found recognition in his being given the command of the van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led by princes of the blood in campaigns beyond India. Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner of the sovereign of Delhi.

Age and experience had cooled the impetuous ardour of his youth,—he had once led the forlorn hope, at the storm-

ing of Mau,—and he now employed stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in preference to war. His foresight and political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and impolitic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character.

And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned his armour at the age of fifty-six to crush a petty chieftain, who in less than ten years had grown great enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi.

§3. *Jai Singh's anxieties and far-sighted preparations.*

It was however, with no light heart that Jai Singh* set himself to the task of subduing Shivaji, against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, Shāista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, and he had the failures of his predecessors before him. Shiva had already established a name for stratagem, and his Māvlés had measured swords with the best regular troops on more than equal terms. Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm Bijapur and Golkondā and throw them into the arms of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give his undivided attention to

* My account of this war is based upon Jai Singh's copious letters (*Haft Anjuman*, Benares and Paris MSS., with a few extra letters in *Faiyyāz-ul-qawāniñ*), Aurangzib's letters (given in Paris MS. *Suppl.* 476, with two stray letters in a miscellaneous Delhi Ms.) and certain other letters given in *Khatut-i-Shivaji* (R.A.S. MS.). Some of these have been translated by me in the *Modern Review*, A. N. 887-907, though contemporary and authentic, has no independent value after the use of the above materials. *Storia*, ii. 120-125, 132-137, gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. The Marathi chronicles, *Sabh.* 36-44, and *91 Q.* 49, contain later and partly legendary accounts.

the Marathas: he had to keep an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease from being busy about the task on which I have been sent." We see from his letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal a concentrated blow at a vital point.

In view of his two enemies, Jai Singh very wisely decided to take up a position between both, *i.e.*, in the eastern part of Shiva's dominion, whence he could also easily threaten Bijapur, instead of pushing the war into the Western Ghāts or the Konkan plains further west. So convinced was he of the wisdom of this plan that when Aurangzib urged him to make a descent into Konkan, he strongly objected and succeeded in carrying his point. He knew that if he could strike a fatal blow at the heart of the Maratha kingdom, its distant limbs would drop down of themselves.

§4. *Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji.*

Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the chance of a reduction of his tribute and the removal of the Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shah aided the Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connection with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine against Shivaji all his enemies and distract his attention by attacks from all possible quarters. As early as January he had sent two Portuguese captains in his service named Francisco and Diogo de Mello,* to the

* Of the *Mello* family living in the Mughal country in banishment from Daman (Goa) for having caused two murders there. Manucci (ii. 144.) Also Pissurlencar, i. app.; Biker, iv. 126.

western coast with letters to the chief of the Portuguese settlement at Goa, inviting him to co-operate with the imperialists in attacking Shiva, who had a fleet of his own plying on that sea. In May he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Shiva is quite negligent and free from anxiety about the west coast, if our ships from Gujarat make a sudden descent on his maritime possessions much booty can be gained." He also wrote to the Siddis of Janjirā seeking their friendship. (H. A. Paris 114a; Ben. 78a.)

In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against Shiva. The zamindars of Karnātak were asked to help the Mughals by threatening Bijapur from the south; and agents from two such chiefs, namely Shivāppā Nayak and the zemindar of Bāsavapatan, reached Jai Singh's camp in April with offers of service.* Towards the end of January an envoy from the Rajah of Jawhār had met Jai Singh at Burhānpur with a proposal to join the Mughal side; he had been conciliated, promised a *mansab*, and asked to send his son or brother with a contingent of troops. Every one who bore a grudge to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslés had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. Bāji Chandra Rao and his kinsman Ambāji Govind Rao Moré,—the family from which Shivaji had wrested Jāvli,—in response to Jai Singh's invitation, sent to him a Brahman named Mudhā, asking for a safe conduct and money help, (middle of February.) These were given, and they reached his camp, along with Mānkoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the Mughal army (4th week of March). Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, solicited from Jai Singh a command and an opportunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's

* Shivāppā Nayak, the Rajah of Bednur, had died in 1660, and his son Soma Shekhar was now on the throne, but the country was still called the realm of the great conqueror Shivāppā. Paris MS. 132a.

European artillery. (*H. A.* Paris, 113, 123, 120b, *Storia*, ii. 132-133.)

Money and promises of high rank in the Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shivaji's officers to corrupt their loyalty, and with some success, as in February Ātmāji and Kahar Koli and two other brothers of the former, who commanded 3,000 cavalry and were posted by Shiva at the foot of Purandar in charge of his artillery, sent their agent to Jai Singh agreeing to desert to him. Rāmā and Hanumānt, two captains descended from an ancient line of Jagirdars of the Supā sub-division, were called away from the service of the Rajah of Chāndā and employed under Jai Singh on account of their familiarity with the seat of war and local influence. (Ben. 54, Paris 113, 122a.)

Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of success in war. The Emperor had at first given him the command of the field-operations only, while all administrative work, like the promotion, punishment and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly insisted that in war there should be only one head, and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full authority, or else the work would suffer. The Emperor yielded to the argument and Jai Singh gained absolute civil and military authority alike. The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmadnagar and Parendā were also placed under his orders.

In Western Mahārāshtra with its heavy rainfall, campaigning is impossible during the monsoons. It was already 3rd March when Jai Singh reached Punā, and if he was to effect anything it must be done in the next three months. From his despatches we learn how he utilized every day, how he struck swiftly and hard, and how he followed up every success to the utmost. The mariner does not scan the sky for the storm-cloud with more anxiety than did this general for the herald of the monsoons which must interrupt

his work in the middle and drive him into the forced inactivity of cantonments.

§5. The theatre of war described.

The Western Ghāts form a long towering wall running north to south along the western side of the Deccan. They have thrown off a number of short spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to join its sisters and form the mighty rivers of the south, the Godāvari and the Krishnā. Towards the east the spurs end, the valleys widen out and merge in the vast plains of the kingdom of Bijapur. This land, almost locked among the hills, is the cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Open, and therefore vulnerable, on the east, it is almost impenetrable from the west on account of hills and jungles. And it is in the west that the historic forts of Shivaji are situated, almost every peak being crowned with the Maratha eagle's eyrie.

Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the Indrāyani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh and Tikonā in the west and Chākan in the centre. Next comes the valley of the Bhimā, in which Punā stands. Further south, across a long range, lies the valley of the slender brook Karhā, with the cities of Sāswad and Supā in the plain and the forts of Singh-garh on the western hills and Purandar on its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies the valley of the Nirā, with the town of Shirwal on its bank and the forts of Rājgarh and Tornā in the west and Rohirā in the south-west.

Punā is roughly the same distance (about 28 miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Rājgarh in the south. Sāswad was admirably situated for attacking Purandar (6 miles south-west of it), Singh-garh and Rājgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and Punā (18 miles north-west of it), —while the widening plain east of it enabled cavalry to

make an easy and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the path of reinforcements coming to Shiva from that side. Even now five main roads meet at Sāswad.

§6. *Mughals set up outposts.*

Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye for the ground, made Sāswad his base. Punā was strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established opposite Lohgarh to observe and blockade it and guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier near Junnar. A flying column was organized to ravage the Maratha Villages embosomed among the hills to the west and south-west of Sāswad. On his eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from the nature of the ground, the position of Sāswad close to the boundary line between Shiva's dominion and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced post at Supā.

After arriving at Punā (3rd March), Jai Singh spent some days in settling the country and establishing outposts, which he regarded as the "first of the pillars supporting the work of this expedition." Qutb-ud-din Khan was sent at the head of 7,000 cavalry with orders to guard the country from Junnar in the north to the lowlands (*pāinghāt*) of Konkan opposite Lohgarh, to set up one permanent outpost facing Lohgarh (to be garrisoned by 3,000 men), another facing fort Nar-durg with a strong force, and other outposts to bar the paths usually followed by the enemy, and to be constantly touring through his jurisdiction and inspecting his outposts. Ihtishām Khan with 4,000 cavalry was left to guard Punā and its surrounding district. Between Punā and Lohgarh, a distance of some 28 miles, is a difficult pass, where a guard of 2,000 cavalry was posted. Sayyid Abdul Āziz was appointed with 3,000 horse to hold the *thānah* of Shirwal and prevent aid from reaching Purandar from the south. With him went Bāji Chañdra Rao, Ambāji Govind Rao (zamindars of Jāvli), and Mānkoji Dhangar who had joined the Mughals.

There was already another *thānah* at Supā, in charge of Sayyid Munawwar Khan of Bārha, and some other Muslim and Hindu officers.

§7. *Jai Singh opens the campaign.*

Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take up his position at Sāswad and besiege Purandar, Jai Singh marched out of Punā on 14th March.

But he had immediately afterwards to make a long halt in its environs, as news came to him that Qutb-ud-din had gone to Junnar to escort treasure and Shiva had come to Lohgarh to make a dash into the imperial territory as soon as Jai Singh's back would be turned on Punā. Jai Singh quickly recalled Qutb-ud-din to his post opposite Lohgarh to watch Shiva's movements and resumed his march on the 23rd. Loni, some 12 miles east of Punā, was next reached ; here a block-house or enclosure for sheltering the troops was built in 3 days, and a *thānah* established under Rāmā and Hanumant, with 300 cavalry and 300 foot-musketeers, to guard the line of communication with Punā and the two roads which led to the imperial territory.

Arriving on 29th March at a place one day's march short of Sāswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with the vanguard and the artillery to cross the path lying in the way, advance four miles, and then halt.

Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Dāud Khan below the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up to noon. The rear-guard were to bring up the stragglers.

On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan went with the van to Sāswad in order to select a place for encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, who occupied an enclosed village in the waist of the hill—called *māchi* in the local language,—now came down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, routed them and captured

the *māchi*. The houses there were burnt and the Mughal van very boldly improved their victory by at once pushing on as near Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond the range of the fort-guns.

Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 of the troops of his command under Rāi Singh, Kirat Singh, Qubād Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundelā and other officers at a gallop. He also despatched an urgent order to Dāud Khan to come to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Dāud Khan, on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir Khon, without coming to Jai Singh.

The day was far spent ; there was no high officer left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to stay there perforce. He had already sent forward a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of Dilir Khan.

Next morning (31st March), Jai Singh carefully escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving as a base, between Sāswad and Purandar, only 4 miles from the latter. Then he reconnoitred the fort from the position of Dāud Khan and Kirat Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass of hills ; hence, to surround and closely blockade it was impossible. (Paris MS. 125b.)

§8. *Purandar described.*

Six miles south-west of Sāswad rises the stupendous mountain mass of Purandar, the highest point of which towers 4,564 feet above sea-level and more than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort, with an independent and very strong sister enclosure, named Vajragarh, on a ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all around and a lower fort or *māchi*, 800 feet or more below it. The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire circuit being four miles.

On the north side the ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing the barracks and offices of the garrison. This terrace is bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called *Khad-kalā* or the Skyscraper)* of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small table-land (3,618 feet above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramāl, (now called Vajragarh.)

This Vajragarh commands the *māchi* or lower fort of Purandar on its northern and most important face, as the garrison has to live here. It was by seizing Vajragarh that Jai Singh in 1665 and the English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided to attack Vajragarh first. (*Bom. Gaz.* xvii. pt. iii, pp. 428-435.)

§9. *Mughals open the siege.*

Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan troops, Hari Bhān and Udai Bhān Gaur, entrenched between Purandar and Rudramāl. In front of him were the chief of the artillery, Turktāz Khan, and the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the 3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other *mansabdārs* made a stockade opposite the north gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Karn Rāthor, Jagat Singh of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Ālam. Behind Purandar and facing its postern gate (*khirkī*) was the position of Dāud Khan, Rajah Rāi Singh, Md. Sālih Tarkhān, Rām Singh Rathor, Sher Singh Rāthor, Rāj Singh Gaur and others.† To the right of this position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhāni and his Rozbhāni followers. Opposite Rudramāl, Chaturbhuj Chauhān with a party of Dilir Khan's followers entrenched,

* Molesworth, 2nd ed., 192, explains *Khadkal* as 'a rocky plateau'.

† Ram S. Rathor, Karn S. and Sher S. were the sons of that Rao Ratan S. Rathor who fell at Dharmat. [Raghuvir Singh.]

and behind them Mitrasen, Indraman Bundelā and some other officers.

Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the hill-side. He visited the trenches every day, encouraged his men, and supervised the progress of the siege. At first all his efforts were directed to dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult hill. It took three days to raise a gun, named *Abdullah Khan*, and mount it opposite Rudramāl. In $3\frac{1}{2}$ days more a second gun, named *Fath Lashkar*, was taken there. A third, named *Haheli*, was painfully approaching the summit. The incessant bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases of the tower in front, and pioneers were sent to its foot to dig a hole underneath.

§10. *Capture of Vajragarh.*

At midday, 13th April, Dilir Khan's division stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure and tried to capture it by escalade. The garrison, oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening (14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed and 109 wounded, as the price of this success. (Paris MS 126b.)

§11. *Flying columns ravage Shivaji's villages.*

The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping-stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's own language, "the key that would unlock Purandar". Dilir Khan now turned to the latter fort, while Jai Singh organized raids

into the Maratha country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to convince Shiva and the Sultan of Bijapur that the Mughal army was large enough to be able to spare troops from the siege, and also to prevent any concentration of forces under Shivaji by creating constant terror and disturbance in various parts of his kingdom. (Paris MS. 133a.)

There was also a secret reason for thus sending away certain generals from the siege-camp. He had some disloyal officers under him, whose presence was worse than useless. Dāud Khan Qureshi was posted to watch the postern gate (*khirkī*) of the fort ; but after a few days it became known that a party of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely rebuked Dāud Khan for his failure, and a bitter quarrel broke out between the two. Jai Singh then transferred Dāud Khan to his own division and posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Karn Bundelā opposite the postern. But matters did not improve: "Subh-Karn did not at all give his heart to the work, but preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!" Dāud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his new station. He constantly declared that the capture of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, and that the siege was a waste of men and money. His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in-chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, so that Dilir Khan would have to retire with failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the mischief-maker from the camp by creating an independent flying column and sending him at its head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on different places in the district. (Ben. MS. 191b, *Faiyyāz*, 592.)

On 25th April, the flying column, six thousand strong under Dāud Khan, accompanied by Rajah Rāi Singh, Sharzā Khan (a Bijapuri general), Amar Singh Chandāwat, Achal Singh Kachhwā (the principal officer of Jai Singh's household troops), and 400 of Jai Singh's own troopers, marched out with orders to enter the region of Rājgarh, Singh-garh

and Rohirā from two sides and 'not to leave any vestige of cultivation or habitation, but make an utter desolation.' At the same time Qutb-ud-din Khan and Ludi Khan were ordered to harry the district from the north and thus distract and wear out Shivaji. (Paris MS. 133b.)

Dāud Khan's party arrived near fort Rohirā on the 27th and burnt and totally ruined about 50 villages. A body of Mughal skirmishers entered four populous villages hidden among the hills, which had never before been visited by an enemy ; the invaders soon received reinforcements, overcame the opposition, occupied the villages, razed them to the ground, and brought away many of the peasants and their cattle and other property as spoils of war. After a day's halt here, the Mughals marched towards Rājgarh on the 30th, burning the villages on the way. Without stopping to besiege the fort (for which they were not prepared), they sacked the villages around it,—the garrison watching the work of ruin from the shelter of the fort-guns, without venturing to make a sally.

The ground in the neighbourhood was hilly and uneven. So, the column retreated four miles to a level place, near the pass of Gunjankhorā, where they encamped for the night, and next day (1st May), reached Shivāpur. Thence Dāud Khan marched towards Singhgarh and harried its environs, returning to Punā on 3rd May, by order of Jai Singh.

Meantime Qutb-ud-din Khan, in the midst of his raids into the passes of Pur-khorā and Tāsi-khorā, near fort Kumāri, was urgently recalled to Punā, where he joined Dāud Khan. The cause of this new order was that Jai Singh had learnt that Shivaji had mustered a large force near Lohgarh, which required to be immediately broken up.

The two Mughal columns were, therefore, diverted to that side (the north-west). Leaving Punā they halted at Chinchwad (10 or 12 miles north) on the 4th and reached Lohgarh on the 5th. When the Mughal skirmishers arrived near the fort, 500 Maratha horse and 1,000 infantry sallied

forth and attacked them. But the imperialists held their ground, and being soon reinforced routed the enemy with heavy loss after a severe fight. Then they burnt the houses on the skirt of the hill, taking many prisoners and cattle. The villages enclosed by the four forts,—Lohgarh, Visāpur, Tikonā and Tangāi,—were devastated, and much of Bālāghāt (highlands) and Pāinghāt (lowlands) harried. Thereafter they returned, Qutb-ud-din Khan and his party taking up an outpost near Punā, and Dāud Khan and his comrades rejoining the main army on 19th May.

§12. *Maratha efforts to raise the siege.*

Meantime the Maratha captains had not been idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise the siege. Early in April, Netāji Pālkar, Shiva's kinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on Parendā, but a Mughal detachment from Supā hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted away at the news and offered no fight. About the middle of May, Qutb-ud-din Khan had to advance up to fort Uravdā.* to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he had got news. The villages on the way were plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they assembled round any of their forts. The hill of Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the top slain or routed, Dāud Khan returning with 300 captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by Qubād Khan, the new *thānahdār* of Punā (*vice* Ihtishām Khan deceased), the victors returning with the captured peasants and cattle. (A. N. 897-99.)

But the Marathas did not invariably fail. As Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile designs." Khāfi Khan is more explicit: "The surprises of the enemy, their gallant

* The *Almgir-namah* (897) gives *Ur-drug*, a mistake for *Uravdā*, 11 miles west of Puna. [Y. R. Gupté.]

successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles, made it very hard for the imperialists to move about. The Mughals lost many men and beasts." (ii. 180.)

After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting ridge and laid siege to the *machi* or lower fort of Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of Khad-kalā at the north-eastern angle of the fort. At first, the garrison made sorties to drive away the besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, who was quite prepared and repulsed them with slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark night on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhāni: he was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But reinforcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in which the Mughals lost 8 men.

But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like grim Death, his men "doing in one day what could not be achieved elsewhere in a month."

§13. *Outworks of Purandar stormed.*

When, in the course of May, the Mughal trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, which had been dismantled by bombardment, the garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy stones, which effectually stopped the further advance of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden platform of logs and planks to be made, on which guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's position. His first two attempts were frustrated: on the first occasion the upright posts had been just set up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, however, the parts of the third tower were

joined together in the rear and sent to the appointed place in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh Rāthor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was being completed. This was done two hours before sunset.

Then the general's hands were forced by the impetuosity of his men. Before artillery could be mounted on the wooden tower and the enemy opposite crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, some Rohila soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy crowded the wall in large numbers and checked them. But reinforcements rapidly arrived: the men of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's officer Bhupat Singh Puār, a commander of 500, was slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, with several other Rajputs. On the left side Balkrishna Shekhāwat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, under Achar Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden structure. After an obstinate struggle at close quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, vacated the White Tower, retreated to behind the Black Tower (formely known as Shah Burj or Royal Tower), and began to gall the Mughals by hurling down bombs, kettles full of gunpowder, rockets, stones, etc. Finding further advance impossible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture of the three bastions made that day and ordered his men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to push on to the Black Tower.

In the course of the next two days the wooden structure was completed and two small pieces of cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated the Black Tower and another

bastion near it and took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the tower. But they could not show their heads. The stockade was untenable, and they retired to the trenches behind it. Thus five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell into the hands of the Mughals.

Purandar now seemed doomed. And, as if to complete its destruction, the Emperor had at Jai Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy artillery which were now on the way to the fort. The garrison had suffered heavy casualties during two months of incessant fighting.* Early in the siege they had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji Prabhu.

§14. *Death of Murar Baji Prabhu.*

Taking seven hundred select men with himself Murar Baji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murar Baji with his Mavles slew 500 Pathans besides many *Bahlia* infantrymen, and at the head of sixty desperate followers cut his way to Dilir's camp.

His comrades were slain by the overwhelming body of the Mughals, but Murar Baji rushed straight on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his matchless courage, called upon him to yield and promised him his life and a high post under him. Murar indignantly refused, and was going to strike at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an arrow. Three hundred Mavles fell with him, and the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the Spartan, continued the struggle, undismayed by their leader's fall and saying, "What though one man Murar Baji is dead?

* *Alamgir-namah*, 903, says that the fort had 4,000 combatants left in it at capitulation. Therefore Sabhasad's figure of 2,000 for the original garrison is wrong. Ben. MS. 187a-189a.

We are as brave as he, and we shall fight with the same courage!" (Sabh. 41 ; 91Q. sec. 51.)

§15. *Shivaji negotiates for submission.*

But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison had been thinned by two months of fighting, and now the capture of five bastions of the lower fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was only a question of time. Shiva found it futile to prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture would mean their captivity and dishonour. He had also failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns from ravaging his country. Defeat and ruin stared him in the face wherever he looked.

With his usual foresight, he had for some time past been sending envoys to Jai Singh to beg for terms, but the astute Rajput did not take him seriously.* Then, as the Mughal success became more and more evident, Shiva began to rise in his offer of tribute and forts as the price of peace ; but his terms were not proportionate to the military advantage gained by Jai Singh, and were therefore uniformly rejected.

The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the impending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh terms for peace with the imperialists, and if these were rejected he would make an alliance with Adil Shah by restoring Konkan and continue

* "After the arrival of the imperial army near Pābal, Shiva's agents began to visit me, and by the time of my arrival at Punā they had brought two letters from him. But I gave no answer and sent them back in disappointment Then he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted servant named Karmāji, who repeatedly entreated me to read the contents only once. In it Shiva offered to be loyal and to help us in a war with Bijapur as more likely to succeed than a war in his hilly and intricate country . . . In reply I asked him . . . to enter the Emperor's service if he desired his life and safety." (Ben. MS. 54a.)

the war against the Mughals with renewed vigour. He had about 20th May sent his minister Raghunāth Ballāl Atré (Pandit Rao) on a secret mission to learn Jai Singh's terms, which were that Shiva must come in person and make an unconditional surrender, after which imperial mercy would be shown to him.*

Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths, that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whether his terms were accepted or not. This visit was to be made in strict secrecy, as "the Emperor had forbidden Jai Singh to hold any negotiations whatever with Shiva."

§16. *Shivaji interviews Jai Singh.*

Raghunāth Ballāl returned to his master on 9th June. On the 10th he sent word to Jai Singh that Shivaji would come next day. On the 11th at 9 o'clock in the morning, while Jai Singh was holding Court in his tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunāth came in and reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a *pālki* accompanied by six Brahmans only. Jai Singh immediately sent his secretary Udairāj and Ugrasen Kachhwā to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward with the two officers. At the door of the tent he was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shiva, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacherous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan!

Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival he had sent

* Shiva's next move was to send the Pandit Rao back with an offer to send his son to make the submission. Jai Singh declined. (Ben. MS. 55a.)

word to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh, whose trenches were the most advanced, to be ready to deliver an assault on Purandar. After Shiva had entered, Jai Singh gave the signal, the Mughals attacked and captured the remaining part of the Khad-kalā defences. The garrison made a sortie to check them, but were driven back with the loss of 80 killed and many wounded. The fighting could be distinctly seen from the interior of the Rajah's tent. Shiva then offered to surrender the fort in order to prevent the useless slaughter of his men. Jai Singh, therefore, sent his Mir Tuzuk, Khāzi Beg, to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh with an order to stop the fight and allow the garrison to depart unmolested. An officer of Shiva was sent with Ghāzi Beg to order the garrison to capitulate. They begged respite for the night. (A. N. 903.)

§17. *Terms of the Treaty of Purandar, 1665.*

Shiva had travelled without any baggage or retinue, and therefore Jai Singh lodged him in his office-tent as his guest. Up to midnight the two sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace.* But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after much discussion, we came to this agreement: (a) That 23 of his forts, the lands of which yield 4 *lakhs* of *hun* as annual revenue, should be annexed to the empire; and (b) that 12 of his forts, including Rājgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 *lakh* of *hun*, should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne."

Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from attending the Emperor's Court like other nobles and Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his representative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to be paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor of the Deccan. This was exactly the

* H. A. Ben MS. 56a, 66b.

favour shown to the Mahārānā of Udaipur. As he pleaded with Jai Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal acts, I have not the face to wait on the Emperor, I shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five Thousand with a suitable jagir As for me sinner, exempt me from holding any *mansab* or serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your wars in the *Deccan*, I am given any military duty, I shall promptly perform it."

In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made another and a conditional engagement with the Mughals: "If lands yielding 4 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 *lakhs* of *hun* a year in the uplands (Bālāghāt Bijapuri), are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial *farmān* that the possession of these lands will be confirmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 *lakhs* of *hun* in 13 yearly instalments." He was expected to wrest these lands from the Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops.

Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in a threefold gain: *first*, we get 40 *lakhs* of *hun* or 2 *krores* of Rupees; *secondly*, Shivaji will be alienated from Bijapur; *thirdly*, the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Shivaji will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's *mansab* and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command. (Ben. MS. 70).

§18. *Shivaji receives Mughal favours.*

Dilir Khan was greatly offended at this pacific end of the siege, which robbed him of the chance of military glory,

and at Shiva's not having made him the intermediary of the Emperor's pardon. So he refused to move from his trenches or consent to an armistcie. The politic Jai Singh now turned to soothe him. On the 12th, as the public did not yet know of Shiva's arrival, he was mounted on an elephant and sent with Raja Rai Singh to wait on Dilir Khan, who, mollified by this attention, presented him with two horses, a sword, a jewelled dagger, and two pieces of precious cloth. Then Dilir Khan conducted Shiva back to Jai Singh, took his hand, and entrusted him to the Rajah. The Rajah now presented Shiva with a robe of honour, a horse, an elephant, and an aigrette (*jigha*) for the turban. Shiva, who had come unarmed, with cunning policy girt on the sword for a short time and then put it off saying, "I shall serve the Emperor as one of his devoted but unarmed servants."

That day (12th June) according to the agreement, 7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were combatants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into possession of it; all the stores, weapons, artillery, and other property found within were attached by the Government. Mughal officers were sent with Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be surrendered by the Marathas.

Some time before this, while Shiva had been sending Brahman envoys to Jai Singh, the latter with his usual foresight had written to the Emperor begging him to send to him a gracious imperial *farmān* addressed to Shiva. This was to be delivered to Shiva in the event of his making submission. By a happy coincidence the *farmān* and a robe of honour sent by the Emperor arrived on the day following the surrender. By the Rajah's advice Shiva followed the Court etiquette, advanced six miles on foot to welcome the *farmān* on the way, and put on the robe of honour. (A. N. 904.)

On the 14th Shiva was presented by Jai Singh with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonious visit to Dāud Khan.

Reaching Kondānā at noon of the 14th, Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rājgarh, where he arrived on the 15th. On the 17th he sent away Shambhuji from Rājgarh, in charge of Ugrasen Kachhwā and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 18th. (Ben. MS. 57a.)

The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor by the treaty of Purandar (A.N. 905) were:— *in the Deccan*: (1) Rudramāl or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondānā, (4) Rohirā, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isāgarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Khadkalā near Kondānā, (9) Tikonā; *in Konkan*: (10) Māhuli, (11) Muranjan, (12) Khirdurg, (13) Bhandārdurg, (14) Tulsi-khul, (15) Nardurg, (16) Khaigarh or Ankolā, (17) Mārg-garh or Atra, (18) Kohaj, (19) Basant, (20) Nang, (21) Karnāla, (22) Songarh, and (23) Mangarh.

These terms were reported to the Emperor for ratification, together with a letter of submission and prayer for pardon from Shiva (but really drafted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairāj) and a despatch from Jai Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms and the granting of a robe of honour to Shiva. They reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was pleased to accede to them all. [H. A. Ben. MS. 207a; A. N. 907; Parasnus MS. No. 8.]

Thus, in less than three months from the date when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh had succeeded in bringing Shiva down on his knees; he had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his dominions and consent to serve as a dependent vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. Shiva faithfully carried out his promises: in the war with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered distinguished service under the Mughal banner and was mentioned in the despatches.

§19. *Shivaji assists the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur.*

The war with Shivaji having thus happily ended and the terms of the Treaty of Purandar been faithfully carried

out, Jai Singh now began to make preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, in order to prevent his large army from eating its bread in idleness after its recent victorious campaign in Mahārāshtra. In September he received the Emperor's despatch accepting all his recommendations about Shiva together with a gracious *farmān* (stamped with the impression of his palm) and a robe of honour for the latter. Jai Singh invited Shiva to come and receive these marks of imperial favour with befitting solemnity. "Shivaji, then in Ādil Shahi Konkan, immediately on hearing of it, travelled quickly and reached my camp on 27th September, 1665. On the 30th, I sent him, with my son Kirat Singh and my Paymaster Jāni Khan, to advance and welcome the imperial letter on the way."

A little mummery was acted on this occasion, to satisfy the etiquette of the Mughal Court: "As Shiva had worn no weapon on his person from the day when he had come like a penitent offender to wait on the Rajah up to this date, Jai Singh now gave him a jewelled sword and dagger and pressed him to put them on." The ceremony completed his restoration to the good grace of the Emperor. (A. N. 907.)

Jai Singh then dismissed Shivaji to enable him to assemble his contingent of 9,000 men and make the necessary preparations for the coming campaign, offering him two *lakhs* of Rupees from the imperial treasury for the purpose. Shiva promised to join Jai Singh the day before he started.

At last, on 20th November, 1665, Jai Singh set out on the invasions of Bijapur,* from the fort of Purandar. The Maratha contingent, 9,000 strong, under Shiva and his

* The invasion of Bijapur by Jai Singh and Shivaji: *Haft Anjuman*, (Ben. MS. 78a—94a, 138b, 172b—173b, 190b, 192a—193b, 201b—202a, 214a—215a, 231a—233b); *Storia*, ii. 141—142; A. N. 988—1021; B. S. 406—427; the narrative in *Tarikh-i-Ali II*, is useless, the sense being completely buried under the flowers of rhetoric. The Maratha writers are totally silent. For details about the war, see my *History of Aurangzib*, vol. iv, ch. xli. In Nov. 1665, Prince Muazzam left for the Court after handing over the vice-royalty of the Deccan to Jai Singh. (A. N. 924.)

kinsman Netāji Pālkar,—“whom the Deccanis regarded as a second Shivaj,”—formed the left centre of the Mughal army.

During the first month of the campaign, Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purandar to Mangalbira, a fort 52 miles north of Bijapur, the invaders advanced without meeting with any opposition; the Bijapuri forts on the way were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at call to Shiva's troops, who had been sent ahead by Jai Singh to capture them. Phaltan, about forty miles south east of Purandar, was entered on 7th December; Thāthvadā, 14 miles south-west of Phaltan, on the 8th; Khatāv (25 miles s. of Phaltan) about a week later; and Mangalbira itself on the 18th. For these services Shivaji received a letter of praise, a robe of honour, and a jewelled dagger from the Emperor. (Parasnīs MS. letter No. 9.)

This invaders marched on, and then, on 24th December, they came into touch with the enemy for the first time. Next day, a Mughal detachment under Dilir Khan and Shivaji marched 10 miles from their camp and fought a Bijapuri army of 12,000 led by the famous generals Sharzā Khan and Khawās Khan and their Maratha auxiliaries under Jādav Rao [Ghorparé?] of Kaliāni and Vyānkoji, the half-brother of Shivaji. The Deccanis evaded the charge of the cavaliers of Delhi, but harassed them by their “cossack tactics.” dividing themselves into four bodies and fighting loosely with the Mughal divisions opposite. After a long contest, Dilir Khan's tireless energy and courage broke the enemy force by repeated charges, and they retired in the afternoon, leaving one general (Yaqut the Abyssinian) and 15 captains dead on the field and many flags, horses and weapons in the Mughal hands. But as soon as the victors began their return march to camp, the elusive enemy reappeared and galled them severely with rockets from the two wings and rear. The Maratha rear-guard under Netaji bore the brunt of the attack, but stood its ground well. When the Deccanis hemmed Netāji round and pressed him

hard, he called for reinforcements from Kirat Singh and Fath Jang Khan, and with their aid repulsed the enemy. Jādav Rao of Kaliāni received a musket-shot, of which he died in five or six days. Shivaji and his brother Vyānkoji fought on opposite sides!

After a two days' halt, Jai Singh resumed his march on the 27th. The next day, after reaching the camping-ground in the evening, he detached a force to attack and expel the Bijapuri army from the neighbourhood. The fight soon became general, and Jai Singh himself had to charge the enemy's largest division. Shivaji and Kumār Kirat Singh, seated on the same elephant, led his van and dashed into the Deccani ranks. After a hard fight, the enemy were put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and many more wounded.

On 29th December, 1665, Jai Singh arrived at Makhnāpur,* ten miles north of Bijapur fort. Here his advance was stopped, and after waiting for a week, he was forced to begin his retreat on 5th January, 1666, as he found his fondly hoped-for chance of taking Bijapur by a *coup de main* gone. He was not prepared for a regular siege, because, in his eagerness "to grasp the golden opportunity" of attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by domestic factions, he had not brought any big artillery and siege-materials with himself. On the other hand, Ādil Shah had put the fort of Bijapur in a strong posture of defence; its walls had been repaired, large quantities of provisions and material laid in, its regular garrison augmented by 30,000 Karnātak infantry, and the country round for a radius of seven miles laid waste, drained of its water-supply, and denuded of its trees. At the same time he had sent a picked force under Sharzā Khan and Siddi Masaud to invade the Mughal dominions and make a diversion in Jai Singh's rear.

* In the Persian MS. the name may be read either as *Makhnāh* or as *Nāgthāna*. The latter is a village 8 miles n. n. e. of Bijapur.

On 27th January, the retreating Mughal army reached a place 16 miles from Parendā, and there halted for 24 days. Here we shall leave it, as the historian of Shivaji is not concerned with its operations any further.

§20. *Shivaji fails at Panhālā, 1666.*

On receiving the unexpected check before Bijapur, Jai Singh looked round, to create a diversion. As he writes in a despatch to the Court, 'At my request the Emperor had [on 25th Dec.] sent a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger for Shiva, who was ready to co-operate at the siege of Bijapur, but . . . I did not deem it expedient. Shiva said to me,—'If you detach me, I can go and capture for the Emperor Panhālā, of which I know all the ins and outs, while the garrison are off their guard. I shall raise so much disturbance in that district that the enemy will be compelled to divert a large force from their army to oppose me.' As his words bore promise of action, I sent him away on his promised errand.' (H. A., Ben. MS. 84b.)

But there was a deeper reason for this step, as we learn from Jai Singh's secret correspondence. The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir Khan,* ascribed his ill-success to the luke-warmness or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the danger in which Shiva stood among the defeated and sullen Mughal soldiery. To safeguard the liberty of the Maratha

* Manucci attests that Dilir Khan several times urged Jai Singh "to take Shivaji's life, or at least to give him (Dilir Khan) leave to do so. He would assume all responsibility, and see that the Rajah was held blameless." (*Storia*, ii. 137.) The English factory records state, "In a battle between the Mughals and this country people, Shivaji ran away, being afraid that Dilir Khan would put him to death, he having told the said wazir [Dilir] that he would take Bijapur in 10 days' time, upon which persuasion he set forwards with 20,000 horse, but to his cost he found the contrary, being forced quickly to retire." (Deccan News in *F. R. Surat*, vol. 104.)

chief, and send him out of the reach of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in the western provinces of Bijapur. (H. A., 195a, 84b, 192a; hints only.)

Shiva left Jai Singh about 11th January, 1666. Five days later he reached the environs of Panhālā, and delivered an assault on it three hours before sunrise. But the garrison were on the alert and offered a stubborn defence. A thousand of Shiva's followers fell, killed and wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, Shiva at last recognized that it was madness to continue the struggle, and drew back sullenly to his own fort of Khelnā [Vishāgarh], about 27 miles westwards. But his troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded in drawing and detaining there a force of 6,000 Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. (H. A., 84b—85a; A. N. 1002.)

The news of Shivaji's failure at Panhālā reached Jai Singh on 20th January. The evil was aggravated by the desertion of Netāji. Taking offence with Shiva, Netā accepted the Bijapuri bait of 4 *lakhs* of *hun* and, deserting to Ādil Shah, raided the Mughal territory with great vigour and effect. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such a man; and so he lured Netāji back (20th March) with many persuasive letters and the granting of all his high demands, *viz.*, the *mansab* of a Commander of Five Thousand in the Mughal peerage, a *jāgir* in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the ill conquered, unsettled, ever-ravaged recent annexations in the Deccan), and Rs. 50,000 in cash. (H. A. 193.)

The cause of Netāji's rupture with Shivaji in January 1666, will become clear if we correct an obvious error in the two earliest Marāthi sources. Sabhāsād (p. 57) says that Shivaji dismissed Netāji from the post of Master of the Horse (*sar-i-naubat*) and appointed Kartoji Gujar (with the title of Pratāp Rao) to that office, as a punishment for Netāji's absence from his assigned position when Shivā delivered a night-attack on Siddi Jauhar's siege-trenches

before Panhālā fort, which failed in consequence of this act of negligence. The 91 *Qalmi Bakhar* (sec. 38) repeats the same story with the variation that the defaulter was Netāji's brother-in-law, and that Shivaji in anger punished him by docking his pay for one month, against which order Netāji remonstrated with rude vehemence, so that Shivaji at once dismissed Netāji. This would place Netāji's dismissal in 1660, though Sabhāsād actually narrates the incident among the events of 1666. It is, however, an unquestioned fact that Netāji continued to command Shivaji's cavalry till January 1666 ; Jai Singh throughout 1665 speaks of Neta as "the second Shivā," and an English factory letter calls him Shivaji's *sar-i-lashkar* till January 1666. Therefore, the only correction needed is to date Netāji's dismissal in January 1666 and assign as its cause his failure to turn up punctually in the sector round Panhālā assigned to him in Shivaji's *assault* upon that fort on 16th January 1666, and not in his *defensive* sortie from it six years earlier. The Maratha assault of 1666 failed, as we can easily infer, from its having been delayed by reason of Shivaji having to wait too long for Netāji's contingent, and thus the element of surprise (on which alone success against such a huge fort depended) was lost ; the garrison took the alarm before the escalade was actually launched, withdrew from the side of the fort which there was no Netāji to attack, and turned the full force of the defence against Shivaji's sector. In the Marāthi records Pratāp Rao is not mentioned as having eclipsed Netāji Pālkar even once before 1666.*

Netāji's defection at the end of January, 1666, coming so soon after the recent reverses, greatly alarmed Jai Singh. If Shiva were to do the same, the entire Marātha army

* Sabhāsād is again grossly in error in saying (on page 44) that when Shivaji started for Agra in March 1666, he left Netāji at home in charge of his army. We know for certain that two months before that date Netāji had given up Shivaji's service and gone over to Bijapur, from which side he was lured by Jai Singh to the Mughal army (*not* to Shivaji's) in the second half of this month of March. See my *House of Shivaji*, Ch. 10.

would join the enemy's ranks and the Mughal invaders would be crushed between the two. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Ādil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is necessary to win Shiva's heart by all means and to send him to Northern India to have audience of Your Majesty." (94a.) The Emperor having consented to this proposal, Jai Singh set himself to induce Shiva to visit the imperial Court.

CHAPTER VI

VISIT TO AURANGZIB, 1666.

1. Shivaji's fears and hopes from visit to Mughal Court.	6. Shivaji in the presence of Aurangzib.
2. His arrangements during absence.	7. The net closes round Shivaji.
3. Shivaji's journey to Agra.	8. Mughal policy <i>re</i> Shivaji.
4. New light on Shivaji at Agra.	9. Shivaji escapes from Agra.
5. Why Shivaji's audience went wrong.	10. His return home.
	11. Jai S.'s anxieties and plans. <i>App.</i> Shivaji's return home, dates and route.

§1. *Shivaji's fears and hopes from a visit to the Mughal Court.*

Jai Singh had undertaken to send Shivaji to the imperial Court. But it was no easy task. In the Treaty of Purandar, Shivaji had expressly stipulated that he was not to be called upon to enter the Mughal military service (*mansab*), nor to attend the imperial Court. There were strong reasons for it. For one thing, he and his countrymen had no faith in Aurangzib's word and believed the Emperor to be capable of any act of treachery and cruelty. Then, again, the Maratha chief had an inborn repugnance to bending his head before a Muslim ; he had been brought up in the freedom and solitude of hill and woodland, away from cities and Courts ; he had imbibed the orthodox Hindu spirit from his mother and his tutor, from the comrades of his boyhood, and the saints whom he adored ; and he had risen to independent sovereignty without ever filling any subordinate post as the servant of a higher authority. He was therefore at first averse to visit the imperial Court.

But Jai Singh plied him with hopes of high reward and "used a thousand devices" (as he repeatedly wrote in his letters), to induce him to go to Agra. The Maratha chronicles assert that Jai Singh gave Shiva hopes that after

his visit to the Emperor he was likely to be sent back as Viceroy of Mughal Deccan, with sufficient men and money for the conquest of Bijapur and Golkondā. The Emperor never committed himself to any such promise, and the Persian histories and Jai Singh's correspondence are silent about it. But it is very probable that among the vague hopes which the wily Rajput general held out to Shiva, was the probability of his being appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, where all the preceding imperial representatives including Jai Singh himself, had failed, and only a born general and renowned conqueror like Shiva could be expected to succeed. The Deccan charge was so heavy and mere generals had so often wasted imperial resources there, that in 1656 and 1666 the Emperor had talked of going there in person and conducting the war against the local Sultans. Shiva's past achievements promised success for such an enterprise, if the vast resources of Delhi were placed under a tried military genius like him. What could be more reasonable (Jai Singh may well have argued) than that the Emperor, after personally meeting Shivaji and seeing his ability, would appoint him Viceroy of the Deccan* to achieve its conquest and save himself the trouble?

Besides the problematical viceroyalty of the Deccan, Shiva had a humbler but nearer object which could be gained only by a personal interview with the Emperor. He had requested that the Emperor should order the Siddi, now an imperial servant, to cede Janjira island to him. On this point the reply from Delhi had been evasive ; but much better result could be expected from an interview and personal pleading. The possession of that impregnable sea-fortress was indispensably necessary for the defence of the Maratha kingdom on its vulnerable west coast.

* *Sabhāśad*, 44 and 48, says that Shiva himself made the offer of conquering Bijapur and Golkondā for the Emperor, if he were appointed Mughal commander-in-chief in the Deccan and permitted to annex the former Nizam-Shahi dominions, and that Jai Singh merely agreed to the proposal.

In spite of these temptations, Shiva hesitated long. Both he and his friends were as much alarmed at the idea of his going to the Mughal Court as they had been at the prospect of his interview with Āfzal Khan six years ago. They feared that a visit to Aurangzib would be only rushing into the jaws of an ogre (Rāvan. Sabh. 44; 91 Q.B. 52.) But Jai Singh took the most solemn oaths possible for a Hindu that Shiva would not be harmed during his visit, while the Rajput Rajah's son and agent at Court, Kumār Rām Singh, similarly pledged his word for the safety of Shiva during his stay at the capital. In the Maratha council of ministers the majority favoured the journey.

§2. *His arrangements for his absence.*

Shivaji's arrangements for the administration of his kingdom during his expected absence in Northern India, were a masterpiece of forethought and organization. His plan was to make his local representatives absolutely independent of any need for his orders or guidance during his absence. The administration of his territories, and forts would go on as efficiently as before, even if he were imprisoned or killed at Agra. His mother Jijā Bāi was left as Regent, with Moro Pant the *Peshwā* and Niloji Sondev the *majmuādār*, under her orders. The commandants of his forts were strictly ordered to be watchful day and night and to follow his rules implicitly, so as to guard against surprise or fraud. The civil officers were to follow his current regulations and practice in all matters.

After making a tour of inspection throughout his small kingdom, and even paying surprise visits to some of his forts, and repeating, as his final instructions to his officers, "Act as I had previously laid down," Shivaji took leave of his family at Rājgarh, and began his journey to Northern India, on 5th March, 1666, with his eldest son Shambhuji, five high officers, and a small but select escort. A *lakh* of Rupees from the Deccan treasury was advanced to him by

order of the Emperor for his expenses, and Ghāzi Beg, an officer of Jai Singh's army, was deputed to act as his guide.

§3. *Shivaji's journey to Agra.*

On the way, he received an imperial letter, written from Agra on 5th April, saying, "Received your letter stating that you have started for my Court. Come quickly with composure of mind, and after receiving my favours you will be permitted to return home. I send you a robe of honour [with this.]" (Parasnīs MS., letter No. 10.)

When he reached Aurangabad, his fame and splendidly dressed escort drew all the people out of the city to gaze on him. But Saf Shikan Khan, the governor of the place, despising Shiva as a mere zamindar and a Marātha, remained with his officers in the audience-hall, and merely sent his nephew to receive Shiva on the way and ask him to come and see him there. Shivaji was highly offended at this intended slight of the governor and asserted his dignity by riding straight to his appointed quarters in the city, entirely ignoring the governor's existence. Saf Shikan Khan then climbed down and visited Shivā at his residence with all the other Mughal officers! Next day, Shivā returned the visit, showing great politeness and cordiality to all. After a halt of some days here, he resumed his march, receiving rations and presents from the local officers along his route, as ordered by the Emperor. On 11th May he arrived in the outskirts of Agra, in which city the emperor was then holding Court. (Dil. 57-58. *Jaipur R.*)

Shivaji's escort and equipage during this journey to Agra are now correctly and vividly known from the Jaipur letters, which enable us to reject the exaggerations of Sabhāsad, Wāqnis and later Marātha writers. Rām Singh's officer writes from Agra: "Shivaji has come with only one hundred retainers and an escort of two hundred to 250 men. Among the latter are 100 *silahdārs* and the rest are *pāgā*, i.e., men mounted and equipped by the State. When Shivā

rides out in a *palki* many footmen big like *Khandāits*, wearing Turkish caps, march before him. His flag is orange and vermillion in colour, with golden decorations stamped on it. A hundred *banjarās* each with two pack-oxen follow his camp. All his high officers have *palkis* to ride in . . . Shivā's contingent is small, but very splendidly equipped. A large elephant goes before him carrying his flag. An advance-guard of troopers also precedes him, the horses have golden and silver trappings. The Deccani infantry [i.e., the Māvlés] too march before him. Two female elephants saddled with *haudās* follow him. . . . His *palki* is completely coated with silver plates and its poles with gold plates. . . . Now that after coming to the Emperor's presence he has shown such audacity and returned such harsh and spirited replies, the public extol him for his bravery all the more.

"Shivaji is very clever ; he speaks the right word, after which nobody need say anything more on the subject. He is a good genuine Rajput . . . and says appropriate things marked by the spirit of a Rajput." [Jaipur Records, tr. in *House of Shivaji*.]

§4. *New light on Shivaji at Agra.*

The historian who digs down to the root causes of great events, cannot help feeling that Shivaji's visit to Aurangzib produced as its ultimate consequence a revolution in the destiny of the Marātha people. This even marks a decisive turning-point in the history of India as a whole. It is now possible to reconstruct the true story of this visit, the plots and counter-plots about him in the imperial Court circle, and the daily changes in the policy of Aurangzib himself, from the most authentic contemporary records.

Kumār Rām Singh was the representative of his father Jai Singh at Aurangzib's Court and the care-taker of Shivaji during the Marātha Rajah's visit to Agra. The letters written by Rām Singh's officers from his camp during this period have been preserved among the archives of the

Jaipur State. They are all written in the Dingal dialect or the Rajasthani variety of Hindi, and are supplemented by Persian news-letters (*ākhbārāt*) also preserved in Jaipur. These Dingal letters are of unique value as they faithfully report the conversations held in Rām Singh's tent every night after his return from attendance at the Emperor's Court in Agra fort, or during the visits of Shivaji to the Kachhwā prince. They also embody the news from various centres circulating in Agra, which was the imperial capital for the time being and the contents of the letters received by Rām Singh from his father in the Deccan. Sometimes these letters were written in the very night of the conversation and sent off next morning by camel-post to the capital (Āmber) where they had been lying in undisturbed repose and ungarbled by later fabricators, till the year 1939, when we dragged them into light. They also give priceless pen-pictures, drawn by competent and critical Hindu eye-witnesses, of Shivaji's personal appearance, conversation, retinue, equipment, etc.

In every way this is the most important discovery of sources on Shivaji's history made in the present century, when taken along with the cognate source of Jai Singh's Persian despatches and private letters included in the *Haft Ānjuman*, discovered by me in 1905.

Viewed in the light of the true details thus made known to us now, the historic visit of Shivaji to Aurangzib began as a comedy of errors due to Rajput incompetence; but as the sinister policy of Aurangzib's dark heart developed, the political drama took on the lurid colours of a tragedy of human sin and divine retribution. Shivaji came out of it with the completest success, achieved by the most unimaginable means. The credit of his escape from the claws of the faithless tyrant rests solely with him, even when we concede that in so far as not a single mishap marred it at any stage, a friendly Fate must have helped the lion-hearted man of action.*

* Sanskrit, *udyoginam purushasingham upaiti Lakshmih.*

§5. *Why Shivaji's audience with Aurangzib went wrong.*

The scenic background on which Shivaji's interview with Aurangzib was acted, will help us to understand why the drama developed in the way that is known to us.

Aurangzib had usurped his father's throne by deposing Shah Jahān in 1658 and keeping him a close prisoner in Agra fort till his death. So long as the old monarch lived, his worthy son never visited Agra, but used to celebrate his coronation and birthday ceremonies in the Delhi palace. At last Shah Jahān died on 22nd January, 1666, and it was only after this event that Aurangzib paid his first royal visit to Agra and held his first Court in the palace there. His 50th lunar birthday fell on the 12th May of that year. The hereditary treasure-hoards and imperial paraphernalia, so long deposited in Delhi fort, were now removed to Agra (in 1,400 carts) and ordered to be displayed in the palace there in order to "dazzle the eyes of the world with the sight of his grandeur and wealth". High officers and vassal princes were expected to attend this, his first official rejoicing in the capital of Akbar the Great.

This is the reason why the 12th of May was the date fixed beforehand for Shivaji's audience, and the Marātha Rajah was advised to arrive at Agra one day earlier, so as not to miss the auspicious honour of the birthday celebration in the morning. But fate upset the plan. Shīvā could enter Agra only about noon on the 12th, and he had therefore to be rushed immediately to the fort for his audience, without being taught the Court etiquette beforehand. This was the real seed of all the trouble that followed.

The first mishance was in respect of welcoming him in advance (*istiqbāl*). This is a ceremony obligatory under the Mughal Government rules, in the case of every high-ranking visitor,—the distance to be advanced by the Emperor's delegate and the rank of his delegate exactly varying with the rank of the great man to be thus welcomed. The visitor used to halt at a station one day's march before

the capital and there the Emperor's delegate used to meet him with presents, marshal the order of his march, and personally conduct him to the capital next day in a procession through the streets, and finally present him to the Emperor at the auspicious hour selected by the Court astrologers.

Shivaji reached the *sarāi* of Mānikchand, a few miles outside Agra in the afternoon of 11th May, and then for the first time his intermediary at Court, Kumār Rām Singh, learnt that the guest was so near. He then sent Munshi Girdhar Lāl to Shivaji at the *sarāi* with his compliments to arrange for conducting him to Agra city next day. This was the first contretemps: no high noble welcomed Shivā at his halting place outside the capital, but only a clerk.

The next mishap was equally unintentional and due to the confusion caused by Rām Singh's slothfulness and the incompetence of his officers. The 12th of May, when Shivā was to be ceremoniously brought into Agra, happened to be Rām Singh's weekly day of patrolling round the imperial palace with his own contingent (*haft-chauki*), so that he was not free to ride out towards Mānikchand's *sarāi* early in the morning and personally guide Shivaji through Agra. That duty was left to a clerk.

Rām Singh no doubt rode out for meeting Shivaji at the entrance to Agra city as soon as his guard duty at the palace was over. But thanks to his officers' bungling yet another hitch occurred. Rām Singh took one route through Agra, while Shivā was led into the town by the Kumār's Munshi along a different road. Thus the host and the guest met only in the heart of the town, when the journey was all but completed.

The scene is thus described by the Kumār's minister: In the morning of 12th May, Rām Singh after finishing his patrol round the Emperor's palace, rode out to welcome Shivaji by advancing towards his own camp. The Kumār's agent Munshi Girdhar Lāl was bringing Shivā into Agra by the route of the Dahar-ārā garden, while the Kumār

and Mukhlis Khan (the two nobles appointed by the Emperor to welcome the Marātha Rajah) followed the path of eunuch Firozā's garden. On the way, the Kumār learnt of this confusion and sent a man to divert Shivaji towards his own position. The two parties met together in the Nurganj garden near the central market.

Tej Singh Kachhwā, who had been sent by Jai Singh to accompany Shivaji from the Deccan, pointed out Rām Singh to him. Shivaji stopped, and Rām Singh himself moved up to him and embraced him seated on horseback. Next Mukhlis Khan was introduced.

The Kumār had set up tents for his guest close to his own quarters and there Shivaji was led and made to alight with welcome music etc.

§6. *Shivaji in the presence of Aurangzib.*

Then Rām Singh started for conducting Shivaji to the royal Court. But it was now so late in the day that the public reception in the Diwān-i-Ām was over, and the Emperor had withdrawn and taken his seat in the Select Audience Hall (Diwān-i-Khās) in the inner part of the Agra palace. There Shivaji was presented to the Emperor by the Assistant Paymaster-General Āsad Khan. His gifts (1,000 *mohars* and Rs. 2,000 as *nazar*, besides Rs. 5,000 as *nisār* or propitiatory alms) as well as his son's offerings, were placed before the Emperor.

Aurangzib spoke not one word of welcome or recognition in return, and Shivaji was led back from the throne and placed standing in the line of 5-hazāri mansabdārs, that is in the third row of nobles. The work of the darbār proceeded and Shivaji seemed to have been forgotten.

This was not the kind of reception he had so long been picturing to himself and expecting as almost a certainty from his many conversations with Jai Singh. Ever since reaching Agra his mind had been ill at ease. First, he had been welcomed on behalf of the Emperor not out-

side the capital but in the heart of the town, and that too by Rām Singh and Mukhlis Khan, two junior officers holding the nominal ranks of 2,500 and 1,500 respectively. No costly present, no high title, no kind word even, had followed his bow to the throne. He found himself standing behind several rows of nobles who almost shut him from the Emperor's view. He learnt from Rām Singh that he was standing among the commanders of 5,000. "What!" he exclaimed, "My little son of nine years was created a 5-hazāri *in absentia*; my servant Netāji is a 5-hazāri. And am I, after rendering all these services and coming all the way to the Court, to get only the same low rank?" Then he asked who the noble standing in front of him was. Rām Singh replied that it was Maharajah Jaswant Singh. At this Shivā flared up, "Jaswant, whose back my soldiers have seen! I to stand behind him? What does it mean?"

Next the robes of honour (*khilat*) for the occasion were presented to the royal princes, the grand wazir Ja'far Khan, and Jaswant Singh, but none to Shivā. At this he began to fret and "his eyes became wet with anger". The Emperor noticed the commotion and told Rām Singh, "Ask Shivaji what ails him". The Kumār came from the row of the 2,500 rank mansabdārs to Shivaji's side, and the Marātha Rajah burst forth, "You have seen, your father has seen, and your Pādishāh has seen, what sort of man I am, and yet you have wilfully made me stand up so long. I cast off your *mansab*." After saying this he then and there turned his back to the throne and rudely walked away. Rām Singh caught hold of his hand, but Shivaji wrenched it away, came to one side (behind the pillars) and sat down there. The Kumār followed and tried to reason with him, but the Marātha king would not be persuaded, he cried out, "My destined day of death has arrived, either you will slay me, or I shall kill myself. Cut off my head, if you like, but I am not going to the Emperor's presence again".

Rām Singh reported the matter to the Emperor, who ordered three other nobles to go, pacify Shivā, clothe him

in a *khilat*, and lead him back to the presence. But Shivā still smarted under the humiliation of having been placed below Jaswant Singh and kept standing so long, and refused to wear the *khilat*. The failure of this peace mission was diplomatically reported to Aurangzib as a case of the rustic Marātha chief having been suddenly taken ill in the unaccustomed heat of an imperial darbar. (This was true; Shivaji had been riding in the sun for five hours in the mid-May heat of Agra, and had had no time to rest himself sufficiently.) The Emperor then told Rām Singh to take Shivaji back with himself to his residence and there soothe him, without waiting till the end of the darbār.

Rām Singh's repeated arguments had no effect on Shivaji; he only relented so far as to agree to let his son Shambhuji visit the Emperor. Next day, when Rām Singh came to Court, the Emperor asked, "Is Shivā coming?" The Kumār replied, "He had fever and therefore cannot come today." The boy Shambhuji attended the Court with Rām Singh and was presented with a full *khilat* (*sar-o-pā*). Here we may add, Shiviji never again appeared before Aurangzib.

§7. *The net closes round Shivaji.*

Immediately after this strange scene in the festive darbār hall, the courtiers opposed to Jai Singh and the nobles who had suffered in person or through their relatives in the course of Shivaji's campaigns, banded themselves together for crushing the Marātha hero, now that he had been caught in a trap. The age-old Kachhwā-Rāthor rivalry for imperial favours, as these proud Rajputs jingled the gilded chains of Mughal vassalage, had been recently sharpened by the contrast between Jaswant's unrelieved failure against Shivaji in 1664 and Jai Singh's dazzling success at Purandar next year. To this a personal sting was added by Shivaji's outcry at the Birthday darbār,

"Jaswant, whose back my soldiers have seen!"* which leering courtiers had repeated. If Jai Singh's *protegé* could be discredited, it would be a nice way of tripping up that exultant Kachhwā chief and dimming the lustre of his victory.

The private malignity of the anti-Jai Singh party was concealed under the mask of a loyal regard for the Emperor's prestige. They repeatedly goaded Aurangzib against Shivaji by saying, "Who is this Shivā, that in your royal presence he behaved with such contumacy and insolence, and yet your Majesty passed over his conduct? If this state of things is allowed to go on, every petty land-holder (*bhumiā*) will come here and act like him with impunity." To Jaswant Singh's jealous hostility was added the more potent clamour of the imperial harem. The grand wazir Jafar Khan's wife was Shāista Khan's sister, and she egged her husband on to avenge the murderous attack on her brother in Punā, now that the infidel was within his reach. The Emperor's honoured sister Jahānārā had been enjoying the custom revenue of Surat as a gift from her father, and Shivā had sacked that rich port. Was he to be now rewarded for these acts with a high *mansab* and some provincial governorship, even after such open insolence at Court?

Thus it came into the Emperor's heart, and the policy was agreed upon in his inner Council either to kill Shivaji or to confine him in a fortress. He ordered the police prefect of Agra (a stern Abyssinian named Fulād) to remove the Marātha Rajah to Radāndāz Khan's house. This Radāndāz was a man of humble origin but of ruthless cruelty

* In 1815, when Wellington as the head of the allied army of occupation in France attended the Court of Louis XVIII, the French marshals, every one of whom he had licked in the Peninsular War, showed their displeasure by turning their backs and pretending not to see him as he entered. When Louis apologised to Wellington for his generals' rudeness, the British hero calmly replied, "Your Highness need not worry. They are so accustomed to turn their backs to me, that they have not lost the habit."

and ferocious bigotry, who had become a favourite tool of Aurangzib,—as in the bloody extermination of the Satnāmi sect of Alwar. He now held charge of Agra fort and State prisoners were thrown into his dungeons.

Rām Singh, on hearing of this order to take Shivaji out of his own protection, went to Muhammad Āmin Khan, the First Paymaster General, and told him, "His Majesty has decided to kill Shivā, who has come here under my father's solemn pledge of safety. So, it is proper that the Emperor should first kill me and then only after I am dead—he should put Shivā to death or do anything else with him as he pleases." Aurangzib met this pleading by asking Rām Singh to sign a security bond for Shivā's conduct when in Agra, and see that he might not escape or do any mischief.

This was done promptly, and then Aurangzib unfolded the crooked working of his heart. He passed an order for Rām Singh to go with Shivaji to Afghanistan and fight the Yusufzāi and Afridi rebels. Rad-āndāz Khan was appointed to lead the Kumār's vanguard during this march to Kābul,—which, from the known character of this man meant, as clearly as daylight, that Shivaji was to be murdered on the way and the murder coloured as an accident or the result of an enemy ambuscade.

But this plan could not be immediately put into execution. Jai Singh had pledged his honour for Shivā's safety during his visit to the Emperor, and Aurangzib could not afford to openly dishonour the greatest of his Hindu feudatories. So a royal letter was sent to Jai Singh in the Deccan, inquiring as to what promises exactly had been made to Shivaji by the Mirzā Rajah before sending him to Court, as Shivā in Agra was openly complaining of breach of promise by the imperial Government. In waiting for the reply of Jai Singh, the exile to Kābul was delayed for some weeks.

Shivaji utilised this delay by bribing the ministers to plead for his release. On 20th May Jafar Khan, presented

Shivaji's petition to the throne begging pardon for his past offences and asking that his life be spared. The order posting him to Kābul was now withdrawn. On 29th May, he submitted another petition, after making the Head Bakhshi his mediator, in which he offered to pay the Emperor two *krors* of rupees if all his lately ceded forts were restored to him and he was allowed to return home. There he promised to fight to the death on the Emperor's side in the war with Bijapur. Aurangzib's only reply was to tighten the net round Shivaji ; he was forbidden to go out of his camp and visit anybody, and strong guards were posted round his residence.

Outside the circuit of Shivaji's camp, a large force with artillery was stationed by Siddi Fulād, the Police chief of Agra, under the orders of Aurangzib. Inside it Rām Singh's Rajput followers kept watch at night over Shivā's bed, and also patrolled round his tent ; this was meant really to prevent any secret attempt to murder him.

Shivaji now became a prisoner in appearance as well as in fact. "This made the Rajah lose heart ; he felt sad and lamented long, clasping Shambhuji to his breast." But he was not a man to yield to despair. Appeals to Aurangzib's sense of justice and hopes of intervention by any minister having failed, Shivaji was now thrown entirely on his own resources. First of all, he made Rām Singh cancel the security bond that he had given the Emperor for keeping Shivā in his own custody. Then he sent home most of the officers and all the escort that he had brought with himself to Agra (7th June.) Aurangzib had no objection to it, as he would now have fewer enemies to watch and his captive would be utterly friendless at the Mughal capital.

Thus left alone, Shivaji now petitioned the Emperor for permission to renounce the world and live at Benares as a religious mendicant. Aurangzib replied with grim humour, "Let him turn faqir and live in Allahabad fort. My subahdār of that place will take good care of him!" The strong fortress of Allahabad was used for confining

State prisoners, like Gwalior, Asir-garh, and Daulatabad. Three months passed in this way.

§8. *Mughal policy during Shivaji's confinement in Agra.*

We now turn to the policy of the imperial Government and the action of Jai Singh during the interval. As the Marātha chief complained that the promises made to him on behalf of the Mughal Government had not been kept, Aurangzib, wrote to Jai Singh asking him to report fully and exactly what promises he had made. The Rajah replied by repeating and explaining the clauses of the Treaty of Purandar, and solemnly asserting that nothing beyond them had been promised. (A. N. 970. But *H. A.* does not contain Jai Singh's reply.)

Jai Singh was placed in a dilemma by this unexpected result of Shivā's visit to the Court. True, he had sent Shivā away to Northern India "by a thousand devices" in order to get him out of the Deccan when the military situation there turned against the Mughals; but he had also pledged his honour for the safe return of his ally. He, therefore, tried to persuade the Emperor that he would gain nothing by imprisoning or killing Shivā, as the Marātha chief's wise arrangements had made his Government independent of his personality; on the contrary the imperial interests in that quarter would be best promoted by turning Shivā into a friend, at the same time that such a course would convince the public of the sacredness of the imperial officers' words. All the while Jai Singh continued to write to his Court agent, Rām Singh, to see to it that Shivā's life was safe and the solemn assurances of Jai Singh and his son remained inviolate. (*H. A.* 234a.)

This, however, was no easy matter. It was impossible for Jai Singh to change Aurangzib's crooked policy, or, at times, even to divine it. The Emperor seemed at first to have played a waiting game—to keep Shivā under surveil-

lance in order to prevent his escape and to decide after the successful conclusion of the Bijapur war if and when he would be released. After some time Aurangzib proposed to set out for the Deccan and conduct the war in person, while Shivā would be left as a State prisoner at Agra in charge of Rām Singh. Jai Singh strongly urged his son to avoid this disagreeable duty, but advised the Emperor to leave Shivaji behind in Agra. He informed the Emperor through Rām Singh, "Every moment has its special requirement. At the time when I begged the Emperor to permit Shivā to return home, the situation here bore a different aspect from now. But under the present circumstances, it is not at all expedient to send him to this side. Also, tell the Emperor, that Shivā should be kept there in a proper style (*i.e.*, not as a prisoner in duress vile), so that his officers here may not despair of his return to Mahārāshtra and in their hopelessness go over to Adil Shah and raise tumults against us, by which policy we shall avoid the necessity of sending a fresh army to the Deccan. Shivā ought to be conciliated and assured that after the Emperor had reached the Deccan, he would be summoned there from Agra. His son should, as a matter of policy, be kept with the Emperor in order that his followers (here) may loyally assist us." (H. A. 194a, 179a.)

§9. *Shivaji's escape from Agra.**

Being now freed from anxiety about his followers, Shivaji set about devising plans for his own escape. He feigned illness and began to send out of his house every evening sweetmeats for Brahmans, religious mendicants and courtiers. These were carried in huge baskets each slung from a pole which was borne by two men on their

* Shivaji's escape from Agra: A. N. 971 (one sentence only!); Bernier, 190, (same); *Storia*, ii. 139-140; *Sabh.* 52-55 and K. K. ii. 198-201, 217-220, (most detailed); *Dil.* 59-61; 91 *Q.B.* 55-56; *Fryer*, ii. 65, *House of Shivaji*, Ch. 10, Jaipur records (fullest).

shoulders. The guards searched the baskets for some days and then began to let them pass out unchallenged. This was the opportunity for which Shivaji had been waiting. In the afternoon of 19th August, he sent word to his guards that he was very ill and had taken to his bed and that they should not disturb him. His half-brother Hiroji Farzand, who looked somewhat like him, lay down on his cot, with a quilt covering all his body except the outstretched right arm adorned with Shivā's gold wristlet,—while Shivā and his son crouched down in two baskets, which were safely sent out shortly after sunset through the lines of unsuspecting guards, being preceded and followed by baskets of real sweets.

The baskets were deposited at a lonely spot outside the city; the porters were dismissed; and then Shivā and his son issued forth and made their way to a village six miles from Agra, where the trusty Nirāji Rāoji was waiting for them with horses. After a hurried consultation in a jungle the party divided; Shivā with his son and three officers, Nirāji Rāoji, Datta Trimbak and Rāghumitrā, smeared their bodies with ashes like Hindu ascetics, and hastened towards Mathurā, while the others took another route homewards.

Meanwhile, at Agra, Hiroji lay in Shivaji's bed all that night and well into the next forenoon. The guards who peeped in in the morning were satisfied when they saw Shivā's gold bracelet on the sleeper's wrist, and a servant sitting on the floor massaging the royal patient's feet. About 8 A.M. Hiorji quietly walked out of the house with the servant, warning the sentries at the gate, "Make less noise; Shivaji is ill and under treatment." Gradually the guards' suspicion was aroused; the house seemed strangely deserted; no crowd of visitors came to see Shivā as usual; and there was no sound, no stir in the house. They entered his room and found that the bird had flown away! It was now ten in the morning. They at once ran with the astounding news to their chief Fulād Khan, who reported

it to the Emperor, ascribing Shivā's flight to witchcraft and saving himself from all blame. "The Rajah," so he said, "was in his own room. We visited it regularly. But he vanished all of a sudden from our sight. Whether he flew into the sky or disappeared into the earth, is not known, nor what magical trick he has played."

Aurangzib was not the man to be taken in by such a tale. A hue and cry was immediately raised, and fast couriers and sergeants-at-arms were sent off to watch the road to the Deccan through Mālwa and Khāndesh, and to warn the local officers to look out for the fugitives. The Marātha Brahmans and other followers of Shivaji were arrested wherever found, at Agra or near it. But by this time Shivā had had fourteen hours' clear start over his pursuers.

The vigorous inquiry made at the capital gradually brought to light the details of the romantic flight. Suspicion naturally fell on Rām Singh, as he had so often tried to avoid accepting responsibility for Shivā's presence at Agra, and it was his interest to effect the Marātha chief's safe return home, for which he and his father had pledged their honour. Some of the Marātha Brāhmans who were caught admitted, under threat of torture, that their master had fled with the connivance of Rām Singh. The Rajput prince was punished, first by being forbidden the Court and then by being deprived of his rank and pay.*

§10. *Shivaji's return home.*

With consummate cunning Shivā threw his pursuers off the scent, by following a route exactly opposite to that

* *House of Shivaji*, Jaipur records. H.A. 201a. Trimbak Pant (*Dabir*) and Raghunath Pant Korde were arrested on 20th August, and escaped from Agra on 3rd April next year. (J. S.). The three leading Brahmans of Shiva's service under arrest were tortured by Fulād Khan. They alleged that the flight of Shivaji was due to the advice of Rām Singh and resulted from the latter's neglect to watch him well. Eleven months later, on the death of his father, Rām Singh was taken back into favour and created a 4-hazari, but was soon afterwards sent to join the army fighting in Assam, to die of pestilence there. (A. N. 1051).

which leads to Mahārāshtra. Instead of moving due south-west from Agra, through Mālwa and Khāndesh or Gujrat, he travelled *northwards* to Mathurā, then *eastwards* to Allahabad, and finally south-westwards through Bundelkhand, Gondwānā, and Golkondā, describing a curve east of the public highway to the Deccan, in returning to Rajgarh.

Arrived at Mathurā, he found the boy Shambhu worn out by fatigue and unable to proceed further. Three Deccani Brahmans,—Krishnāji, Kāshi, and Visāji, brothers-in-law of Moro Trimbak (the Peshwā), were living at this holy city. Nirāji knew them and confided to them the story of Shīvā's escape and his present plight. They nobly responded to the appeal in the name of their country and faith, and braving all risks of imperial vengeance in the event of detection, they agreed to harbour Shambhuji* till Shīvā should reach home and write for him.

Shivaji had crammed the hollow core of a *sannyāsi*'s staff with gems and gold coins. Some more money was concealed in his shoes, and a diamond of great value and several rubies coated with wax were sewn in the dresses of his servants or carried in their mouths.

At Mathurā, which was reached within six hours of leaving Agra, he shaved off his beard and moustaches, smeared himself with ashes, and put on the disguise of a *sannyāsi*. "Travelling in the darkness of the night with swift Deccani couriers, who were practised in the art of moving in various disguises and assumed characters," he rapidly left the capital behind him.

Dattāji Wāqnis gives a charming picture of the scene of Shivaji's home-coming. "He went to the gate of Rajgarh, where his mother Jijā Bāi resided, and requested admittance to her presence. The guards informed her that some stranger Bairāgis or religious mendicants were at the

* According to the Maratha chroniclers, also *Dil.* 61, Shambhuji was left at Mathura in charge of Kāshi Pant and his brothers. But K. K. (ii. 201 & 218) incorrectly says that he was entrusted to Kavi Kalash at Allahabad.

gate of the fort and demanded to see her. She ordered them to be admitted. When they came into her presence, Nirājī Pant blessed her after the manner of the Bairāgis ; but Shivā came closer and threw himself at her feet. She did not recognise him and was surprised . . . that a Bairāgi should place his head on her feet . . . Shivā then laid his head on Jijā Bāī's lap and took off his cap. She immediately perceived by a mark on his head, that he was her lost son, and clasped him to her bosom." (91 Q. B. 56.)

After returning to Rājgarh, he spread a false report that his son Shambhuji had died on the way, and even went into mourning for him. Then, when the suspicion of the Mughal officers along the Deccan road had been thus lulled asleep, and some months had passed, he wrote to Mathurā for his son, and the three brother* care-takers of the boy migrated with their whole family to Mahārāshtra, bringing Shambhuji disguised as a Brahman kinsman, with them.

At a certain outpost on the road, the Mughal officer suspected that Shambhuji was not of their family or caste ; but his Brahman protectors dined with him to prove their kinship, and the danger was passed. Shivā royally rewarded the faithful three—Krishnāji, Kāshi Rao and Visāji,—gave them the title of *Vishwās Rāo* (Lords Fidelity) and a *lakh* of gold pieces, and settled on them an annual revenue of 10,000 *hun*. The devoted companions of his own escape were similarly rewarded. (Sabh. 53-55. 91 Q. B. 57 ; Dil. 61.)

Shivaji's escape from captivity caused lifelong regret to Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote in his last will and testament : "The greatest pillar of a Government is the keeping of information about everything that happens in the kingdom,—while even a minute's negligence results in shame for long years. See, how the flight of the wretch Shivā, which was due to carelessness, has involved me in

* One of the three brothers, Krishnāji Trimal had accompanied Shivaji in his flight as his guide. The other two now escorted Shambhuji to his home.

all these distracting campaigns to the end of my days." (Anec. §10.)

§11. *Jai Singh's anxieties and plans about Shivaji.*

We now turn to Jai Singh's anxieties, plans, and measures during Shivaji's absence from the Deccan. His correspondence with the Emperor and with Kumār Rām Singh during the three months of Shivā's captivity has been given before.

His position was rendered infinitely worse by Shivā's escape from Agra (19th August). He had been disgraced in the eyes of the Emperor by the failure of his invasion of Bijapur. And now his son Rām Singh was openly suspected of having connived at Shivā's flight. As he writes in bitterness, "All the plans and devices that I have employed in sending Shivā to Court have been spoiled, and measureless distraction has fallen to my lot. But there is no remedy against Fate and what is written on a man's forehead. I learn from the letters of some Court agents that there is a proposal to dismiss Rām Singh from his rank (*mansab*) and *jāgir*, because Shivā's Brāhman followers, at the instigation of selfish men [my enemies at Court], have alleged that the flight of Shivā was due to the advice of Rām Singh, and resulted from the latter's omission to watch him well. May God give death to the man who cherishes the very thought of such an act of faithlessness in his heart! Why should Shivā's men's words be believed against mine, when I had reduced him to such an extremity [in war]?" [H. A. 201a.]

The anticipated return of Shivaji to the Deccan greatly added to Jai Singh's fears. As he wrote on 5th November, 1666:—"The times are bad for me. My anxieties are ceaseless. The lying Bijapuris are wasting time [by delusive negotiations]. There is no trace or news of the fugitive Shivā. My days are passing in distraction and anxiety. I have sent trusty spies, in various disguises, to get news of Shivā." [H. A. 199b—200a.]

About this time the officers left by Shivā in the Deccan when starting for Agra began to display ominous activity. Sayyid Masaud, the Mughal *qiladār* of Rohirā, wrote to Jai Singh's Paymaster complaining of the lack of provisions, etc. in the fort, and the collection of lead, gunpowder, rockets and infantry in the neighbourhood by some men who gave themselves out to be Shivā's followers and pretended that they intended to invade Bijapuri territory. At this alarming news Jai Singh sent orders to provision the fort as a precaution and to hold it strongly, pending the arrival of Udāi-bhān [the permanent *qiladār*?] A reinforcement of 500 infantry under Sukh-man Chauhān was also ordered to be thrown into the fort if necessary. [H. A. 234.]

At last in November, 1666, definite news was received of Shivā's arrival at Rājgarh. As Jai Singh's secretary wrote, "Trusty spies have now brought the news that Shivā himself has arrived but is very anxious about his son who has not returned with him. He professes a determination [to submit] to the imperial Government. But who knows what is in his heart? For some time past Mahādāji Nimbālkar, the son of Bajāji, the zamindār of Phaltan and son-in-law of the infernal Shivā, has been causing disturbances in the region of Punā and other places. My master [i.e., Jai Singh] has appointed the *jāgirdārs* of that tract, such as Tānāji [or Bābāji?] Bhonslē and others to Supā, Halāl Khan to Indāpur, Ghālib Khan to Chamārgunda, Hasan Khan, Abdur Rasul and other Deccanis also to that side, and Trimbakji Bhonslē and others to Rāisin. Before the others could arrive at their posts, Tānāji Bhonslē went to his *jāgir* and getting an opportunity attacked Mahādāji, sent many of his followers to hell, captured his flag, *torāh*, 150 horses, arrows, etc., and returning lived in peace of mind. As the Deccanis have some [mysterious] longing for the flag and *torāh*, Mahādāji trod the path of submission and humility; but Tānāji declined [to restore them.] At last, four days afterwards, that wretch got help from the Bijapuris and attacked Tānāji by surprise. That loyal

and martial officer fought valiantly on foot, till he fell in the Emperor's service. And Ānāji (or Dātāji) Deshmukh went to hell in the neighbourhood of Pandhārpur. It is reported that Mahādāji also was wounded. . . . Jai Singh at first wanted to march there in person [and retrieve the disaster], but was persuaded to give up the idea, lest the Bijapuris should take advantage of his absence. So, he has decided to send Abdul Hamid with 5,000 men to that quarter." [H. A. 211b.]

Then, in a letter to the prime-minister Jafar Khan we have this astounding proposal from Jai Singh to entrap Shivā by the false offer of a marriage between his daughter and Jai Singh's son, and get him murdered during his journey to the Rajput general's camp:

"I have not failed, nor will I do so in future, to exert myself against Bijapur, Golkondā and Shivā in every possible way. . . . I am trying to arrange matters in such a way that the wicked wretch Shivā will come to see me once, and that in the course of his journey or return [our] clever men may get a favourable opportunity [of disposing of] that luckless fellow in his unguarded moment at some place. This slave of the Court himself, for furthering the Emperor's affairs, is prepared to go so far, regardless of the praise or blame of his act by other people,—that if the Emperor sanctions it, I shall set on foot a proposal for a match with his family and settle the marriage of my son with his daughter,—though the pedigree and caste of Shivā are notoriously low and men like me do not eat food touched by his hand (not to speak of entering into a matrimonial connection with him), and in case this wretch's daughter is captured I shall not condescend to keep her in my harem. As he is of a low caste, he will very likely be caught by this bait. But great care should be taken to keep this plan secret. Send me a reply quickly to enable me to act accordingly." [H. A. 139a.]

This letter throws a lurid light on the political morals of the 17th century. When people argue that Afzal Khan

could not have possibly intended to stab Shivaji during an interview, they should remember that the sanctimonious Jai Singh was prepared to prove his loyalty by lowering his family honour and laying a fatal snare for Shivaji, a brother Hindu.

Immediately after Shivaji's flight the Emperor ordered Jai Singh to arrest Netāji Pālkar (then a Mughal mansabdar) by cunning, and send him as a prisoner to Delhi. Here the luckless general—known and feared as "the second Shivā,"—was placed in charge of the police chief, who made him in three days petition to turn Muslim if his life was spared. No offence is alleged in the Court histories for dooming him to death! He was circumcised and named Muhammad Quli ; his wife and children were brought away from the Deccan and made Muslims, and he was sent to serve in the army of Afghanistan for ten years (1667.) He returned to Shivaji in May, 1676 and was made a Hindu again. (*House of Shivaji*, Ch. IX.)

APPENDIX

SHIVAJI'S RETURN HOME FROM AGRA, 1666: DATES AND ROUTE

A news-letter from Aurangabad, received at Delhi on 14th November, 1666, contained a spy's report that Shivaji had reached his home "25 days after escaping from Agra." This would fix the date of his arrival at Rājgarh as 12th September. I had the original of this letter carefully examined and it does not mention 'one month and 25 days' as one may imagine. Now, Agra to Rājgarh is 670 miles in a straight line. But when we make allowances for the hill-passes and river-ferries on the way and the indirect circuitous route chosen by Shivaji for safety, an addition of 50 per cent should be made to the above distance. In other words, Shivaji had to do the equivalent of a thousand miles journey on a plain. This would give him an average of 40 miles a day to cover, which was not an unusual feat for a horseman of his capacity and habits. He was not yet forty years of age.

The news given in the *ākhbārāt* that on arrival at Rājgarh, "he lay ill for several days, then became well, and is now down with illness again," proves two points: (i) that Shivaji had reached home at least two months before the arrival of this letter in Delhi (say, 20 days for his first illness,

7 days of recovery, seven days of second illness, five days for the spy's report to reach Aurangabad, and 21 days for the *ākhabārāt* to travel from Aurangabad to Delhi); (ii) that Shivaji travelled with such breathless speed, by rough jungly tracks, without stopping anywhere sufficiently long for rest or good meals, that these hardships and the coarse food and bad drinking water of the long way thoroughly impaired his health, and it took him *two* courses of treatment and rest in bed to be fit again. A more leisurely journey by the civilised well-known pilgrim-routes would not have brought him to Rājgarh in such a knocked up condition.

Against the above date the following entry in the *Jedhē Shakāvalī* has been set up:

"Shivaji reaches Agra and meets Aurangzib on 25th May 1666
(*wrong date, should be 12th May.*)

He issues from Agra on 17th August (*should be 19th August.*)

He reaches Rājgarh on 20th November *along with Shambhuji*"
(*wrong fact.*)

Here there are unquestionable errors in the first and third statements. How can a reasonable man accept the late date from such a doubly tainted source?

The reasons why Shivaji lay low for a long time after returning to Rājgarh are obvious: (i) he was in broken-down health, (ii) he was anxious to ensure the safe return of his son left behind in Hindustan, and (according to one account) circulated a false report that Shambhuji had died on the way, (iii) he was wise enough not to provoke a Mughal attack at a time when he was physically incapable of riding to battle and had not yet called his dispersed officers and troops together for planning a campaign of reconquest. Hence the Mughal spy failed to hear of his return for a month or more after he had actually reached home in disguise.

After escaping from Agra in a basket, Shivaji certainly went first to Mathurā, in a direction opposite to his home, so as to throw his pursuers off the scent. His next stage, I believe, was Allahabad, which was the greatest pilgrim-centre and "clearing-house" of *Sādhus* and Hindu religious mendicants in India, and where parties could be most easily formed for travelling as *sannyāsīs* in convoy to any part of the country.

The Maratha chroniclers, no doubt, say that Shivaji visited Benares, Gaya—and even Jagannath Puri, on his return journey; but they wrote from popular gossip a generation after the event. It would be disbelieving in Shivaji's wonderful practical instinct to suppose that he roamed about making pilgrimage to every famous shrine in North India, when his life depended on his getting outside Aurangzib's jurisdiction in the shortest time possible, before the Mughal guards at the passes and ferries of the route could be warned against him or pursuing troops anticipate his arrival at any point.

It is, therefore, the historian's painful duty to cut out of Shivaji's time-table his visit to any *tīrtha* beyond Allahabad. The romantic stories about our hero's adventures when incognito at Benares and other places have been rejected as untrue; they are given below only for the delectation of the reader.

In a certain town the travellers were arrested on suspicion by the faujdār Ali Quli, who had learnt of Shivaji's flight from a letter of his Court agent before he received the official intimation of it. A close examination of the prisoners was begun. But at midnight Shivaji visited the faujdār in private, boldly declared his identity and offered him a diamond and a ruby worth a lakh of rupees as the price of his liberation. The faujdār preferred the bribe to his duty. (K. K. ii, 218.)

After performing his bath at Allahabad, Shivaji proceeded to Benares. Here he hurriedly went through all the rites usually done by a pilgrim in the dim morning twilight, and slipped out of the town just as a courier arrived from Agra with the proclamation for his arrest and hue and cry was started.

In this connection Khafi Khan writes:—"When I was at the port of Surat, a Brahman physician named Nabha [or Babha] used to tell the following tale: 'I had been serving one of the Benares Brahmans as his pupil, but he stinted me in food. At last, one morning when it was still dark, I went to the river-side as usual; a man seized my hand, thrust into it a quantity of jewels, *ashrafis* and *huns*, and said, 'Don't open your fist, but quickly finish the bathing rites for me.' I immediately hastened to shave and bathe him, but had not done ministering to him, when a hue and cry was raised and the news spread that sergents at the mace had arrived [from the Court] in search of Shivā. When I became attentive I found that the man to whom I had been ministering had slipped away. I [then] knew that it was Shivaji. He had given me 9 gems, 9 *ashrafis* and 9 *huns*. Then without going to my preceptor I returned to my country and reached Surat. The grand house that I have here was bought with that money.' (ii. 219-220.)

Still moving eastwards, he visited the famous Hindu shrine of Gaya and was joined by two of his men whom he had sent there beforehand. Then they turned south-westwards and returned home by way of Gondwana, Hyderabad and Bijapur territories. "Through travelling long distances on foot every day, he felt a desire for riding. At the time of buying a pony he had not a sufficient number of Rupees with him. So, opening his purse of gold coins, he gave a few of them to the horse-dealer. The flight of Shivaji had already been noised abroad, and the man cried out, 'You must be Shiva, as you are paying so much for a little pony!' At this Shivaji gave him the whole purse [as hush money] and fled from the place." (Dil. 61.)

We have a characteristic anecdote about an incident during this journey. The story runs that the pretended *sannyāsi* one evening took shelter in the house of a peasant in a village on the Godāvari. The old mother of the host apologized to the holy men for the poor fare placed before them, saying that the troopers of the brigand Shivaji had recently robbed the village. She cursed them and their master to her heart's content. Shivaji noted the names of the peasant and the village carefully, and on his return home, summoned the family of his host and gave them more than what they had lost in the raid. (91 Q.B. sec. 56.)

CHAPTER VII

1667—1670

1. State of Mughal Deccan in 1667.
2. Shivā makes peace with Mughals, 1668.
3. War with Mughals renewed, 1670.
4. Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir.
5. Second loot of Surat, 1670.
6. Battle of Dindori.
7. Raid into Berar ; Chhatra Sal Bundela.

§1. *State of Mughal Deccan, 1667.*

On returning home from Agra in September 1666, Shivaji found the political situation in the Deccan entirely changed. The Mughal viceroy, Jai Singh, was no longer in a position to repeat his former success over the Marāthas. Worn out by age, toil, disappointment and domestic anxieties, discredited in his master's eyes by the failure of his invasion of Bijapur, and expecting every day to be removed from his post, Mirzā Rajah was visibly hastening to his grave. In May 1667 Prince Muazzam, the newly appointed governor, reached Aurangabad and relieved Jai Singh of his charge. The Rajput veteran set out on his homeward journey in extreme misery of mind and sense of public humiliation, and died on the way at Burhānpur on 28th August.

The return of the weak and indolent Muazzam and the friendly Jaswant to power in the Deccan (May 1667) relieved Shivaji of all fear from the Mughal side. It is true that soon afterwards an able and active general, bearing implacable hatred to the Marāthas, joined the Mughal camp. Dilir Khan returned from the Gond country to the side of Prince Muazzam in October 1667, but the coming of this famous warrior brought no accession of strength to the imperialists. The Prince was jealous of Dilir's influence and prestige at his father's Court, resented his insubordinate

spirit, and regarded him as a spy on behalf of the Emperor. The proud Rohila general, on his part, publicly slighted Maharajah Jaswant Singh, the right-hand man and trusted confidant of the Prince. Nor was this the only source of discord in the Mughal army in the Deccan. Rao Karn Rathor, the chief of Bikanir, was an officer in Dilir's contingent. His Rajputs practised gang-robbery in the camp at night. Dilir Khan, to save his credit with the Emperor, reported the matter to Court, and the Emperor in reply ordered him to arrest the Rao. Dilir was sent towards Bidar to punish the enemy, but Rao Karn remained behind at Aurangabad by order of the Prince. The Prince used to help the Rao with money in his distress and enforced idleness. Thus, Dilir's enemies found a ready shelter with Muazzam. [Dil, 66-68.]

But even if the viceroy of the Deccan had been a man of greater spirit and enterprise, it would have been impossible for him for some years from this time to get the men and money necessary for crushing Shivaji. The resources of the empire had to be concentrated elsewhere, to meet more pressing dangers. Within a fortnight of Shivaji's escape from Agra, a large army had to be sent to the Panjab to meet the threat of a Persian invasion, and the anxiety on this point was not removed before December. But immediately afterwards, in March 1667, the Yusufzai rising in Peshawar took place, which taxed all the strength of the empire for more than a year afterwards.

It was, therefore, the Emperor's interest not to molest Shivaji at such a time.

§2. *Shivaji makes peace with the Mughals, 1668.*

The Marātha chief, on his part, was not eager for a war with the imperialists. For three years after his return from Agra, he lived very quietly at home, and avoided giving any fresh provocation to the Mughals. He wanted peace for a time to organize his Government, make a

revenue settlement of his lands, repair and provision his forts, and consolidate and extend his power on the western coast at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddis of Janjirā. As early as April 1667 he had sent a letter to the Emperor professing terror of the imperial army which was reported to have been despatched against him, and offering to make his submission again and send a contingent of 400 men with his son to fight under the Mughal banners.*

Aurangzib had taken no notice of this letter. But Shivaji made another attempt. He entreated Jaswant Singh to be his intermediary in making peace with the empire. He wrote to the Maharajah, "The Emperor has cast me off. Otherwise I intended to have begged for the task of recovering Quandahār with my unaided resources. I fled (from Agra) in fear of my life. Mirzā Rajah, my patron, is dead. If through your intercession I am pardoned, I shall send Shambhu to wait on the Prince and serve as a *mansabdār* at the head of my followers wherever ordered." (Dil. 69-70.)

Jaswant Singh and Prince Muazzam jumped at the offer and recommended Shivā to the Emperor, who accepted the proposal,† and recognized Shivā's title of Rajah, but so far as we can judge did not restore to him any of his forts. Thus a peace was made which lasted nearly two years.

In terms of the agreement with the Mughals, Shambhuji was sent to the viceroy's Court at Aurangabad. He interviewed the Prince on 4th November 1667 and was next day permitted to return home. On 5th August next year a Marātha contingent was sent to Aurangabad under

* *Akhbarat*, 10-9. Shivaji's three years' peace with the Mughals 1667-1669 and the causes of rupture; *Sabh.* 58-61; 91 *Q.B.* sec. 62, *Jedhē S.*; *Dil.* 69-71. The terms of this treaty are nowhere given in detail. *F. R. Surat*, 105.

† Muazzam's letter to Shivaji, dated 9th March, 1668, informs him of the granting of the title of Rajah, and states that his other demands were under consideration. (Parasnīs MS., Letter No. 11.)

Pratāp Rao and Nirāji Rāoji [Jedhē]. Shambhuji was created a Commander of Five Thousand again and presented with an elephant and a jewelled sword. Jāgirs were assigned to him in Berār. Half his contingent attended at Aurangabad, while the other half was sent to the new jāgir to help in collecting the revenue. For a year and a half the Marātha contingent lived in the jāgir, "feeding themselves at the expense of the Mughal dominion," as Sabhāsād frankly puts it. (*Dil.* 70. *Sab.* 61.)

During 1667, 1668 and 1669, Shivaji lived at peace with the Mughal Government. The English factory letters at the close of 1668 and in 1669 describe him as "very quiet" and as "Aurangzib's vassal, (bound) to do whatsoever is commanded by the Prince." His relations with Bijapur also were pacific. "The country all about [Kārwār] at present is in great tranquillity. Shivaji keeps still at Rājgarh, and though as yet there is no peace made between this king [Ādil Shah] and him, yet both refrain from committing any acts of hostility against one another." Still later, on 17th July, 1669, the English traders at Hubli speak of "Shivaji being very quiet, not offering to molest the king's country." [F. R. Surat, Vol. 105, Karwar to Surat, 16 Sept., 1668.]

In fact, during these three years (1667-69), he was busy framing a set of very wise regulations, which laid the foundations of his Government broad and deep, and have remained an object of admiration to after ages. (*Sabh.* 24-30, 56.)

But the peace was essentially a hollow truce on both sides. Shivaji's sole aim in making it was to save himself from the possibility of a combined attack by three great Powers and to recover his strength during this respite from war. Aurangzib, ever suspicious of his sons, looked upon Muazzam's friendship with Shivā as a possible menace to his throne, and he secretly planned to entrap Shivaji a second time, or at least to seize his son and general as hostages. (*Sabh.* 60.)

Sabhāsad tells us that Aurangzib wrote to his son to arrest Pratāp Rāo and Nirāji Pant, the Marātha agents at Aurangabad, and attach the horses of their troops, and that the Prince, who had learnt of the order beforehand from his Court agent, revealed it to Nirāji and instigated the Marāthas to escape, while the imperial order arrived a week afterwards, when it was too late to carry it out. (Sabh. 60-61.)

The rupture, inevitable in any case, was precipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly reduced. The disbanded soldiery took service with Shivā, who had to find employment for them. Another ill-judged measure of imperial parsimony was to attach a part of Shivā's new *jāgir* in Berār in order to recover the *lakh* of Rupees advanced to him in 1666 for his journey to the Court. The news of it reached Shivaji when he had completed his military preparations.* He sent a secret message to Pratāp Rāo to slip away from Aurangabad with his men. The other half of the contingent fled from Berār at the same time, plundering the villages on the way! (Dil. 71.)

§3. *War with the Mughals renewed, 1670.*

This breach with the Mughals occurred early in January 1670, or a fortnight earlier. On 11th Dec. 1669, the Emperor received a despatch from the Deccan reporting the desertion of four Marātha captains of Shivā's clan (*birādāri*) from the imperial service. Aurangzib soon set to strengthening his forces in the Deccan. On 26th January 1670 an order was sent to Dilir to leave Deogarh

* There is no evidence for holding that Shivaji broke the peace with Aurangzib (Jan. 1670) as a protest against the latter's general order for temple destruction (9 April 1669), though the two events are placed immediately after one another in an English Factory letter (Foster, xiii. 256) and *Jedhē*.

in the Gond country and hasten to Aurangabad. Dāud Khan was ordered to arrange for the defence of his province of Khāndesh and then go to Prince Muazzam's assistance. Many other officers were transferred from North India to the Deccan. (*Akhbārāt*, year 12.)

Shivaji opened his offensive with great vigour and immediate success.* His roving bands looted Mughal territory, and he attacked several of the forts which he had ceded to Aurangzib by the Treaty of Purandar. "The imperial officers in command of most of these forts fell after fighting heroically. Every day the Emperor got news of such loss of forts. But some of these places defied capture by reason of the strength of their fortifications and abundant supply of war material." (*Dil.* 64.)

His most conspicuous success was the capture of Kondānā from Udai-bhān, its Rajput *qiladār*, (4th Feb. 1670). Assisted by some Koli guides who knew the place well, in that dark winter night Tānāji Mālusaré, with 300 picked Māvlé infantry men, scaled the less abrupt hillside near the Kaliān gate by means of rope-ladders and advanced into the fort, slaying the sentinels. The alarm was given ; the Rajputs, stupefied with opium, took some time to arm and come out ; but in the meantime the Marāthas had made their footing secure. The garrison fought desperately, but the Māvlés with their war cry of *Hara ! Hara ! Mahādev !* carried havoc into their ranks. The two chiefs challenged each other and both fell down dead, after a single combat. The Marāthas, disheartened by the fall of their leader, were rallied by his brother Suryāji Mālusaré, opend the Kaliān gate to their supporting columns, and took complete possession of the fort. The rest was butchery. Twelve hundred Rajputs were slain, and many others perished in

* *Sabhāsād*, 58, says, "In four months he recovered the 27 forts he had ceded to the Mughals." But it is an exaggeration, and *four months* is merely a vague term. There is a most spirited but legendary ballad on the capture of Singh-garh (*Powadas*). The *Akhbārāt* and *Dilkashā* have been of invaluable help in the history of the campaign of 1670 as reconstructed here, with a few dates from *Jedhē*.

trying to escape down the hill-side. The victors set fire to the thatched huts of the cavalry lines and the signal blaze informed Shivaji at Rājgarh, nine miles southwards, that the fort had been taken. He mourned the death of Tānāji as too high a price for the fort, and named it *Singh-garh* after the lion-heart that had won it.

On 8th March, Nilo Pant recovered Purandar,* capturing its *qiladār* Razi-ud-din Khan. A few days later the Marāthas looted the village of Chandor, seizing an elephant, 12 horses and Rs. 40,000 belonging to the imperial treasury, then entered the town and plundered it, while the imperial *qiladār* was shut up in the fort. At one place, however, he met with repulse. The fort of Māhuli (in North Konkan, 50 miles n.e. of Bombay) was held for the Emperor by a gallant and able Rajput named Manohar Dās Gaur, the nephew of Rajah Bithal Dās of Shah Jahān's time. Shivā invested it in February 1670 and attempted a surprise at night. He sent up 500 of his men to the ramparts by means of rope-ladders. But Manohar Dās, who "used to be on the alert day and night," fell on the party, slew most of the men and hurled the rest down the precipice. Shivaji then raised the siege, turned to Kaliān-Bhivandi and recovered them after slaying the *thānāhdār* Uzbak Khan and driving out the Mughal outposts there. Ludi Khan, the *faujdār* of Konkan, was wounded in a battle with the Marātha forces, defeated in a second encounter, and expelled from his district. The Mughal *faujdār* of Nānder (?) fled away, deserting his post. (M. A. 99. Dil. 65. Surat letter.)

The only officer who made an attempt to uphold the imperial prestige in the Deccan was Dāud Khan Qureshi, who had been second only to Dilir Khan during Jai Singh's Marātha campaign of 1665. Leaving the province of Khāndesh in charge of his son, Dāud Khan arrived at

* Shivaji's first attempt to gain this fort by sending a party of Rāmusis to take it by escalade failed, according to the oral traditions of this tribe. Mackintosh, *Account of Ramoossies* (Bombay, 1833), p. 55.

Ahmadnagar on 28th March 1670. Six days afterwards he set out with 7,000 cavalry to expel Shivā's men who were roving near Pānir, Junnar, and Māhuli. They evacuated Pānir and Junnar and returned before him, while he occupied these two posts. Meantime, Shivaji had invested three Mughal forts in that region, and Dāud Khan left Junnar to relieve them. But at the approach of his van (under his gallant son Hamid and Ludi Khan) the Marāthas raised the siege and fled away, and the Mughal advanced division fell back on their main body.

Soon afterwards, these two officers went with a detachment and destroyed an old fort which the Marāthas were repairing on the frontier, 20 miles from Māhuli. Towards the end of April, Dāud Khan himself marched to Māhuli, and after throwing provisions into the fort, returned to Junnar. The Emperor in open Court highly praised Dāud Khan for his spirit in invading the enemy's country, regardless of the smallness of his own force, and thereby creating a useful diversion of Shivaji's attention. (*Akhbārāt*, year 13.)

On 16th June Māhuli too was lost to the Emperor. Manohar Dās, conscious of the inadequacy of the garrison and provisions in the fort to repel another attack of the superior Marātha forces, resigned his post in despair of getting reinforcements. Shivaji seized the opportunity, and captured Māhuli, slaying its new commandant Alawardi Beg and his garrison of 200 men. By the end of April 1670* he had looted 51 villages near Ahmadnagar, Junnar and Parendā.

§4. *Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir.*

But the Mughal administration of the Deccan was in no condition to make a stand against Shivaji. For half of

* The text of *Akhbārāt* here is doubtful. *Jedhē* says that in August Shivaji raided the Mughal dominions and laid siege to Junnar; captured Lohgarh (13 May), Hindolā (15 June), Karnāla (22 June), Rohidā (24 June). *Dil.* 65.

the year 1670 it was passing through a civil war of its own. In obedience to the Emperor's anxious and repeated orders, Dilir Khan* had left the Gond country, where he had been profitably employed in squeezing the local chieftains, and set off for the Deccan. Starting from Nāgpur on 29th March 1670, he expected to reach Aurangabad and to wait on the Prince on 12th April. But at his near approach the old quarrel between the viceroy and his general broke out afresh. We have seen how they had disagreed in 1667. So, now too, when Dilir, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached Pathri, 26 miles w. of Aurangabad (about 8th April) and received an order from the Prince to wait on him, he feared to go to the interview lest he should be treacherously imprisoned or killed by the Prince. "Twice or thrice he took horse for the purpose of visiting the Prince, but returned from the way, and spent some days on the plea of illness."

At this act of insubordination Muazzam and Jaswant wrote to the Emperor accusing Dilir Khan of rebellion. The Khan had already denounced the Prince to the Emperor, saying that he was in collusion with Shivaji and had done nothing to defend the imperial dominions, and offering to crush the Marātha chief if the command of the army in the Deccan were left in his (Dilir's) hands for two years with an adequate supply of artillery and siege material.

So, at the end of March 1670 the Emperor had sent his Chamberlain (*Khān-i-sāmān*), Iftikhār Khan, to Aurangabad to investigate how matters really stood,—whether Muazzam was really bent on rebellion and what his relations with Shivaji were. This officer was now

* Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir Khan in 1670: *Dil.* 73-75, 80-82 (main source); Ishwardas (important) 59a—60a; *Storia*, ii. 161-166; while *M. A.* 102, *Akhbarat*, year 13, and English records give dates and a few details. *O. C.* 3415, *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 3, Vol. 105 (Bombay to Surat, 5 Sep.) &c. *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, Baroda ed., i. 274-276, merely copies Ishwardas.

instructed to inquire into the Prince's charges against Dilir Khan.

Iftikhār, no doubt moved by kindly intentions, became guilty of double-dealing. As an English gunner in Muazzam's service wrote, "He played the Jack on both sides, and told the Prince that Dilir Khan was his enemy, and went to Dilir Khan and told him that the Prince would seize on him if he came to Aurangabad." His unfortunate advice to Dilir only prolonged the tension. (John Trotter to President of Surat, 20 Dec. 1670, in *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 105.)

Muazzam complained to the Emperor that Dilir Khan had openly defied his authority and that the Khan's Afghān troops used to rob the people and sack the villages along their line of march ; and the latter charge was borne out by the reports of the news-writers. Then Dilir, finding his position in the Deccan intolerable, wanted to go back to the imperial Court without waiting for permission ; but the Prince ascribed this course to a wicked desire of creating disorder in Northern India. Imperial orders reached him to force Dilir Khan back to the path of obedience. The Prince set himself to raise an army for a war with Dilir and called in the Mughal detachments from the outlying posts to his banners.

Dilir Khan was pursuing a Marātha band across the Godāvari river, when he heard of the arrival of a *farmān* from the imperial Court, and divined its purport. His former suspicion and anxiety now deepened into alarm and perplexity. Though it was the height of the rainy season (August), the rivers swollen and the roads miry, he burnt his tents and stores and fled northwards to Mālwā with his army.

As soon as he started from the south, Prince Muazzam and Jaswant gave him chase up to the bank of the Tāpti, with all the available Mughal troops, calling upon Shivaji to come to their aid! The Deccan was filled with wild rumours of a civil war among the imperialists, which were

"so confused that we cannot write them for credible." (O. C. 3470, Bombay to Surat, 1 Sep. 1670.)

A letter, however, came from the Emperor ordering Muazzam back to Aurangabad (September.) The Prince's evil genius, Jaswant Singh, was separated from him and posted at Burhānpur until further orders. Muazzam promptly obeyed his father's order and returned to Aurangabad at the end of September, 1670.

These internal troubles paralyzed the Mughal arms, and Shivaji made the most of this golden opportunity. We have seen how he had recovered several of his forts early in the year. His cavarly bands roamed over the country, plundering far and wide. In March the English factors at Surat wrote, "Shivaji marches now not [as] before as a thief, but in gross with an army of 30,000 men conquering as he goes, and is not disturbed though the Prince lies near him." (O. C. 3415.)

§5. *Second loot of Surat, 1670.*

In April Bahādur Khan visited Surat with 5,000 horse, to guard the town against an apprehended attack by Shivā. In August there were false rumours that Muazzam, then supposed to be in rebellion against his father, was coming to Surat, "to take possession of this town and castle." The Mughals demanded from the Court of Bijapur a contingent of 12,000 horse for service against Shivaji, and some ammunition from the English at Bombay for the fort of Kuwāri-durg (40 m. w. of Punā.) People were expectant as to what the imperialists would do when the rains would cease and campaigning again become possible. But Shivaji as usual, struck the first blow. On 3rd October he plundered Surat for the second time. (O. C. 3457, Surat Cons.)

Throughout September he had been assembling a large body of cavalry at Kaliān, evidently to invade Gujrat. The matter was so notorious that on 12th September the

English factors at Surat* had rightly concluded that "that town would be the first place he would take," and "foreseeing the ensuing danger, [we] had taken a convenient time to empty all our warehouses at Surat of what goods were ready baled and sent them down to Swally;" even their entire Council with the President (Gerald Aungier) were at Swally at the beginning of October. And yet the Mughal governor was so criminally negligent as to keep only 300 men for the defence of the city. On 2nd October came successive reports of Shivā's arrival with 15,000 horse and foot within 20 miles of Surat. All the Indian merchants of the city and even the officers of Government fled away in the course of that day and night. On the 3rd, Shivaji attacked the city which had recently been walled round by order of Aurangzib. After a slight resistance the defenders fled to the fort, and the Marāthas possessed themselves of the whole town except only the English, Dutch and French factories, the large *New Sarāi* of the Persian and Turkish merchants, and the *Tartar Sarāi* opposite the French factory, which was occupied by Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kāshghar, recently returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The French bought off the raiders by means of "valuable presents." Though the English factory was an open house, it was defended by Streynsham Master with 50 sailors, and the Marāthas were received with such a hot fire from it that they lost several men, and, leaving the English alone, assaulted the Kāshghar king's *sarāi* from the advantageous position of some avenues next to the French factory, which they were suffered by the French to occupy. The Tārtārs made a stout resistance all the day, but finding the post untenable they fled with their king to the fort at night, giving up to plunder their house with its valuable

* The second loot of Surat: Surat Cons. 12 Sep.; Surat Council to Co., 20 Nov. 1670. (Hedge's *Diary*, ii. pp. cxxxvi—ix.) *F. R. Surat* Vol. 3. (Consult. at Swally Marine, October); *Dutch Records*, Trans. Vol. 29. Nos. 703. Martin, *Mémoires*, i. 293. *M. A.* 106 (bare mention). *Sabbh.* 62-63; *91 Q. B.* sec. 63.

property, including a gold *palki* and other costly presents from Aurangzib.

From the safe shelter of the *Tartar Sarāi* the Marāthas prepared to open fire on the English factory the next day, but the resolute attitude of the handful of Englishmen cowed them, and after an angry parley they came to an understanding and agreed not to molest the English. The Dutch warehouse was untouched. As their Surat Resident writes, "A messenger came from the invader to assure us that no harm would befall us if we remained quiet . . . and we gave him our assurances that we would not interfere for or against him." The Turks in the *New Sarāi* successfully defended themselves, inflicting some loss on the raiders. (*Dutch Records, Translations*, Vol. 29, Surat to Directors, 14 Nov. 1670.)

The Marāthas plundered the larger houses of the city at leisure, taking immense quantities of treasure, cloth, and other valuable goods, and setting fire to several places, so that "nearly half the town" was burnt down to the ground. They then approached the fortress of Surat, threatening to storm it ; but it was a mere demonstration, as they were not prepared to conduct a siege, and did not venture close to the walls. The third day (5th Oct.) they again appeared before the English factory, threatening to burn it down. Shivaji and his soldiers were greatly enraged at the loss of their men in the first assault on this house, and they clamoured for vengeance. But the wiser among his captains knew that a second attack would result in further loss of life, and at their request two English agents waited on Shivaji in his tent outside the town, with some presents of scarlet cloth, sword blades and knives. The Marātha king "received them in a very kind manner, telling them that the English and he were good friends, and putting his hand into their hands he told them that he would do the English no wrong." (Surat to Co., 20 Nov. 1670, in *Hedge's Diary*.)

On 5th October, about noon Shivaji suddenly retreated from the town, though no Mughal army was near or even

reported to be coming. "But he had got plunder enough and thought it prudent to secure himself. When he marched away he sent a letter to the officers and chief merchants, saying that if they did not pay him twelve *lakhs* of Rupees as yearly tribute, he would return the next year and burn down the remaining part of the town. No sooner Shivaji was gone than the poor people of Surat fell to plundering what was left, in so much that there was not a house, great or small, excepting those which stood on their guard, which were not ransacked." Even the English sailors under S. Master took to plundering.

During the three days that Surat was undergoing this fate, the sea-port of Swally marine, ten miles west of it across the Tapti, was not free from alarm. There the English, Dutch and French had built their warehouses and landing-places for ocean-going vessels. Here lay during those days all the members of the English factory, their treasure, and most of the goods bought for Europe. Here the *shāh i-bandar* (harbour and custom-master), the *qāzi*, and the most eminent merchants (Hindu, Muslim and Armenian) of Surat had taken refuge with the English. Many rich people of the town, too, had fled to the villages north of Surat, across the river and close to Swally. On the 3rd it was reported that Shivaji wanted to send 500 horsemen north of the river to plunder the villages and seize these rich men ; and it was feared that he might even come to Swally to demand the surrender of the Surat refugees and blackmail from the European merchants. But the coming of the spring-tide made it impossible for the Marāthas to cross the river, and Swally remained safe. So great was the alarm there, however, that on the 3rd the English factors removed their treasure from the shore to one of their ships, and next day loaded all their broadcloth, quicksilver, currall (coral?) &c., on board ship, "to secure them against any attempts of Shivaji." Two other English ships, which were due to sail, were detained at Swally till 10th October, by which time the Marāthas were expected to withdraw from the district.

The English factors with the help of the ship's carpenters even ran up a wooden platform at one end of the marine yard and mounted eight guns on it, "to defend the Company's estate the best we could."

The manly attitude of the English and their success in scaring away the Marātha myriads, greatly impressed the people of the country. These traders had, as a reward for their brave defence of their factory during the loot of 1664, received commercial privileges from the Emperor. And now the son of Hāji Said Beg, the richest merchant of Surat, who had found shelter at Swālly, publicly swore that he would migrate with his family to Bombay.

The fact that all the three European factories at Surat were untouched while every other shop and house was ransacked by the raiders, naturally excited suspicion. Both at Surat and the imperial Court people "talked of the three Christian nations having made a league with Shivaji when he was here." The foreign merchants therefore received no reward from the ruler of the land *this* time. (F.R. Surat, 105.)

An official inquiry ascertained that Shivaji had carried off 66 *lakhs* of Rupees' worth of booty from Surat,—viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 *lakhs* from the city itself and 13 *lakhs* worth from Nawal Sāhu and Hari Sāhu and a village near Surat. (*Ākhbārāt*, 13-10.)

But the real loss of Surat was not to be estimated by the booty which the Marāthas carried off. The trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed. For several years after Shivaji's withdrawal from it, the town used to throb with panic every now and then, whenever any Marātha force came within a few days' march of it, or even at false alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the merchants would quickly remove their goods to the ships, the citizens would flee to the villages, and the Europeans would hasten to Swālly. Business was effectually scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest emporium of Western India.

For one month after the second sack, "the town was in so great a confusion that there was neither governor nor Government," and almost every day was troubled by rumours of Shiva's coming there again. "On the 12th (*i.e.*, only a week after his departure) it was again rumoured that he was returning with 6,000 horse and 10,000 foot, and that he had already reached Peint (dist. Nāsik), a place about 75 miles distant. At once there was a general exodus and the town was changed from a busy port into the death-like quiet of a desert. The Turkish, English and French merchants abandoned their factories." But the Dutch, 52 men in all, with flags flying and drums beating proceeded from their ship to their factory. This was their belated imitation of the English demonstration of January 1664, when "the English President, at the head of some 200 men, had marched through the town, declaring that he meant to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men!" (*Dutch Records, Trans.*, Vol. 29, letter No. 763 and Vol. 27, No. 719.)

At the end of November, and again about 10th December, 1670, the alarm was revived; and the European merchants met together to concert the means of guarding their respective interests. The landward defences of Swally were strengthened by adding a breastwork on the north side of the *choultry*, and the entrance to the harbour or "hole" was guarded by stationing a ship there. The English used to remove their money and goods from Surat to this place at every such alarm.

In June 1672 the success of the Marātha forces under Moro Pant in the Koli State of Rāmnagar, on the way to Surat, kept the city in constant terror for a long time. The Marātha general openly demanded *chauth* from Surat, threatening a visitation if the governor refused payment. There was the same panic again in February and October 1672, September 1673, October 1674, and December 1679. In short, the destruction of the trade and financial prosperity of Surat was well nigh complete. (*F. R.*)

§6. *Battle of Dindori, 17th Oct. 1670.*

Having concluded the story of the Marātha dealings with Surat, we turn to Shivaji's activities in other quarters.

Prince Muazzam had just returned to Aurangabad after chasing Dilir Khan to the bank of the Tāpti, when he heard of the plunder of Surat. He immediately summoned Dāud Khan from Burhānpur and sent him off to attack the Marātha raiders. Meantime, Shivaji had left Surat, entered Baglānā, and plundered the villages nestling at the foot of the fort of Mulhir. Dāud Khan, after sending his baggage from Baizāpur back to Aurangabad, marched westwards with light kit to Chandor, a town at which the road from Nāsik to Baglānā crosses the hill range. Spies brought him news that Shivaji had started from Mulhir and intended to cross the Chandor range by the pass of Kānchanā-Mānchanā, ten miles west of Chandor. Arriving at the hamlet of Chandor (below the fort) at about 9 p.m., Dāud Khan waited to verify the news of the enemy's movements. At midnight his spies reported that Shivā had already issued from the pass and was rapidly following the road to Nāsik with half his forces, while the other half of his army was holding the pass to pick up stragglers. Dāud Khan at once resumed his march. But the moon set about three o'clock in the morning, and in the darkness the Mughal soldiers were somewhat scattered.

Ikhlās Khan Miānā (son of Abdul Qādir *bin* Bahlol Khan, a former Pathan leader of Bijapur), commanded the Mughal vanguard. Ascending a hillock in the early morning, he beheld the enemy standing ready for battle in the plain below. While his men were putting on their armour, which was conveyed on camels, he himself with a handful of followers recklessly charged the enemy. The Marātha rear-guard, which had faced about, was 10,000 strong and commanded by distinguished generals like Pratāp Rāo Gujar, the Master of the Horse, Vyānkoji Datto and Makāji Anand Rao (a natural son of Shāhji Bhonslē.) Ikhlās Khan was

very soon wounded and unhorsed. After a time Dāud arrived on the scene and sent up Rāi Makarand and some other officers to reinforce the Van, while he left his elephants, flags and drums at a ruined village on a height, surrounded by *nālās*, with orders to make his camp and rear-guard halt there when they would come up.

For hours together an obstinate and bloody battle raged. Sangrām Khan Ghori and his kinsmen were wounded, and many were slain on the Mughal side. The Marāthas, "like the *Bārgis* of the Deccan, fought hovering round the imperialists." But the Bundela infantry of the Mughal army with their abundant fire-arms kept the enemy back. Dāud Khan himself entered the fight, repulsed the enemy with his artillery, and rescued the wounded Ikhlās Khan.

Meantime, in another part of the field, Mir Abdul Mabud, the *dārogha* of the divisional artillery, who had been separated from the main army by a fold in the ground, was attacked. He was wounded with one of his sons and some followers, while another son and many soldiers were slain; and his flags and horses were carried off by the enemy. There was a lull in the fight at noon.

At that time Dāud Khan had less than 2,000 men with him, while the Marāthas outnumbered him fivefold. In the evening they charged him again, but were driven back, evidently by the artillery. At night the Mughals bivouacked under the autumn sky, their camp was entrenched, and they engaged in burying the dead and tending the wounded. The Marāthas retreated to Konkan without further opposition. This battle was fought near Dindori on the 17th of October, 1670.* About a week later the Peshwa captured the fort of Trimbak (Nāsik district.)

* Battle of Dindori: entirely based upon *Dilkashā*, i. 84-88. (Bhimsen was an eye-witness); with a few points from *Sabh.* 63. Date in *Jedhē S.* *Dindori* is 28 m.s.w. of Chandor and 15 m.n. of Nasik. *Jedhē* states that from Dindori Shivaji went to Kunjargarh and stayed there.

As the result of the battle of Dinodori, the Mughal power was neutralized for more than a month afterwards. The day after the fight Dāud Khan marched with the broken remnant of his army to Nāsik, and halted there for one month, evidently to recoup his strength and also to watch the route from Konkan (by the Tal pass?). The wounded were sent to Aurangabad. Late in November, he removed to Ahmadnagar, but at the end of December he was recalled to the scene of his last battle by the revival of Marātha activity in the Chandor range. (*Dil.* 87, 89, 92.)

§7. *Raid into Berār and Baglānā.*

We shall not deal in this chapter with Shivaji's activity at sea and in the western coast-strip in November and December 1670 after his return from Surat. Early in December a Marātha force under Shivaji himself made a raid into Khāndesh, after capturing the forts of Ahivant, Mārkandā, Rāvlā, and Jāvlā in Baglānā, on the way. Advancing by rapid marches, he plundered Bahādurpurā, a village two miles from Burhānpur (the capital of Khāndesh), but did not come closer to that city, because of the warning of Jaswant Singh, who had been posted there since September last. Passing into Berār, he fell, when least expected, upon the rich and flourishing city of Kārinjā, and looted it completely. Four thousand oxen and donkeys were loaded with the booty—consisting of fine cloth, silver and gold, to the value of a *krore* of Rupees, captured here. All the rich men of the place were carried off for ransom. Only the most eminent one among them escaped in the disguise of a woman. The other towns also yielded vast sums of money. That rich province, with its accumulated wealth of more than half a century of peace and prosperity, afforded a virgin soil to the plunderers in this their first raid. A force, reported to be 20,000 strong, began to loot the country round Āusā and collect the revenue, but they rode away without attacking the fore. In the neighbourhood of Kārinjā

and, Nāndurbār the Marāthas took from the affrighted people written promises to pay them one-fourth of the revenue (*chauth*) in future.*

No resistance was made by the Mughals. Khan-i-Zamān, the governor of Berār, moved too slowly to intercept the raiders, and he stopped on reaching Deogarh. Dāud Khan, the governor of Khāndesh, was absent campaigning near Ahmadnagar, while his son Ahmad Khan, who officiated as his deputy at Burhānpur, was at open war with Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who was trying to raise money for the Prince's expenses and had demanded five *lakhs* from the treasury of Khandesh. Dāud Khan's son replied that if the Maharajah could produce Aurangzib's order, he would pay him even 20 *lakhs*, or else not a pice, at which message Jaswant threatened to sack the town. (F. R. Surat, 105, Bombay to Surat, 5 February, 1671.)

Dāud Khan from his camp near Ankāi Tankai hastened towards Burhānpur. Arriving near the pass of Fardāpur he heard that the Marāthas returning from Berār had turned aside from Burhānpur and taken the road to Baglānā. The situation at the capital of Khāndesh was also eased by the arrival there on 1st January 1671 of a new supreme command, Mahābat Khan, who took Jaswant away with himself when leaving the town.

From Fardāpur, Dāud Khan swerved to the west and entered Baglānā on the heels of the Marāthas. While Shivaji had been sacking Kārinjā in Berār, another Marātha band under Moro Trimbak Pinglē had been looting West Khāndesh and Baglānā, and now these two divisions had united in the neighbourhood of Sālhir. They had plundered the village under the hill-fort of Mulhir and laid siege to Sālhir. Dāud Khan arrived near Mulhir at about 8 P.M., but could advance no further as most of his camp and army were lagging behind.

* *Jedhē*; *Dil.* 98. *Akhbārāt*, year 13—5, 10. *F. R. Surat*, 105. *Letter* of J. Trotter, 20 Dec. 1670; S. Master to President, 19 Dec. *Dil.* 64 (bare mention of Karinja.) *Sabh.* 70, Karinja is 77-30 E. 20-32 N.

The Khan urged his troops to start next morning in order to raise the siege of Sālhir. He himself set out before sunrise. But most of his men had not yet arrived, and the few that had come with him were scattered. They busied themselves in cooking food or taking rest in the camp, instead of resuming the march with their chief. Dāud Khan heard on the way that Sālhir had already been captured by the Marāthas, and so he returned in disappointment to Mulhir, and after a short halt there fell back on his new base near Kānchanā-Mānchanā in the Chandor range.

Shivaji had invested Sālhir with a force of 20,000 horse and foot, and one day finding the garrison off their guard he had scaled the wall by means of rope-ladders. The *qiladār* Fathullah Khan fell fighting, and his wife's brother then gave up the fort to the enemy. This happened about 5th January 1671. The success of the Marāthas continued. They threatened other forts in the province, such as Mulhir, Chaurāgarh and Huigarh. Their roving bands cut off the grain supply of Neknām Khan, the *faujdār* of Baglānā (whose head-quarters were at Mulhir.) They also laid siege to Dhodap, the loftiest hill-fort in the Chandor range.*

In the winter of 1670-71, Shivaji received a visit from Chhatra Sāl, the son of Champat Rāi Bundelā, the late chieftain of Mahewā in eastern Bundelkhand. This young man had entered the imperial army at Jai Singh's recommendation, but he was discontented with what he considered the inadequate reward of his services in the Mughal invasion of the Gond country. So, one day he left the Mughal camp on the plea of hunting and made an adventurous journey with his wife to Mahārāshtra by obscure and roundabout paths. He offered to serve under Shivā against the Emperor. Shivaji received him with honour, praised his manly spirit, but sent him back with the advice to rise against Aurangzib in Bundelkhand, saying, "Illustrious chief! conquer and

* *Dil.* 98-100. *Akhbarat*, year 13—12, 15. 91 *Q.B.* sec. 74. K. K. ii. 247-249 (gives another story of the surrender of Sālhir).

subdue your foes. Recover and rule your native land. . . . It is expedient to commence hostilities in your own dominions, where your reputation will gain many adherents. . . . Whenever the Mughals evince an intention of attacking you, I will distract their attention and subvert their plans, by active co-operation with you." The contemporary historian, Bhimsen, however, tells us that Chhatra Sāl returned from Rājgarh in disappointment as he found the provincial spirit of the Deccani Court uncongenial to him and Shivaji never gave his trust or any high office to men from Northern India.*

* *Chhatraprakash*, canto 11; tr. in Pogson's *Boondelas*, pp. 52-53; *Dil.* 132. For history of Chhatra Sāl, see Sarkar's *Aurangzib*, ch. 61, and Irvine's *Later Mughals*, ii. ch. 9.

CHAPTER VIII

STRUGGLE WITH THE MUGHALS AND BIJAPUR, 1671-74

1. Campaign of Mahābat & Dāud, 1671.
2. Campaign of Bahādur & Dilir.
3. Marathas occupy Koli country 1672.
4. Surat threatened.
5. Marātha successes, 1672.
6. Desultory fighting, 1673.
7. Panhālā & Satara captured.
8. Battle of Umrāni.
9. Battle of Nesari, 1674.
10. Dilir Khan defeated.

§1. *Campaigns of Mahābat and Dāud Khan, 1671.*

The second sack of Surat and the Marātha ravages in Baglānā roused Aurangzib to a sense of the gravity of the situation in the Deccan. As early as 28th November, 1670, he had appointed Mahābat Khan to the supreme command in the Deccan. The events of December only deepened the Emperor's anxiety. On 9th January 1671, he sent orders to Bahādur Khan to leave his province of Gujrat and take the command of one of the imperial army corps in the Deccan, Dilir Khan being directed to accompany him. The Emperor also repeatedly talked of going to the Deccan and conducting the war against Shivaji in person, but the idea was ultimately dropped. Dāud Khan was instructed to attack Shivā wherever he was reported to be. Amar Singh Chandāwat and many other Rajput officers with their clansmen were posted to the Deccan. Reinforcements, money and provisions were poured into Baglānā in January, 1671. (*Akhbārāt*, 13-1, 2, 8, 14, 16; *M.A.*, 107.)

Mahābat Khan left Burhānpur on 3rd January 1671 with Jaswant Singh, reached Aurangabad on the 10th, paid his respects to the viceroy, Prince Muazzam, and set out to join the army near Chandor. Dāud Khan had been appointed his chief lieutenant and the commander of his

vanguard ; but he despised this office as below his rank, and begged the Emperor to recall him. (*Akh.* 13-12 ; *Dil.* 102.)

We shall now trace the history of the war in the Chandor range. Late in December 1670 Shivaji's men had laid siege to Dhodap, and Dāud Khan had started on the 28th of that month to relieve the fort. But the *qiladār* Muhammad Zamān, successfully repelled the attack unaided. Dāud Khan had next advanced to the relief of Sālhir, but had been too late to save it, as we have already seen. In January 1671, he held a fortified base near the Kānchanā pass from which he sallied forth in every direction in which the Marāthas were heard of as roving. From the Emperor's letters it appears that Dāud Khan was under a general order to right everything that might go wrong in Baglānā! Once after a night-march he fell on a body of the enemy near Hātgarh and slew 700 of them. (*Akhbārāt*, 13-6 and 15 ; *Dil.* i. 101.)

Late in January 1671, Mahābat Khan joined Dāud Khan near Chandor and the two laid siege to Ahivant, which Shīvā had recently taken. After more than a month had been wasted in a fruitless exchange of fire, the fort was entered from the trenches of Dāud Khan and the garrison capitulated to him. Mahābat Khan became furiously angry at losing the credit of this success. He had been previously treating Dāud Khan, a 5-hazari, with courtesy, and now the relations between them became strained to the utmost. Leaving a garrison to hold Ahivant, Mahābat spent three months at Nāsik and then went to Parnerā (15 miles north of Daman) to pass the rainy season (June to September) there, while Dāud Khan was recalled to Court, (about June.)*

* *Dil.* 102-104, 106 ; *Sabh.* 72. "Mahābat Khan is come as far as Nāsik Trimbak and hath taken 4 castles ; Huturnt (=Ahivant) and Sālhir are the names of two of them." (*F. R. Surat*, 105, Bom. to Surat, 8 April 1671.) But the Mughals did not recover Sālhir, *Sabh.* 73 says they were severely defeated near it. They only captured Jāvlā, Markandagarh, Anchalāgiri, and Ahivant in Vaishākh (April 1671), acc. to *Jedhē*.

There was excessive rainfall that year and many men and cattle perished of pestilence in the camp at Parnerā. But while his troops were dying, Mahābat Khan attended daily entertainments in the houses of the nobles by turns. There were 400 dancing-girls of Afghanistan and the Panjab in his camp, and they were patronized by the officers. (*Dil.* 160.)

§2. *Campaign of Bahādur and Dilir, 1671-72.*
Battle of Sālhir.

The Emperor was dissatisfied with Mahābat Khan for the poor result of his campaign in the first quarter of 1671 and his long spell of inactivity afterwards, and suspected him of having formed a secret understanding with Shivaji. So, he sent Bahādur Khan and Dilir Khan to the Deccan next winter. They marched from Surat into Baglānā, laid siege to Sālhir (now in Marātha hands), and leaving Ikhlas Khan Miānā, Rao Amar Singh Chandāwat and some other officers to continue the siege, proceeded towards Ahmadnagar (Oct.). (*Dil.* 107; *O. C.* 3567; *Jedhé*.)

From the environs of Ahmadnagar, Bahādur Khan advanced towards Supā (in the Punā district), while Dilir Khan with a flying column recovered Punā, massacring all the inhabitants above the age of 9 years, (end of December 1671.) Early in January 1672, Shivaji was at Mahād, draining his forts of men to raise a vast army for expelling the invaders from the home of his childhood.* But the pressure on Punā was immediately afterwards removed and Bahādur

* *F. R.* Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 13 Jan. and 20 Jan. 1672. The town taken by Dilir Khan is spelt in the English Factory Records as *Puna Chackne*, (from the usual practice of tacking two places together in one subdivision) and described as "a place of great concern in a very large plain in the heart of all Shivaji's upper country." This description suggests Puna and Chakan ; but we have no direct evidence that Shivaji got back Puna and Chakan from the Mughals by the treaty of 1665 or that of 1668. The English record a rumour, which we know was baseless, that at the capture of this place Dilir Khan killed Kartoji Gujar, the Marātha Lieutenant-General (*i.e.*, Pratāp Rao).

Khan was recalled from this region by a severe disaster to the Mughal arms in Baglānā. There, the division left to besiege Sālhir was attacked by a large force of Marāthas under Pratāp Rao, Anand Rao and the Peshwā (Moro Pant). After an obstinate battle, Ikhlaś Khan and Muhakam Singh (the son of Rao Amar Singh Chandāwat) were wounded and captured with 30 of their principal officers, while Rao Amar Singh and many other commanders as well as several thousand common soldiers were slain, and the entire siege-camp was taken by the enemy.* Shortly afterwards Moro Pant captured Mulhir, and then putting fresh men, munitions and provisions in the two forts, they hurried back to Konkan unmolested. This took place at the end of January and the first week of February, 1672. Shivaji's prestige and confidence in his own power were immensely increased by these successes. Surat was now in constant terror of him, as he entirely dominated Baglānā.

From the English records we learn that Shivā now "forced the two generals (*viz.*, Bahādur and Dilir), who with their armies had entered into his country, to retreat with shame and loss."† But the Persian accounts are silent about it. We can, however, be sure that the Satnāmi rising in March and the rebellion of the Khaibar Afghans in April next, made it impossible for the Emperor to attempt the recovery of his prestige in the Deccan, and Shivā was therefore left the master of the situation throughout the year 1672. (M. A. 115-116.)

Bahādur Khan returned from Baglānā with failure, encamped for some time on the bank of the Bhimā, and then went back to Ahmadnagar to canton for the rains. About May 1672 Mahābat left the Deccan for Hindusthan,

* On the Marātha side also many soldiers were slain and only one chief of note, Suryā Rao Kankré, a comrade of Shivaji's youth. *Sabh.* 74; *Jedhē*; *Dil.* 107; *Ishwardas*, 60b; *F. R.* Surat 87, M. Gray to Bombay, 15 Feb. Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 16 Feb., 1672; *K. K.* ii. 249.

† *O. C.* 3633, Surat to Co., 6 April, 1672. Ramaji Pangrē's heroic battle with Dilir near fort Kanerā (*Sabh.* 73) must be placed here.

and a month later Muazzam did the same. Bahādur Khan was appointed commander-in-chief and acting viceroy of the Deccan, in the place of these two, becoming substantive *subahdār* in January 1673 and holding that office till August 1677. (*Dil.* 108-109; *M. A.* 121.)

§3. *Marātha occupation of the Koli country, 1672.*

So greatly was the spirit of the Marāthas roused by their victory over Ikhlās Khan, capture of Mulhir, and expulsion of Bahādur and Dilir from Punā, that their activity continued unabated even during the hot weather and the rainy season of this year. On 5th June, a large Marātha army under Moro Trimbak Pinglē captured Jawhār from its Koli Rajah, Vikram Shāh, and there seized treasure amounting to 17 *lakhs* of Rupees. The place is only 100 miles from Surat, and adjoins the Nāsik district, from which it is separated by the Western Ghats. Advancing further north, he threatened the other Koli State of Rāmnagar* which is only sixty miles south of Surat. The Rajah, Som Shāh, fled with his family (about 19th June, 1672) to Chikli, six miles s. e. of Gandavi and 33 m. s. of Surat. Even Gandavi was deserted by the people in fear of the coming of the Marāthas. But the invaders speedily retreated from Rāmnagar on hearing that Dilir Khan was assembling his forces for a campaign. Heavy rain stopped the activity of the Marāthas for a few days. But soon afterwards Moro Pant, with his army raised to 15,000 men, returned to the attack, and took Rāmnagar in the first week of July. Its Rajah took refuge in the Portuguese territory of Daman.

The annexation of Jawhār and Rāmnagar gave the Marāthas a short, safe and easy route from Kaliān up Northern Konkan to Surat, and laid that port helplessly open to invasion from the south. The city became subject

* Now called Dharampur. The old capital Rāmnagar, now known as *Nagar*, stands 24 m. s. w. of Dharampur, the new capital.

to chronic alarm, whenever any Marātha troops were heard of even 60 miles off, at Rāmnagar.

§4. *Surat threatened for chauth.*

From the neighbourhood of Rāmnagar, Moro Trimbak Pinglē sent three successive letters on behalf of his master to the governor and leading traders of Surat demanding four *lakhs* of Rupees as blackmail, and threatening a visit to the city in the case of their refusal. The third of these epistles was very peremptory in tone; in it Shivaji wrote, "I demand for the third time, which I declare shall be the last, the *chauth* or quarter part of the king's revenue under your Government. As your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country, that army must be paid by his subjects. If you do not send me the money speedily, then make ready a large house for me, for I shall go and sit down there and receive the revenue and custom duties, as there is none now to stop my passage."

At the first news of the arrival of the Marātha army in Rāmnagar, the governor of Surat summoned all the leading Hindu and Muhammadan merchants and proposed that they should subscribe Rs. 45,000 for engaging 500 horse and 3,000 foot to guard the town for two months. Officers were immediately sent to make a list of all the Hindu houses in the town for assessing this contribution. But no soldiers were enlisted, and the governor pocketed whatever money was actually raised for the defence.

On the receipt of the third letter from Shivā, the helpless citizens were seized with panic. The richer men went to the governor that very night and wanted permission to remove their families to Broach and other towns for safety. He kept them waiting till after midnight, gave them the permission, but retracted it next morning, when he held a second conference with the townsmen, asking them to raise the blackmail demanded,—the merchants paying one *lakh* and the *desāis* raising two *lakhs* from the cultivators of the

villages around. After a discussion lasting a day and a night, in which he reduced his demand to Rs. 60,000, the people finally refused to pay anything, as they knew too well that he would appropriate the money instead of buying the enemy off with it. Thereafter, every time that there was an alarm of the approach of Shivaji's troops, the citizens of Surat hastened to flee from the town, but the governor shut the gates to keep them in! *

We may conclude the history of the Koli Rajahs here. Vikram Shāh, the ex-chief of Jawhār, on losing his kingdom in June 1672, fled to the adjoining Mughal district of Nāsik. From this place he used to sally forth with roving bands of his own, plunder the peasantry, and cut off communications in the north Thānā district, now in Marātha hands. His son joined Dhārā Rāi Koli (another dispossessed chief) and took to brigandage, causing considerable loss to Marātha territory and military routes. Finally both were captured and executed. (*Jedhē S. 91 Q. B. sec. 74.*)

§5. *Further Marātha successes in 1672, but raid into Khāndesh and Berār, Dec. 1672, defeated.*

From their base in the Koli country of Jawhār and Rāmnagar, a Marātha force under Moro Trimbak easily crossed the Ghāts into the Nāsik district, in the middle of July 1672, plundered and occupied it. Jādav Rao Deccani, a great-grandson of Lakhji Jādav (the maternal grandfather of Shivaji), with 4,000 men, was the Mughal *thānahdar* of Nāsik-Trimbak. He was defeated and captured after losing many of his troops in battle. Siddi Halāl,

* Conquest of Koli country and its effect on Surat: *F. R. Surat*, vol. 3. Consult, Surat 21 June, 1672; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 21 and 25 June; vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 8 July; *O. C.* 3649; *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, 1 November 1673; *Sabh.* 72; *Jedhē*. The threatening letter is given (in Persian) in the R. A. S. MS. Persian 71 (*Khatut-i-Shivaji*), 3, and the reply to it in A. S. B. MS. F. 58, p. 98; both translated in my *House of Shivaji*.

the *thānahdār* of Vāni-Dindori (or North Nāsik district), was also defeated and his charge looted by the Marāthas. For this failure, both the officers were sharply reprimanded by Bahādur Khan, and in anger they deserted to the Marāthas, with two other officers and all the men of their "four great regiments of horse" (October.) Other desertions were apprehended, and Dilir Khan was left in great danger with a weakened army to defend the province of Gujrat against the exultant enemy.*

On 25th October, a large Marātha army appeared at Rāmnagar again, and Surat trembled in alarm, especially as a party of Shivaji's horse advanced to Chikli. But that city was not Shivaji's objective now. He made a lightning raid into a different corner of the Mughal empire.

He sent his light cavalry to plunder Berār and Telin-gānā.† The viceroy Bahādur Khan, on hearing of it, set out from Ahmadnagar due eastwards, left his heavy baggage at Bir (70 miles to the east) and Kandhār, and arrived as fast as he could near the fort of Rāmgir (18°35' N. 79°35' E.) in pursuit of the raiders. But they had been two days beforehand with him, looted the village at the foot of the fort, and carried off the families of most of the inhabitants for ransom. So the baffled Mughal general returned by way of Indur (modern *Nizāmābād*), 95 miles due west of Rāmgir. Entering the Qutb-Shāhi territory, he ravaged the land at the instigation of Dilir Khan. The Marāthas in their retreat divided into two bodies; one turned south-west to their own country by crossing the frontier of the Gol-

* *Dil.* 116; *F. R.* Surat 81, Surat to Bombay, 20 July, 1672, Vol. 3, Surat, 26 October; Bombay to Surat, 18 October, in *F. R.* Surat 106, 91 Q.B. 74, for the two deserters.

Siddi Halāl, formerly an officer of Afzal Khan (of Bijapur), entered the Emperor's service, but used to write secretly to Shivaji news of everything that occurred at the Mughal head-quarters. *Akb.* 13-18. (MS. reads *Shah* for *Siddi*).

† *Dil.* 116, 120-122 (full.) The exact month is uncertain. The *Shivapur Yadi* merely says that "Shivaji took horse on 29 Dec. 1672 and Annaji Pant was sent on 6 Jan. 1673"—without giving their destinations.

kondā state, and the other moved northwards by way of Chandā into imperial territory. Dilir Khan was sent off to pursue the first division, while Bahādur Khan tried to bar the advance of the second.

Sending his heavy baggage back to Aurangabad from the neighbourhood of the village of Jāmkhed, the viceroy hastened by way of Partur, Shellode and Peedolā, and arrived near the pass of Āntur (38 miles north of Aurangabad.) Here the Marāthas turned at bay, and attacked the Mughal Van under Sujan Singh Bundelā. But they were repulsed and pursued till evening, many of the horses of traders and other kinds of booty were recovered from the enemy and restored to their owners. Next day the Mughals crossed the pass and encamped at Durgāpur, four miles from the fort of Āntur.

The following day, when they were marching to Aurangabad in rather straggling groups, before the time fixed for the starting of the general, one body of 10,000 imperialists was charged by 750 picked Marātha cavalry on the left of the pass of Bākāpur, six miles off. After an obstinate battle, in which the Mughals were reinforced by their general, the Marāthas retreated, leaving 400 of their number dead on the field. The credit of this victory belongs to the Bundelās under Subh-Karn, whose gallant son Dalpat Rao was wounded in the fight.

The division under Dilir Khan rejoined Bahādur Khan after pursuing the other Marātha band into west Bijapur territory, and capturing much booty. The general cantoned his troops at Pathri, 76 miles s. e. of Aurangabad. This Marātha raid into Khāndesh and Berār, unlike their first incursion in December 1670, was completely foiled, and the Mughal troops showed commendable mobility and enterprise. (Nov.-Dec. 1672.)

To guard against a repetition of these two Marātha penetrations into Khāndesh from Bālāghāt, Bahādur Khan set up gates across the tops of the chief passes and posted troops with artillery at each of them. Bājāji Nayak Nim-

bālkār, "a great Deccani zamindar" and father of Shīvā's son-in-law Mahdājī, with his family, was now won over by the Mughals. (*Dil.* 122 and 125.)

§6. *Desultory fighting in Desh, 1673.*

Marātha activity, thus shut out of Khāndesh and Berār, burst forth in another quarter. They next assembled in the Punā district. Bahādur Khan left his baggage at Chamārgundā, hastened to meet the invaders, and defeated them after a severe battle.* Then he encamped at Pedgāon, on the north bank of the Bhimā, eight miles due south of Chamārgundā. This place became the residence of his army for many years afterwards, and here a fort and town grew up from their cantonment, which the Emperor permitted him to name *Bahādur-garh*. (*Dil.* 126.)

Pedgāon occupies a position of great strategic importance. It stands on the plain just clear of the long mountain spur running eastwards from Punā. From this place the Mughal general could at will move westwards along the north of the range to protect the valleys of the Mulā and the Bhimā (the North Punā district), or along the south of it to guard the valleys of the Nirā and the Karhā (the southern portion of the district.) Northwards he could communicate with his great depot of arms and provisions at Ahmadnagar, without having to cross any river (except at the foot of that fort); and southwards he could easily invade Bijapur through the Sholāpur district. In short, the cantonment at Pedgāon served as the Mughal advanced base for some years after this time, exactly as Aurangzib's camp at Brahmapuri, 90 miles s. e. e. of it, did twenty-two years later, when the Mughal empire had extended further south.

* It is probably this campaign that is referred to in *M. A.* 128, among the Court news of 1673, in the following terms: "Bahādur Khan had defeated Shīva after a forced march of 120 miles, made large captures of spoils and sent them with Dalpat to the Emperor, who viewed them on 22 Oct."

It was most probably in this year (1673)* that Shivaji met with a sore disappointment. The fort of Shivner, a mile west of Junnar, was no doubt of strategic importance, as it guarded the Mughal frontier in the north of the Punā district and blocked the shortest route by which he could sally out of North Konkan to overrun Mughal Deccan. But what gave it the greatest value in Shivaji's eyes was that it was his birth-place. The Mughal governor of Shivner was Abdul Aziz Khan, a Brahman convert to Islām and one of the most faithful and valued servants of Aurangzib. Shivaji promised him "mountains of gold" for surrendering the fort into Marātha hands; and he, pretending consent, received the money, appointed a day for the delivery, and asked Shivaji to send 7,000 cavalry to take the fort over. But Abdul Aziz at the same time secretly informed Bahādur Khan of the plot; the Marātha army fell into an ambuscade planned by the Mughals, and retired in disappointment with heavy loss. (Fryer, i. 339-340.)

§7. *Gains from Bijapur and raids into Kanārā, 1673.*

In another direction, however, a wide door for conquest was now opened to the Marāthas. Ali Ādil Shah II. died on 24th Nov., 1672, and was succeeded on the throne of Bijapur by Sikandar, a boy of four years. Khawās Khan (an Abyssinian general) became regent and monopolized all the power in the State, thus breaking his former agreement to share the government of the realm with the other three leading nobles,—by which Abdul Muhammad (ex-wazir) was to hold the eastern province, Bahlol Khan the western (with Panhālā fort), Muzaffar Khan the Kanārā districts, and the regent the capital. He refused to hand over to them the royal forts in their respective districts, and they therefore left him. "Disturbances broke out on all sides," and the Government was weakened by this internal discord.

* But Jedhē asserts that he once besieged Junnar (*i.e.*, Shivner) in Sept. 1670.

Shivaji was not the man to miss such an opportunity. He broke off friendly relations with the new regent and recalled his ambassador Bābāji Nāyak Pundé, from Bijapur. Then he sent a strong force under Annāji Pant on a secret enterprise of great importance. This force assembled at Rājapur. One division of it, equipped for scaling and storming forts, was sent in advance under Kondāji Farzand, with orders to march secretly by night only, while Annāji himself with the rest of the troops remained concealed in the great forest of the Ratnagiri district.

In the pitch dark night of 6th March, 1673, Kondāji arrived at the foot of Panhālā, and taking sixty picked Māvlés with himself, silently scaled the steep hill-side, every man helping his next comrade up by the hand. On reaching the summit, they suddenly blew their trumpets from different sides and charged through the fort. The surprise was complete. The wildest confusion and alarm reigned among the garrison, which was heightened by the drums beating to arms and the hastily roused soldiers running hither and thither. A confused hand to hand fighting raged for the rest of the night. Kondāji himself attacked and slew the commandant of the fort. The chief civil officer or Paymaster Nāgoji Pandit fled away with his bare life. The other Marātha troops swarmed into the fort, the day dawned, and the whole place was soon occupied by the victors, who seized the local officials and beat them to discover the hidden treasure in their own houses and the Government offices.

On hearing of the victory, Annāji came up from the rear, and Shivaji himself arrived from Rāigarh, and spent a month in the newly acquired fort which he planned to turn into an impregnable tower of refuge. The success of the Marāthas continued; Parli was captured on 1st April and Satārā on 27th July.*

* B. S. 436—440; *Jedhē*; the Sanskrit poem *Parnāl-parvat-grahanākh-yānam* by Jayārām. *Jedhē* says that Panhala was taken by seducing some

§8. *Battle of Umrāni, 1673.*

The loss of Panhālā roused the Court of Bijapur from its sleep. Khawās Khan was blamed for his incompetence and neglect in defending the realm. Bahlol Khan was sent to recover the fort, while three other great generals were summoned from the provinces to join him and with Mughal co-operation make a united attack on the Marāthas. But, as usual, Shivaji struck the first blow and upset his enemies' plans. He detached Pratāp Rao, Anand Rao and several other generals, at the head of 15,000 troops to attack Bahlol before his allies could join him. By two night-marches of great speed and secrecy, the Marāthas came up with Bahlol at Umrāni, 36 miles west of Bijapur city, and completely enveloped his camp at a distance, before he knew of their presence. They quietly cut him off from his water-supply, and next morning charged his camp in successive groups from different quarters. The battle raged all the day with intense ferocity. Many were slain and wounded, though the light and elusive Marāthas suffered less than the hard-pressed and densely crowded Bijapuris. But Bahlol's Afghans held their ground with desperate tenacity. Indeed, fight would have meant destruction for them after that day-long fight in April heat without any water to quench the thirst of man or beast and with an exultant light cavalry hanging on their heels.

At nightfall the two forces separated. Bahlol sent a secret message to Pratāp Rao saying that he was not really going to fight against Shivaji, but had to make a show of hostility in order to satisfy his Government, and therefore each side should spare the other. Pratāp Rao agreed, probably for a bribe, and withdrew his troops from a point in the line of investment, through which Bahlol's wounded army safely fell back on his base at Tikotā, with the loss of one war-elephant and some baggage only (about 15th April).

of the garrison ; but Jayārām contradicts him and *Basātin* is silent on the point.

Shivaji sharply censured his general for letting Bahlol escape when he could have easily crushed him and seized his entire camp.*

From the field of Umrāni, Pratāp Rao made a dash south-westwards into Kanārā, robbing many places, in May, as will be described in chapter 10 § 9. Shortly afterwards, Bahlol with a replenished army, took post near Kolhāpur, where he continued for some months, defeating the Marāthas in several encounters and forcing all their roving bands to leave Kanārā. We hear of his pressing hard upon Shivaji and successfully defending that region throughout June, July and August, 1673. But in September he fell very ill at Mīraj, and the Bijapur and Golkondā Governments sought Shivaji's help in defending themselves from a Mughal invasion threatened by Bahādur Khan. As Gerald Aungier, the President of the Bombay Council, wrote on 16th September, "Shivaji bears himself up manfully against all his enemies; . . . and though it is probable that the Mughal's army may fall into his country this year and Bahlol Khan on the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for want of provisions, and his flying army will constantly keep them in alarm; nor is it either their design to destroy Shivaji totally, for the Umaras maintain a politic war to their own profit at the king's charge, and never intend to prosecute it violently so as to end it." (F. R. Surat 106.)

At the end of the rainy season, Shivaji opened a grand campaign on 10th October (the *dashaharā* day) and raided Kanārā, both upland and coast. Here he continued till the middle of December, being finally forced to retire by the pressure of Bahlol, Sharzā and other Bijapuri generals. (Ch. 10 § 9.)

§9. *Battle of Nesari and death of Pratāp Rāp, 1674.*

It was to restore his prestige after this set-back in Kanārā that next month (January 1674) he sent Pratāp Rāo

* Umrāni : Sabh. 78 ; *Parnal-parvat-grahana* ; B. S. 440. Nesari : Sabh. 79, and F. R. Surat 88 (Narayan Shenvi's letter.)

against Bahlol Khan, severely censuring him for his neglect in having let that Bijapuri general off instead of crushing his power once for all, when he was at his mercy at Umrāni in April last. The Rajah wrote to his general in anger, "Bahlol has come again. Go with your army, destroy him and win a decisive victory. Otherwise, never show your face to me again!"

Stung to the quick by this letter, Pratāp Rāo sought Bahlol out at Nesari, "in a narrow passage between two hills," (24 Feb. 1674). Smarting under his master's censure, he threw generalship to the winds, and rushed upon the Bijapuri army followed by only six horsemen, the rest of his soldiers hanging back from the mad charge. The gallant seven were cut down by the swarm of foe, and much havoc was done among the Marāthas who were disheartened by the fall of their leader; "a river of blood flowed." Shivaji greatly mourned the death of Pratāp Rāo and repented of his angry letter. The dead general's relatives and dependants were well provided for, and his daughter was six years later married to Rājārām, the favourite son of the king.

Anand Rao, a lieutenant of Pratāp Rāo, rallied the disheartened army of his chief. Shivā appointed him to an independent command and ordered him not to return alive without defeating the enemy.* At this Anand Rao went off

* The Maratha achievements in this paragraph and the next two are ascribed to Hansājī Mohitē by both Sabhāsād and Chitnis. But Nārāyan Shenvi, writing from Rāigarh, only a month later, on information supplied by Shiva's ministers, states that it was *Anand Rao* who rallied the Maratha army after the fall of Pratāp Rao, and was the leader in all these campaigns. *Jedhē* supports him, and I have followed these original authorities.

The place of Pratāp Rao's death is called *Jesari* (a misreading for *Nesari*) in Sabhasad and *Nivti* in *Jedhē*, and described as situated in the Panhālā district. This *Nesari* lies 45 m.s. Kolhāpur, in the Garh-Hinglāj sub-division of the Kolhāpur State, one mile north of the Ghātprabhā river, and 11 miles south of Garh-Hinglāj town. [Degree sheet 47 L.] There is "a narrow passage between two hills" near it. There is another *Nesari*, but too far from Panhālā to be the battle-field, viz., *Nesargi* of *Ind. Atlas*, Sheet 41 N. E., 18 miles east of Belgaum, on the Belgaum-Kaladgi road. It was the halting place of Little's detachment when co-operating with Parashurām Bhao. (Moor, p. 15; *Bom. Gaz.* xxi. 591.)

with the whole body of his cavalry far into Bijapur territory in search of Bahlol. Dilir Khan with the Mughal army advanced promptly to the succour of his brother Afghan, Bahlol Khan. But Anand Rao, not daring to fight two such large forces, retreated towards Kanārā, making forced marches of 45 miles a day. The two Khans, unable to overtake the mobile Marāthas, gave up the pursuit and turned,—Bahlol to Kolhāpur and Dilir to Panhālā, whence, after a 5 day's halt with the intention of besieging it, he fell back on his base.

Anand Rao, penetrating further into Kanārā, robbed the bazar (*peth*) of Sāmpgāon, about 20 miles from Bānkāpur, in Bahlol's jagir, capturing 150,000 *hun* worth of booty (23 March). Thence he set out on return with 3,000 ox-loads of plunder. Bahlol and Khizr Khan, with 2,000 cavalry and many foot-soldiers, tried to intercept him near Bānkāpur, but were defeated after a desperate battle and put to flight with the loss of a brother of Khizr Khan. Anand Rao robbed the entire Bijapuri army, capturing 500 horses, 2 elephants, and much other prizes. (March, 1674).*

But the Bijapuris had their revenge immediately afterwards. Bahlol Khan, "regarding the loss [of the elephants] as a great disgrace to him, became desperate, attacked the robbers again, and being reinforced secured such a victory that the robbers had to abandon 1,000 horses and were pursued for a long distance." It was not the Marātha policy to fight pitched battles during a raid. So, Anand Rao rapidly retreated with his booty to Shivā's dominions, left

* The Dutchman Van Reade, 15th Dec. 1674, (*Dutch Records*, Vol. 32, No. 824), calls the pillaged bazar "*Honspent*, situated on the borders of Bijapur near Bankapur." Narayan names it "a city called Pench, 8 leagues from Bankapur." Sabhāsād refers to this campaign on p. 80, but gives other names to the two generals: "Hambir Rao went with his army to Sampgāon [19 m. s. e. of Belgāum.] Husain Khan Miānā, a great Bijapuri general, with 5,000 Pathans marched against Hambir Rao. A severe battle took place between them, from noon till next morning. Many men, horses and elephants were slain in Husain's army. He was captured with 4,000 horses, 12 elephants, many camels, and property beyond calculation. His whole army was destroyed."

it there in safety, and then at the beginning of April was ordered to ascend the plateau (*bālā-ghāt*) for raiding more towns.*

On 8th April, Shivaji held a grand review of his troops at Chiplun, and appointed Hansāji Mohité commander-in-chief with the title of 'Hambir Rao' in succession to Pratāp Rao Gujar. Bounties were lavishly distributed among the soldiers. The fort of Kelanja (Mohangarh) fell to him on 24th April. [Sabh. 80 ; *Jedhe S.*]

§10. *Defeat of Dilir Khan, January 1674.*

Late in January 1674, a Mughal army tried to descend into Konkan and cause a diversion in that quarter simultaneously with the Bijapuri invasion of the Panhālā region. But Shivā stopped the paths by breaking the roads and mountain passes and keeping a constant guard at various points where the route was most difficult ; and the Mughals had to return baffled. It was probably this expedition to which the English merchants refer in a letter written at the end of January 1674, in the following words, "Dilir Khan hath lately received a rout by Shivaji and lost 1,000 of his Pathāns, and Shivaji about five or six hundred men." If so, Dilir Khan had either made a rash frontal attack on one of the entrenched passes or fallen into an ambuscade of the Marāthas. Throughout these four months, December 1673 to March 1674, Shivaji's wars with Adil Shah and the Siddis were carried on languidly with only occasional outbreaks of vigour. The soldiers on both sides were weary of fighting and their commanders not in earnest to end this paying business. The winter rains of this year were very heavy and bred pestilence. Shivā in December and January was com-

* Sabhasad, 82, says that the raid (under Hambir Rao) extended over Khandesh, Baglana, Gujrat, Ahmadabad, Burhanpur, Berar and Mahur, to the bank of the Narmada, and that the tired Mughal pursuers always lagged 30 or 40 miles behind, so that the Marathas returned home unmolested and with all their booty.

peled to distribute his horses throughout his dominions in order to stable them in comfort.*

Soon afterwards the Mughal power in the Deccan was crippled. The rising of the Khaibar Afghāns became so serious that Aurangzib had to leave Delhi (7th April) for Hasan Ābdāl, in order to direct the war from the rear, and next month Dilir Khan was called away to the North-western frontier. Bahādur Khan was left alone in the Deccan with a greatly weakened force. This lull in the war was utilized by Shivaji to crown himself with the greatest pomp and ceremony. (M. A. 132; F. R. Surat 88, Oxinden's *Letter*, 21 May, 1674.)

The eve of Shivaji's coronation affords a suitable time for making a survey of his territorial position. We have seen in Chapter 3 §5 what his kingdom was in 1648 and in 1659. His gains between November 1659 and February 1660 were shortlived except in South Konkan. Here he completed the conquest of the Ratnagiri district by taking possession of its western part (including all the ports except Rājapur and Vingurlā) as well as its southern extremity. From this time his power began to impinge on that of the Sāvants of Vādi (or the *desāis* of Kudal, as they were then called), and after a long and confused struggle much of the latter's territory as well as the ports of Rājapur and Vingurlā passed into Shivaji's hands, (by the middle of 1663), and all South Konkan owned him as its sole master. He had already wrested the western coast of the Kolābā district from the Siddis.

What he ceded to the Mughals by the Treaty of Purandar (1665) touched only his territories in the Puna and Thānā districts, while his acquisitions in middle and south Konkan remained intact. Most of these cessions even were recovered by him in 1670 and 1671.

From 1664 the Marāthas began to *raid* Kanārā,—both the Kārwār coast and the uplands of Hubli and Bednur;

* Narayan Shenvi's letter from Raigarh in F. R. Surat, Vol. 88; O. C. 3906 and 3939; *Dutch Records*, Vol. 34, No. 840.

but their actual *conquest* of the coast was achieved as late as 1675.

Marātha activities in 1671 and 1672 resulted in the annexation of Baglānā (north of the Nāsik district) and the Koli country (Jawhār and Rāmnagar) in North Konkan, between Surat and the Thānā district. The hill-forts in the Chandor range seem to have repeatedly changed hands between the Mughals and the Marāthas. But their importance in Shivaji's eyes was only strategical, as they secured his northward route to Baglānā and Khāndesh.

Southwards, Shivaji's power was firmly planted by his annexation of Panhālā in 1673 and Kolhāpur and Phondā in 1675. Thus his boundary in 1675 extended beyond the Kolhāpur district well into western Karnātak or Kanārā uplands.

The full extent of his kingdom at his death (1680) will be described at the beginning of Ch. 15.

CHAPTER IX

THE CORONATION OF SHIVAJI AND AFTER, 1674—1676

1. Why Shivaji wanted to be crowned.
2. Shivaji recognised as a Kshatriya.
3. Coronation preparations.
4. Puja and purification.
5. Scene of coronation.
6. Street procession.
7. Shivaji's tantrik coronation.
8. Cost of coronation.
9. Loot of Bahadur Khan's camp.
10. Shivaji's false negotiations.
11. War with Mughals renewed.

§1. *Why Shivaji wanted to be crowned.*

Shivaji and his ministers had long felt the practical disadvantages of his not being a crowned king.* True, he had conquered many lands and gathered much wealth: he had a strong army and navy and exercised powers of life and death over men, like an independent sovereign. But in theory his position was that of a subject; to the Mughal Emperor he was a mere zamindār; to Ādil Shah he was the rebellious son of a vassal jāgirdār. He could not claim equality of political status with any king.

Then, again, so long as he was a mere private subject, he could not, with all his real power, claim the loyalty and devotion of the people over whom he ruled. His promises could not have the sanctity and continuity of the public

* This chapter is mainly based upon the detailed reports of the English ambassador Henry Oxinden (both *Letters* and *Memorial or Narrative*), the English interpreter Nārāyan Shenvi, and the Dutch merchant Abraham Le Feber (of Vingurlā), preserved in *Factory Records*, Surat, Vols. 88 and 3, and *Dutch Records*, Vol. xxxiv. No. 841, of the India Office, London. These have been supplemented by Sabhāsād (82-84). 91 Q.B. sec. 83 confirms the contemporary European records in some particulars in a surprising manner. The *Bombay Gazetteer* (xi. 369) has pointed out that the Chitnis *bahhar* imputes to Shivaji's coronation in 1674 the ceremonies which marked the Peshwa's coronation of a century later! The Sanskrit poem *Shiva R. R. Kalpataru* has been critically used.

engagements of the head of a State. He could sign no treaty, grant no land with legal validity or an assurance of permanence. The territories conquered by his sword could not become his lawful property, however undisturbed his possession over them might be in practice. The people living under his sway or serving under his banners, could not renounce their allegiance to the former sovereign of the land, nor be sure that they were exempt from the charge of treason for their obedience to Shivaji. The permanence of his political creation required that it should be validated as the work of a sovereign.

It is also clear that the rise of the Bhonslés created much jealousy among the other Marātha families which had once been their equals in social status. These men consoled themselves by refusing to adhere to Shivaji as his servants, bragged of their being loyal subjects of Aurangzib or of Ādil Shah, and sneered at Shivaji as an upstart rebel and usurper. It was necessary to rectify his position in their eyes. A formal coronation alone could show them that he was a king and therefore their superior, and enable him to treat on equal terms with the rulers of Bijapur and Golkondā.

The higher minds of Mahārāshtra, too, had begun to look up to Shivaji as the champion of Hinduism, and wished to see the Hindu race elevated to the full stature of its political growth by the formal assertion of his position as an independent king. They longed for the Hindu *Swarāj*, and that implied a Hindu *Chhatrapati*. (Sabh. 82.)

§2. *Shivaji recognized by Gāgā Bhatta as a Kshatriya.*

But there was one curious hindrance to the realization of this ideal. According to the ancient Hindu scriptures, only a member of the Kshatriya caste can be legally crowned as king and claim the homage of Hindu subjects. The Bhonslés were popularly known to be neither Kshatriyas nor of any other twice-born caste, but mere tillers of the soil,

as Shivaji's great-grandfather was still remembered to have been. How could an upstart sprung from such a *Shudra* (plebeian) stock aspire to the rights and honours due to a *Kshatriya*? The Brāhmans of all parts of India would attend and bless the coronation of Shivaji, only if he could be authoritatively declared a *Kshatriya*.

It was, therefore, necessary first to secure the support of a pandit, whose reputation for scholarship would silence all opposition to the views he might propound. Such a man was found in Vishweshwar, nicknamed *Gāgā* Bhatta, of Benares, the greatest Sanskrit theologian and controversialist then alive, a master of the four *Vedas*, the six philosophies, and all the scriptures of the Hindus, and popularly known as the *Brahma-deva* and *Vyās* of the modern age. After holding out for some time, he became compliant, accepted the Bhonslé pedigree as fabricated by the clever secretary Bālāji Avji and other agents of Shivā, and declared that this Rajah was a *Kshatriya* of the purest breed, descended in unbroken line from the *Mahārānās* of Udaipur, the sole representatives of the solar line of the mythical hero-god Rāmchandra. His audacious but courtierly ethnological theory was rewarded with a huge fee, and he was entreated to visit *Mahārāshtra* and officiate as high priest at the coronation of Shivā. He agreed, and on his arrival was welcomed like a crowned head, Shivā and all his officers advancing many miles from Satārā to receive him on the way.

§3. *Preparations for coronation.*

The preparations took many months. There was no unbroken tradition about the exact ceremonies and paraphernalia required at the coronation of an independent Hindu sovereign. The Sanskrit epics and political treatises were ransacked by a syndicate of pandits to find out the orthodox ancient precedents on these points, and agents were sent to learn the modern practice of the Rajahs of Udaipur and Amber.

Invitations had been sent to learned Brāhmans of every part of India; the report of the coming ceremony had attracted others. Eleven thousand Brāhmans, making 50,000 souls with their wives and children, were assembled at Rāigarh and fed with sweets for four months at the Rajah's expense. The greatest forethought and organizing power must have been shown by Shivā in providing for the comfort of the numerous guests—Brāhmans, nobles, local magnates of the realm, agents of other States, foreign merchants and visitors, and poor cousins, who flocked to the ceremony. Nothing went amiss in catering to this crowd of nearly a hundred thousand men, women and children.

The daily religious ceremonies and consultations with the Brāhmans left Shivā no time to attend to other business, as the English envoy, Henry Oxinden, found to his chagrin. Shivā began by bowing to his *guru* Rāmdās Swāmi and his mother Jijā Bāi and receiving their blessings. The unhappy discarded first wife of Shāhji, now verging on eighty, had forgotten her husband's neglect in the love and devotion of her son, and rejoiced to see, before she closed her eyes, that he had reached the summit of human greatness as the crowned king of the land of his birth, an irresistible conqueror, and a strong defender of the religion which was the solace of her life. Like a queen-mother of the same country born 15 centuries earlier, Gautami, the mother of the Andhra king Shri Sātakarni, she gloried in the glory of her victorious and orthodox son.* A kind Providence seemed to have preserved her life just long enough to enable her to witness the scene of his coronation, for she died twelve days after it.

* "I am Gautami, the mother of Shri Sātakarni (reign c. 109-135 A.D.), who shared the joys and sorrows of the people without distinction, who trampled on the pride of the warrior caste, who slew Scythians, Bactrians, and Parthians, who exterminated the Kshaharāt dynasty, established the glory of the Shātavāhan family, put an end to illicit unions among the four castes, conquered his enemy hosts in many a fight, and whose victorious banner has never been defeated." (*Ep. Ind.* VIII. 60.)

§4. *Puja and purification by Shivā.*

Then he set out on a round of worship at the most famous shrines of the land. Chiplun was visited early in May, 1674, and after adoring Parashurām in the great temple there, he returned to Rāigarh on the 12th. Four days afterwards he again issued forth to worship the Bhavāni goddess he had installed at Pratāpgarh, as the ancient Bhavāni of Tuljāpur was beyond his reach. To this image he presented an umbrella of pure gold, weighing one and a quarter maunds, (worth about Rs. 56,000) and many other costly gifts. Returning to Rāigarh in the afternoon of the 21st, he plunged into devotion there. Under the guidance of his family priest, Bālam Bhatta, (the son of Prabhākar Bhatta Upādhyāy), he adored Mahādev, Bhavāni and other local deities for many days in succession.

But one great defect had to be removed before his coronation could take place. He had to be publicly purified and "made a Kshatriya." On 28th May he performed penance for his ancestors' and his own sin of omission in not having observed the Kshatriya rites so long, and was invested by Gāgā Bhatta with the sacred thread, the distinctive badge of the twice-born castes like the "pure" Kshatriyas of Northern India. Next day he was married again to two of his surviving wives according to the *Kshatriya* manner and with the scriptural chanting which is a privilege of the twice-born castes, so as to "purify" them and make them worthy to share his coronation ritual.

The next step was to teach him the *mantra* (sacred verses) and initiate him into the rules of the Kshatriya caste. Shivaji very logically demanded that all the Vedic verses appropriate to the initiation and coronation of a true Hindu king should be chanted in his hearing, because the Kshatriyas being one of the holy "twice-born" castes, he as an admitted Kshatriya was entitled to use the Vedic *mantra* equally with the Brāhmans. At this there was a mutiny among the assembled Brāhmans, who asserted that there

was no true Kshatriya in the modern age* and that the Brāhmans were the only twice-born caste now surviving! Even Gāgā Bhatta was cowed by the general opposition and evidently dropped the Vedic chant and initiated the Rajah only in a modified form of the life of the twice-born, instead of putting him on a par with the Brāhmans in this respect. This purification and its sequel, the investiture with the sacred thread, were performed with "great ceremony"; a vast amount of money was distributed among the Brāhmans, Gāgā Bhatta alone getting 7,000 *hun* and the crowd of ordinary Brāhmans 17,000 *hun*. (91 Q. B. 83; *Dutch Records*.)

Next day, Shivā made atonement for the sins, deliberate or accidental, committed in his own life. He was separately weighed against each of the seven metals,—gold, silver, copper, zinc, tin, lead and iron,—as well as very fine linen, camphor, salt, nails (*sic*), nutmegs, and other spices, butter, sugar, fruits and all sorts of eatables (betel-leaves and country wine being among them). All these metals and other articles to the weight of his body, together with a *lakh* of *hun* more, were given away to the assembled Brāhmans after the coronation.

* The following significant passage in 91 Q. B. sec. 83, suggests that Shivaji at one time thought of punishing the proud intolerant Brāhmans by removing them from lucrative secular duties like the command of armies and viceroyalties of provinces and confining them to their scriptural functions of fasting and praying. "The Maharajah learning [of the refusal of the Brāhmans to teach him the Vedic *mantras*], said, 'The Brāhmans are reverend men. It is not proper to appoint them royal servants. They ought not to perform any work except worshipping God.' So he removed all the Brāhmans from their posts and appointed Prabhu Kāyasthas in their places. Moro Pant interceded for the Brāhmans."

That Shivaji was invested with the sacred thread and made a "purified Kshatriya" by Gāgā Bhatta as an indispensable preliminary to his coronation, is questioned by nobody. But I believe that he was *not* allowed to repeat the *Gāyatri mantra* ("the mother of the Vedas") as neither Sabhāsad (who wrote to please Shivaji's son), nor Dattaji Wāqnis mentions such a fact. Jedhē merely says that on 30th May Shivaji was married "with *mantras*", *i.e.*, the Vedic chant, and Nischalpuri asserts that Shivaji "received the *Gāyatri* uttered by his guru Gāgā at an inauspicious moment."

The *Vedokta* is a live issue in Marātha society even now.

But even this failed to satisfy their greed. Two of the learned Brāhmans pointed out that Shivā, in the course of his raids, had burnt cities "involving the death of Brāhmans, cows, women and children." He could be cleansed of this sins,—for a price. It was not necessary for him to pay compensation to the surviving relatives of the men and women who had perished in his sack of Surat or Kārinjā. It would be enough if he put money into the pockets of the Brāhmans of Konkan and Desh. The price demanded for this 'pardon' was only Rs. 8,000, and Shivā could not have refused to pay this trifle. (*Dutch Records*, Vol. 34, No. 841.)

§5. *Scene of Shivaji's Coronation.*

All his disqualifications having been thus removed with gold, the actual coronation was now begun. The 5th of June was the eve of the grand ceremony. That day had to be spent in self-restraint and mortification of the flesh, like the night of vigil preceding knighthood in the age of chivalry in Europe. Shivaji bathed in water brought from the holy Ganges, and gave Gāgā Bhatta 5,000 *hun* and the other great Brāhmans a hundred gold-pieces each. The day was probably spent in fasting.

Next day (6th June, 1674) the coronation itself took place. Rising very early in the morning Shivaji prepared himself by bathing amidst ceremonies intended to avert evil, worshipped his household gods, and adored the feet of Bālam Bhatta his family priest, Gāgā Bhatta, and other eminent Brāhmans, who all received gifts of ornaments and cloth.

The essential parts of a Hindu king's coronation are washing him (*abhishek*) and holding the royal umbrella over his head (*chhatra-dhāran*.) Clad in a pure white robe, and decked with garlands of flowers, scented essence, and gold ornaments, Shivā walked to the place appointed for the bath. Here he sat down on a gold-plated stool, two feet

square and two feet high. The queen-consort, Soyrā Bāi, occupied a seat on his left with the hem of her robe knotted up with his, in sign of her being his equal partner in this world and the next (*saha-dharmini*), as the Hindu sacred law names the wife. The heir-apparent Shambhuji sat down close behind. Then the eight ministers of his cabinet (*ashta-pradhān*), who stood ready at the eight points of the horizon with gold jugs full of the water of the Ganges and other holy rivers, emptied them over the heads of the king, queen and crown-prince, amidst the chanting of hymns and the joyous music of the band. Sixteen pure-robed Brāhmaṇ wives each with five lamps laid on a gold tray, waved the lights round his head to scare away evil influences.

Then Shivaji changed his dress for a robe of royal scarlet, richly embroidered with gold, put on sparkling gems and gold ornaments, a necklace, a garland of flowers, and a turban adorned with strings and tassels of pearls, worshipped his sword, shield, bow and arrows, and again bowed to his elders and the Brāhmaṇs. Then, at the auspicious moment selected by the astrologers, he entered the throne-room.

The hall of coronation was decorated with the 32 emblematic figures prescribed by Hindu usage and various auspicious plants. Overhead an awning of cloth of gold was spread, with strings of pearls hanging down in festoons. The floor was covered with velvet. In the centre was placed a "magnificent throne", constructed after months of continuous labour in a style worthy of a great king. Even if we reject Sabhāsād's statement that it contained 32 maunds of gold (worth 14 *lakhs* of Rupees), we must accept the English observer's report that it was "rich and stately". The base was evidently coated with gold plate, and so also were the eight pillars standing at the eight angles, which were further richly embellished with gems and diamonds. They supported a canopy of the richest gold embroidery from which strings of pearls were suspended in tassels and festoons, interspersed with sparkling gems. The covers of the royal seat were a grotesque combination of ancient

Hindu asceticism and modern Mughal luxury: tiger skin below and velvet on the top!

On the two sides of the throne, various emblems of royalty and government were hung from gilded lance-heads. On the right hand stood two large fish-heads of gold with very big teeth, and on the left several horses' tails (the insignia of royalty among the Turks) and a pair of gold scales, evenly balanced (the emblem of justice), on a very costly lance-head. All these were copied from the Mughal Court. At the palace gate were placed on either hand pitchers full of water covered with bunches of fresh green leaves, and also two young elephants and two beautiful horses, with gold bridles and rich trappings. These latter were auspicious token according to Hindu belief.

As Shivaji mounted the throne, small lotuses of gold set with jewels, and various other flowers made of gold and silver were showered among the assembled throng. Sixteen Brāhmaṇ married women again performed the auspicious waving of lamps round the newly enthroned monarch. The Brāhmaṇs lifted up their voices, chanting holy verses and blessing the king, who bowed to them in return. The crowd set up deafening shouts of "Victory, victory unto Shiva-rāj!" All the instruments began to play and the musicians to sing at once. By previous arrangement the artillery of every fort in the kingdom fired salvos of all their guns exactly at this time. The arch-pontiff Gāgā Bhatta advanced to the throne, held the royal sun-shade of cloth of gold fringed with pearls over his head, and hailed him as *Shivā Chhatrapati*, or *Shivā* the paramount sovereign.

The Brāhmaṇs stepped forward and poured their blessings on his head. The Rajah gave away vast sums of money and gifts of every kind to them and to the assembled beggars and general public. "He performed the sixteen varieties of greater alms-giving (*mahā-dān*) prescribed in the sacred books of the Hindus. Then the ministers advanced to the throne and made their obeisance, and received from

his hands robes of honour, letters of appointment, and large gifts of money, horses, elephants, jewels, cloth, and arms. Sanskrit titles were ordered to be used in future to designate their offices, and the Persian titles hitherto current were abolished." (Sabh. 83-84).

The crown-prince Shambhuji, the highest-priest Gāgā Bhatta, and the prime-minister Moro Trimbak Pinglē, were seated on an eminence a little lower than the throne. The other ministers stood in two rows on the right and left of the throne. All other countries and visitors stood according to their ranks at proper places in a respectful attitude.

By this time it was eight o'clock in the morning. The English ambassador, Henry Oxinden, was now presented by Nirāji Pant. He bowed from a distance, and his interpreter Nārāyan Shenvi held up a diamond ring as an offering from the English to the Rajah. Shivaji took notice of the strangers and ordered them to come to the foot of the throne, invested them with robes of honour, and then sent them back.

§6. *Street procession at Rāigarh.*

When the presentations were over, the Rajah descended from his throne, mounted his best horse, decked with gorgeous trappings, and rode to the Jagadishwar temple. There he mounted the finest elephant in his stable, dressed out most splendidly for the occasion, and then rode through the streets of the capital in full military procession, girt round by his ministers and generals, with the two royal banners, *Jari-patākā* and *Bhagwé-jhāndā*, borne aloft on two elephants walking in front, while the generals and regiments of troops follow with their respective flags, artillery and bands. The citizens had decorated their houses and roads in a manner worthy of the occasion. The housewives waved lighted lamps round him and showered fried rice, flowers, holy grass, &c., on his head. After visiting the various temples on Rāigarh hill and offering adoration with presents at each of them, he returned to the palace.

On the 7th began a general distribution of gifts to all the assembled envoys and Brāhmans and of alms to the beggars, which lasted twelve days, during which the people were also fed at the king's expense. The more distinguished pandits and sannyāsīs were not included in this alms-giving, as these ordinary men got only 3 to 5 Rupees and the women and children a Rupee or two each.

A day or two after the coronation the monsoon burst, the rain set in with violence, and the weather continued wet for some time, to the intense discomfort of the assembled crowd. On the 8th, Shivaji took a fourth wife without any state or ceremony. This was evidently a renewal of his marriage with one of his former wives, but performed with the full Kshatriya rites to which he had now become entitled.* (Letter of Oxinder, 27 May; Oxinden's *Memorial* under date 8 June.)

After the coronation was over, Jijā Bāi died on 18th June, in the fulness of years and happiness, leaving to her son her personal property worth 25 *lakhs of hun*, "some say more". When the period of mourning for her was over, Shivaji sat on the throne a second time on 24th September. (*Dutch Records, S. R. Kalpataru. Shivāpur Yādi.*)

§7. *Shivaji's second enthronement.*

A full account of Shivaji's second coronation only three months after his wellknown first formal enthronement, has been found in a recently discovered Sanskrit manuscript, the *Shiva-rāj-Rājyāvishek-Kalpataru*. This book unfolds a sordid tale of monkish greed and sectarian bitterness among the Brāhmans. In it a famous Tāntrik high priest named Nischal Puri Goswāmi boastfully describes why and how

* *Jedhē S.* says that marriage was celebrated with [Vedic] *mantras*, on 30th May, i.e., two days after Shivaji was invested with the sacred thread, and we shall not be wrong in supposing that Shivaji made these late marriages in order to assert publicly his right as a 'twice-born' to hear the Vedic *mantras*!

the Rajah performed this second ceremony under his influence. This is the story:—

Gāgā Bhatta, the director of Shivaji's first coronation rites, was a follower of the Vedic system of Hindu theology and the patron of Brahmans belonging to that school, while Nishchal was the champion of the (Bengali) Tāntrik school, and the two differed as Jew from Gentile. So, the first coronation was performed according to the Vedic ritual and only Vedic Brahman beggars benefited from the golden shower of the Rajah's bounty at the ceremony,—while the Tāntrik mendicants sent by Nishchal to share the royal alms were driven away with abuse.

Gāgā Bhatta (as charitably described by Nishchal) was an idiot; he made a wrong astronomical calculation and thus performed the coronation on a day when the malignant stars were in the ascendant. He made the king worship only the Vedic gods and scornfully ignored the spirits and goblins adored in the Tantra. The coronation thus conducted ended, when lo! a miracle. A number of the most unaccountable mishaps took place (some of them before it! ! !): the queen-consort Kāshi Bāi, the Queen-mother Jijā Bāi, the commander-in-chief Pratāp Rao, all died within a short space of time. A meteor fell. Immediately after the king had left the coronation-hall, a piece of timber hit Gāgā Bhatta's nose,—unquestionably an act of divine retribution for his having made Shivaji believe that Nishchal was not "worthy of being bowed to"—and, what mattered most, of getting a half share of the purse of 7,000 gold pieces presented by the king to Gāgā! This favoured high priest's sin had infected his assistant Bālam Bhatta, on whose head the wooden lotus of a pillar in the hall tumbled down. Other evil portents had taken place during the coronation: As Shivā was mounting the steps of the throne, some unlucky wretch sneezed at the south-eastern corner (where the Fire-god dwells); the Crown Prince lost two pearls from his necklace; the sword placed before Shivā for worship fell out of its scabbard; when the king as a part of

the ritual shot an arrow the seal dropped out of his hand ; the minister Dattāji tumbled down to the ground.

Shivā and the public alike were puzzled and alarmed by these mischances for which no earthly cause could be found. Then Nishchal had his revenge on Gāgā ; he sent a disciple (*malla*, *i.e.*, a ruffianly Nāgā *chelā*) to the Rajah to explain that these evil portents (like the pranks of the *polter-geist* as known in Europe) were due to the idiot Gāgā Bhatta's omission to propitiate with *pujā* and sacrifice* the gods of the Tantra, such as the ten *Mahāvidyās*, the spirits dwelling in the hill, the soil, the gate-posts, the throne, and the eight points of the horizon, and these had made their wrath felt in the above ways.

This unearthly evidence conclusively proved that the Vedic gods could not protect their votaries so much as the Tāntrik devils could hurt, and that the carnivorous monks were more potent magicians than the grass-eating priests who professed the Vedic cult! Shivā, like the shrewd practical man that he was, decided to woo *both* of these supernatural hosts,† for how could one be certain as to who really rules over that undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveller returns? Therefore, Nishchal Puri found Shivaji now 'falling at his feet' and begging him to conduct a Tāntrik coronation for him. This was done on 24th September and every grade of goblins was satisfied with due offerings. Its natural corollary followed ; there was another shaking of the king's pagoda-tree by the

* *Bali*, the Sanskrit word used here, means either (1) offerings of dry grain, such as rice, or (2) animal sacrifice, such as goats and buffaloes. Animal sacrifice is an integral part of Tāntrik worship. In the Deccan there was the immemorial custom of consecrating a king's visit to a fort by slaughtering a buffalo at the gate and washing his elephant's feet with its blood before he entered it. A French officer of Bussy's corps saw this done in 1750 when Salābat Jang entered Golkondā fort with his escort. (Paris ms. tr. by me in *Islamic Culture*.)

† The Jārejā Rajput Rao of Cutch, "when he appears in public, alternately worships God in a Hindu pagoda and a Muhammadan mosque." (J. Burnes, *Visit to the Court of Sinde and a History of Cutch*, 1839, p. xiv.)

Brahmans,—this time the Tāntrik and Vedic mendicants mingling together in a tumultuous crowd and giving a foretaste of the rabble of Brahman beggars who used to invade the Punā of the Peshwās every year to get the Shrāvan alms and terrorise the city by their insolent and riotous conduct!

Another mishap, mentioned by Nishchal Puri, was that the temple on Pratāpgarh caught fire and many costly horses and one elephant were burnt there in consequence. The *Shivāpur Yādi* says that "lightning struck the temple on Pratāpgarh on 25 Sept, 1675,"—i.e., one full year after the Tāntrik coronation. If this information is correct, then the Tāntrik rites were clearly as futile for averting evil as the Vedic *pujā*, for all the money that Nishchal Puri had wheedled out of Shivaji and all his boasting.

§8. *Cost of the Coronation.*

The total cost of the coronation, including the sums distributed in gifts and alms, is put down by Sabhāsād at the incredible figure of one *krore* and 42 *lakhs* of *hun*. The Dutch merchant Abraham Le Feber, writing from Vingurla only four months after the event, quotes the popular report that "this ceremony and distribution of largess cost 150,000 pagodas". He evidently means the money spent in the 12 days' general alms-giving from the 7th to the 18th of June, and not the special gifts to the ministers and other officers, Brahmans and priests. But even when all these are taken into account, together with the price of the throne and ornaments made for the occasion and the cost of feeding the assemblage, the total expenditure cannot be put higher than 10 *lakhs* of *hun* or fifty *lakhs* of Rupees.

§9. *Loot of Bahādur Khan's camp and extensive contest with the Mughals.*

The coronation exhausted Shivaji's treasury and he was in need of money to pay his troops. It was, therefore,

necessary for him to be out on raid immediately afterwards. (F. R. Surat, 88, Nicolls to Surat, 14 Oct., 1674.)

His first movement was against Bahādur Khan. As early as May 1674 it was the talk of the Marātha Court that Dilir Khan, whom they feared most, having been recalled by the Emperor, the Mughal forces in the Deccan were commanded by Bahādur Khan alone, whom they despised and whose "quarters they intended to beat up after the rains". The blow was struck much sooner, at the very height of the monsoons. Towards the middle of July, a body of 2,000 Maratha light cavalry, made a false demonstration and lured Bahādur Khan some 50 miles away from his cantonments at Pedgāon, while a second force, 7,000 strong, swooped down by another route on his defenceless camp, carried away a *krone* of Rupees in booty and 200 fine horses collected for presentation to the Emperor, and burnt all his tents. (F. R. Surat 88, Oxinden to Surat, 21 May; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 1 Aug., 1674.)

The state of war with Bijapur continued, though languidly. A general of that State, probably Rustam-i-Zamān II, lay with his army on the Ghāts near Kolhāpur (July), ready to descend into Konkan and wrest Rājāpur from the Marāthas. In August, September and October Marātha bands spread northwards into the Koli country, giving repeated alarms to the port of Surat. But a body of three to four thousand Bhils of Rāmnagar held the jungles and passes through that State and opposed the Marāthas, who vainly offered them a bribe of one *lakh* of Rupees for a safe passage (middle of October 1674).* Shortly afterwards the baffled Marātha army, after provisioning their forts in that region, marched away to join Shivā near Aurangabad, and Surat breathed freely again. They had found an easier prey in another quarter. Late in October, a large army commanded by Shivaji in person

* F. R. Surat, 3, Consult. 6 Aug.; Vol. 87, Surat to Bomb. 6 Aug. and 22 Oct., 1674, O. C. 4062.

advanced into the Deccan plateau, skirted Bahādur Khan's camp, which was "hotly alarmed," looted several towns near Aurangabad, and then burst into Baglānā and Khāndesh, where they continued for more than a month (Nov. to middle of Dec.). Among other places they pillaged and burnt Dharangāon (10 m. north of Erāndol) and its English factory. Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi bravely opposed the raiders, but his small force was routed with the loss of 3 to 4 hundred men, and he fled to Aurangabad for refuge. (*F. R. Surat* 87, *Surat to Bomb.* 28 Oct., 1664; *Vol. 107, Bomb. to Surat*, 2 Nov., 1674; *Dungom to Surat*, 10 Dec., *O. C.* 4062.)

It was probably on his return from this raid that Shivā encamped near Junnar, but a shot from a 22 feet narrow-bore gun on the walls of Shivner killed a Rajah of his army and caused the prompt retreat of the Marāthas.*

At the end of January 1675, a band of 3,000 Marātha cavalry under Dattāji roved in the Kolhāpur district. The town of Kolhāpur saved itself by paying 1,500 *hun*, and Shongāon (near Gargoti, about 30 miles south of Kolhāpur) 500 *hun*. In the middle of February, a Mughal force crossed the Ghāts, fell on the town of Kaliān, burnt the houses (including those of many Khojās) and then quickly retired, after which the Marāthas re-occupied the place. (*F. R. Surat* 88, *Rajapur to Surat*, 6 Feb.; *Vol. 107, Bomb. to Surat*, 27 Feb., 1675.)

§10. *Shivaji's false negotiations with Bahādur Khan, 1675.*

Shivaji next opened delusive peace negotiations with Bahādur Khan, who eagerly swallowed the bait, as he was weary of the war and at his wits' end how to guard all parts of his viceroyalty against such a mobile and elusive enemy. For nearly three months (March-May) Shivā kept the

* Fryer (i. 388) says that it happened "some four months before" the 22nd of May, 1675, and that the shot was hurled 2 *kos* off.

Mughals in play, by feeding false hopes of a peace.* His real motives were to gain respite from Mughal attacks in order to provision his forts, to get money out of Ādil Shah by the threat of an alliance with the Mughals for the invasion of Bijapur and to secure his northern frontier during the siege of Phondā.

It was proposed that Shivaji would cede 17 of his forts to Aurangzib and send his son Shambhuji with a contingent to serve under the Mughal subahdār, while the Emperor would create Shambhuji a commander of six thousand horse, and grant Shivā all the country on the right bank of the Bhimā. The negotiations were deliberately spun out. Shivā "demurred to sending his son to the Mughal general until he had better security for his safety." Bahādur Khan reported the terms to the Emperor, who sent in reply a *farmān* accepting them and pardoning Shivā's past misdeeds. Then the viceroy sent messengers asking Shivaji to receive the *farmān* and deliver the forts. But by this time (July 1675), Phondā had been captured. Shivaji now threw off the mask and dismissed the Mughal envoys with taunts, saying, "What pressure have you succeeded in putting on me that I should seek peace with you? Go hence quickly, or you will be disgraced."

Bahādur Khan, ashamed at being thus outwitted and anxious to cover his foolish credulity and diplomatic defeat by some striking success, hurriedly made an agreement with the Bijapuri wazir Khawās Khan (October) for a joint war on Shivā. Aurangzib approved of the idea, and is said to have offered to give up one year's tribute from Bijapur if that State heartily co-operated with his victory in a concerted attack on Shivā from two sides. But the overthrow of Khawās Khan and the usurpation of the regency by Bahlool Khan (11th Nov.) spoiled this plan, and soon afterwards the

* False overtures of peace with the Mughals in 1675; *F. R.* Surat 107, Bomb. to Surat, 27 Feb. 1675; *O. C.* 4077; Vol. 88, Surat to Bomb. 15 June and 17 July, also Letters from J. Child, 7 August; *Dil.* 134—135; *B. S.* 401—2, *M. A.* 142 (7 July, 1675).

Mughals were drawn into the whirlpool of faction-fights at the Adil-Shahi Court. (B. S. 445.)

Meantime, while the Mughal viceroy was being lulled into inactivity by these peace overtures, and Shivā was hastening to the siege of Phondā, he captured Kolhāpur (March) but failed to take Rāibāgh. A little later another division of his army ranged for eastwards, plundering Bijapur and Golkondā territories, especially Yadagiri and two towns near Haidarabad, "bringing away a great deal of riches besides many rich persons" held to ransom. At the same time his men robbed Cuncolim and Veroda* in the Portuguese territory (middle of April.) The other Marātha activities in the latter half of this year will be described in the chapter on South Konkan and Kanārā.

§11. War with the Mughals renewed. Union with Bijapur.

In November, Bahādur Khan, on being sharply censured by Aurangzib, marched to Kaliān, and pressed Shivā hard in North Konkan. In January next (1676), a Marātha band spread near Aurangabad, but Bahādur with light equipment and no tent, made a rapid march from Pedgāon, defeated the rovers near Lāsur, 28 miles from the capital, and drove them back towards Junnar. (O. C. 4139 ; Dil. 140).

At this time Shivā was taken seriously ill, and passed the next three months on the sick-bed at Satārā. His perfect recovery was announced at the end of March, after which he removed to Panhālā. The Marāthas looted Athni, 43 m. west of Bijapur, in April. The civil war that had broken out between the Deccani and Afghan parties at Bijapur, was Shivaji's opportunity. Early in May we hear of his having sent out "4,000 horse that ranges up and down, plunders and robs without any hindrance or danger." (F. R. Surat,

* F. R. Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat 1 April, Karwar to Surat 22 April, 1675.

Vol. 89, Rajapur to Surat, 11 Jan. and 9 May 1676; *O. C.* 4202.)

In May, his prime-minister Moro Trimbak drove the Rajah of Rāmnagar out of his country and took Pindol* and Painecah within three days' march of Surat. But the monsoons being at hand, he left 4,000 men to garrison the district and retired with the rest of his army to Rāigarh at the end of the month. (*F. R.* 89, Surat to Bomb., 27 May and 1 June 1676.)

On 31st May Bahādur Khan opened a vigorous and long campaign against Bijapur, where the Afghan faction had seized the Government. This act drove the new regent Bahlool Khan into the arms of Shivā, and in July we have the report of a peace between them having been concluded through the mediation of the Golkondā minister Mādanna. The terms of this treaty were that the Adil-Shahi Government would pay Shivā 3 lakhs of Rupees down as a contribution and one lakh of *hun* annually as subsidy for protection against the Mughals, and confirm him in the possession of the country bounded on the east by the Krishnā, including the Kolhāpur district. But the union was shortlived, as no policy could be durable in a State ravaged by civil war and subject to almost daily changes of authority. Shivaji hardly minded the rupture of this subsidiary alliance; his gaze was fixed elsewhere; and in January next (1677), he set out on the greatest expedition of his life, the invasion of the Eastern Karnātak. (*B. S.* 450-470; *F. R.* Surat 89, Rajapur to Surat, 24 July 1676.)

* *Pindval*, 11 m. s. e. of Dharampur, in the Dharampur State, south of Surat. *Painecah* is probably either *Panva*, 5 m. w. of Pindval, or *Panaj*, 9 m. n. of Dharampur (*Ind. At.*, 24 N. E.).

CHAPTER X

SOUTH KONKAN AND KANARA

1. Kanara, its rulers and trade.
2. First raid on Rajapur &c.
3. Maratha conquest of S. Konkan, 1663.
4. Shivaji in Kanara 1664, massacre of Ghorparés.
5. Loot of Basrur and Karwar.
6. Bijapuri struggle in S. Kanara 1665.
7. Shivaji and Rustam-i-Zaman.
8. His plot for seizing Goa.
9. His failure in Bijapuri Kanara.
10. Internal troubles in Kanara 1674.
11. Capture of Phonda 1675.
12. Marathas in Kanara uplands.

§1. *Kanārā, its rulers and trade.*

In the seventeenth century, Kanārā or the extensive country along our west coast, was held by various Hindu chieftains. North Kanārā (now included in the Bombay Presidency) owned the overlordship of Bijapur, which ruled directly over the coast-strip from Kārwār (south of Goā) to Mirjān (14.30 N. lat.), leaving the inland districts in the hands of feudatory chiefs, among whom the Nāyaks of Sundā were the most important. The portion of Kanārā that lay south of Mirjān formed a large and independent principality under the Keladi dynasty, whose capital was then at Bednur.

A Muslim officer with the hereditary title of Rustam-i-Zamān (originally Randaula Khan) was the viceroy of the south-western corner of the Bijapur kingdom. His charge extended on the west coast from Ratnagiri town, going southwards round the Portuguese territory of Goā to Kārwār and Mirjān, while landwards it included the southern part of the Ratnagiri district, Kolhāpur, Belgāum, a bit of Dhārwar and the western corner of the North Kanārā district. His seat was at Miraj. The fort of Panhālā lay within his province, but it was governed by a commandant directly under the orders of the Sultan. The viceroy admi-

nistered by means of his agents the flourishing ports of Rājāpur in the north and Kārwār in the south, through which the trade of the rich inland places flowed to Europe. In both towns the English had factories.

"The best pepper in the world is of the growth of Sundā, known in England by [the name of] Kārwār pepper, though five days' journey distant from thence." (Fryer, ii. 42.) Indeed, after the loss of Chaul, Kārwār became the greatest port of Bijapur on the west coast. "The finest muslins of western India were exported from here. The weaving country was inland, to the east of the Sahyādris, at Hubli (in the Dhārwar district), and at other centres, where the English East India Company had agents and employed as many as 50,000 weavers." (Bom. Gaz., xv., pt. ii., pp. 123-125.)

At Mirjān, a port twenty miles south-east of Kārwār, pepper, saltpetre and betel-nut were shipped for Surat. Gersāppā, a district annexed by Bednur, was so famous for its pepper that the Portuguese used to call it Rāni "the Pepper Queen." (Ibid, 333 and 124.)

In 1649 the pepper and cardamon trade of Rājāpur was the chief attraction that induced the English Company to open a factory there. Vingurlā was spoken of in 1660 as a great place of call for ships from Bataviā, Japan and Ceylon on the one side, and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea on the other. All the ports of the Ratnagiri district did much trade also in calicoes, silks, grain and coarse lac, though pepper was their chief export, "which coming out of Kanārā is sent by sea to Persia, Surat and Europe. This country is the store-house for all its neighbours." (Bom. Gaz., x. 175.)

§2. *Shivaji's first raid on Rājāpur, &c.*

After the disastrous failure of Afzal Khan, Rustam-i-Zamān had marched against Shivaji (December, 1659) with 3,000 horse, but this show of hostility was made simply to save his credit with his king. The queen-regent, Bari Sāhiba,

being his enemy, he had made a secret alliance with Shivaji for self-protection. This fact was well-known to the country around, and the English factors had found proofs of it. But even if Rustam had been in earnest, he could have done little with his small army.

Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal's army by pushing on to Panhālā and capturing that fort (28 Nov.). Then he entered the Ratnagiri district and began to "take possession of all the port and inland towns." The Bijapuri governors of these places fled to Rājapur, which was at first spared, "because it belonged to Rustam-i-Zamān, who is a friend of Shivaji." (Rajapur to Surat, 10th December 1659, *F. R. Rajapur.*)

On the fall of Dābhol, its defeated governor made his escape to Rājapur with three junks of Afzal Khan, of 450, 350 and 300 tons burden respectively. The governor of Rājapur, by order of his master Rustam-i-Zamān, received the junks and landed their cargoes for safe-keeping. Shortly after this Shivaji encountered and routed near Panhālā, the combined armies of Rustam and Fazl Khan (the son of Afzal.)* The latter, who bore the brunt of the battle, lost many of his followers, while Rustam, who had made a mere show of fighting, retreated to Hukri with slight loss, and there sat still, while the Marāthas continued to make their incursions into Adil-Shahi territory. (Rajapur to Bassein, 4 February 1660, *F. R. Rajapur.*)

The news of this battle greatly alarmed Rustam's governor of Rājapur, who took refuge in one of Afzal Khan's junks for escaping to the open sea. Before he could start, a Marātha force appeared on the bank to seize the junks; but the governor (about 10th January) succeeded in slipping away beyond the range of the Marātha guns, with the help of the English factor Henry Revington, who for his private gain opposed the Marāthas, as will be described in Chapter 14.

* *Jedhē S.* states that in this battle the Marāthas captured 2,000 horses and twelve elephants. *Shivāpur Yāddi* gives the date as 28th Dec., 1659.

Shivaji condemned this attack on his ally's town of Rājapur, dismissed Doroji, the general responsible for it, "commanded all things that his soldiers took from the townsmen [at Rājapur] to be restored," and put Rustam-i-Zamān's agents again in possession of the town and port. (Rajapur to Surat, 20 February.)

The Dutch report states that about this time Shivā with his troops arrived with four hours' march of Vingurlā, but was driven off by the *desāi* of Kudal (i.e., Sāvant-Vādi), while another Marātha army which had penetrated to near Bijapur was forced to withdraw after being defeated in a bloody battle by the combined Bijapur and Golkondā troops (early in 1660.) (*Dutch Records*, Trans., Vol. 24, No. 664 and Vol. 23, No. 651.)

The Marātha invasion of the Ratnagiri district in Feb.-April 1661 has been described in Ch. 4 §5.

In March 1663, Rustam-i-Zamān did another friendly turn to Shivaji. Netāji Pālkar, Shivā's "lieutenant-general," had raided the imperial territory, but a large Mughal division of 7,000 cavalry pursued him so close as to force him to march 45 or 50 miles a day. Rustam met this army near Bijapur and persuaded the Mughal commander to give up the chase as "that country was dangerous for any strange army to march in, likewise promising them to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netāji got escaped, though not without the loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." This reverse defeated Shivaji's plan of raiding North Kanārā and penetrating to the rich port of Kārwār. (F. R. Surat, 103; Vol. 2, 9th October.)

On 1st March 1663, Ali Adil Shah II., with all his Court, left his capital for Bānkāpur.* There they were at first denied entrance by the mother of Abdur Rahim

* F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 20th July, 1663. A letter from him to Surat, 30th March, says that the Adil-Shahi Court went there in fear of the Mughals who had come within five leagues of Bijapur in pursuit of Netāji. But *Tarikh-i-Ali II*, 160-164, (also B. S. 391) says that Ali went to Bankapur to direct the operations against the Rajah of Bednur in person.

Bahlol Khan, in whose fief it lay. But the gates were soon opened to the king. Adil Shah summoned Bahlol Khan, Shāhji and other officers from the Karnātak, who came by forced marches and waited on the king on the bank of the Wardā (an affluent of the Tungabhadrā.) Bahlol and Shāhji were at once arrested and placed in chains (end of June 1663), but Shāhji was released in two days, though he continued to be deprived of his command for some time. The Bijapuri invasion of Kanārā had already begun. (F. R. Surat 103, Gyffard to Surat, 8th April and 20th July 1663.)

§3. *Marātha conquest of South Konkan, 1663.*

Shivāppā Nayak,* who governed Bednur for forty-two years (1618-1660), first as regent and then as king, had extended his kingdom on all sides by his conquests and stretched his sway over the whole of South Kanārā, the north-western corner of Mysore, and North Kanārā up to the Gangāvati river, including the port of Mirjān. At the close of his life his ambition brought him into collision with Bijapur. He had conquered Sundā and some other forts belonging to vassals of Adil Shah and had thus come dangerously close to Bānkāpur, the fortress of asylum of the Bijapuri Sultans in the south-western corner of their kingdom. (Bom. Gaz., xv. pt. ii, pp. 122-123.)

The Sundā Rajah appealed to Bijapur and Adil Shah seized the opportunity of the death of Shivāppā and the succession of his weak son Bhadrāppā to invade Bednur in person with an overwhelming force.

* In the Persian histories of Bijapur he is styled Rajah of Mālnād, which is a Kanarese word meaning "hill country". (Mysore Gazetteer, ii. 286). Karwar letter to Surat, 18th April, 1664 says that Bhadrappa was "murdered per his Brahmans", the Portuguese account that he sickened (of small-pox) and died in a few days after making peace with Adil Shah, not without suspicion of having been poisoned. (Pissurlencar, i. 19n.) The following is the correct succession list of these kings:—On Shivāppā's death in 1660 his brother Venkatāppā succeeded but died in 1661; then Bhadrāppā, a lad of eight, reigned till 1663, when Somasekhar came to the throne (reign 1663-1671).

Ali Adil Shah's campaign was short but vigorous and an unbroken success. Bhadrāppā Nayak could make no stand against the combined resources of the entire Bijapur kingdom ; he lost Sundā, Bednur and many other forts, and was forced to make peace by restoring Sundā to its former chief and promising an indemnity of 7 *lakhs* of *hun* to Adil Shah. On 21st November the victorious Ali II. returned to his capital. (B. S. 391-395 ; F. R. Surat 103.)

We now turn to the activities of Shivaji in this region. While Ali was engaged in the struggle with Bednur, Shivaji had been active in South Konkan and in the north-western part of the Kanārā district. By way of Kolhāpur and Kudāl, he marched to Vingurlā (May 1663) ; "all the way, as he goes along, he gives his *qaul* (safe assurance), promising them that neither he nor his soldiers shall in the least do any wrong to anybody that takes his *qaul*, which promise he hitherto hath kept." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 24th May, 1663.)

His going down the coast caused such alarm that "all the Muhammadan governors as far as Sānquelim and Bicholim were fled," and in consequence the petty robbers on the route became more active than usual. In June Shivaji returned from Vingurlā after leaving a garrison of 2,000 soldiers there. Shortly before this Shāista Khan had defeated a Marātha army, killing more than 200 men. (Ibid., Gyffard to Surat, 24th May and 22nd June, 1663. Pissurlencar, *Antig.* I. i. 107.)

In July the Bijapur Government ordered its governor of Phondā to join forces with the Sāvant of Vādi and other petty Rajahs and try to drive Shivaji's men out of Rājāpur and Khārépatan. But nothing was done, as "there was juggling between them, and he remained possessed of all." (F. R. Surat, 103, 20th July 1663, Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 20th November 1663.)

In punishment of Rustam-i-Zamān's secret friendship with Shīvā, the Sultan dismissed him from his viceroyalty

and gave the province to Muhammad Ikhlās Khan, the eldest son of the late Khan-i-Khānān Ikhlās Khan and a brother of Khawās Khan, while Dābhol and Chiplun were given to Fazl Khan. Shivaji got final possession of Rājāpur at this time and kept it permanently in his own hands. (*Ibid.*)

Rustam's agent at Kārwār fleeced the English factors there so severely that in July 1663 they were ordered by the Council at Surat to remove themselves and the Company's goods quietly to Hubli. Adil Shah and Rustam-i-Zamān alike were sensible of the loss of revenue caused by such molestation of traders, and therefore the king sent them a farmān promising that they would be left in peace at Kārwār and would have to pay no other duties than they had formerly done. Then the factory was re-established at Kārwār. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 2, Consult., 14th August, 1663.)

§4. *Shivaji in Kanārā, 1664.*

In 1664 the war with Bednur was renewed. Shivāppā Nāyak had died in old age, about October 1660. His son and successor, Bhadrāppā, was murdered by his Brāhmans, (1663) and an infant named Somasekhar was set up on the throne under the regency of his mother Chennāmmāji and her favourite Timmāyā Nāyak, a toddy-seller, who "by his cunning policy raised himself to be general and protector" of the realm. At this revolution Ali Adil Shah II. was so incensed that he sent his generals, Bahlool Khan and Sayyid Iliyās Sharzā Khan, to invade Bednur from two sides (April 1664.) [F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 18th April 1664. Fryer, i. 41-42. Pissur. i. 19n.]

By this time Rustam-i-Zamān seems to have returned to favour at Court. Muhammad Ikhlās Khan was transferred from the government of Kārwār and his friends from that of Ānkolā, Shiveshwar (or Hālekot), Kādrā and other places in North Kanārā and these cities were given to three of

Rustum's sons. In August Rustam himself was ordered to go to that region with two other Bijapuri generals and try to expel Shivaji. He reached Kudāl at the end of August, but did nothing. (F. R. Surat, 104, Karwar 23rd July and Hubli 28th August, 1664.)

Any serious attack by Adil Shah on Shivaji was now rendered impossible as the Sultan's attention was diverted to Bednur, whither he wanted to march in person with 12,000 horse after the *Diwāli* festival (October) and co-operate with Sharzā Khan in crushing the Kanārā Rajah. Throughout the second half of 1664 the coast region was in an unhappy condition. As the English merchants write, "Deccan and all the south coast are all embroiled in civil wars, king against king and country against country, and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength." — (F. R. Surat, Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 26th Nov., 1664.)

Shivaji had planned to march his army down the west coast, get on board his fleet waiting at Bhatkal (14° N, the southern point of the North Kanārā district), and raid the coast towns. But Khawās Khan barred his path.

Lakham Sāvant, the chief of Kudāl, had made peace by accepting Shivaji's vassalage and ceding Kudāl to him. But he now tried to recover his own by calling in Bijapuri aid. So Adil Shah sent Khawās Khan with a small army into that district to expel Shivaji. The first encounter between them took place in October 1664. At first the negligent Khawās Khan was encircled by the Marāthas, but he called his captains together and heartened them in the midst of their despair. The Marāthas opened fire; the Bijapuris advanced to close quarters and fought a severe battle, losing Siddi Sarwār (their subahdār of Konkan, with his seat at Phondā), Shah Hazrat, Shaikh Mirān and some other high officers. After four hours of struggle the defeat of the Muslims seemed imminent, when Khawās Khan charged sword in hand; his troops followed him fearlessly in one

body ; and they broke through Netāji's cavalry, some of whom carried carbines. Shivaji then broke off the engagement and fled away after losing 400 men in killed and nearly a thousand in wounded, while the Bijapuri loss was only a quarter of their enemies'. (Dutch letter from Vingurlā ; *Basātin-us-Salātin*, 398-402. Pissurlencar, *Antigualhas*, I. i. 108-116.)

Rumour immediately exaggerated the result as a disaster to Shivaji, who was reported to have been chased and closely invested in a fort, while the casualties were swollen to six thousand men slain! This report, occurring in a Surat, factory letter of 26th November 1664, was, however, contradicted by the same source on 2nd January 1665. Lakham Sāvant immediately afterwards recovered possession of Kudāl and brought Khawās Khan there.

Shivaji, however, was anything but crushed. He had only made a strategic retreat in order first to cut off a detachment coming to reinforce Khawās Khan, and then double back and crush the Khan when weakened by this blow. He had also to settle scores with an old enemy. Bāji Ghorparé, jāgirdār of Mudhol, was a faithful vassal of Bijapur. At the siege-camp before Jinji he had carried out his commander-in-chief's orders by arresting the refractory Shahji (1648), without, however, resorting to treachery as alleged in later Marātha stories. He used to co-operate loyally with the Adil-Shahi generals sent out to restore their king's authority over the Konkan territory usurped by Shivaji. His energy, honesty and devotion to his master made him a dangerous enemy to Shivaji. When Khawās Khan was marching to Kudāl to expel Shivaji, Ghorparé came from Bijapur with his contingent of 1,500 horse to join him. But Shivaji struck the first blow and prevented the junction of his enemies. He suddenly invaded Mudhol. Bāji Ghorparé, who had hurried to the defence of his jāgir, was defeated and slain and 1,200 of his horses were captured. Mudhol itself was taken, and so many members of the Ghorparé family were put to death that the incident

is known as "the massacre of the Ghorparés"*(end of October.)

Was Mudhol sacked by Shivaji? From Kudāl where Shivaji broke off his first fight with Khawās Khan to Mudhol town, the distance is 110 miles in a straight line, with two mountain passes to be crossed on the way. It would take Shivaji's cavalry full six days to cover this distance at a speed not destructive of their fighting freshness at the end of the march, and six days more to return. It is clear from *Sabhāsād*, p. 68, that Shivaji cut off Bāji Ghorparé's relieving column of 1,500 horse somewhere in Konkan *below* the Ghāts, say two days' march from Kudāl. Therefore Shivaji did not personally sack the town of Mudhol. After Bāji Ghorparé, now an old man and hopelessly outnumbered ten to one by Shivaji, had fallen in the encounter in Konkan, a deatachment of Shivaji's army probably sacked the defenceless and masterless town of Mudhol and massacred such Ghorparés as were still there.

When Shivaji, flushed with his victory over Ghorparé, came near, Lakham Sāvant advised Khawās to escape from Kudāl, as he was now hopelessly outnumbered. The Khan removed to Bāndā, setting his troops on retreat. Immediately on hearing of the break up of the Bijapuri army, Shivaji on 26th October (O. S.) sent Netāji to Bāndā with the pick of his cavalry to take Khawās by surprise. But the Khan was in no position now to stand an attack; he fled precipitately with his soldiers back to Chandargarh in the uplands (Bālāghāt.) Shivaji then burst into the district now called Sāvant-vādi, (between Ratnagiri and Goa), the numerous petty chieftains of which were feudatories of Bijapur. The greatest among them was Lakham Sāvant, the

* *Sabh.* 68; *Jedhē S.* The popular tradition (91 Q. B. sec. 66-69) is that Shivaji committed this massacre in obedience to his father's order that if he was his true son he should avenge on Baji Ghorparé the latter's treachery to Shahji in 1648. The fall of the Ghorparés and Lakham Sāvant's defeat (which immediately followed it) took place in Nov. 1664, nearly a year after Shahji's death; they cannot be placed in 1663. *Pissurlencar, Antigualhas*, I. 1, 113, Dutch letter.

desāi (chief) of Kudāl, who had sided with the Bijapuri generals in these parts against Shivaji and was the first to feel Shivaji's wrath now. After resisting for a short time he escaped with his bare life into the forest, leaving his riches to the victor. Keshava Nāyak and Keshava Prabhu of Pernem and Rāwal Shenvi of Bicholim* next shared the same fate. All these defeated *desāis* took refuge in Goa and lived there in misery, making frequent attempts to recover their own by raising troops and organizing expeditions from the Portuguese territory against Shivaji's governors. Krishna Sāvant, a kinsman and rival of Lakham for the *desāi*-ship, naturally joined Shivaji and was placed by him in charge of Kudāl.

Shivaji next plundered Vingurlā, "a place of great trade, from whence he carried away vast riches." He had heard that the Dutch had accumulated great wealth by trade in their warehouse in this important port. Another town (probably Mālvan) not far from it, suffered the same fate. About this time, *i.e.*, early in December 1664, his men looted Hubli and many other rich towns of that region, holding several eminent merchants prisoners for ransom.

* The geography of this tract in 1664 was as follows:—Leaving out a narrowing coast-strip in the south-west of the Ratnagiri district, from Malvan to Tarikhola, the inland part east of it was divided into the districts of Kudāl (north), *Vādi* (middle) and *Bāndā* (South). South-west of Bāndā lay Pernem, and south of the latter lay Bardes and Goa successively, with *Phondā* due east of Goa. North-east of Bardes and Goa lay Bicholim, with *Sanquelim* further to the east. Of these, only Bardes, Goa and Salsette (or the 66 maritime villages of Goa, quite distinct from Salsette near Bombay island) belonged to the Portuguese in the 17th century, while Pernem, Bicholim and Sanquelim were annexed later. For Krishna Sāvant's intrigues against Lakham S. and the latter's faithful assistance to successive Bijapur generals, see Pingulkar, *farmans* 8-12; *Sabh.* 68.

Shivaji repeatedly protested to the Goa Government against the conduct of the fugitive *desais* and even invaded the Portuguese territory of Bardes by way of reprisal. At last the Viceroy expelled the *desais* from Goa in May 1668. [Pissurlencar, i. 12-25; *Antig.* I. i. 116 sq.] The Lakham Sāvant submitted to Shivaji, pleading that he was of the same Bhonsle clan. Shivaji appointed him as his slared agent in Kudāl, under agreement not to raise forces or build forts but to serve under Shivaji's orders. [*Sabh.* 68; Pingulkar, *farman*, 7, date incorrect.]

He had sent only three hundred horsemen to Hubli, but these did their work so thoroughly that the town "was little better than spoiled." The merchants who had fled at the attack were too frightened to return there soon, even after the departure of the Marāthas. The raiders were said to have been assisted by some of Rustam's soldiers; that noble, as the English remarked, had "begun to taste the sweetness of plunder [so] that in a short time he would get a habit of it." "Shiva and his scouts range all over the country, making havoc wherever he comes, with fire and sword." (F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 6th January 1665, Taylor to Surat, 14th December 1664; Vol. 86, Surat to Karwar, 23rd March, Surat to Co., 2nd January 1665.)

On 12th March 1665, the Surat Council write: "The subjects [of Adil Shah] unanimously cry out against him for suffering Shivaji to forage to and fro, burning and robbing his country without any opposition, wherefore it is certainly concluded by all that he shares with the said rebel in all his rapines, so that the whole country is in a confused condition, merchants flying from one place to another to preserve themselves, so that all trade is lost.... The rebel Shivaji hath committed many notorious and great robberies since that of Surat, and hath possessed himself of the most considerable ports belonging to Deccan [i.e., Bijapur] to the number of eight or nine, from whence he sets out two or three or more trading vessels yearly from every port to Persia, Basra, Mocha, etc."

§5. *Loot of Basrur and blackmail from Karwar, 1665.*

On 8th February 1665 Shivaji left Mālvan with a fleet of 85 frigates and three large ships, sailed past Goa to Basrur,* the chief port of the Bednur kingdom, where he

* Basrur (Sanskrit *Vāsupura*), 12 miles south of Coondāpur in the South Kanara District, was "the principal port of the Bednore Rajahs." (S. *Canara Gazetteer*, ii. 242). Portuguese spelling *Bracolore*, early English *Barcelore*, Hunterian *Barkalur*, Marathi *Basnur*.

was quite unexpected, so that he took immense plunder in one day. Then setting out on his return, he landed at the holy city of Gokarna, on the coast, 22 miles south of Kārwār, and took a purifying bath with all religious ceremonies before the great temple of Mahābaleshwar. From this place he marched to Ankolā (nine miles northwards) with 4,000 infantry, sending all his fleet back, with the exception of twelve frigates, which he detained for transporting his army over the rivers on his way back to North Konkan. On the 22nd he reached Kārwār. The English factors, having got early news of his coming from the spies they had sent out, put all the Company's ready money and portable goods on board a small hundred-ton ship belonging to the Imām of Maskat, then lying in the river, its captain Emanuel Donnavado promising to defend it as long as he lived or his vessel kept floating. The factors themselves took refuge in the ship. Sher Khan,* a son of the late Khan-i-Khānān Khan Muhammad and a subordinate of Bahlol Khan, arrived in the town that very night, without knowing anything about Shivaji's approach. With the help of his escort of 500 men he quickly fortified himself as well as he could to protect the goods he had brought down, and sent a messenger to Shīvā in the night, warning him not to enter the town as he would resist him to the utmost. Sher Khan was famous throughout the country for his valour and ruling capacity, and his chief, Bahlol Khan, was "one of the potentest men in the kingdom of Bijapur." Shivaji, therefore, shrank from provoking him, and after much discussion "condescended to go a little out of the way, and so came and encamped with his army at the mouth of the river" Kālānadi, sparing the town.

From this place he sent an envoy to Sher Khan, asking him either to deliver the English merchants up to him or, retiring himself, permit him to revenge himself on them, "whom he styled his inveterate enemies." Sher Khan sent

* The cause of his coming to Karwar was to charter a ship of Rustam-i-Zamān's to convey Bahlol Khan's mother to Mecca.

this news to the English and desired to know their final answer, which was that they had nothing on board except powder and bullets which Shivaji might come and fetch if he thought they would serve him instead of gold. "This our answer being sent to Shivaji did so exasperate him that he said he would have us before he departed, which the governor of the town hearing, they persuaded all the merchants to agree to send him [Shivaji] a present lest he should recall his fleet, which lay on this side of Salsette." To this blackmail the English contributed £112, so as not to endanger the Company's property in Karwar, worth 8,000 *hun.* "With this Shivaji departed on 23rd February, very unwillingly, saying that Sher Khan had spoiled his hunting at the *Holi*, which is a time he generally attempts some such design."*

Thence the disappointed Marātha chief marched home northwards, reaching Bhimgarh (25 miles north-west of Kārwār) on 14th March. But soon afterwards Jai Singh's siege of Purandar and vigorous invasion of the neighbouring country called away Shivaji to the defence of his home, and Kanārā enjoyed peace for some time.

§6. *Bijapuris recover and lose S. Konkan, 1665.*

By the treaty of Purandar (12th June 1665) the Mughals left Shivaji free to annex Adil-Shahi Konkan. The affairs of Bijapur also fell into confusion at this time. Bahlol Khan died (June or July.) He had come to Bijapur from the Karnātak war at the king's call, but died of illness only eight days after his arrival. The Sultan being jealous of his large force, 10,000 brave Afghans, tried to sow dissension

* Shivaji's loot of Basrur and visit to Karwar: *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 104, Karwar to Surat, 14th March 1665. Sabh. 70-71. The Karwar factors wrote on 28 Jan. that the great annual bathing festival (*Shivaratri*) would take place only eight days later at Gokarna. 4 Feb. was *Krishna 14th*. Shivaji missed it. He took ship for the Basrur expedition (at Mālvan) on 8 Feb. [Shivapur Y.] and bathed at Gokarna on his return from Basrur. [F. R. Surat, 104.]

among his sons and nephews. Sher Khan, a brave, able and upright man, kept them at peace. But he was soon afterwards poisoned, it was suspected, by Adil Shah, and immediately a bitter quarrel for the headship of the family broke out between the two elder sons of Bahlool Khan, while the Sultan seized some of their *jāgirs*. The affairs of the royal drunkard at Bijapur passed from bad to worse. (F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 29th August 1665. *House of Shivaji*, Ch. 5.)

The Bijapuri governor of Hubli fell into disfavour at Court and the governor of Mirjān rebelled. Muhammad Ikhlās Khan, the brother of Khawās Khan, recovered Dābhol and many other places in South Konkan from the Marāthas, while the latter were busy fighting Jai Singh. But by November next Shivaji, now an ally of the Mughals, had reconquered all that country after slaying 2,000 soldiers of Muhammad Ikhlās, including several men of note. The Khan fell back on Kudāl and waited for Sharzā Khan to reinforce him. But no such aid came, as Jai Singh began his invasion of Bijapur that very month and Ikhlās Khan had to hasten from Kudāl to the defence of the capital. But Vingurlā and Kudāl continued in Bijapuri hands, while Shivaji held Rājāpur and Khārépatan. The country about Kārwār was at this time subjected to constant pillage by the soldiers of Shivaji's garrisons there, who used to leave their forts in bands of 200 men and raid the small towns. Murtazā Beg, who had lost his fort, also took to plunder with his 200 retainers. (F. R., 29th August, 21st September and 29th November 1665 and 15th January 1666.)

§7. *Shivaji and Rustam, 1666.*

In the course of Jai Singh's war with Bijapur, Shivaji had been detached against Panhālā. His assault on that fort (16th January 1666) failed and then he went off to Khelnā. From this place he sent 2,000 men under a

Muhammadan officer to besiege Phondā.* The garrison resisted for two months (February and March) killing 500 Marāthas, and finally agreed to surrender in six hours. In the meantime, the Bijapuri Government had sent 5,000 horse and 1,000 foot under Siddi Masaud, Abdul Aziz (the son of Siddi Jauhar), and Rustam-i-Zamān to the Panhāla region. They formed a plan for surprising Shivaji, who lay on the top of the hill over-looking Konkan. When their Van, under Rustam, approached, he beat his drums and sounded his trumpets and thus gave his friend Shivaji timely warning to escape. But Masaud chased the Marāthas with 600 chosen cavalry and cut off 200 of the enemy. On the way back he intercepted Shivaji's friendly letters to Rustam, which he immediately sent to Bijapur. At this Adil Shah wrote to Rustam that though he reluctantly pardoned this act of disloyalty, he would dismiss him unless he raised the siege of Phoondā. Rustam then wrote to his agent Muhammad Khan to save Phondā by all means. This was effected by a stratagem. Muhammad Khan could get together only a small force, with which he went and sat down in a town of his master's about three miles from Phondā, and sent word to the general of Shivaji that he had only come to look after his own country. The general suspected no stratagem, as his master and Rustam were friends. He went with his Muslim soldiery to a hill a mile off in order to say his prayers in public. Muhammad Khan seized this opportunity ; he surprised and routed the soldiers left in the siege-camp, and after a long and well contested fight defeated the rest of the Marātha army who had hurried back from the hill. Thus the siege of Phondā was raised after the poor men in it had been driven to eat leaves for the last three days. "This business, it is generally

* First siege of Phonda: *F. R. Surat* 104, "Deccan News", following a letter from Karwar, dated 24th April 1666. Phonda, 10 m. s. s. e. of Goa city, was the westernmost frontier-fortress of Bijapur nearest to Goa, and a menace to the latter. The Portuguese, after some previous failures, annexed it in the 18th century. *Pissurlencar, Antig.* I. 1. 118.

thought, hath quite broken the long continued friendship between Rustam-i-Zamān and Shivaji. Rustam hath taken now Phondā, Kudāl, Bāndā, Sānquelim and Bicholim, five towns of note, from Shivaji." We thus see that Shivaji's possession of the extreme south of Konkan and the region of Kanārā close to Goa, was of a pulsatory character. He overran every district when he appeared in person, but when his troops were heavily engaged elsewhere or he went to a long distance from Mahārāshtra, the dispossessed local chiefs (like the desāis of Kudāl harboured in Goa) and the Bijapuri officers reappeared in force and seized parts of his conquests there. This see-saw went on for years and ended only before his death.

§8. *Plot to seize Goa, 1668.*

Soon afterwards, on 5th March 1666, Shivaji started for the Mughal Court. For the next four years he gave no trouble to Bijapuri Konkan or Kanārā, his opponents during this interval being the Portuguese and the Siddis. The English merchants of Kārwār repeatedly speak of Shiva in 1668 and 1669 as being "very quiet" and "keeping still at Rājgarh," and of his credit as decreasing during these years of inactivity, while the "country all about was in great tranquillity." In October 1668 Shivaji made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the territory of Goa by stratagem. He smuggled into the towns of this State 400 to 500 of his soldiers in small parties at different times and under various disguises, hoping that when their number was doubled they would suddenly rise one night, seize one of the passes, and admit him before the Portuguese could raise a sufficiently large army for their defence. But either the plot leaked out, or the Portuguese Viceroy's* suspicion was roused. He made a narrow search in all his towns, arrested the 400 or

* The Viceroy was Conde de S. Vicente, who died on 27th Oct. 1668, and according to Giffard's letter he detected the plot "a little before his death." *Pissurlencar, Port. e Mar.* i. 27. *Antigu.* I. 1. 132.

500 men of Shivaji at various places, and evidently extorted the truth from them. Then he sent for Shivaji's ambassador, with his own hand gave him two or three cuffs in the ear, and turned him and the Marātha prisoners out of his territory. On hearing of it Shivaji assembled an army of 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse, threatening to invade the Bardes and Salsette districts of Goa in person. From the north of Rājāpur he marched to Vingurlā, inspected all his forts in that quarter, "changing their men and putting in (fresh) provisions and ammunition," and then in December returned to Rājgarh as he found "the Portuguese well prepared to give him a hot reception." (Gyffard to Surat, 12th November and 16th December, 1668. *F. R. Surat* 105.)

At the beginning of 1670 came his rupture with the Mughals, which kept him busy in other quarters and prolonged the peace in Kanārā till the close of 1672, when, taking advantage of the death of Ali II., he renewed his depredations in Bijapur territory.

Meantime, in September 1671, Rustam-i-Zamān had broken out in rebellion against his master. He had at last been deprived of his viceroyalty and *jāgir* for his treacherous intimacy with Shivā, the crowning act of which was the surrender of one of the king's forts to the Marāthas. And now he took up arms in the hope of intimidating the Government into reinstating him. With the underhand help of Shivaji, he occupied Bijapuri territory, yielding three *lakhs* of *hun* a year, and plundered and burnt Rāibāgh, completing the ruin of that city, which had been previously sacked by the Marāthas. But within a month the royal troops crushed the rebellion,—the forts of Mirjān and Ānkolā alone holding out for several months more. By the middle of 1672 Muzaffar Khan, the new Adil-Shahi viceroy of the Kanāra coast, had made peace with the rebel chiefs (*Nāyakwāris*) of Shiveshwar and Kadrā.*

* *F. R. Surat* 106, Kawar to Surat, 20th September, 31st October 1671, 26th June 1672.

§9. *Shivaji's failure in Bijapuri Kanara, 1673.*

The death of Ali Adil Shah II. (on 24th November 1672) was followed by the rebellion of the Rajahs of Sundā and Bednur, who invaded the Bijapur territory across their frontiers. An army under Muzaffar Khan chastised both of them (February, 1673) and wrested Sundā from its Rajah. (F. R. Surat, 106, Karwar to Co., 17th February 1673.)

This rebellion had been hardly suppressed when the Marāthas made their second incursion into the upland of Bijapuri Kanārā, sacking many forts and rich cities in that region. Their general Pratāp Rao raided Hubli,* the most important inland mart of the province, causing a loss of 7,894 *hun* to the English Company alone, besides the private property of the factors (early in May 1673.) The Company's house was the first they entered and dug up, carrying away all the broadcloth in it to their general who sat in the bazar. Muzaffar Khan, however, promptly came to the scene with 4,000 cavalry and saved the town from total destruction. The Marāthas fled precipitately with what booty they had already packed up, "leaving several goods out in the streets which they had not time to carry away." When the English at Surat complained to Shivā about the outrage, he denied that it was done by his soldiers.

At Hubli, Muzaffar missed the Marātha raiders by just one day. He was probably suspected of having entered into a secret understanding with them, like Rustam-i-Zamān, for immediately afterwards all the nobles under his command and most of his own soldiers forsook him and the Bijapur Government removed him from his viceroyalty. This drove him into rebellion and he tried to retain possession of his

* The commercial importance of Hubli can be judged from the following remarks of the English merchants:—"Hubli, the mart of our Karwar factory, where we sell and buy most of the goods that port affords us." (F. R. Surat 87, 1st November 1673.) "Hubli, a great inroad [=inland] town and a mart of very considerable trade." (O. C. 3779.) Maratha invasion of Kanara in 1673; F. R. Surat 8, Consult. 24th May, 10th and 9th July, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, 1st November. O. C. 3779 and 3800. Sabhāsad, 69, has only eight lines for the events of 1673-75.

fiefs by force. The great fort of Belgāum remained in his hands and also many strong places between Goa and Kanārā (June, 1673.) Adil Shah sent a large army to reduce Belgāum in case Muzaffar declined the compromise offered to him.

In June Bahlol Khan with a large Bijapuri army held Kolhāpur and defeated the Marāthas in several encounters, forcing all their roving bands to leave the Kārwār country. He also talked of invading South Konkan and recovering Rājapur and other towns next autumn. In August he is still spoken of as "pressing hard upon Shivaji, who supplicates for peace, being fearful of his own condition." But soon afterwards Bahlol Khan, his irreconcilable enemy, fell ill at Miraj and Shivaji's help was solicited by the Bijapur and Golkondā Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal invasion under Bahādur Khan (September).*

At the end of September we find Shivaji at the head of a great army raised for "some notable attempt against the Mughal." He also sewed 20,000 sacks of cotton for conveying the plunder he expected to seize! But on the *dashaharā* day (10th October), an auspicious time with the Hindus for setting out on campaigns, he sallied forth on a long expedition into Bijapuri territory, with 25,000 men, robbed many rich towns, including Bānkāpur, and then penetrated into Kanārā, "to get more plunder in those rich towns to bear the expenses of his army." Early in December he reached Kadrā (20 miles north-east of Kārwār) with a division of 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and stayed there for four days. The bulk of his forces occupied a hill near Hubli. But two severe defeats at the hands of Bahlol and Sharzā Khan at Bānkāpur and Chandgarh (a fort midway between the Belgāum and Sāvant-vādi towns) respectively forced him to evacuate Kanārā quickly.†

* O. C. 3800 and 3832; F. R. Suart 106, Bombay to Surat, 16th and 29th September 1673; B. S. 439-443; *Jedhe S.*

† F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 29th September and 10th October, Vol. 88, Karwar to Surat, 17th December 1673. O. C. 3910; Fryer, ii.

§10. *Internal troubles in Kanārā, 1674.*

Though Kanārā had been freed from the Marāthas, that province enjoyed no peace. Miān Sāhib, the *faujdār* of Kārwār, (instigated, it was said, by Shivā), rebelled and Adil Shah had to conduct a long war before he could be suppressed. The two sides continued to fight skirmishes with varying success. In February 1674 the royal troops captured Sundā, with the rebel's wife in it, but he held out obstinately in his other forts. By 22nd April this "long and tedious rebellion" was at last ended by the arrival of Ābu Khan, Rustam-i-Zamān II., as the new viceroy. Miān Sāhib's followers deserted him for lack of pay; his forts (Kadrā, Kārwār, Ankolā and Shiveshwar) all surrendered without a blow, and he himself made peace on condition of his wife being released. Shivaji was then only a day's march from Kārwār, "going to build a castle upon a very high hill, from which he may very much annoy these parts." (F. R. Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 14th February and 22nd April 1674. Orme, *Frag.*, 35.)

Unlike his father, the new Rustam-i-Zamān did not cultivate the friendship of the Marāthas. In August 1674 he seized a rich merchant, subject of Shivā, living at Narsā (16 miles from Phondā) and the Marātha king prepared for retaliation. In October Rustam was summoned by Khawās Khan, the new *wazir*, to Bijapur; and, as he feared that his post would be given to another, he extorted forced loans from all the rich men of Kārwār and its neighbourhood that he could lay hands on, before he went away. In the last week of August, Annāji Datto passed through Kudāl with 3,000 soldiers intending to "surprise the fortress of Phondā, but Mamet Khan who was there armed himself, so that the aforesaid pandit accomplished nothing." (F. R. Surat 88; Dutch Rec., Vol. 34, No. 841.)

At Bijapur everything was in confusion, "the great

Khans were at difference." The worthless *wazir* Khawās Khan was driven to hard straits by the Afghan faction in the State. Rustam-i-Zamān II, after his visit to the capital evidently lost his viceroyalty. This was Shivaji's opportunity and he now conquered Kanārā for good. First, he befooled the Mughal viceroy Bahādur Khan by sending him a pretended offer of peace, asking for the pardon of the Mughal Government through the Khan's mediation and promising to cede the imperial forts he had recently conquered as well as the twenty-three forts of his own that he had once before yielded in Jai Singh's time. By these insincere negotiations Shivaji for the time being averted the risk of a Mughal attack on his territory and began his invasion of Bijapuri Kanārā with composure of mind.

§11. *Capture of Phondā and Annexation of Kanārā coast, 1675.*

In March 1675 he got together an army of 15,000 cavalry, 14,000 infantry and 10,000 pioneers with pickaxes, crow-bars and hatchets, etc.* Arriving at Rājapur (22nd March), he spent three days there, ordering forty small ships to go to Vingurlā with all speed and there wait for fresh commands. Next he marched to his town of Kudāl, and on 8th April laid siege to Phondā, the most important Bijapuri fort near Goa. While he was prosecuting the siege, another division of his army plundered Atgiri in Adil-Shahi territory and two other large cities near Haidarabad, carrying away "a great deal of riches, besides many rich persons held to ransom."

He began the siege of Phondā with 2,000 horse and 7,000 foot, and made arrangements for sitting down before

* Invasion of Kanara and capture of Phonda (1675): *F. R.* Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 14th and 22nd April, 8th and 25th May; Rajapur to Surat, 1st and 20th April; 3rd, 21st and 31st May; 3rd and 14th June; *B. S.* 441; *Orme Frag.*, 38, 40. *Sabh.* 70 (scanty). Delusive peace offer to Mughals, *B. S.* 445; *O. C.* 4077.

the fort even during the coming rainy season in order to starve the garrison into surrender. Muhammad Khan had only four months' provisions within the walls; there was no hope of relief from Bijapur or even from the Portuguese who now trembled for the safety of Goa and appeased Shivaji by promising neutrality. Rustam-i-Zamān had too little money or men to attempt the raising of the siege. But Muhammad Khan made a heroic defence, unaided and against overwhelming odds.

Shivaji ran four mines under the walls, but they were all countermined, with a heavy loss of men to him. He then threw up an earthen wall only 12 feet from the fort and his soldiers lay sheltered behind it. The Portuguese, fearing that if Shivā took Phondā their own Goa would be as good as lost, secretly sent ten boat-loads of provisions and some men to aid the besieged (middle of April); but these were intercepted by Shivaji, and the Viceroy of Goa disavowed the act.

The siege was pressed with vigour. By the beginning of May Shivaji had taken possession of two outworks, filled up the ditch, and made 500 ladders and 500 gold bracelets, each bracelet weighing half a *seer*, for presentation to the forlorn hope who would attempt the escalade.

Bahlol Khan, who was at Miraj with 15,000 troops wanted to come down the Ghāts and relieve Phondā, but Shivā had barred the passages with trees cut down and lined the stockades with his men, and Bahlol, being certain of heavy loss and even an utter repulse if he tried to force them, returned to his base. His inactivity during the siege was imputed to bribery by Shivā. At length the fort fell about the 6th of May. All who were found in it were put to the sword, with the exception of Muhammad Khan, who saved his own life and those of four or five others by promising to put into Shivā's hands all the adjoining parts belonging to Bijapur. In fear of death the Khan wrote to the *qiladārs* of these forts to yield them to the Marāthas, but they at first declined. So the Khan was kept in chains.

Ināyet Khan, the *faujdār* of Ankolā, seized the country and forts lately held by Muhammad Khan and placed his own men in them, but he could make no stand against Shivaji whose forces were now set free by the fall of Phondā. He therefore compounded and gave up the forts for money. In a few days Ankolā, Shiveshwar (which had been besieged by 3,000 Marātha horse and some foot-soldiers since 24th April), Kārwār, and Kadrā (which alone had made a short stand), all capitulated to Shivaji, and by the 25th of May the country as far south as the Gangāvati river had passed out of Bijapuri possession into his hands.

§12. *Marāthas in Kanārā uplands.*

On 26th April, 1675, one of Shivā's generals had visited Kārwār and "burnt the town effectually, leaving not a house standing," in punishment of the fort of Kārwār still holding out. The English factory was not molested. This general, however, went back in a few days. But next month, after the fall of Phondā, the fort of Kārwār surrendered to the Marāthas.

The rainy season now put an end to the campaign. Bahlol Khan went back to Bijapur, leaving his army at Miraj. Shivā at first thought of cantoning for the rains in a fort on the frontier of Sundā, but soon changed his mind and returned to Rāigarh, passing by Rājapur on 12th June.

A Marātha force was detached into the Sundā Rajah's country at the end of May. "They finding no great opposition seized upon Supā and Ulavi belonging to the Rajah." But Khizr Khan Pani (Bahlol's lieutenant) and the *Desāis* in concert attacked the Marātha garrisons there, killed 300 of the men and recovered both the places. A party of Marāthas that was posted at Varhulli, 7 miles south of Ankolā, to take custom duty on all goods passing that way, was now forced to withdraw (August 1675.) (F. R. Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat, 27th August 1675.)

The dowager Rāni of Bednur had quarrelled with her colleague Timmāyā, but had been compelled to make peace with him (August), she being a mere cypher, while he held the real power of the State. The Rāni then appealed to Shivaji for protection, agreed to pay him an annual tribute, and admitted a Marātha resident at her Court. [F. R. Surat 88. 91 Q. B. sec. 65.]

The *dalvi*, or general of the *desāi* who had been the local Bijapuri governor of North Kanārā, had aided Shivaji in the conquest of that district. But now (1675), disgusted with him, the *dalvi* was moving about the country with a force, saying that he would restore his former master. He attacked Shivaji's guards in Kārwār town and forced them to retire to the castle. The people were in extreme misery in Shivaji's new conquests: he squeezed the *desāis*, who in their turn squeezed the ryots. But Bijapur was now in the grip of a civil war, the Adil-Shahi State was hastening to a dissolution, and Shivaji's possession of South Konkan and the North Kanārā district remained unchallenged till after his death. (Bom. Gaz. xv. pt. i. 128.)

But Bednur did not really become a Marātha protectorate. We learn from an English letter of 29th July, 1679, that the Rajah of Sundā and the Rāni of Bednur had sharp wars, "but the former by the assistance of Jamshid Khan has had the advantage of compelling the Rāni, on conclusion of the peace, to deliver up to him his castles of Sirsy and Serā, formerly possessed by them, as likewise the port and castle of Mirgy [=Mirjān], a little to the southward of Kārwār." (Orme MSS. 116.)

CHAPTER XI

NAVAL ENTERPRISES

1. Need of a national navy.
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§1. *Need of a National Navy.*

Nothing proves Shivaji's genius as a born statesman more clearly than his creation of a navy and naval bases. His father had left to him only a few inland districts; but Shivaji at the very commencement of his own independent expansion, immediately after gaining the towns of Kalyan and Bhiwandi (1658) started building ships of his own in the creek below them. Three years later, when his land forces overran the South Konkan Coast, he made a survey of the sea-side down to the frontier of Goa, and embarked on a plan for building new naval bases there and strengthening the older ones. He instinctively perceived that without the command of the coastal waters his inland territories could not be protected, nor the economic prosperity of his subjects assured.

A series of raids by foreign ships on the Konkan Coast, with their attendant atrocities, for a thousand years past, had burnt into the memory of the Maratha people the bitter truth that they were helpless if they could not defend their seaboard. In the first century of Islam, in the years 636 and

660 A.D., pirate fleets from Arabia had sacked the flourishing port of Thana. Even as late as 1530, Portuguese ships from Goa burnt the suburbs of Kalyan and took from them a large booty; in 1540 they plundered and burnt another great port, Agashi and destroyed 300 vessels lying in it.

The rich products of peninsular India were collected in the historic ports on the west coast for export to foreign countries. India's seaborne trade was in constant risk of destruction if these emporia could not be guarded against foreign raiders and the neighbouring sea could not be cleared of the hereditary pirate tribes of Kathiawar and Gujrat. To our Arab and Abyssinian invaders by sea were added in the 17th century formidable gangs of European pirates working in Indian waters, mostly British by race. It was only a strong national fleet, supported by naval bases close at hand that could protect our west coast towns and the trade which was their life-blood.

Besides this need, Shivaji wisely planned to increase his State income and the wealth of his people by developing over-sea trade in Indian hands, and for this purpose a mercantile marine of his own was the first thing necessary. Why should he be content to live on the scanty land revenue of his sterile native land, while foreigners reaped a golden harvest as middlemen in the exchange of goods? A merchant fleet is also the nursery of a national fighting navy. Finally, there was the loss and insult to which the Portuguese were subjecting all Indian shipping by compelling them to buy pass-ports from the Government of Goa, for plying in the Indian Ocean, on pain of confiscation of the ships and their cargo for failure to comply with this demand. Shivaji could free his subjects from this encroachment on the freedom of the high seas, only if he could show the Portuguese that he was strong enough at sea to hit back.

Finally, according to the local law and the usage of that age, all flotsam and jetsam and the cargo of ships wrecked in the neighbouring sea belonged to the ruler of

the coast land. Only the possession of a fleet of his own could have enabled Shivaji to enforce this right.

§2. *Shivaji's Naval Bases and Docks described.*

Ships of war cannot do their work unless they have well-defended bases close at hand for repair, supply of stores, and shelter during rough weather. Shivaji proved his faultless leadership by providing a number of such naval forts on the west coast, *pari passu* with the growth of his fighting ships and trading vessels.

All of Shivaji's forts, whether inland or marine, were built according to one pattern. "The site chosen is usually a cliff or a spit of land more than half surrounded by the sea. The whole top of the hill or the end of the promontory is surrounded by a wall which is relieved by numerous bastions. There is a seldom more than one entrance to the fort, and this is generally the strongest part. The outer gateway is thrown forward and protected by a bastion on each side and often by a tower above. A narrow passage winding between two walls leads to the inner gate, which is in the face of the main wall and is defended by bastions which command the approaches Inside the main wall there was generally an inner fortress or citadel (*bālā qila* in Persian and Marāthi), and surrounding this were the various buildings required for the accommodation of the troops, and also magazines, tanks and wells. The larger forts had generally a town or *petha* clustered about the base of the hill on which the fort stood."

Vijaydurg, popularly known as *Gheria*, which was rebuilt by Shivaji, "is the most perfect example of a great coastal fortress, which was also a palace (or residence of a chief). It stands on a spit of land projecting into the broad estuary of a noble river (the Vāghotan), and communication with the continent was cut off by a ditch which extended across the spit. The outer walls are washed by the sea round the greatest part of their extent, and out-works

are thrown forward down to the shore The walls are immensely massive and lofty, and thus looking up from the landing place a triple line of most formidable defences is seen. On one side a great round tower rises from the highest part of the main wall From it the view is lovely and varied. In front the open sea, on one side the broad estuary, and on the other a little cove of white sand bounded by black rocky promontories. Behind, the river stretches away to the blue line of the distant ghāts." It was much strengthened by Shivaji; to whom it owes its finest features, the triple line of walls, the numerous (27) towers, and the massive interior buildings. (*Bom. Gaz.* I. ii. 74; X. 380.)

Suvarn-durg or Songarh is the most striking example of his island fortresses, as the lofty walls seem to rise straight out of the sea, on a low irregular island, with an area of eight acres. Great parts of the fortifications are cut out of the solid rock, and the rest are built of blocks of stone of ten or twelve feet square. Within the fort are several reservoirs and a small step-well with water enough for a large garrison. (*Bom. Gaz.* X. 338.)

Ratnagiri contains a series of fortifications on the high land at the west end of the north arm of the Ratnagiri harbour. The defences of the headland form an outer and an inner fort Shivaji added or renewed the strong wall that crests the eastern ridge south to the Lighthouse Point, and built protecting towers on two commanding points. (*Ibid.* 367.)

§3. *Fortifications of Malvan.*

"But *Malvan* is the most interesting and formidable of his naval forts. This base consists of a fort on the mainland and two fortified islands about a quarter of a mile from the shore, lying in a bay which is so studded with rocks and reefs that at low water it looks as if nothing larger than a rowing boat could enter. The largest of these islands, *Sindhudurg*, was (probably) meant by Shivaji as a place of

refuge from the main land. It is very extensive, little less than two miles round the ramparts. The walls are low, 30 feet [in height], and are on an average 12 feet thick and have about 32 towers,—generally outstanding semi-circles with fire embrasures for cannon. Narrow stair-cases lead from the inside to the top of the walls. Shivaji is said to have worked with his own hands in fortifying it, and his stone image is worshipped as an *avatār* in a temple in it. A smaller fortified island is called Pāndavgarh ; it is said to have contained Shivaji's ship-building establishments."

The fortification of Sindhu-durg was commenced with Hindu religious rites on 25th November, 1664, and the spoils of the first sack of Surat were spent on the works. Building material and skilled workmen were secured for these works regardless of cost from places as far off as Goa, and the fort was soon completed.

"The only entrance to the bay at Malvan is by a narrow channel through the rocks and the passage from the land to the island is equally intricate. From the landing place the approach to the fort is even narrower than usual

"A convenient station for his own ships to sail in and out was not the chief object of Shivaji in locating his naval bases. It would seem that his idea of a good harbour was a place that could not easily be got into (by an enemy). His earliest naval headquarters, at Kolaba (near Alibagh, occupied in 1660), is very badly hemmed in by rocks and reefs. Vijay-durg offers an easy entrance and safe anchorage ; Jaygarh (at the mouth of the Sangameshwar river) is similar to it, and Devgarh leads to a narrow but safe channel opening into a large and perfectly land-locked harbour with very deep water." (*Bom. Gaz.*, I. ii. 75, X. 318-340.)

To *Jaygarh*, with its double line of fortifications upper and lower, Shivaji added several finely constructed wells and a few habitable buildings. There were lesser naval bases with repair shops at Ratnagiri (port), Anjanwel, and Rajapur, on this coast.

§4. *Sea-faring tribes of West Coast.*

For manning his ships, Shivaji had the most skilful and experienced human material in India ready to his hand on the Kathiawad Gujrat and Konkan coasts. Here lived tribes, Hindu and Muslim, whose hereditary profession for centuries past had been fishing, ocean navigation, and piracy. Even in the modern age of steam shipping, the skilful long-voyage sailors known in Europe as *lascars* come mostly from the Khārvā, Koli and Bhādela tribes of the west coast, and to a lesser extent from the Vāgher and Miānā (these last two being pirates by preference.) The Khārvās have Rajput, Koli and Muslim subdivisions; the Bhādelas and Vāghers are mostly Muslim by faith.

Of the Khārvās, it is said that they are among the hardiest of sailors and most skilful and daring of seamen; "they man the country craft that visit Zanzibar, Aden, and the whole coast of India, east as far as Singapore, and are also largely employed in steam-boats running between Bombay and Europe." (*Bom. Gaz.*, IX. pt. 1, 519-529.)

In addition to a race of hereditary expert seamen, the West Coast supplied ship-wrights whose workmanship enjoyed the highest reputation in Asia. The vessels built in the Konkan dock-yards by local Indian agency without any European guidance, could compete on equal terms with those built in Portugal in that age. In 1530 "Agāshi had a rich timber trade and built ships, able to make the voyage to Europe". "Bassein and Agāshi stood on equality with Portugal in the art of ship-building."*

§5. *Weakness of Maratha navy—its tactics.*

In picturing Shivaji's navy we must banish from our minds the idea derived from Europe of a line of men-o'-war

* *B. Gaz.*, XIV, p. 1, 31. Vol. I., pt. 2, p. 36.

A ship built at Agāshi was seized by the Portuguese and it made several voyages to Portugal. One of the ships stopped by Sir H. Middleton in 1612 was 153 ft. long, 42 ft. beam, 18 ft. deep, 1,500 tons burthen. One of the Dābhol ships stopped at the same time was of 1,200 tons burthen.

boldly sailing into the boundless open sea and defeating an opposing fleet by superior manœuvring and gunfire. The Maratha fighting vessels were meant for work in the coastal waters only ; their tasks were to escort his merchant ships from port to port, or sally out of their shelter in some land-locked harbour, swoop down upon an enemy trading vessel or small fighting craft, and after dismasting capture it by boarding and hand-to-hand fight. For serving this end, their cumbrous gun-boats called *ghurābs* had to be towed at sea by row-boats so as to overtake the enemy, shoot off his masts and finally send a boarding party in the row-boats to capture the prize. In fact Shivaji's Sea-battles merely followed the tactics of land-fighting. Even in gun-power, his largest vessels were inferior to third-rate English or Portuguese fighting ships. He mounted only a few and small guns and the marksmanship of his gunners was poor and slow. C. Downing, who fought against Angre's ships in 1717, notices that "not knowing how to point a piece of cannon, they did us little damage", and again, "As soon as they came into the road, they never offered to fire at us, but sent their boats on board." (*Indian Wars*, 21 and 23.)

Shivaji had no cannon-foundry, no factory for making first-class gun-powder* in his kingdom. All his naval armament and superior munitions had to be purchased from the European traders, among whom the English and the Portuguese refused to give him any aid of this kind for fear of antagonising the Mughal Government, while some Dutch or French tramp ship would sell to him in secrecy a few small guns which they probably found useless for their own need. Of course, big guns cast in India in earlier times passed into the Maratha king's hands through his land conquests ; these were stored in his forts, and some of them were laboriously transferred to his naval bases ; only a few

* In 1801 we find Daulat Rao Sindhia unable to procure good gunpowder in his own dominions and ordering it from Kota and other places. Maharashtra was still further off from the supply centres of saltpetre and sulphur.

medium-sized ordnance could be mounted on his *ghurābs*. These antique "Museum pieces" could not compare with the modern brass-guns mounted on elevating screws, which De Boigne's French engineers cast for Mahadji Sindhia, and which excited the admiration of Lake and Wellington in 1803.

Shivaji's first object in creating a navy was to fight his eternal enemy the Siddi of Janjira and to supply escort to his mercantile marine in the coastal waters. He never wished to fight the English* who did not molest his subjects, or the Portuguese whose sole policy in that age of their decadence was to live at peace with all their Indian neighbours. His few incursions into Portuguese territory (provoked by breaches of neutrality by the Sāvants) were always ended by diplomacy. Hence the young Marātha navy never sought pitched battles at sea with any European Power. Its few battles with the Siddi fleet always ended in loss to both the sides, the tactical victory usually lying with the Abyssinians.

§6. *Fighting ships, ghurābs and gallivats.*

Three generations after Shivaji, Tuloji Angré's navy followed exactly the same tactics. The following description of it from the skilful pen of Orme will serve well to give us a picture of Shivaji's fighting fleet, if we make sufficient allowances for the comparative smallness, weakness in fire-power and primitive methods of the Chhatrapati's navy and remember that it had roughly only one-fourth of the fighting value or efficiency of the Angré fleet which was destroyed 75 years after Shivaji's death:—

"Angré's fleet consisted of *ghurābs* and *gallivats*. The *ghurābs* have rarely more than two masts; those of three are about 300 tons burden, but the others are not more than 150 tons. They are built to draw very little water, being

* The struggle with the English for Underi (1679) best illustrated the objectives and tactics of the Maratha fleet.

very broad in proportion to their length, narrowing from the middle to the end, where they have a projecting prow, covered with a strong deck, level with the main deck of the vessel On the main deck under the forecastle are mounted two pieces of cannon of nine or twelve pounders, which point forwards and fire over the prow ; the cannon of the broadside are from six to nine pounders.

"The *gallivats* are large row-boats built like the *ghurāb*, but of smaller dimensions, the largest rarely exceeding seventy tons ; they have two masts, of which the mizen is very slight, the main mast bears only one sail, which is triangular and very large In general the *gallivats* are covered with a spar deck made of split bamboo, and these carry only petteraroes which are fixed on swivels in the gunnel of the vessel, but those of the largest size have a fixed deck on which they mount six or eight pieces of cannon from two to four pounders. They have forty or fifty stout oars, and may be rowed four miles an hour.*

"Eight or ten *ghurābs*, and forty or fifty *gallivats*, crowded with men, generally composed Angré's principal fleet, destined to attack ships The (enemy) vessel no sooner came in sight of the port where the (Maratha) fleet was lying, than they slipped their cables and put out to sea If the wind was calm, the *gallivats* rowing towed the *ghurābs*. When within cannon shot, the *ghurābs* attacked the chase at a distance with their prow guns, firing first only at the masts As soon as the chase was dismasted, they came nearer and battered her on all sides until she struck ; and if the defence was obstinate, they sent a number of *gallivats* with two or three hundred men in each, who boarded

* The Gujurat coast *galbats* had round sterns and two masts, each carrying a lateen sail ; 10 to 50 tons burden.

"Being of a sharp build, they usually sail well. These *galbats* were the pirate ships of former days." (B. Gaz., ii. 416.) In the early times the pirates of Kolhapur and Vādi were called *Malvans*, from the port of Malvan which was their nest, while the pirates of the Ratnagiri coast were called *Sanguiceros*, a Portuguese form of Sangameshwar, their principal station." (Bom. Gaz., I. pt. 2, 88.)

sword in hand from all quarters in the same instant." (Orme's *Indostan*, 4th ed. i. 408-409.)

§7. *Shivaji's mercantile marine.*

Shivaji's trading and transport vessels included the types known as *machuā*, *shibār*, *tarānd*, and *pagār*.

Machuā—a large cargo-boat with a square sail and single mast. On the Ratnagiri coast these varied in size from one to three tons burden. Its Portuguese name *Manchuā* was derived from the Sanskrit word *mancha*, meaning the raised platform for the cargo. (Hobson-Jobson, Molesworth.) The war-*manchucas* of the Portuguese fleet, however, carried 12 oars, 15 soldires and four small guns. (Careri.)*

Shibār—a large *phatimar* sailing vessel, square-sterned, flat-bottomed with two masts, but no deck. *Phatimār* is a deep narrow vessel of great speed and an excellent sailer, 25—45 ft. long, 25—100 tons burden.

Tarānd—a large sailing vessel; but in the Marathi language *tāramb-tarāndé* is used as an indefinite term for ships. (Molesworth, 376.)

Pagār—in Marathi means a canoe well-scooped, smoothed and finished. (Molesworth, 625.) Portuguese *parangue* (or *pangara*). Used for carrying provisions. In Ratnagiri, the *pagār* belonged to the *phatimāri* class. [B. Gaz. X. 171.]

§8. *The Abyssinians of the West Coast.*

The expansion of Shivaji's rule across the Western Ghāts into the coast-district of Konkan brought him into contact with the maritime Powers of our western sea-board.

* On the Surat coast, the *machua* (pronounced as *machhvo*) was the smallest kind of craft employed in carrying on the sea-trade of the district; varying from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 8 tons burden, carrying one mast, one triangular or lateen sail, and some oars. (B. Gaz., II. 413.) But later we find *machuas* which were round-built, two-masted, and of 3 to 20 tons burden. (xiii, pt. ii, 717.)

Chief among these were the Siddis or Abyssinians of Janjirā, a rocky island 45 miles south of Bombay, and guarding the mouth of the Rājpuri creek. Half a mile east of it, on the mainland stands the town of Rājpuri, and two miles south-east of the latter is the fort of Dandā on the shore of the creek. But these two are regarded as one place and formed the head-quarters of the land-possessions of the Siddis, covering much of the modern district of Kolābā. From this tract were drawn the revenue and provisions that nourished the Government of Janjirā.

An Abyssinian colony had settled here in the 15th century. One of them secured the government of Dandā-Rājpuri under the Sultans of Ahmadnagar. But the dissolution of that monarchy and the situation of the district on the extreme frontier of the State beyond the Western Ghāts, made it easy for the Siddi to establish himself in practical independence of the central authority, so that, when the partition treaty of 1636 gave the west coast to Bijapur, that Government had to fight for years before the Siddi submitted to it; in the end a compromise was made, it recognized the Siddi chief as its representative in the district, gave him the title of a *wazir*, and added to his charge the whole sea-board from Nāgothnā to Bankot, on condition of his protecting Bijapuri trade and Mecca pilgrims at sea.

As the Siddis formed a small military aristocracy dominating a vast alien population, their constitution provided for the rule of the ablest, and on the death of a chief not his son but the first officer of the fleet succeeded to the governorship. The Abyssinians were hardy, skilful and daring mariners and the most efficient fighters at sea among the Muslim races, while their courage and energy, joined to coolness and power of command, made them enjoy a high estimation as soldiers and administrators.

The Siddi chief of Janjirā maintained an efficient fleet, and throughout the 17th century he was officially recognized as the admiral, at first of Bijapur and latterly of the Mughal empire. There was no native Power on the west coast that

could make a stand against him at sea. (*Bom. Gaz.*, xi. 434, 416.)

To the owner of Konkan it was essential that the Siddi should be either made an ally or rendered powerless for mischief. Shivaji found that unless he created a strong navy, his foreign trade would be lost, and his subjects on the sea-coast and for some distance inland would remain liable to constant plunder, enslavement, outrage, and slaughter at the will of a band of pirates alien by race, creed and language. The innumerable creeks and navigable rivers of the west coast, while they naturally fostered the growth of rich ports and trade centres, made it imperatively necessary for their protection that their owner should rule the sea. On the other hand, the possession of Dandā-Rājpuri and its adjacent district was necessary to the owner of Janjirā for his very existence. The political separation of the two made war against the mainland an economic necessity to him.

§9. *Marātha conquests from the Abyssinians,
up to 1661.*

Nothing is known accurately about the early history of the Siddis. The proceedings of the Viceroy's Council in Goa show that Siddi Ambar, Captain of Danda, was a defeated rebel against his sovereign Adil Shah in November 1640, that a Bijapuri army under Asad Khan (the son of the premier Mustafa Kh.) went with a large army in February 1642 to wrest Danda from the rebels, and that in March 1642 a rebel Fath Khan had proclaimed a puppet Nizam Shah under the title of Shahid Sultan Alauddin Padishah, as the lawful heir of the ancient dynasty, and was tyrannically seizing territories in Balaghat under his pretended authority. Eventually the Bijapur Government made peace by recognising Fath Khan as its vassal and the lord of Danda.

Shivaji had early captured the eastern part of the Kolābā district adjoining the Siddi's territory, but the latter

still held Dandā-Rājpuri and much of the neighbouring land. There were constant skirmishes between the two Powers thus occupying the eastern and western portions of the Kolābā district, but no record of them has come down to us. The Siddi had too small an army to defy the regular Marātha forces on land, and he seems to have confined himself to making raids by surprise and doing petty acts of mischief to Shivaji's villages in that region, as is clear from the Marātha chronicler's description of the Siddi as "an enemy like the mice in a house."* (Sabh. 66.)

Fath Khan was a brave active and able leader. In 1659, when Afzal Khan was advancing against Shivaji from the east, Fath Khan seized the opportunity of trying to recover his own. But, on hearing of the destruction of the Bijapur army (November), he retired in haste. Next year, when Ali Adil Shah II. opened a campaign against Shivaji, who was invested in Panhālā fort, Fath Khan renewed his invasion of Konkan. The Kāy Sāvant, a loyal vassal of Bijapur, co-operated with the Siddi. After an obstinate battle both the Sāvant and Bāji Rao Pāsalkar (Shivaji's general) fell in a single combat, and both parties retreated to their bases. (Sabh. 65.)

To retrieve the position, Shivaji next sent a larger force, five to seven thousand strong, under Raghunāth Ballāl (Ātré?) who beat the Siddi forces, captured Talā, Ghonsālā, and other forts, and wrested the sea-coast up to Dandā.† The Marāthas continued the campaign even during

* The dates relating to the struggle with the Siddis given in this section are very doubtful, as Sabhasad is never accurate in his order of events and there is no independent check on his statements here. The *Shivapur Daftari Yadi* says that in July 1657, Raghunath was sent to Rajpuri. This date cannot be reconciled with the other narratives, and is unsupported by Jedhe. The meaning also is not clear. An English Factory letter (1659) states, "Those that inhabit Danda-Rajpuri are pirates and rogues, and maintain vessels abroad to rob all that they master." (Foster, 214.)

† The English merchants of Rajapur write on 10 Dec. 1659, of "Shivaji having already taken the town of Danda-Rajpuri, but not the castle." (F. R. Rajapur.)

the rains, and after a long siege captured the fort of Dandā, and following up their success opened batteries against Janjirā itself. But their weakness in artillery defeated their attempt on this sea-girt rock. Hopeless of relief from Bijapur, the Siddi came to terms with Shivaji and formally ceded Dandā-Rājpuri. Thus, no stronghold was left to the Siddi on the mainland. (Sabh. 66.)

But this peace could not possibly last long. To the Siddi the loss of the Kolābā territory meant starvation, and, on the other hand, it was Shivā's "lifelong ambition to capture Janjirā" and make his hold on the west coast absolutely secure. Hostilities soon broke out again. The Siddis resumed their depredations on the coast, while Shivā fired upon Janjirā every year during the dry season, without being able to take that island-fortress.

The Marātha gains on the Kolābā coast were now organized into a province, and placed under an able viceroy, Vyankāji Datto, with a permanent contingent of 5 to 7 thousand men. (Sabh. 66.) He defeated the Siddis in a great land-battle, totally excluded them from the mainland, improved the defences of Dandā-Rājpuri by fortifying a hill that commanded it, and built a chain of forts (such as Birwādi and Lingānā) which effectually prevented Siddi depredations in that quarter. At this the Siddis, in order to "fill their stomachs," had to direct their piracy against the villages and ports further south, in the Ratnagiri district, which had now come under Shivā's sway. The Marātha chief, therefore, realized that he must create a formidable navy and set up fortified bases along the coast, if he was to ensure the protection of his seaside districts and the conquest of Janjirā which would continue as a thorn in his side if left in enemy hands. (Sabh. 67.)

§10. *The growth of Shivaji's navy.*

In June 1659, Shivaji was reported to have built twenty gallivats in Kalian, Bhiwandi and Pen for the

purpose of making war on the Siddi of Danda, and given charge of the fleet to Ruy Leitao Viegas, whom he ordered to secure permission from the Goa Government for these ships to proceed to the open sea through the Portuguese stations of Thana and Bassein. This permission was refused by the Viceroy's Council. Again, in August 1664, the Portuguese Captain of Chaul reported that the Marātha king had made fifty ships, out of which seven built at Upper Chaul were complete and about to put to sea. [Goa, proceedings of Viceroy's Council.]

The Marāthi chronicles speak of Shivaji's fleet as consisting at its best of seven hundred vessels of various sizes and classes, such as *ghurābs* (gun-boats) *tarāndis*, *tārambēs*, *gallivats*, *shibārs*, *pagārs*, *manchwās*, &c. Most of these were mercantile marine belonging to the State, or supply boats. The English factory reports never put the number of his fighting vessels above 160, and usually as 60 only. They were formed into two squadrons (of 200 vessels each, if we accept the Marāthi accounts), and commanded by two admirals who bore the titles of *Dariā Sārang* (Admiral of the Ocean) and *Māi Nāyak*.*

We may here record what little is definitely known about Shivaji's mercantile marine. Soon after getting possession of the ports in North Konkan, he began to engage in foreign trade on his own account. Early in January 1660 he captured at Rājāpur one of the junks of Afzal Khan and turned it to his own use. In February 1663 the English at Surat report that he was fitting out two ships of considerable burden for trading with Mocha (in western Arabia) and loading them at Jaitapur, two miles up the Rājāpur river, with "goods of considerable value which were by storms or foul weather driven upon his coast." Two years later (12th

* Sabhasad, 67, speaks of *Dariā Sārang* as a Musalman and of *Māi Nāyak* as a Hindu of the Bhandāri caste. But a Bombay letter dated 21 Nov. 1670 says, "The admiral of the [Maratha] fleet is one *Ventgee Sarungee*, commonly called *Durrea Sarungee*." Daulat Khan was an officer distinct from the *Daria Sarang* (Rajwade, viii. 27 and 91 Q. B., 74).

March 1665), they write that from each of the eight or nine "most considerable ports in the Deccan" that he had seized, he used to "set out 2 or 3 or more trading vessels yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha, &c." Again, we learn that in April, 1669, a great storm on the Kārwār coast destroyed several of his ships and rice-boats, "one of the ships being very richly laden." (*F. R. Surat*, Vols. 2, 86, 105.)

§11. *Doings of the Marātha navy, 1664-1665.*

The rise of the Marātha naval power caused anxiety to the Siddis, the English merchants, and the Mughal Emperor alike. On 26th June, 1664, the Surat factors report that Shivā was fitting out a fleet of 60 frigates for an attack on some unknown quarter, probably "to surprise all junks and vessels belonging to that port and to waylay them on their return from Basra and Persia," or to transport an army up the Cambay creek (Sabarmati) for making a raid on Ahmadabad. At the end of November it was learnt that the fleet had been sent to Bhatkal, to co-operate with his army in the invasion of Kanara. The English President describes the Marātha vessels as "pitiful things, so that one good English ship would destroy a hundred of them without running herself into great danger." In addition to the inferior size and build of their ships, the Marāthas on land and sea alike were very weak in artillery and, therefore, powerless against European ships of war. (*F. R. Surat*, 86.)

In February 1665, Shivaji's fleet of 85 frigates* and three large ships conveyed his army to Basrur for the plunder of South Kanara. (Ch. 10.)

He had very early begun to plunder Mughal ships, especially those conveying pilgrims for Mecca from the port of Surat (called *Dar-ul-hajj*, "the City of Pilgrimage.") The Emperor had no fleet of his own in the Indian Ocean able

* Duff (i. 201n) suggests that by the term *frigates* were probably meant small vessels with one mast, from 30 to 150 tons burden, common on the Malabar coast.

to cope with the Marāthas. Early in 1665 when Jai Singh opened his campaign, in accordance with his policy of combining all possible enemies against Shivaji, he wrote to the Siddi to enter into an alliance with the Mughals. (*Haft Anj.*, Benares Ms., 78a). Late in the same year, when Jai Singh was about to begin the invasions of Bijapur, he invited these Abyssinians to join the Mughal force, promising them *mansabs*.* By the Treaty of Purandar, the Mughals left the territory of Janjirā adjoining Shivā's dominions to him, if he could conquer it. (*Ibid.*) Shivā also offered to attempt the conquest of Janjirā for the Emperor. (*Ibid.* 78b. But 91 Q. B. 51, states that Jai Singh definitely refused to make the Siddis give up Janjirā to Shivā.)

§12. *Marātha attack on Janjirā fails, 1670.*

In 1669 Shivaji's attack upon Janjirā was renewed with great vigour. In the earlier months of the year the hostile armies made almost daily inroads into each other's country and the warfare closed the roads to all peaceful traffic. In October, the Siddi was so very hard pressed and Janjirā was in such danger of being starved into surrender that he wrote to the English merchants of his "resolve to hold out to the last and then deliver it up to the Mughal." (F. R. Surat 105, Hubli to Surat, 17 July, Bomb. to Surat, 16 Oct.)

The contest came to a crisis next year (1670.) Shivaji staked all his resources on the capture of Janjirā. Fath Khan, worn out by the incessant struggle, impoverished by the ruin of his subjects, and hopeless of aid from his suzerain at Bijapur, resolved to accept Shivā's offer of a large sum and a rich jagir as the price of giving up Janjirā. But his three Abyssinian slaves roused their clansmen on the island

* Siddi Sambal fought on the Mughal side during the invasion of Bijapur in 1666. (A. N. 1012.) The informal connection thus established between the Emperor and the Siddis continued, as we find that during Shivaji's siege of Janjirā in 1669, Aurangzib wrote to him commanding him to withdraw from the attempt. (Bombay to Surat, dated 16 Oct., 1669, F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.)

against this surrender to an infidel, imprisoned Fath Khan, seized the Government, and applied to Adil Shah and the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan for aid. The Mughals readily agreed, and the Siddi fleet was transferred from the overlordship of Bijapur to that of Delhi, and Siddi Sambal, one of the leaders of the revolution, was created imperial admiral with a *mansab* and a *jāgir* yielding 3 *lakhs* of Rupees. His two associates, Siddi Qāsim and Siddi Khariyat were given the command of Janjirā and the land dominions respectively. The Siddi fleet was taken into Mughal service on the same terms as under Bijapur. The general title of Yaqut Khan was conferred on successive Siddi admirals from this time onwards, and the government of Janjirā was separated from the admiral's charge and placed under another Siddi, who was regarded as the second leader of the tribe and heir to the admiral's post. Yaqut Khan was merely first among his equals. "The other Siddi captains preserved the distinct command over their own crews and dependants, and an aristocratical council determined the general welfare of this singular republic." (Orme's *Frag.* 57; K. K. ii. 224.)

This revolution at Janjirā is said by Khāfi Khan to have taken place in January or February 1671.* Shortly before it the Marātha fleet had met with a great reverse. In November 1670, Shivaji collected at Nandgāon, 10 miles north of Janjirā, 160 small vessels (under Dariā Sārang) and an army of 10,000 horse and 20,000 foot, with full provisions for a siege, large numbers of mining tools (pick-axes, shovels and crow-bars), and victuals for 40 days. Another body

* But the date is evidently wrong. On 4th April 1674, Narayan Shenvi, the English diplomatic agent, writes from Raigarh to Bombay, "I have discoursed with Niraji Pandit concerning the peace you desired might be concluded with the Siddi Fath Khan." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.) This proves (a) that Fath Khan was a Siddi and not an Afghan as stated by Khāfi Khan, and (b) that he was in power in 1674, instead of having been deposed in 1671. Here Khāfi Khan is proved by contemporary records to be unreliable. But Siddi Sambal was undoubtedly admiral of the fleet from 1671 onwards.

of 3,000 soldiers, with a great number of pioneers, was kept "ready to embark and depart with the fleet at a minute's notice." His secret design was to march to Surat by land, where the fleet would join him, and then the fort would be delivered to him on 29th November, as had been secretly agreed upon by its commandant. If he succeeded there, he intended to march on and take Broach also.

But the plan failed. The fleet left Nandgāon on 24th November and passed northwards skirting the Bombay island the next day, and Mahim on the 26th. The army under Shivaji marched in the same direction by land. But on the 26th he suddenly turned back and recalled his fleet. He had discovered that the seemingly treacherous *qiladār*'s promise to sell the fort to him was only a trap laid for him. Quickly changing his plan, he turned to an easier and surer prey. Early in December he suddenly burst into Khāndesh and Berār and looted these provinces far and wide. During his absence on this raid, his fleet met with a defeat. In passing by Daman, his admiral had captured a large ship of that place worth Rs. 12,000 bound for Surat. The Portuguese retaliated by capturing 12 of his ships* and leaving the prizes at Bassein went in pursuit of the rest of the Marātha fleet, which, however, succeeded in escaping to Dābhōl. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 105, Bomb. to Surat, 17, 21 and 28 Nov. and 17 Dec., 1670.)

§13. Abyssinians recover Dandā fort, 1671.

Siddi Qāsim, the new governor of Janjirā, "was distinguished among his tribesmen for bravery, care of the peasantry, capacity, and cunning. He busied himself in increasing his fleet and war-material, strengthening the defences of his forts and cruising at sea. He used to remain day and night clad in armour, and repeatedly seized enemy ships, cut off the heads of many Marāthas and sent them to

* Father Navarette says, there were 15 small ships, which the Portuguese drove up to the shore and took without the expense of a grain of powder. (Orme's *Frag.* 207.)

Surat. (K. K., ii. 225.) His crowning achievement was the recovery of Dandā from Shivāji's men. One night in February, 1671, when the Marātha garrison of that fort were absorbed in drinking and celebrating the Spring Carnival (*Holi*), Qāsim secretly arrived at the pier with 40 ships, while Siddi Khairiyat with 500 men made a noisy feint on the land-side. The full strength of the garrison rushed in the latter direction to repeal Khairiyat, and Qāsim seized the opportunity to scale the sea-wall. Some of his brave followers were hurled into the sea and some slain, but the rest forced their way into the fort. Just then the powder-magazine exploded, killing the Marātha commandant and several of his men, with a dozen of the assailants. Qāsim promptly raised his battle-cry *Khassu! Khassu!* and shouting "My braves, be composed ; I am alive and safe," he advanced slaying and binding to the centre of the fort, where he joined hands with Khairiyat's party, and the entire place was conquered.

Shivā had been planning the capture of Janjirā, and now he had failed to hold even Dandā! It is said that during the night of the surprise, at the moment the powder-magazine blew up, Shivā, who was 40 miles away, started from his sleep and exclaimed that some calamity must have befallen Dandā! He was, however, unable to make reprisals immediately, as his army was busy elsewhere, in the Nāsik and Baglānā districts, where the Mughal viceroy was pressing him hard. Qāsim, therefore, could easily follow up his success by capturing seven other forts in the neighbourhood. Six of them opened their gates in terror of his prowess after his grand victory at Dandā. The seventh stood a siege for a week and then capitulated on terms, which Qāsim faithlessly violated, enslaving and converting the boys and handsome women to Islam, dismissing the old and ugly women, and massacring all the men of the garrison. For some time afterwards the Marāthas were forced to stand on the defensive in their own territory. (K. K. ii. 225-228, only authority.)

These disasters fully roused Shivā. The recovery of Dandā fort became an absorbing passion as well as a political necessity, to him. To the end of his life and throughout the reign of Shambhuji, hostilities continued between the Marāthas and the Siddis, intermittently, indecisively, but with great bitterness and fury. Gross cruelty and wanton injury were practised by each side on the captive soldiers and innocent peasantry of the other, and the country became desolate. The economic loss was more keenly felt by the small and poor State of the Abyssinians than by the Marāthas, and the Siddis at times begged for peace, but did not succeed, as they were not prepared to accept Shivā's terms of ceding their all to him.

In September 1671, Shivaji sent an ambassador to Bombay to secure the aid of the English on an attack on Dandā. But the President and Council of Surat advised the Bombay factors "not to positively promise him the grenadoes, mortar-pieces, and ammunition he desires, nor to absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it convenient to help him against Dandā, which place if it were in his possession would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay." (*F. R. Surat*, 87.)

§14. *Naval war, 1672-1675.*

Towards the end of 1672, Aurangzib sent a fleet of 36 vessels, great and small, from Surat to assist the Siddi of Dandā-Rājpuri by causing a diversion by sea. This squadron did Shivaji "great mischief, burning and plundering all his sea-port towns and destroying also above 500 of his vessels" (evidently trading boats).* At this time (21st December) Shivā had six small frigates, which he laid up in Bombay harbour in fear of the Mughal armada, and which the English saved from the latter by pretending that

* "Sacked and burnt Dabhol, burnt the fleet of Shivaji at Kelshi (17-55 N., near Bankot) and eight large vessels, robbed all the coast." [Portuguese records, *Pissur.*, i. 35-37.]

they themselves had attached them as compensation for the plunder of their Rājapur factory in 1661. Early in January next, the Mughal fleet visited Bombay after its successful campaign against the Marāthas. At this time both Shivā and the Emperor were eagerly courting the naval help of the English in a war with the other side. But the foreign traders very wisely maintained their neutrality, though it was a "ticklish game". In the following August, however, the ship *Soleil d' Orient* of the new French East India Company founded by Colbert, arrived at Rājapur and secretly sold 80 guns (mostly small pieces) and 2,000 maunds of lead to Shivā's fleet. The French gave similar help in November 1679 when they sold him 40 guns for the defence of Panhālā. (*O. C.* 3722; 3734. *F. R.* Surat 87, Surat to Co., 12 Jan., 1674; Vol. 108, Rājapur to Surat, 30 Dec., 1679.)

The difference between the English and Shivaji was utilized by Reickloff Van Goen, the Dutch commodore, who about March 1673 opened negotiations with the Marātha chief, promising him the help of the entire Dutch fleet (of 22 ships in retaking Dandā-Rājpuri, while Shivaji was to lend 3,000 of his soldiers for a Dutch attempt to conquer Bombay. Shivaji, however, durst not trust the Dutch and continued to remain friendly to the English, though he had by this time spent a vast treasure and incurred the loss of nearly 15,000 men in his vain attacks upon the Siddi strongholds. (*O. C.* 3760.)

The Mughal fleet of 30 frigates, commanded by Siddi Sambal, returned from Surat to Dandā Rājpuri, in May 1673, and after passing the south-west monsoon (June-September) there, sailed down the coast, taking many Marātha trading vessels and some ships of war. On 10th October it entered the Bombay harbour, sent landing parties to the Pen and Nāgothnā rivers, laid waste the Marātha villages opposite Bombay, and carried off many of the people. These devastations were frequently repeated. But at the end of the month, "some of Shivaji's soldiers [from Rāigarh] surprised a parcel

of the Siddi's men as they were on shore cutting the standing rice in his country, and destroyed about a hundred of them, carrying away the heads of some of the chiefest unto Shivaji." The great cruelty practised by the Siddis on his subjects and their burning of several small towns in his territory "provoked Shivaji much", and reprisals by him were apprehended in the Mughal dominions, especially at Surat. (O. C. 3779 and 3870.)

In February 1674, we learn from an English letter, "the war betwixt the Siddi and Shivaji is carried on but slowly, they being both weary," and the President of Surat was requested by the Siddi "to mediate a peace between them." (O. C. 3939.)

Next month (March 1674), however, Siddi Sambal attacked Shivaji's admiral Daulat Khan in the Sātavli river (*i.e.*, the Muchkundi creek in the Ratnagiri district), both the admirals being wounded and the two sides losing 100 and 44 men respectively. The Marāthas were left victors, and Siddi Sambal withdrew to Harishwar, a port 21 miles south of Janjirā. In May Shviaji, who "was resolved to take that castle (Dandā-Rājpuri) let it cost him what it will," was reported to be daily sending down more artillery, ammunition, men and money to strengthen his siege-troops. In the course of this year he reduced the whole coast of South Konkan from Rājpuri to Bardes north of Goa, but not the *fort* of Dandā-Rājpuri. By the end of 1672 he had already spent a vast treasure and 15,000 soldiers in his futile attacks on Janjirā. (F. R. Surat 88; O. C. 3760.)

§15. *Grand assault on Janjirā, 1675-1676.*

In September 1675, we read of his making preparations for taking that fort by a land and sea attack. His fleet had by this time increased to 57 sail, of which 15 were *ghurabs* and the rest *gallivats*. The cruise of the Siddi fleet along Shīvā's coast in January and February of this year had proved unsuccessful. But it returned in November with

admitted ships of a great size, such as were used at Surat, or by the Europeans. The (immense) traffic from port to port of the Malabār and . . . Konkan coasts had from time immemorial been carried on in vessels of shallow burden capable of taking close refuge under every shelter of the land. The vessels for fight (on) these coasts were" also built of the same small size, "and trusted to the superiority of number (and not of gun-power or seaworthiness) against ships of burden in the open sea. Shivaji did not change this system in his own marine." (Orme's *Fragments*, 77-78.)

In February 1680, Qāsim sallying from his anchorage in Bombay harbour burnt many villages on the Pen river and brought away a thousand captives. Then Shivā and the English made an agreement (March) not to let the Siddi fleet winter in Bombay unless they promised to observe strict neutrality. This brings the narrative down to the death of Shivaji, but the same wearisome story of abortive attacks on Janjirā by the Marāthas and cruel devastation of the coast district by the Siddis continued under Shambhuji.

§17. *War with the English for Khanderi Island, 1679.*

The difficulty of capturing Janjirā set Shivā thinking of some other island in the neighbourhood which would afford him a naval base. His choice fell on Khanderi ('Kennery') a small rocky island, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles by $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, situated 11 miles south of Bombay and 30 miles north of Janjirā. As early as April 1672 the people of Surat learnt of his intention to build a fort on the island. The English President at once decided to prevent it, as affecting the interests of Bombay even more than those of Surat, because no ship could enter or issue from Bombay harbour without being seen from Khanderi. (F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Bomb., 22 April; Vol. 106, 1 May 1672.)

The progress of the Marātha engineers was very slow, and in September next their fortification were still incomplete. The English and Siddi fleets came there in concert and warned the Marāthas to stop their work. Shivaji's admirals, Daulat Khan and Māl Nāyak, finding themselves opposed to very superior forces, withdrew from the island.

At the end of August 1679, Shivā again took up the project of fortifying Khanderi,* and collected men and materials for the purpose at Chaul. He allocated one *lakh* of *hun* from the revenues of Kaliān and Chaul to be spent on the work. On 15th September we find that 150 men of Shivā with four small guns under command of Māl Nāyak are already on the island and have run up breast-works of earth and stone all around it. A request from the Deputy Governor of Bombay "to quit the place as it belonged to the island of Bombay," was declined by the Marāthas in the absence of orders from Shivaji to that effect. The English, therefore, resolved that if the occupation of the island was persisted in and the Marātha fleet under Daulat Khan came there to protect the fortifications, they would "repel them with force as an open and public enemy." (Orme MSS. 116. F. R. Surat 4, Consult., 4 and 15 Sep. 1679.)

The first encounter between the English and the Marāthas at sea took place on 19th September and ended in a reverse for the sons of the Ocean Queen. The larger English ships were still outside the Bay of Khanderi, because the soundings had not yet been taken and they could not be brought closer to the island. Lieutenant Francis Thorpe, with some *shibars* made a rash attempt to land on the island, "positively against orders". The Englishmen were assailed with great and small shot from the shore works. The rash drunken young officer was killed with two other men (John Bradbury and Henry Welch), several others were wounded, and George Cole and many other Englishmen were left prisoners on the island. The lieutenant's *shibar* was cap-

* The foundation stone was laid on 27th August.

reinforcements, and sailed down the coast to Vingurlā, plundering and burning that town. Marātha squadrons from Gheriā (Vijay-durg) and Rājapur took to the sea, seeking a fight, but the Siddi escaped to Janjirā. (F. R. Surat 107, Bomb. to Surat, 7 Sep. ; Orme, *Frag.*, 49, 53.)

That island had been besieged by Shīvā with a great force some months earlier. The neighbouring coast was dotted with his outposts and redoubts, and he also built some floating batteries and made an attempt to throw a mole across the sea from the mainland to the island of Janjirā.* The siege was raised at the end of 1675, on the arrival of the fleet under Siddi Sambal ; but it was renewed next year with greater vigour than before. The Peshwā Moro Pant was sent (August, 1676) with 10,000 men to co-operate with the fleet and the former siege-troops. They felled all the wood around to make floating platforms with breastworks, from which the walls were to be assaulted.

But the attempt failed. Siddi Qāsim arrived with the Abyssinian fleet, broke the line of investment, infused life into the defence, made counter-attacks, burnt the floating batteries and forced the Marāthas to raise the siege (end of December 1676.)

§16. *Naval war, 1676-1680.*

The rest of the struggle with the Siddis is given below in a summary form, on the basis of the English factory records.

In April 1676, Siddi Sambal, who had quarrelled with the other Siddi leaders, was removed by them from the naval command, which was given to Siddi Qāsim, with the governorship of Dandā-Rājpuri. But Sambal still retained the Mughal fleet. He cruised along Shīvaji's coast (in October) burning

* Siege of Janjira: Orme, *Frag.*, 48, 57. A very confused and obscurely written account of this struggle is given in *Shivadigvijay*, 192-196, and 91 Q. B. It is evident that these two works have transferred to Shīvaji's reign some of the incidents of Shambhuji's sieges of Janjira in 1681 and later.

Jaitāpur (at the mouth of the Rājāpur river) in December, but was prevented from advancing further up the river and returned to Janjirā, where Qāsim had already raised the Marātha siege under Moro Pant.

Early in 1677 strict orders came from Delhi that the imperial fleet must be delivered to Qāsim. But Sambal put off obeying the order for many months, till the two rival Siddi admirals who were living in Bombay came to blows, and finally through the mediation of the English Council the quarrel was settled, and Qāsim was installed as admiral, at the end of October. Sambal in disgust transferred his services to Shivā, carrying his family and personal retainers with himself, the most notable among them being his gallant nephew Siddi Misri.

Qāsim left Bombay with the fleet in November; up to March next he cruised off the Konkan coast, making frequent landings and kidnapping the people, all of whom (including the Brāhman prisoners) he forced to do menial services of a defiling character. At the end of April 1678 he returned to Bombay to rest during the monsoons. Shivaji, wishing to avenge the degradation of his Brāhman subjects, sent his admirals Daulat Khan and Dariā Sārang with 4,000 men to Pānvel, a town opposite Bombay (July), with orders to cross the creek and burn the Siddi fleet then anchored at Mazāgon in Bombay island. But insufficiency of boats and the violence of the monsoon prevented the army from crossing, and Daulat Khan, after vainly pressing the Portuguese to allow him a passage through their territory, retired to Rāigarh. Siddi Qāsim sent his boats and plundered the Alibāgh coast.

In October 1678, Daulat Khan was sent with a large army and a mightier train of artillery than before to renew the bombardment of Janjirā; but Siddi Qāsim could not pay his men for want of remittance from Surat, and had to continue inactive in Bombay harbour.

Shivaji's navy had by this time been increased to 20 two-masted *ghurabs* and 40 gallivats. "None of his harbours

tured by the enemy, while two other *shibārs* escaped to the fleet in the open sea. Next day the Marāthas carried off another English *shibār*, Sergeant Giles timidly offering no resistance. (Orme MSS. 116.)

Early in October the Marātha fleet was got ready to go to the succour of Khanderi. The second battle with the English was fought on 18th October, 1679.* At day-break the entire Marātha fleet of more than 60 vessels under Daulat Khan suddenly bore down upon the small English squadron consisting of the *Revenge* frigate, 2 *ghurabs* of two masts each, 3 *shibars* and 2 *manchwas*,—eight vessels in all, with 200 European soldiers on board, in addition to the lascars and white sailors. The Marāthas advanced from the shore a little north of Chaul, firing from their prows and moving so fast that the English vessels at anchor near Khanderi had scarcely time to get under weigh. In less than half an hour the *Dover*, one of the English *ghurabs*, having Sergeant Mauleverer and some English soldiers† on board, with great cowardice struck its colours and was carried off by the Marāthas. The other *ghurāb* kept aloof, and the five smaller vessels ran away, leaving the *Revenge* alone in the midst of the enemy. But she fought gallantly and sank five of the Marātha gallivats, at which their whole fleet fled to the bar of Nāgothnā, pursued by the *Revenge*. Two days afterwards the Marātha fleet issued from the

* A full description is given in *Bombay Gaz.* xiii. pt. ii. p. 478. I have followed Orme, *Frag.*, 80-81, in addition.

† Surat Consultation, 3 December, 1679. "Sergeant Mauleverer etc., English, taken formerly by Shivaji in the Ghurab *Dover*, being in great want of provisions and all other necessaries we having duly considered, and perceiving how cowardly they behaved themselves in the time of engagement, do order them to be stricken out of the muster rolls, but that they may not wholly perish, that some small allowance be made to them for victuals only, if it can be securely conveyed to them [in the Maratha prison.]" (F. R. Surat, Vol. 4.) This was in answer to a letter from Mauleverer, dated 6th November, begging for provisions, clothing and medicines for the wounded, and stating that the prisoners in the Maratha fort (Suragarh?) included 20 English, French and Dutch, 28 Portuguese, and 9 lascars. (Orme MSS. 116.)

creek, but on the English vessels advancing they fled back. Such is the inefficiency of "mosquito craft" in naval battles fought with artillery that even fifty slender and open Indian ships were no match for a single large and strongly built English vessel. At the end of November the Siddi fleet of 34 ships joined the English off Khanderi and kept up a daily battery against the island. (Orme, 81-84.)

But the cost of these operations was heavily felt by the English merchants, who also realized that they could not recruit white soldiers to replace any lost in fight, and therefore could not "long oppose him (Shivā), lest they should imprudently so weaken themselves as not to be able to defend Bombay itself, if he should be exasperated to draw down his army that way." Moreover, during the monsoon storms the English would be forced to withdraw their naval patrol from Khanderi, and then Shivā would "take his opportunity to fortify and store the island, maugre all our designs." So, the Surat Council wisely resolved (25th October), that the English should "honourably withdraw themselves in time," and either settle this difference with Shivaji by means of a friendly mediator, or else throw the burden of opposing him on the Portuguese governor of Bassein or on the Siddi, and thus "ease the Hon'ble Company of this great charge." The Surat factory itself was in danger and could spare no European soldier for succouring Bombay. (F. R. Surat, 4, Consult., 25 and 31 Oct. 3, 8 and 12 Dec. 1679.)

The dreaded reprisal by Shivaji against Bombay almost came to pass. "Highly exasperated by the defeat of his fleet before Khanderi," he sent 4,000 men to Kaliān-Bhivandi with the intention to land in Bombay by way of Thānā. The Portuguese governor of Bassein having refused to allow them to pass through his country, the invaders marched to Pānvel (a port in their own territory) opposite Trombay island, intending to embark there on seven *shibars* (end of October 1679.) The inhabitants of Bombay were terribly alarmed. The Deputy Governor breathed fire, but

the President and Council of Surat decided to climb down. On receiving a courteous letter from Shivaji sent by way of Rājapur, they wrote "a civil answer, demonstrating our trouble for the occasion his people have given the English at Bombay to quarrel with him about his fortifying so insignificant a rock as Khanderi, which is not in the least becoming a prince of his eminence and qualifications; and though we have a right to that place, yet to show the candour of our proceedings, we are willing to forget what is past, and therefore have given instructions to the Deputy Governor of Bombay to treat with such persons as he shall appoint about the present differences." The Deputy Governor was "very much dissatisfied" with this pacific tone and held that a vigorous policy of aggression against Shivā's country and fleet would "give a speedy conclusion to this dispute, to the Hon'ble Company's advantage." But the higher authorities at Surat only repeated their former order that Bombay should avoid a war with Shivā and "frustrate his designs of fortifying Khanderi either by treaty or by the Siddi's fleet assisting us to oppose him thereon." The two English captains consulted took the same view. At the end of December the Marāthas dragged several large guns to Thäl (on the mainland) and began to fire them at the small English craft lying under Underi for stress of weather. (*Orme MSS. 116.*)

But the hope of hindering the Marātha fortification of the island without fighting proved futile, and the English ships were withdrawn (January, 1680) from Khanderi, which, after "holding out [against the Siddis and the English] to the admiration of all", was freed from enemy vessels by the coming of the monsoons, and remained in Shivā's hands. (*F. R. Surat 108, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan. 1680.*)

But the Siddi occupied Underi ('Henery'), a small island about a mile in circumference, close to Khanderi, with 300 men and 10 large guns, fortified it (9th January, 1680), and tried to silence the Marātha guns on Thäl,

Daulat Khan with his fleet came out of the Nāgothnā river and attacked Underi on two nights, hoping to surprise it, "but the Siddi's watchfulness and good intelligence from Chaul frustrated his design." On 26th January, 1680, Daulat Khan assaulted the island at three points, ready to land 2,000 men and conquer it. But after a four hours' engagement he retreated to Chaul, having lost 4 *ghurābs* and 4 small vessels, 200 men killed, 100 wounded, besides prisoners,* and himself severely wounded. The Siddi lost only 4 men killed and 7 wounded, but no vessel, out of a fleet of 2 large ships, five three-masted frigates, one ketch and 26 gallivats, with 700 men on board,—such was the superiority of the Abyssinian ships to the opener and more slender vessels of the Marāthas. Underi continued in Siddi hands throughout Shambhuji's reign, and neutralized the Marātha occupation of Khanderi, the two islands merely bombarding each other. (*Ibid.*, also 31 January.)

* Two letters from Underi to Bombay state that Daulat Khan's fleet consisted of above 30 *ghurabs* and *gallivats*, and that he lost 137 men in killed and wounded. The letter of 28 Jan. adds, "Shivaji had threatened hard Daulat Khan that if he did not take Underi, if ever he came back to Negaon again, he would have his life." On 6th March Daulat Khan came into the town of Rajapur from the fleet, wounded in the foot. [Orme MSS. 116.]

CHAPTER XII

INVASION OF THE KARNATAK, 1677-1678

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§1. *The Madras coast : Its wealth.*

Shivaji's grand coronation in June 1674 had greatly reduced his treasury balance. Since then he had not been able to seize any very rich prize, though his roving bands had raided many places in Adil-Shahi territory. Added to this, his wars with the Mughals and the Bijapuris in 1674 and 1675 and his siege of Phondā had been costly affairs, and chequered by defeats, while his invasion of the Sundā country or Kanārā uplands in May 1675 had failed. In the earlier months of 1676 he had suffered from a protracted illness, which had forced on him a long period of inactivity.

He, therefore, looked about for some fresh field of gain. In the Mughal territory, Surat had been sucked dry by his two raids, while his permanent occupation of the Koli country of Rāmnagar and Jawhār, close to Surat, had so alarmed that port that its trade and wealth were well-nigh gone. The rich Kanārā coast had already been swept clean of booty. The disorder and mis-government of the Bijapur State during the effete rule of the regent Khawās

Khan and the civil war between the Afghan and Deccani parties at that Court had so impoverished the central part of the realm as to make it no longer an object of cupidity. An attack on the heart of the Adil-Shahi kingdom might also unite all the factions at the capital in a common resistance to the invader.

But there was an outlying province of this kingdom which had enjoyed many years of peace and prosperity and whose wealth was fabulous. The Karnātak plain or the Madras coast was known in that age as the land of gold. It was an extremely fertile tract, rich in agricultural produce, with a population that led a life of primitive simplicity and consumed very little in food and clothing. The many ports on the long sea-board had fostered a brisk foreign trade from remote antiquity, while the rich mines of the hinterland brought wealth into the plains. Thus the annual addition to the national wealth was very large. A part of it was spent on the grand temples for which the land is still famous; but most of it was hoarded underground. From very early times the Karnātak has been famous for its buried treasure and attracted foreign plunderers. (*Dil.* 113 a.)

From this land Samudra-gupta and the Western Chalukyas, Malik Kafur and Mir Jumla, had brought away vast booties. And at the end of the 17th century, even after the recent raids of Mir Jumla and Muhammad Adil Shah, Shivaji and Nasrat Jang, the land still had enough wealth left in it to tempt the cupidity of Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote (about 1703) to his general, "Many large treasures of olden times are reported to be buried in the Karnātak. The zamindār of Tanjore, who is of low origin (*be-āsal*) and a grandson of Shahji, the father of Shivaji now in hell, is possessed of the country by usurpation. His kingdom is not very strong. Its revenue, according to the late Siddi Masaud Khan, is between 70 and 80 *lakhs* of *hun*. Why should it be left in his possession? Inquire into the state of the country and the means of

wresting it from his hands." (*Ruqāt*, No. 163.) To this real land of gold Shivaji's eyes were now turned. An attack on this frontier province would scarcely rouse the Government of Bijapur, as the Karnātak formed the fiefs of certain semi-independent nobles who alone were interested in its defence. Moreover, Shivā had a plausible claim to a portion of it.

The vast province of Jinji, officially known as Bijapuri Karnātak Pāinghāt, was divided into three baronies; one-third of it was held in *jāgir* by Vyankoji as successor of Shahji, and the remainder by two Muslim nobles of the Adil Shahi State. Shivaji planned to conquer these two Muslim fiefs, add to them one-half of Shahji's *jāgir* taken from his brother's hands, and thus create a large East Coast kingdom, which he would bequeath as an independent dominion to one of his sons, while his other son would inherit the territory of Maharashtra. He chose the beginning of the year 1677 as the time for launching this ambitious scheme of equal danger and profit, and his complete success within one year proved what an unfailing opportunist he was.

§2. *Internal discord in Bijapuri Karnātak.*

With the fall of the Vijaynagar empire at the beginning of the 17th century, its various provinces covering the Mysore plateau and the Karnātak plains ceased to obey any common head such as might have held together and protected them. The numberless local chieftains stood up, each for himself, and engaged in incessant fighting with their neighbours out of a vain and ruinous passion for the extension of dominion. The defenceless and chaotic condition of these rich countries had drawn more powerful spoilers into the field. As the Jesuit missionary Proenza wrote from Trichinopoly in 1659, "The ancient kings of the country seem, by their jealousies and imprudent acts, to invite the conquest of entire India by the Muslims . . ."

At first the Hindu Nāyaks of Jinji, Tanjore and Madurā rose against their sovereign Shri Ranga of Vijayanagar (then holding Court at Vellore.) The ruler of Madurā begged the aid of Golkondā, which came, conquered the Vellore province and expelled Shri Ranga to find a last refuge with his vassal of Mysore. Then the same Nāyak of Madurā invited Adil Shah, who took Jinji fort and annexed that rich province (1649), and advancing further south forced the Nāyaks of Tanjore and Madurā to pay enormous contributions and promise annual tributes! [Mission du Madure, iii. 41-47.]

The treaty with the Mughal empire in 1636 having fixed their northern and western boundaries, the States of Bijapur and Golkondā could find an outlet for their territorial ambition in the south and east only, and during the next eighteen years they conquered much of Mysore and the Eastern Karnātak. The acquisitions of Golkondā in this region included the Kadāpā and North Arcot districts up to the Pālar river, and all the land bordering the sea from Chicācole to Sadrās. Bijapur had spread its suzerainty over the district of Karnul, all the Mysore plateau north of Bangalore, and the Madras plain between the Pālar and the Kolerun rivers, i.e., the country from Vellore to near Tanjore. The Bijapuri generals continued to make raids into Tanjore and Madurā (1650-1665) without annexing any part of these territories. They held only the Jinji province, where we find three such generals (one of them being Vyankoji) in charge of the government in 1673. [Ibid., iii. 201.]

The suicidal wars among the Hindus still continued. The new Nāyak of Madurā at last seized the kingdom of Tanjore and beheaded its perpetually faithless ruler Vijaya-Rāghav (April 1674). Adil Shah was appealed to by the son of the murdered king, and he ordered Vyankoji to invade Tanjore and restore it to its old dynasty. After a year of patient waiting and plotting, and more by sowing dissension among the enemy than by superior force, Vyankoji

took the capital on 12 Jan. 1676, conquered the country, usurped the throne of Tanjore* and crowned himself as an independent king! He still held his father's jagirs north of the Kolerun, in the province of Jinji. Adil Shah sent an army to punish this audacious rebellion of his general, and the Nayak of Madurā sent his forces to assist the Bijapuris, and Mysore also assembled its troops, seemingly in order to attack Madurā when its Nayak would be entangled with Vyankoji (1676).

The authority of the central Government vanished from Bijapuri Karnātak. In 1672 the boy Sikandar had succeeded to the throne of Bijapur and his guardianship had become an object of contest between rival factions at the capital. When his first regent, Khawās Khan, was put to death by Bahlol Khan (18th January 1676), an open civil war broke out in the heart of the kingdom, while the provincial governors ceased to recognize any superior and began to extend their own sway.

In the Karnātak plain, the local governors of Bijapur in 1676 were Nāsir Muhammad Khan (a son of the former wazir Khan Muhammad, Khan-i-Khānān, and a brother of Khawās Khan) with his seat at Jinji and a jurisdiction extending up to Pondicherry, and south of him Sher Khan Lodi (an Afghan *protégé* of Bahlol Khan) with his seat at Wali-ganda-puram. Further south were the Hindu Rajahs of Tanjore and Madurā.

But there was no amity or even peace among these Bijapuri vassals. Sher Khan was bent on annexing the territory of Jinji with the armed help of the French traders of Pondicherry. Nor was this the limit of his dream. He would, after thus removing his only rival in these parts and doubling his strength, hire more French soldiers, despoil

* The Tamil work *Bhosal-vamsham* gives the date of his capture of Tanjore as 23 January 1675, which is wrong by one year. The correct date is 12 January 1676, as is proved by the diary of François Martin, the founder of Pondicherry, vol. i. 603, ii. 9 and 35. Vyankoji was enthroned as Maharajah of Tanjore on 5th March 1676.

the Hindu Nayaks beyond the Kaveri of their fabulous riches, and employ these resources in conquering the kingdom of Golkondā for himself!

And the Hindu rulers of the country were no less divided and senseless. Vyankoji was "the mortal enemy of the Nayak of Madurā", and in June 1676 solicited French troops and ships for conquering the petty princes (*poligars*) in his neighbourhood. The ruler of Madurā similarly applied for armed help from the French for a war further south (January 1675).

Sher Khan Lodi opened the attack. He conquered Porto Novo and several other places belonging to Jinji and finally, on 14th Sep. 1676, a French force under Francois Martin by a night-attack stormed the fort of Valdaur (12 miles west of Pondicherry) on his behalf. By the end of that month he had completely defeated Nāsir Muhammad and driven him into Jinji. Tindavanam was next besieged. At last, about 4th November, Nāsir Muhammad made peace by ceding Valdaur, Porto Novo and most of his territory to Sher Khan. But he knew it for certain that Sher Khan would not be content to leave him even the fort of Jinji, and that he could not hope for protection from his sovereign who was now entirely in the hands of Bahlol Khan, the clansman and patron of Sher Khan.

In this state of despair, Nāsir Muhammad was invited by the Golkondā Court to come over to its side and join it for conquering Sher Khan's lands. The paralysis of the Government of Bijapur and this civil war between its local agents tempted the Qutb Shah to seize this opportunity of easily conquering Bijapuri Karnātak. Earth-hunger is the ever-present passion of absolute rulers. But there was a special reason which led the Golkondā Sultan to embark on a policy of conquest in the Karnātak. His all-powerful *wazir* Madannā Pandit was a devout Hindu and Madannā's nephew Gopannā was a Vaishnav saint, for whose benefit the gods were believed to work miracles. It was the heart's desire of the minister to conquer Bijapuri Karnātak nominally for

Golkondā, but really to place the whole of it under Hindu rule as had been the case before 1648.

For accomplishing this pious design, no better agent could be found than Shivaji, the ever-victorious captain and the sword-arm of the Hindu revival of that age. Madannā induced his master to agree to a joint enterprise with Shivaji, in which Qutb Shah, as the sleeping partner, would supply all the expenses and munitions of war, while the Marātha king, as the active partner, would do all the fighting with his own troops. Bijapuri Karnātak was to be conquered "in the name and for the benefit of the king of Golkondā", while Shivaji for his pains would get all the spoils of war and collections of blackmail as well as the territory in the uplands of Mysore.

An incursion into the Eastern Karnātak had been discussed in Shivaji's inner council for some time past. As far back as July 1675, the French director Monsieur Baron, while on a visit to Rājāpur, had learnt about the Marātha king's ambitions about the Karnātak from his chief minister.*

§3. *Shivaji's claims in the Eastern Karnātak.*

According to the usual good luck of Shivaji, a most valuable source of local knowledge in the scene of his projected invasion was secured by him before he started. Raghunāth Nārāyan Hanumanté had been left by Shāhji as the guardian and regent of his younger son Vyankoji and had ruled the province with absolute authority. When Vyankoji grew up, he naturally wished to be master in his own dominions and could not brook the supremacy of his minister any longer. During his long years of power, Raghunāth had dishonestly enriched himself from the public revenue† and he was now called upon to render accounts.

* Kaeppelein, 155. Martin *Mémoires*, ii. 22 (proposal of alliance, futile). Bertrand's *Mission du Madure*, 1st ed., tome 3.

† Martin says that on Shambhuji's accession the governor of the Karnātak was disgraced suddenly for his "malversations scandaleuses," but

At this he resigned his post, took leave of his master on the pretext of making a pious pilgrimage to Benares, and left Tanjore with his younger brother Janārdan and all their family and property. But power and wealth were still the gods adored by the aged ex-minister. His pilgrimage was made to the holy shrine of Adil Shah, where his reputation and personal cleverness so impressed the Muslim Government that he was pressed to enter its service as a high minister. But he could not have failed to see that the Adil-Shahi monarchy was tottering to its fall, and he was therefore glad to receive Shivaji's invitation to come to his Court instead of joining a Muslim master. Raghunāth went to the Marātha capital and was welcomed with the highest honours.

But his revenge had yet to be gratified against his late master. In his private audiences with Shivaji, Raghunāth constantly described the vast extent and riches of the Karnātak kingdom left by his father to Vyankoji, and the ease with which it could be conquered, and urged the king to claim his lawful share of this patrimony from his half-brother. The great local knowledge and influence of the Hanumanté family he promised to place at Shivaji's service in effecting its conquest.*

§4. *Diplomatic preparations for the Karnātak expedition.*

The political situation in the neighbouring countries was eminently favourable to his design. The Mughal

was afterwards re-established in his service. [Kaep. 167.] The officer meant was evidently Raghunāth, the *diwan*, as Shantaji was not reinstated. *Mémoires*, ii. 212. 91 Q.B. 75, (Raghunāth leaves Vyankoji, why?)

* Tanjore was conquered by Vyankoji in 1675 and not by Shahji. Though the Bijapuris captured Tanjore fort (March 1659) and occupied the territory of this kingdom for two years afterwards, they were forced to vacate the country by famine, pestilence and mutual dissensions (1662). Shahji was one of the two Bijapuri generals who commanded this army, the other being Mulla. Next year he attacked Trichinopoly (with the Tanjore Nayak's help), but was driven back to Jinji by the ruler of Madura. [Mission, iii. 51, 119-123.]

Emperor had, no doubt, returned to Delhi on 27th March 1676, after a two years' absence in the Panjab, but his best troops were still engaged in controlling the revolted hillmen of the N.W. frontier. At Bijapur the Afghan leader Bahlol Khan had seized the guardianship of the boy-king Sikandar (11th Nov., 1675) and murdered the deposed regent Khawās Khan (18th Jan., 1676). But his favouritism to his clansmen turned the Government into "Afghan rule" and roused the antagonism of the Deccani party and its allies, the Abyssinians. The Deccanis murdered Khizr Khan, the right-hand man and ablest servant of the new regent, and civil war broke out between the Afghans and the Deccanis throughout the State (Feb.). To make matters worse, Bahlol Khan alienated Bahādur Khan, the Mughal viceroy, who openly took the side of the Deccani party and on 31st May began a campaign against Bijapur which was to continue for more than a year. The rotten and tottering Adil-Shahi Government was in no condition to trouble Shivaji at such a time.

Over the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, Shivaji's clever diplomacy won a complete triumph. Bahādur Khan had now grown weary of his more than two years' war with Shivaji, which had been chequered by as many defeats as successes and which seemed to promise no decisive end as far as he could look into the future. He had already coquettled with Shivā for a friendly understanding and offered to make peace between him and the Emperor and get a command of 6,000 horse for his son Shambhuji, (June, 1675). And now, on the eve of opening the Mughal campaign against Bijapur, (May 1676), it was as much his interest to make friends with the Marāthas on his right flank as it was Shivā's to secure Mughal neutrality in his rear during his invasion of the Karnātak. When two parties find a mutual advantage in being at peace, the terms are quickly settled.

Shivā sent his Chief Justice, Nirāji Rāoji, "a clever logician," to Bahādur Khan, with costly presents to induce him to promise neutrality during his projected absence in

the Karnātak, the conquest of which was expected to take one year. Bahādur received a large bribe for himself in secret, and a certain sum in public as tribute for his master, and made a formal peace with the Marāthas. (Sabh. 85.)

Having thus secured his flank and rear, Shivā made preparations for starting on this his longest campaign. In June, 1676, Netāji Pālkar had returned to Mahārāshtra, after ten years' service under the Delhi Government as a Muhammadan, and he had "now been remade a Hindu" by means of religious purification, and some important command was probably given to him, though the Marātha chroniclers are silent about the unhappy renegade. The premier (*Peshwā*) Moro Trimbak Pinglē was left as regent, assisted by Annāji Datto the superintendent of correspondence (*surnis*), with a portion of the army to guard the kingdom. The Konkan districts were entrusted to Annāji Datto with strong garrisons and a large body of disposable infantry. (F. R. Surat 89. Sabh. 85-87.)

With Golkondā close friendship and co-operation was secured. Madannā Pandit, the all-powerful wazir of Abul Hasan Qutb Shah, had already made a subsidiary alliance with Shivā, promising him an annual tribute of one *lakh* of *hun* for the defence of the realm. Prahlād Nirāji, a shrewd diplomatist, had been posted at Haidarabad as Marātha envoy. Shivaji decided to get from Golkondā the expenses of the campaign and the assistance of an auxiliary force, by promising a share of the conquest. But he was careful to avoid the least show of force, and trusted to his personal magnetism and power of persuasion in securing Qutb Shah's alliance.

§5. *March to Haidarabad.*

He wrote to his envoy at Haidarabad to arrange for a friendly interview between him and Qutb Shah. The indolent and gay king of Haidarabad was at first afraid of meeting the man who had slain Afzal, wounded Shāista, and defied Aurangzib in the very midst of his Court. But

Prahla^d Nirāji took the most solemn oaths in support of Shivā's honesty of purpose. Madannā Pandit also told the king that he was satisfied on that point, and most probably he also urged the importance of a personal interview in strengthening the alliance between the two kings. (Sabh. 86.)

Qutb Shah having agreed to receive him, Shivaji started from Rāigarh at the beginning of January, 1677, and advanced due east by regular marches. On entering Haidarabad territory he issued strict orders to his men not to rob or molest any inhabitant of the country, but to buy all necessary things with the owners' consent. The hanging or mutilation of the first few offenders struck such terror among the Marātha troops and camp-followers that they strictly obeyed his order and behaved with exemplary propriety ever after, and the most perfect discipline was maintained among that horde of 50,000 armed men.*

Haidarabad was reached early in February, 1677. Qutb Shah had proposed to advance from his capital and welcome Shivaji on the way. But the Marātha king very gracefully declined the offered honour, saying, "You are my elder brother. You should not come forward to receive a junior like me." So, the Sultan remained at Haidarabad, but his ministers Madannā and Akannā with many of the highest citizens met Shivaji several miles before the capital and conducted him into it.

§6. *Shivaji's grand entry into Haidarabad.*

The city of Haidarabad had been gaily decorated to welcome the great friend and protector of her king. "The

* Sabh. 86. The army that followed Shivaji into the Karnātak is estimated by H. Gary in a letter dated 16th Jan. 1678, as 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot (*O. C.* 4314). Sabhasad mentions only "a select force of 25,000 horsemen" (p. 86). The Madras Council estimates the force at "16 to 20 thousand horse and several thousand of foot, raised and raising among the woods." (19 June, 1677, *O. C.* 4266.) Martin, a very near observer, computes Shivaji's army at "12,000 cavalry and many thousands of infantry" (ii. 100).

streets and lanes on all sides were coloured with a thin layer of *kunkum* powder and saffron. Maypoles and triumphal arches were erected and flags hung at intervals throughout the city. The citizens in their hundreds of thousands lined the roads" to gaze on the scene, while the ladies crowded on the balconies to bless the visitor.

The guests responded to the city's civility. The Marātha army, for once, abandoned its rude simplicity and magnificently attired itself. Shīvā had distributed among his captains and select soldiers strings of pearls (*torah*) for their helmets, gold bracelets, bright new armour, and rich accoutrements embroidered with gold, "and made the whole army look splendid." His generals in their equipment and trappings rivalled the grandeur of hereditary nobles.

At the auspicious hour chosen for the interview,* the Marātha army 50,000 strong entered the city. The citizens gazed with admiration not unmixed with awe at the men who had vanquished the greatest kings of North India and South India alike, and caused wailing at the Court of Bijapur and consternation among the peerage of Delhi. Here rode the fleet hardy horsemen who had poured like a swift resistless flood to the farthest districts of Mughal Deccan and carried their raids to the very gates of Bijapur and Golkondā. There tramped the Māvlé infantry, whose feats were the theme of many a ballad and legend throughout the Southern land, whose assault no fort had been able to withstand, and whose swords were dreaded by every foe they had met in battle. The leaders were men whose names had become household words: Hambir Rao Mohité, the dashing but far-sighted commander-in-chief; Ānand Rao and Mānāji Moré, two generals second only to Hambir Rao; Suryāji Mālusaré and Yesāji Kank, the gigantic captains of the Māvlés, each able to subdue an elephant in single combat; Sonāji Nāyak, the royal door-keeper and Bābāji Dhāndhere, (probably the captain of the body-guard.)

* Shivaji at Haidarabad: *Sabhr.* 87-88; *91 Q.B.* 78-79; *Dil.* 112-113.

Nor even among such heroic figures did the citizens fail to notice the high brows, the bright but sunken eyes, and the painted foreheads of the Marātha Brāhmans, whose administrative capacity and diplomatic skill had facilitated and confirmed the conquests achieved by the swords of these men: Raghunāth and Janārdan Nārāyan Hanumanté, until recently known as the uncrowned kings of Tanjore; Prahlād Nirāji, the resident ambassador at Haidarabad; Dattāji Trimbak the chronicler (*wāqnis*), Kesho Pant, and Nilo Moreshwar and Gangādhar Pant the auditors (*majmua-dārs*.) With them were mingled the more retiring and studiously unostentatious figures of the Kāyastha writers: Nila Prabhu, the accomplished Persian draftsman (*munshi*), Bālāji Āvji, that jewel of a secretary (*chitnis*) whom Shivaji loved to keep close to his person; and also, but of another caste, Shāmji Nāyak, the Keeper of the Seal.

But none of them attracted so much attention as the moving spirit of all this host. In the centre of a brilliant throng of ministers and generals, rode a short spare figure, rendered still thinner by his recent illness and the fatigue of an unbroken march of 300 miles. His quick beaming eyes were glancing right and left, and a natural smile played on his long light brown face distinguished by a Roman nose. The assembled citizens gave cheers for "Shiva Chhatrapati"; flowers made of gold and silver were showered on him from the balconies crowded with ladies and the road-side alike. Every now and then the women came forward and waved lighted lamps round his person with verses of welcome and blessing. Nor was Shivā less liberal. In his turn he kept showering handfuls of gold and silver among the crowd on the two sides and presented costly robes of honour to the chief citizens of every ward.

§7. Interview between Shivaji and Qutb Shah.

In this way the procession arrived at the *Dād Mahal* or Palace of Justice. There all stopped before the gate,

keeping perfect order, while Shivaji attended by five of his officers ascended the stairs and entered the palace-hall where Qutb Shah was waiting for him. The Sultan came forward, embraced Shivaji, and seated him by his side on the royal carpet. The wazir Madannā was also permitted to sit down ; all others remained standing. The ladies of the harem looked on the scene with wonder through the latticed windows around.

For three hours did the two monarchs hold a friendly conversation. After the usual exchange of compliments and conventional inquiries about health, Abul Hasan Qutb Shah listened with rapt attention to the stories of Shivaji's heroic feats. To the slothful voluptuary of Golkondā, who had never drawn a sword in anger nor ridden to a tented field in his life, it sounded like the most fascinating of romances when Shivaji recounted how he had slain the gigantic Afzal Khan single-handed and hacked at Shāista Khan in the bosom of his harem, how he had challenged Aurangzib in full Court, what hair-breadth escapes he had made in his flight from Āgrā, how he had sacked Surat and stormed so many hill-forts. At last he gave his royal guest and the chief Marātha officers ornaments, jewels, horses, elephants, and robes of honour, and dismissed them for the day, after graciously anointing Shivaji with scent and serving him betel-leaf with his own hand, and accompanying him to the foot of the staircase.

Then Qutb Shah heaved a sigh of relief ; he now felt convinced of Shivā's honesty of purpose and determination to befriend him. The Marātha ambassador at his Court was praised and rewarded for the truth of his assertions. Shivaji returned with his army to the residence selected for him, scattering alms all the way.

Next day, the wazir Madannā Pandit gave a grand dinner to Shivaji and his chief men. The Rajah's meal was cooked by the prime-minister's venerable mother, and Madannā and Akannā sat down with due respect and attention before Shivaji as he fed. The guests were conducted

back to their quarters with presents of elephants, horses, and clothes.

§8. *Alliance with Golkondā*

They then proceeded to business. Abul Hasan, being very favourably impressed by Shivaji's personal charm, character and ability, and the strength and discipline of his army, bade his wazir grant him whatever he wanted. After some discussion a secret compact was made regarding the coming campaign. The Sultan was to pay Shivaji a subsidy of 3,000 *hun* a day, or four and a half *lakhs* of Rupees a month, and send 5,000 men (consisting of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot) in charge of one of his generals (*sar-i-lashkar*), Mirzā Muhammad Āmin, to co-operate in the conquest of the Karnātak. A train of artillery with material was also supplied by Qutb Shah, and probably a large sum of money as advance payment of the promised subsidy. In return for this aid, Shivaji promised his ally such parts of his conquests in the Karnātak as had not belonged to his father Shahji. The defensive alliance against the Mughals was strengthened anew with solemn oaths taken by Shivaji in the presence of Qutb Shah, while the latter promised to pay his annual tribute of one *lakh* of *hun* regularly and to keep a Marātha ambassador at his Court.

While these secret negotiations were going on, social functions and ceremonies were also being held in public. Shivaji paid a second formal visit to Abul Hasan and was presented with "an immense quantity of jewels and ornaments and innumerable horses and elephants." The two kings sat down together on the terrace of the palace and received the salute of all the Marātha officers, who were rewarded by Qutb Shah with gifts according to their ranks and achievements. Even Shivaji's charger did not go unrewarded; a string of precious stones* was placed round its neck, as the worthy companion of his glorious deeds!

* A necklace, reputed to be this historical one, passed from Satara into the possession of Mr. Purushottam Vishram Mawji of Bombay and was shown to me by that gentleman. *Sabh.* 88. *Martin*, ii. 88-90.

Another day, the leading nobles of Haidarabad gave a dinner to Shivaji. Then a combat was got up between Yesāji Kank, the Māvlé captain, and a *mast* elephant of Qutb Shah, for the diversion of that king and also as a demonstration of the valour of Shivaji's men. Yesāji, after keeping the huge brute at bay with his sword for some time, cut off its trunk and put it to flight.*

A month was spent at Haidarabad, ostensibly in going through these ceremonies, but really in concluding the alliance, taking delivery of the promised arms, money and material, and equipping the local auxiliary force that was to assist in the campaign.

§9. *Visit to Shri Shaila*

At last, all his objects having been gained, Shivaji left Haidarabad, early in March 1677, and marched due south towards the Krishnā. From the city of Karnul he levied a contribution of five *lakhs* of hun. (91 Q.B. 80.) Then he proceeded to the Nivritti Sangam where the Bhavanāshi flows into the Krishnā, 24 miles north-east of Karnul. This spot "is considered by the Hindus a most holy place of pilgrimage". Here and also in the whirlpool of Chakratirtha, a short distance below the junction, the Rajah bathed, performed the religious ceremonies of a pilgrim, and then made a rapid journey of 37 miles due east to Shri Shaila, lightly attended, while his army waited for him at Anantpur (44 miles east of Karnul.)

As the river Krishnā winds its way eastwards to the sea, it forms some 70 miles below Karnul a sharp loop northwards, flowing through a wide and steep-sided trench of nearly a thousand feet in depth. Here, in the heart of the uninhabited Nallāmālā forest, surrounded by rugged hills

* 91 Q.B. 78. But Chitnis, 136, says that to Qutb Shah's question, "How many famous elephants have you?" Shivaji answered by parading several thousands of his well-built Māvlé infantrymen and saying, "These are my elephants."

and a desolate fever-haunted belt of land, rises a plateau 1563 feet high, overlooking the river, on which stands the famous Shivā-temple of Shri Shaila, "the most ancient and sacred in Southern India."* Entering the plateau by a large archway (now no more) called the *Kailāsh-dwāra* (or Gateway of Shiva's Heaven), the pilgrim sighted the temple enclosure, an oblong space, 660 feet by 510, surrounded by thick walls varying from 20 to 26 feet in height, built of large hewn blocks of greyish stone exactly squared and laid together, and elaborately sculptured with a profusion of accurately designed figures of elephants, horses, tigers, hunters, warriors, and *yogis*, as well as numerous scenes from the Hindu epics and religious books. In the centre of this enclosure is the square temple of Mallikārjuna (*linga*), the chief deity worshipped here, the walls and roof being entirely covered with gilded brass plates presented by Krishna Dev, the victorious Rajah of Vijaynagar (1513.) There is a smaller temple dedicated to Shivā's consort. A flight of stone steps, built by a Vijaynagar queen, leads down from the plateau to the bed of the Krishnā, called Pātāl-Gangā, and a ford called Nila-Gangā, a little below, both of which are considered as sacred bathing-places.

Shivaji ascended this difficult plateau, bathed in the Krishnā and spent some ten days at Shri Shaila doing religious rites. The quiet and secluded beauty of the scenery and the spiritual atmosphere of the place penetrated his soul, and he believed that he would find no purer spot to die in. So, he attempted to cut off his own head before the goddess; but his ministers restrained his religious frenzy and recalled him to a sense of his duty to his subjects and the Hindu world at large. Here he built a *ghāt*, named Shri-Gangesha, a monastery, and a rest-house for pilgrims (*dharmashāla*), fed a lakh of Brāhmans, and gave away large sums to them.

* Shri Shaila: *Kurnool Dist. Manual*, 14, 144, 181-183. Shivaji's visit: Sabh. 89; 91 Q.B. 80. says that he spent the first nine days of Chaitra Shukla (24 March—1 April, 1677) there.

§10. *Capture of Jinji and siege of Vellore.*

Leaving the sacred hill in the first week of April, Shivaji overtook his army at Anantpur and hastened southwards, evidently by way of Nandiyāl and Kadāpā, to Tirupati. From the last-named place he descended into the plains of the east coast, and passed through Kalahastri to Peddāpolam (about seven miles west of Madras), in the first week of May. After some days' halt at Peddāpolam, he turned to the south-west, sending an advanced detachment of 5,000 cavalry through Conjeveram (9th May) to Jinji. The commander of this force paid a visit to Nasir Muhammad Khan within the fort and persuaded him to give up Jinji in return for a cash sum on account and a jāgir yielding half a lakh of Rupees a year,* (about 13th May). On hearing of this success, Shivaji himself hastened to the fort and took possession of it for himself, instead of handing it over to the Golkondā agents as he had promised.

Shivaji placed the fort of Jinji in charge of a Māvlé captain named Rāyāji Nalgé, and the surrounding district under Vital Pildev Atré Garodkar as governor, assisted by a paymaster (*sabnis*) and a caretaker of buildings. The military and revenue administration of Mahārāshtra was transferred here without any change. He "constructed new ramparts round Jinji, dug ditches, raised towers and bastions, and carried out all these works with a perfection of which European skill would not have been ashamed." [Andre Freire, S.J., in *Mission du Madure*, iii. 271. 91 Q.B. 81.]

From Jinji, Shivaji turned back northwards to Vellore, where he arrived about 23rd May. This fort was held for

* Madras *F. R.*; Martin, ii. 93. By this treaty Nasir Muhammad was granted a jagir in the dependencies of Golkonda. But when Shivaji kept hold of Jinji, the Golkonda officers naturally refused to put Nasir Muhammad in possession of the promised lands. "Poor Nasir was tossed about and received not more than a fraction of what had been promised him. Beggared of his former grandeur, he felt so disappointed that he died shortly afterwards." *Sabh.* 91.

Bijapur by a brave Abyssinian officer named Abdullah Khan, who put up an obstinate defence. Vellore is one of the strongest fortresses in Southern India. A deep wet ditch, swarming with crocodiles, surrounds it. The outer ramparts are wide enough for two carts to be driven abreast. Four concentric lines of circumvallation protect it. Shivaji had, therefore, to begin a regular siege, for which he was not properly equipped. Occupying two neighbouring hillocks, which he named Sājirā and Gojirā, he mounted batteries there and opened the attack. The fort defied the Marāthas for fourteen months.* But Shivaji did not wait; leaving Narahari Rudra (*sabnis*), with 2,000 horse and 5,000 Māvlé infantry, to conduct the protracted siege, he himself marched southwards (about 20th June) to fight Sher Khan Lodi. (Sabh. 91; 91 Q.B. 81.)

§ 11. *Condition of the invaded country.*

The flood of Marātha invasion swept over the Karnātak plains. Only a few fortified places offered resistance and stood like islands above the waste of waters, for some time. The vanguard of a thousand horsemen rode a day or two's march ahead of the main body which Shivaji accompanied. The report of his exactions and the fury of his soldiery had preceded him; and at the news of his coming, all who had anything to lose made haste to remove their property to the safe refuge of the neighbouring woods or the fortified seaports of the European traders. The rich men were the first to flee, lest he should seize and torture them for ransom.

Shivaji was in need of money. On his refusal to deliver the fort of Jinji and his other conquests in this region to Golkondā as required by the treaty, the Qutb-Shahi Government rightly stopped the payment of the promised subsidy of 3,000 *hun* a day. Therefore, he sent letters to the chief

* *Jedhē Shakavali* says that Vellore fell on Shrāvan Shukla 14 (=22 July 1678.) But *Madras Diary*, 21 Aug., records the fall of Vellore that day, after a siege of 14 months. If we read *Bhādra* instead of *Shrāvan* in *Jedhē S.*, the date would be 21 August. Martin, ii. 94.

places in the coast districts, in advance of his march, demanding loans to the amount of two *lakhs* of *hun*, out of which Madras and Pulicat were asked to contribute half a lakh each. The loan, which was only another name for a forced contribution, was naturally refused, and this fact, the Madras President feared, "would serve him for a pretence to play his old pranks."

Nor was this fear unfounded. As Shivaji passed by Madras southwards, he took minute account of all the rich men in the country around him with a view to estimating each man's ransom correctly. A net-work of his collectors of blackmail spread throughout the invaded province.

This was the authorized or regular exaction. But the sufferings of the people of the unhappy land, whose only crime was their wealth, did not end with paying it. Behind Shivaji's army came a vast crowd of some 20,000 unattached persons, mostly hungry Brāhmans in search of official employment in the province to be conquered. Nothing could exceed their shameless greed and dishonesty. The newly appointed administrators of Shivaji and even their soldiers plundered the wayfarers and the town-dwellers without fear or mercy.

The disorder was further aggravated by local robbers. Most of the petty chiefs (the *poligars* or 'woodmen' as they are called in the old English and French factory records) of that region made peace with Shivaji by sending him tribute, and some even joined his army with their followers to share in the plunder. Nay more, the shock of the Marātha invasion dissolved the civil government and tempted every private robber to come out of his den with his band and hang on the rear of the Marātha army in the hope of picking up what the lion would leave undevoured.

§12. *Struggle with Sher Khan Lodi.*

The southern half of the Bijapuri Karnātak plains was ruled over by Sher Khan Lodi, a Pathan noble, with his seat

of government at Wali-ganda-puram.* By nature he was more fitted for civil government than for war. He was entirely guided by his Brāhman advisers, who had foolishly taught him to underrate Shivaji's strength, and this delusion was also shared by his son Ibrāhim Khan, in disregard of the warnings of Francois Martin.

With a force of 4,000 cavalry and three or four thousand second-rate infantry (of the militia type), "whom the mere name of Shivaji caused to tremble", Sher Khan arrived at Tiruvādi, 13 miles west of Cuddālore, on 10th June, to wait for the Marāthas. Shivaji reached the neighbourhood with 6,000 cavalry, on 26th June. At the sight of him Sher Khan immediately put his men in battle order and advanced to the attack. The Marāthas calmly waited for the onset. Their attitude made Sher Khan realize that he had taken a false step and he ordered a retreat! Then Shivaji charged the confused and wavering ranks of the enemy and turned the retreat into a rout.

Sher Khan flung himself with the remnant of his army into the fort of Tiruvādi in his rear. At night he tried to escape from it to Tevenāpatam, a suburb of Cuddālore. The Marātha horse, noticing the movement, gave chase and drove him into Akāla Nāyak's wood, which lay in the way. Five hundred of the Khan's horsemen offered battle and held up the pursuers for two hours. Then the moon set and Sher Khan ran away with some of his cavalry and elephants southwards out of the wood. Shivaji's men continued the chase. Sher Khan fled before them at full gallop and had just time to throw himself the next day (27th June)

* Now an obscure village in the Perāmbālur tāluq of the Trichinopoly district, but in the 17th and 18th centuries one of the most important posts on the main road from Madras to Trichinopoly. (Orme's *Indostan*, 4th ed., i. 172.) The fort is at Ranjangudi, 3 m.n. of the village Wali-ganda-puram.

My account of this contest is based upon Martin's *Memoires*, ii. 102, and Madras *Factory Records*, vol. 27, "Letters from our Brahmins Wardapa from Shivaji Raja's camp, 27 June, and Nellor Raimana 16th July, 1677." Jedhē S. has misread *Lodi* as *Bairagi*!

with a hundred horsemen, into the poor fort of Bonāgir-patam, (or Bowānigiri) on the Vellār river, 22 miles south of Tiruvādi, where he was immediately blockaded by the Marāthas. In this encounter Shivaji's men captured 500 horses, two elephants, twenty camels and many oxen, tents and war drums from the Khan.

The fort of Tiruvādi held out for some time under Sher Khan's father-in-law. Leaving Bābo Sāhib with some horse to invest the place, and quartering his main army three miles south of Tevenāpatam, Shivaji himself appeared before Bonāgir-patam. On 30th June, Valdāur, Tevenāpatam and several other forts of the Khan fell to the Marāthas, their garrisons having vacated them in terror. Soon afterwards, Sher Khan gave up the struggle. On 5th July he made terms with Shivaji, giving up all his territories and promising a ransom of 20,000 *hun* in cash, for which he left his eldest son as a hostage, while Shivaji agreed to give him a free exit from the fort and the delivery of his property in Gondelur.

We may conveniently bring the story of Sher Khan to its close here. After leaving Bonāgir-patam and visiting Shivaji, he sought asylum in the forest of Āriyālur, a village 15 m. s. e. of Wali-ganda-puram. The chieftain of this place (a Kallār by caste) received him most hospitably and gave him two villages yielding Rs. 1,500 a year for his support. The Khan professed to be too poor to pay his promised ransom, and in consequence his hostage Ibrāhim Khan was harassed by the Marāthas for the money. At last in February 1678, the Hindu princes of those parts, among whom the Khan was popular and highly respected, subscribed the amount and secured his son's release. In April Sher Khan retired to the Court of the Nāyak of Madurā. [Martin, ii. 103-133.]

§13. *Shivaji on the Kolerun river.*

His victory over Sher Khan being now complete, Shivaji at the end of the first week of July left the vicinity of Cud-

dālore, marched south across the Vellār river, and cantoned his army for the rainy season at Tirumalavādi, on the north bank of the Kolerun river, 10 miles due north of Tanjore, (arriving there about 12th July). Here an envoy from Chokkanāth, the ruler of Madurā, waited upon Shivaji, who demanded from him one *krore* of Rupees "for the present, for his expenses," arguing that the Nāyak bore the sign of being worth nine *krores*. The envoy "answered that part of his master's country the Nāyak of Mysore had taken and part Vyankoji, and that if he (Shivā) would restore him the said country, the Nāyak of Madurā would give him seven *lakhs*. The Nāyak sent all his family away from Trichinopoly where they were before, to Madurā [for safety]; and while the river Kolerun remained full he feared nothing [from the Marāthas]." But shortly afterwards Raghu-nāth Pant came from Mahārāshtra and was cordially welcomed by Shivaji, who then sent him to Madurā with the Nāyak's envoy to settle the amount of the blackmail by negotiation. The Nāyak agreed to pay six *lakhs* of *hun*, out of which $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lakhs* were delivered immediately, and Shivaji promised to retire with his army. (Nellor Ramana's letter to Governor of Madras, 16 July, 1677.)

§14. *Shivaji meets Vyankoji.*

In the meantime, messages had been passing between Shivaji and his half-brother Vyankoji for a meeting.* At Shivaji's request, the Rajah of Tanjore had sent his ministers for a preliminary discussion. They returned to their master with three of Shivaji's ministers carrying a letter of invitation from him. Reassured by their report and Shivā's

* Meeting between Shivaji and Vyankoji: *F. R. Fort St. George*, Vol. 27. Letter from Nellor Ramana, 27 July, 1677; Martin, ii. 112. *Mission du Madure*, iii. 269; *Dil.* i. 113. The Marathi accounts are later and much less reliable. *Sabb.* 90, I follow *91 Q.B.* 82-83 and Martin.

Martin (ii. 85) writes in June 1677, that Shivaji claimed from Vyankoji the territories dependent on Jinji (newly conquered by Shivā) which Vyankoji held.

solemn promises of safety, Vyankozi arrived at Tirumalavādi about the middle of July, with an escort of 2,000 horse. Shivā advanced to Tirumānur (6 m. n. e.) to welcome him on the way. The brothers spent some days together exchanging gifts and feasting each other. Then Shivaji opened his business. He demanded half of whatever Shahji had left at his death,—money, horses, jewels, and territory,—offering to let Vyankozi enjoy the remainder. Vyankozi met this by a counter claim to half the Maratha kingdom in Western India. Shivaji objected on the ground that he had inherited nothing from their common father (except the Puna jagir worth 40,000 *hun* a year) and that his vast dominion, a hundred times as rich, was his own personal acquisition, to which his brother could have no just claim. Vyankozi retorted that Shahji, as regent of a puppet Nizam Shahi Sultan, had possessed 20 lakhs *hun* worth of territory in Maharashtra in 1634, and that Shivaji had merely recovered it from usurpers, while the Tanjore kingdom had been conquered and annexed by Vyankozi after their father's death.

With this spirit animating the two brothers a partition by agreement was impossible. At last, when Shivaji assumed a hectoring tone, Vyankozi told him that the only solution was to fight it out, for which he was ready.

Shivaji set a watch on his brother's movements to prevent his escape. Vyankozi found that he was a prisoner in effect; but after all he too was a son of Shahji and a match for Shivaji in the art of contriving his own deliverance. He used to go daily to the river bank with only one servant for the customary purifying wash; and when his watchers grew slack, one night he walked to the water side on the pretext of necessity, jumped on a raft which had been kept ready for him, and crossed over to his own territory, on the opposite bank, followed by only five attendants, (about 23rd July.)

Shivaji learnt of his brother's flight next morning and, ascribing it to the advice of the Tanjore ministers,—

Jagannāth Pant (the *diwān*), Konher Mahādev and Shivaji Shankar (two *majmuadārs*) and Niloji Nāyak (a merchant), he placed them under arrest and threatened to send Janārdan Nārāyan Hanumanté to take possession of the kingdom of Tanjore. He was highly indignant at his brother's conduct, as implying a distrust of his solemn pledge of safety, and cried out in open Court, "Was I going to imprison him? My fame has spread over the sea-girt earth. I asked for my father's property, only because one should keep his heritage. If he does not wish to part with it, he is under no compulsion to give it. Why did he flee for nothing? He is very young and has acted like a child." Shivaji sent some of his officers to Tanjore to recall Vyankoji, but they returned unsuccessful. (Sabh. 90.)

After a time the captive ministers of Vyankoji were set free, and sent back to Tanjore with presents and robes of honour. Thus Shivaji cleared himself in the eyes of the public. But though he gave up the idea of invading the Tanjore territory south of the Kolerun, he seized the whole Karnātak north of that river, both the *jāgirs* of Vyankoji and those of Sher Khan, Vellore and Ārni alone still holding out.*

The French envoy M. Germain, who spent three days in Shivaji's camp on the Kolerun, gives a graphic account of the Marātha king's Spartan simplicity and efficient arrangements:—"His camp is without any pomp and unembarrassed by baggage or women. There are only two tents in it, but of a thick simple stuff and very small,—one for himself and the other for his minister. The horsemen of Shivaji ordinarily receive two pagodas per month as pay. All the horses belong to him and he entertains grooms for them

* F.R. Fort St. George, Vol. 18, Madras to James and Chamberlain, 24 Aug., 1677. Letter of Nellor Ramana, 2 Aug. (Vol. 27), says that Shivaji kept the three Tanjore ministers with him for some time after leaving Tirumalayādi, and that Jagannāth induced the garrison of Elavanasur to give up to him. Jedhē S. records that Shivaji next captured Chidāmbaram, Vriddhāchalam and Jagdevgad (=Kaveripatan) and laid siege to Kolhār.

Ordinarily there are three horses for every two men, which contributes to the speed which he usually makes. This chief pays his spies liberally, which has greatly helped his conquests by the correct information which they give." (Martin, ii. 113, 119.)

§15. *Shivaji's return home and conquests.*

His hope of recalling Vyankoji having proved futile, Shivaji broke up his camp on the Kolerun about 27th July. Thence after a short halt at Wali-ganda-patam (28 m. north), he crossed the Vellār river (10 m. n.) and stopped at Tundumgurti for a day or two. Here he received a visit from the Dutch Chief of Tevenāpatam bearing many presents (about 31st July), and from this place sent his army on to Elāvanāsur (22 miles further north) to take that fort from Vyankoji's men, while he himself, with Simāji Nāyak and others of his great men, turned 16 miles north-east to worship at the great Shivā temple of Vriddhāchalam, (1-3 August.)

On 22nd September Shivaji was at Vanikamvādi, (40 miles s. w. of Vellore) and wrote to the English governor of Madras: "In the Karnāt country . . . I intend to build new works in several forts and castles. You may likely have with you such men as know how to make great carriages for guns and how to contrive mines. We have need of such men at present, especially those that know how to make mines and to blow up stone-walls. If there be any such men with you that know how to make mines, you would be pleased to send some 20 or 25, or at least 10 to 5 such men, for I shall pay them very well and shall entertain them in several of my forts." The English politely declined the request, saying that, being merchants, it was their duty to maintain strict neutrality. On 3rd October, Shivaji was within two days' march of Madras. Shortly before, he had pillaged Porto Novo, and made himself master of the South Arcot district. In October Ārni surrendered to him, and so also did some other forts in the North Arcot district.*

* F.R. Fort St. George, vol. 27. Love's *Vestiges*, i. 371, 357.

Shivaji had been now absent from his own realm for ten months and the administration there was suffering from the lack of the master's control. At a grand council of his officers which he held in September it was decided to return to Mahārāshtra. This resolution was strengthened by the news that Aurangzib had ordered his governor of the Deccan to punish Qutb Shah for having joined and assisted the arch-rebel Shivaji, and a combined Bijapuri and Mughal army had invaded Golkondā territory near Mālkher.* (September 1677.) Therefore at the beginning of November 1677, Shivaji himself with 4,000 cavalry marched away from the Karnātak plains, leaving the bulk of his army in occupation of his new conquest and "promising to return quickly." Ascending the Eastern Ghats into the tableland, he took easy possession of his father's jagir districts,—Kolar, Uskota, Bangalore, Balapur and Sera, in the eastern and central parts of the present kingdom of Mysore, repressed the turbulent poligars of that No Man's Land, and then returned home through the Bellāry and Dhārwar districts, reaching Panhāla early in April, 1678. (F. R. Surat, 107. Sabh. 91.)

About 21st August 1678, the fort of Vellore surrendered to Shivaji's forces after a siege of 14 months, "Abdullah Khan, the Captain, that held it out all this time, having behaved himself very resolutely therein. But his men from 1,800 foot and 500 horse, being by the extremity of the siege and sickness reduced to 200 foot and 100 horse, and no supplies sent from Bijapur, . . . he could not hold it longer, and therefore delivered it upon condition to have 30,000 pagodas in money, a small fort and country worth 30,000 pagodas per annum." (Madras *Diary and Consult.* 1678-79, p. 105; B. S. 476.)

The territory annexed by Shivaji in the Karnātak was estimated by Sabhāsad to yield 20 *lakhs* of *hun* a year and included a hundred forts, taken or built by him. In August

* Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, iv. ch. 42, §7-8.

1678, the Madras factors write, "Shivaji by his deputies has a full and quiet possession of all these countries about those two strong castles of Jinji and Vellore, which are worth 22 lakh of pardoes or 550 thousand pounds sterling per annum, at five shillings the pardo, in which he has a considerable force of men and horse, 72 strong hills and 14 forts [in the plain], being 60 leagues long and 40 broad." But gold, and not land, was his chief object. The whole of the Karnātak was "peeled to the bones" by his system of "organized plunder" and exaction, which is graphically described by the Madras President as well as by Francois Martin. The booty carried off in this expedition* was so vast as to stagger the imagination of the Marātha chroniclers, and they made no attempt to compute its value.

Over the Karnātak plains thus conquered, he at first placed Shāntāji, a natural son of Shāhji, as viceroy with Jinji for his head-quarters, assisted by Raghunāth Nārāyan Hanumanté as diplomatic adviser and auditor (*majmuadār*), and Hambir Rao as commander of the army of occupation. The tableland of Mysore was placed under Rango Nārāyan as viceroy, but subject to the higher jurisdiction of Jinji. [Sabh. 91; Madras to Surat, 20 Nov. 1677; *Mission*, iii. 269.]

§16. *Struggle with Vyankoji renewed; final settlement.*

But the new conquest was not to enjoy peace in the absence of the master's eye. Vyankoji set on foot intrigues with the Nāyaks of Madurā and Mysore and the *poligars*, and even appealed to the Court of Bijapur and the Muslim nobles in his neighbourhood to organize "a confederacy for

* "With a success as happy as Cæsar's in Spain, he came, saw and overcame, and reported so vast a treasure in gold, diamonds, emeralds, rubies and wrought coral that have strengthened his arms with very able sinews to prosecute his further victorious designs." (H. Gary to Co., dated Bombay, 16 Jan., 1678, *O.C.* 4314.) "Peeled to the bones" in Madras records of Oct. 1677. "Organized pillage" in *Kaep.* 164. Martin, ii. 109, 114-115, 117.

regaining their own." But no help came to him except from some petty chiefs.

In November, 1677, Shivaji's troops showed a disposition to cross the Kolerun river and enter the territory of Tanjore. Vyankoji opposed them. The two armies stood facing each other across the Kolerun for some days, without any action. Envoys from the two parties tried to effect a compromise, but without success. Vyankojii delayed giving battle, because for some days in succession vultures had been flying into his camp, which was a bad omen.

At last, on 16th November, Vyankoji crossed the Kolerun at the head of 4,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, and attacked Shivaji's army of 12,000 men, led by Shāntāji Bhonslē.* Shāntāji boldly resisted from morning to night-fall, though his cavalry was of inferior quality. The contest was very severe, and many were slain or wounded, including several persons of note. In the end, Shāntāji was worsted and fled for two miles. The Tanjore horsemen, after pursuing him for a mile, returned to their tents to rest from the day's fatigue. But Shāntāji, on reaching his camp, "Consulting with his captains what the importance and shame [of the defeat] would be, resolved to dress and saddle their horses again, and so immediately rode away by other ways, and in the dead of night surprised them fast at rest after so hard labour, their horses unsaddled, and made a great slaughter of them, taking nigh 1,000 horses, the three chief commanders, the tents and all their baggage, and 100 horses more taken by woodmen who fell to share the plunder. The rest fled over the river Kolerun for Tanjore".*

* The Maratha accounts say that Hambir Rao commanded Shivaji's troops in this battle, the Madras Factory Records and the Jesuit missionary say it was Shantaji. There is no real conflict: both were present, the viceroy and the c.-in-c. Martin, ii. 119-120.

† *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 107, Madras letters of 20 and 29 Nov. 1677. Father Andre Freire wrote from a town of Jinji district in 1678, "The soldiers of Vyankoji, transported by fury, fell on the enemy's army like lions, broke the ranks, &c. . . . Shantaji, obliged to flee, preserved enough coolness to place a large detachment in ambush; the victors, carried away by the

Skirmishes continued between detachments of the two armies throughout December, and they pillaged and ruined the country with equal violence. Shivaji soon afterwards found it necessary to recall much of his army from the Karnātak as he was threatened with an attack in his homeland. So, peace was made between the two brothers, Shivaji retaining the Jinji territory, some other forts, and for a time the Mysore tableland (Kolar, &c.) which had once belonged to his father, while Vyankoji was left in undisturbed possession of his dominions south of the Kolerun and some portion of the country north of it, in return for a payment of 3 lakhs of *pardoes* (Rs. 6 lakhs) in cash. The army of occupation under Hambir Rao was recalled to Mahārāshtra, and Raghunāth organized a local force of 10,000 horse (both *pāgā* and *silāhdār*) for the defence of the new province.*

§17. *The European traders during Shivaji's invasion.*

As soon as Shivaji descended into the Karnātak plains (early in May 1677), the European traders on that coast

ardour of success, fell into the trap ; taken in the rear by the detachment, they saw in an instant the fugitives returning against them with irresistible impetuosity. After some hours of fierce combat, they were crushed and left the field of battle Shantaji's losses were, nevertheless, very much more considerable than those of the vanquished." [Mission, iii. 270.]

Sabhasad, 92, describes the battle thus: "Vyankoji's army was four times as large as that of Hambir Rao, but the latter defeated the former, capturing 4,000 of his horses, besides elephants, jewels, ordinary officers, and Vikaji and Pratapji (two natural sons of Shahji) and other officers of high rank." Jedhē S. says that the battle took place near Ahiri, and that Hambir Rao captured 3,000 horses and several elephants and *sardars* of Vyankoji. 91 Q. B. 83.

* F. R. Surat 107, Madras to Surat, 27 May 1678 ; Sabh. 93, 91 Q.B. 83, which adds that Arni and Venidurg were left to the son of Vedaji Bhaskar, out of respect for Shahji's grant to him. Shivaji does not seem to have retained any of his conquests in eastern Mysore such as Kolar and Bangalore, after 1678. A late tradition runs that by a polite fiction, the Bangalore, Ooskota and Shilagutta parganas (*i.e.*, the modern Mysore and Kolar districts) were handed back by him as a present to Vyankoji's wife for her wardrobe expenses!

hastened with presents to keep him amicably disposed towards them from the outset. On 14th May the English Governor of Madras received a letter from him, brought by his Brāhman agent, Mahādji Pant, asking for some cordial stones (bezoar) and other counter-poisons. The English supplied these, together with Maldiv cocoanuts and presents worth 60 *hun*. These were acknowledged with thanks on the 25th, in Shivaji's letter from Vellore in which he asked for a fresh supply of "good counter-poisons," entreating the Governor "not to be bashful in asking for the cost," and sending a robe of honour for the Governor. But, again, the English supplied him with presents worth 52 *hun*, (18th June.) Two Brāhmans in the service of the English attended Shivaji's camp and sent news of his doings and intentions to Madras. On 22nd September, Shivaji again wrote to the Governor asking him to send 20 or 25 men who knew how to make gun-carriages and dig mines and blow up stone-walls, and promising to pay them very well. The Governor maintained his neutrality. [Madras *Diary*, 1677, pp. 112-115; *O.C.* 4266; *F. R. Madras*, 27.]

At the near approach of the Marāthas and the consternation and flight among the people all around, Francois Martin, the Governor of Pondicherry, sent (22nd May) a Brāhman to Shivaji at Vellore, with a letter appealing to him to protect the French factories in the Karnātak as he had hitherto protected them at Rājāpur in his own dominions. This agent had three interviews with Shivaji who demanded French help in his war with Sher Khan, and finally asked what they would give him for leaving them in peace. The French pleaded poverty in consequence of their recent war with the Dutch and stoppage of trade. On 2nd July, Martin sent his Brāhman agent again with a fresh appeal for protection written as from M. Baron, the director. Shivaji wished for a European envoy to be sent to him. Sieur Germain (with A. Cattel as interpreter) was accordingly sent to Shivaji's camp on the Kolerun, where they were introduced by Janārdan Pant, and returned after three

days with a *farmān* of reassurance for Pondicherry. (August.) But the local Marātha officials of Shivaji who visited that city continued to extort money from the people. As Martin wrote, "It was nothing but a continual search for the men whom they believed to be capable of yielding money. The intendants are in concert with the governor (*subahdār*) of this province. All the ways of extracting money are permitted. The letters that were written to Shivaji had no effect at all." [Martin, ii. pp. 93-115.]

On 31st July the Chief of the Dutch factory at Tevenāpatam (Cuddālore) waited on Shivaji at Tundumgurti with presents (scarlet silk stuffs, sandal wood, rose water, Maldiv concoanuts, cloves, and sword blades.) Shivaji was pleased and gave the party robes of honour. But some goods of their factory had been robbed and they asked for their restitution. Evidently they had no relief. As Martin writes, "The Dutch were as prisoners in their house at Tevenapatam and forced to give presents in order to have free entry and exit." [F. R. Madras 27 ; Martin ii. 115.]

§18. *Vyankoji's true character.*

A striking illustration of the deliberate falsification of history by later Marātha writers is furnished by the attempt of Wāqnis, Chitnis and others to paint Vyankoji as a dull incompetent sluggard, without any noble ambition or martial spirit, or even the power to appreciate an able and useful minister like Raghunāth N. Hanumanté. Contemporary records enable us to correct these misrepresentations and put Vyankoji's character in a true light, as no unworthy brother of Shivaji. The Persian histories mention his gallant fight against the Mughals during Jai Singh's invasion of Bijapur (1665.) He himself, and his father, annexed Tanjore (to which, therefore, Shivaji had no legal claim.) The Jesuit missionary Andre Freire thus praises his civil administration of the newly conquered kingdom of Tanjore: "He sought to make himself beloved by the inhabitants.

The justice and wisdom of his government began to close the wounds of the preceding reign and to develop the natural resources of the country. By repairing the canals and tanks, he has given fertility to the vast fields which had been left untilled for many years, and the last crop has surpassed all that was seen before." [Letter of 1676 in *Mission*, iii, 249. 91 Q.B. 75.]

Raghunāth Hanumanté was no saint in money matters. I have found no evidence for Pārasnis's story that Raghunāth administered Vyankoji's own kingdom as his wazir for a year after Shivaji's return in 1678. No authentic historian records such an arrangement, and it is improbable from the known facts. Therefore, the story in D. B. Parasnīs's *Tanjāvar-chen Rajgharānē*, 36-38 and 42-43, should be rejected as apocryphal.

CHAPTER XIII

HIS LAST YEARS

1. Adventures during return from Karnatak.
2. Maratha activity in 1677.
3. Conquest of Tungabhadra north bank.
4. Mughals, Bijapur and Shivaji in 1678.
5. Shambhuji deserts to the Mughals.
6. Maratha plot to seize Bijapur.
7. Dilir captures Bhupalgarh.
8. Shivaji's letter to Aurangzib on religious toleration.
9. Dilir invades Bijapur, 1679.
10. Dilir's ravages.
11. Last campaign of Shivaji.
12. His domestic troubles.
13. Death of Shivaji.
App. His wives and children.

§1. *Adventures during return from the Karnatak.*

After his marvellous success in the invasion of the Karnatak, Shivaji left the Madras plains (early in November, 1677) and ascended the Mysore plateau, conquering its eastern and central parts.*

Leaving Mysore (January, 1678) he crossed the Tungabhadra, and by way of Kopal and Gadag, reached Lakshmiswar in the Dhärwar district. The desāi, named Khāngaudā, had evacuated his fort in terror, and it was occupied by the Marāthas. Bānkāpur, 20 miles s. w. of Lakshmiswar, was next threatened, in the middle of January, 1678. From this place Shivaji turned his steps northwards, and arrived near Sampgāon in the Belgāum district. At Belvādi, a small village 12 miles s. e. of Sampgāon and 30 miles s. e. of Belgāum, Sāvitri Bāi, the widowed lady proprietor, plundered some transport bullocks of Shivā's army when passing by.

* His route is thus given in *Sabhasad*, 92: Kolhar—Balapur—Kopal—Lakshmiswar—Khāngaudā desai chastised—Sampgaon district—Balvada desain invested, captured, and "taught a lesson"—Panhala. *Kopal* is north of the Tungabhadra, 22 m. west of the ruins of Vijayanagar, and 105 miles due south of Bijapur. *Gadag* is 35 m. west of Kopal, and Lakshmiswar, 24 m. south of Gadag.

Her fort was at once besieged, but she defended it most heroically for 27 days, after which it was carried by assault and she herself captured.*

This long check by a woman, before a petty mudfort, greatly lowered Shivaji's prestige. As the English merchants of Rājapur wrote: "He is at present besieging a fort where, by relation of their own people come from him, he has suffered more disgrace than ever he did from all power of the Mughal or the Deccans (=Bijapuris), and he who hath conquered so many kingdoms is not able to reduce this woman *desāi*!" (F. R. Surat, 107, 28 Feb. 1678.)

Soon afterwards Shivaji had another and very great disappointment,—probably the greatest in his life, which we describe in the words of the Rājapur factors: "Jamshid Khan, since the death of his master the Nawab [Bahlol Khan, on 23rd Dec., 1677] found himself incapable of longer holding out, agrees with Shivaji to deliver up [the fort of Bijapur and the person of Sikandar Adil Shah] to him for 600,000 pagodas. Siddi Masaud, having intelligence of this, feigns a sickness, at last death, and causes a *handol* publicly to be sent away with part of the army to Adoni, the residue (of his troops) about 4,000 sent to Jamshid, pretending that since the leader was dead, if he would entertain them they would serve him. He presently accepts their service and receives them into the Fort, who within two days seized his person, caused the gates to be opened and received the Siddi in alive, (21st Feb., 1678.) Shivaji upon his march hearing this news returns, and is expected at Panhālā in a short time." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 107, 3rd April 1678.)

* O.C. 4314. 91 Q.B. 83, thus describes her fate: "A woman named Sāvitri was the *patelni* (village headman's wife) of Belvādi. From the shelter of her fort she fought Shivā for one month. On her provisions and munitions running short, she made a sortie, demolished all the siege trenches, and dispersed and slew many of the besiegers. For one day she kept the field heroically, but at last fled vanquished, was captured and greatly dishonoured. Sakhaji Gaikwar was the doer of this evil deed. Shivaji, on hearing of his act, put out both his eyes and thus gave him his deserts. He was imprisoned in the village of Manauli."

In an age when almost every man had his price, Shivaji cannot be blamed for trying to make gains by bribery. The fort of Bijapur was for sale, and he only made a bid for it, and took his chance with other competitors for the position of keeper of the puppet Adil Shah, even as Shahji had been the keeper of a puppet Nizām Shah. Masaud and Bahlool were not more disinterested, but certainly less efficient than he would have been as regent of Bijapur.

The news of the delivery of the Adil-Shahi capital to Siddi Masaud (21st February) reached Shivaji on his way from Belvādi through Turgal to Bijapur, and he swerved aside to the west and returned to his own stronghold of Panhālā in the first week of April, 1678.

§2. *Marātha activity in 1677.*

At this stage we may conveniently inquire into what happened in Mahārāshtra during Shivaji's absence from home in the Karnātak expedition (January 1677—March 1678.) An army was sent under Shambhuji to annex some Portuguese territory near Goa. He demanded 60 villages from the Portuguese on the ground that they belonged to the fort of Phondā, which was now in Shivaji's possession; but on meeting with a refusal, he made a rash assault on the Portuguese, who beat him off. Then the Marāthas left the district for Daman, hoping to find less opposition there (Nov. 1677.) But no permanent gain resulted from this campaign. (*Dutch Rec.*, Vol. 34, No. 844.) The Marātha embassy to Goa in December 1677, will be described in Chapter 14.

During this period the armies left at home under Moro Trimbak in the Desh and under Annāji Datto in Konkan, naturally confined themselves to minor raids, without venturing on any distant expedition. The Surat district was, as usual, subjected to contribution by the Marātha forces now quartered close by at Navsāri, Gandavi, and Pindvāl, with Trimbakji in a actual command, in the absence of the Peshwā. Their officers used boldly to enter even the city of Surat,

with 40 or 50 troopers at a time and publicly demand provisions and money from the governor. In November, 1677, Dattāji taking advantage of the crushing repulse of Dilar and Bahlol by the Golkondā troops (two months earlier), roved the inland parts of Kanārā and looted Hubli. Early in January, 1678, Moro Pant "plundered Trimbak, Nāsik and other considerable places in the Mughal territory." Dilar Khan hastened there with the remnant of his broken army, (middle of February).*

§ 3. *Conquest of the north bank of the Tungabhadrā.*

Shivaji's return home (March, 1678), revived Marātha activity. The districts that he retained in Central and Eastern Mysore as the result of his Karnātak expedition, had to be connected with his old dominions by the conquest of the southern corner of the kingdom of Bijapur, which consisted of the Kopal region north of the Tungabhadrā opposite the Bellāry district, as well as part of the Dhārwar and Belgāum districts intervening between Kopal and Panhālā. The Kopal district was held by two Afghans, Husain Khan Miānā of Kukānur and his brother Qāsim Khan of Kopal. They were fellow clansmen of Bahlol Khan, and on the death of that chief and the ruin of his family, the defence of this frontier was entrusted to them.

Husain Khan is spoken of by Sabhāsād as a high and powerful noble of the rank of Bahlol Khan, and a brave general renowned for his martial spirit, with 5,000 Pathan soldiers, archers, lancers, musketeers, and artillerymen under him. In January 1677, Hambir Rāo invaded the Gadag district. Husain Khan Miānā opposed him near Yelburgā. After a long and bloody fight, the Pathans were defeated. Husain Khan, on account of his corpulence, could not ride on horseback. The elephant on which he

* F. R. Surat 89, Surat to Bomb., 26 May; Vol. 107, Rajapur to Surat 8 Dec. 1677; Bomb. to Surat, 21 Feb., 1678.

was trying to escape was wounded in the trunk by Nāgoji Jedhē and forced to turn back. Nāgoji was shot dead, but the Khan was captured with 2,000 of his horses and some elephants. Shivaji offered to set him free if he gave up the fort of Kopal, but he declined and was kept a prisoner. Early in 1678, Shivaji conquered the Gadag district. At last after two years, the Peshwā Moro Pant negotiated with Qāsim Khan (the commandant of Kopal) through Husain's son and induced him to give up the fort for money (3rd March 1679.) Husain was now released and entered the Marātha service for a living.*

Kopal is rightly called by Sabhāsād "the gate of the south," and its possession enabled the Marātha dominion to be extended to the bank of the Tungabhadrā river and even across it into the Bellāry and Chittaldurg districts. Many of the local chieftains, who had long defied the Bijapur Government and withheld taxes in this ill-subdued border country, were now chastised by the Marāthas and reduced to obedience,—among them being the poligars of Kanakgiri (25 miles n. e. of Kopal), Harpan-halli (40 miles s. of Kopal), Rāydurg, Chittaldurg, Vidyānagar (? old Vijaynagar), and Bundikot (? Gudicotā, 45 miles e. of Harpan-halli.) This country was now formed into a regular province of Shivaji's kingdom and placed under a viceroy (Sabh. 81.)

* I have here followed *Jedhē* with a few points from 91 Q.B. 74. These two works call the victor Bahir Rao, while Sabhāsād calls him Hambir Rao. (In Modi MSS. *Hambir* is easily misread as *Bahir*.) The place of battle is put by *Jedhē* 'near *Yelgedla*', which I amend into *Yelburga* (30 m. n. e. of Gadag, now in the Lingasagar district), and not into *Yelagi* (20 m. south of Belgaum.) Waqnis says that Husain Khan was the 'sardar of *Kukamur*',—a city 15 m. north of Kopal, and that Bahir Rao fell in the battle and Husain, out of wounded honour, took poison on being set free by Shivaji (which is not historically true.) Sabhāsād, 80—81, places the battle as beyond Sampgāon. B. S. 451 merely says that Shiva imprisoned Husain Khan by deception.

The correct history of the capture of Kopal is given in *Zawābit-i-Alamgiri* (Br. Museum ms. Or. 1641, f. 145b. See my *House of Shivaji*, ch. 5.)

Late in April 1678, Shivaji's troops plundered Mungipaihan, on the Godāvari, 30 miles south of Aurangabad. It was probably next month that they made a second attempt to get possession of Shivner. They invested the village (of Junnar) at its foot, and at night tried to scale the fort. "Three hundred Marāthas climbed the fort-walls at night by means of nooses and rope-ladders. But Abdul Aziz Khan was an expert *qiladār*. Though he had sent away his sons and followers to reinforce the *faujdār* Yahiyā Khan in the village, he personally with a few men slew all the infantry of Shivā who had entered the fort. Next morning he hunted out the few who had concealed themselves in the hill [side] below the fort and among the rocks and holes, but released them with presents, sending a message to Shivaji to the effect, 'So long as I am *qiladār*, you will never take this fort'." (*Dil. 157. M. A. 166.*)

§ 4. *The Mughals, Bijapur and Shivaji, 1678.*

A rupture now took place between Shivā and Qutb Shah, and the diplomatic system so patiently built up by Madannā Pandit fell to the ground. Qutb Shah's indignation had been rising as he found himself made a mere cat's paw by Shivā in the Karnātak adventure. He had borne all the expenses of the expedition and supplied artillery and an auxiliary force for it. But not one of the conquered forts was given to him, not one piece of his contribution was repaid out of the fabulous booty carried away by Shivā from that land of gold. And now the Marātha plot to capture Bijapur by treachery destroyed the last trace of patience in the Golkondā king, especially as he had been playing for some years past the flattering role of a chivalrous friend and protector of the boy Adil Shah. So, Abul Hasan arranged for a peace between the new Bijapuri regent, Siddi Masaud, and his rivals (especially Sharzā Khan), promised him money to pacify the unpaid mutinous soldiery, and bound him to wage war against Shivā and "confine him to Konkan." The

Adil-Shahi nobles prepared to open the campaign in October next, with about 25,000 cavalry and numerous infantry. But Dilir Khan spoiled the whole plan. (*O. C.* 4266; *F. R.* Surat 107.)

Dilir Khan had exacted heavy and humiliating concessions from Siddi Masaud when he made peace with him at Kulbargā (Nov. 1677.) The odium of that treaty fell on the new regent, and all the disorders in the State and all the sufferings of the people were laid at his door. Distracted by domestic factions, daily insulted and threatened by the Afghan soldiers, and hopeless of preventing Shivā's boundless violence and encroachments with the resources of the ruined, divided and bankrupt State, Siddi Masaud wanted to come to terms with Shivaji; but Dilir Khan forbade it, assuring him that the imperial army was ready to help him in fighting the Marāthas. Masaud was, however, too bewildered by the disturbances in all parts of the country to listen to this advice. He wrote to Shivā, "We are neighbours. We eat the same salt. You are as deeply concerned in [the welfare of] this State as I am. The enemy [*i.e.*, Mughals] are day and night trying to ruin it. We two ought to unite and expel the foreigner." [B. S. 452-470]. At the news of these negotiations, Dilir Khan grew angry and set himself to conquer Bijapur. Only respect for treaties had kept him from doing so before; but Masaud's breach of faith absolved him from the obligation to spare Adil Shah. And he now received a most unexpected accession of strength; Shivaji's eldest son Shambhuji came over to the Mughal side.

§ 5. *Shambhuji deserts to the Mughals.*

Shivaji's severe illness early in 1676 had raised a very serious question in his inner council. How was he to provide for his two sons? The younger Rajaram, a boy of six, would not be safe if left in the power of his elder brother Shambhuji, a grown-up youth notorious for his violent temper and self-indulgent character. The example

of the reigning Mughal Emperor boded no good for Shivaji's sons after his death. Later in that year, when the plan of invading the Eastern Karnatak was matured, the Rajah decided to separate his two heirs before setting out on this distant campaign, with its natural war risks for himself. So, on 1st November he sent away Shambhuji to Sangameshwar to take lessons in the Hindu religion and government from the learned Deputy Pandit Rao, Keshav Bhatt Upādhyāy. The prince was also to be trained in administrative work by making him governor of that district, with Nilo Moreshwar (the Peshwa's son) as his diwān. Rajaram was left in the capital in charge of the queen-mother and the council of ministers. At Sangameshwar, Shambhuji attended lectures in Sanskrit ethics and politics, but profited little by them. He antagonised his diwan by interfering with the administrative measures of the officers and setting the people up against the minister as an oppressor.

A year and a half passed in this way when Shivaji came home from the Karnatak, and the division of his heritage after him became a live issue (April 1678.) He proposed a very sensible partition of his empire,—the homeland of Maharashtra with its long-settled peaceful territory and resident families of faithful hereditary ministers and generals, was to go to Rajaram, a delicate boy of eight, because there was then no whisper even of the Mughal Emperor or one of his sons coming to the South with a vast army for subduing the Marathas, and Bijapur and Golkonda were still strong and allied to the Maratha king. The newly annexed country of the Karnatak (Mysore—Jinji) could more reasonably be Shambhuji's share, because the half-subdued state of the province demanded a vigorous grown-up sovereign to keep hold of it, and for such a task Shambhuji was beyond question the fittest person and Rajaram was unthinkable.

Shambhuji naturally grumbled at the ancestral homeland of the Bhonslés being given to his junior brother,

while his own lot was to be to shoulder the dangerous and unprofitable task of maintaining himself in an unsubdued province, six hundred miles away from Maharashtra, amidst an alien race and alien speech, with no resident Maratha population to back him but only refractory local chiefs all around him.

The breach in the Maratha royal council became the public talk. Dilir Khan seized the opening and wrote secret letters to Shambhuji promising to win his patrimony of Desh and Konkan for him by the armed strength of the Mughal Government if he joined Dilir. There was no talk of annexing Maharashtra to the Mughal empire ; Dilir's support was to be purchased merely by Shambhuji agreeing to a policy of friendly alliance with the viceroy of Mughal Deccan, as Shāhu promised in 1718. [Param. *Kāvya*, sec. 3.]

Shambhuji's own conduct brought matters to a crisis. For having violated a beautiful Brahman woman who was visiting the palace on a religious festival, the prince was removed to Parli (Sajjangarh) to be placed under the moral teaching of Shivaji's *guru* Ramdas. The saint of Sajjangarh was as successful as the pandit of Sangameshwar. At Parli, Shambhuji soon overawed his father's qiladar, raised troops of his own, and one day escaped with his wife Yesu Bai dressed in male attire on horseback, and joined Dilir Khan. This happened on 13th December 1678. Shivaji sent a force in pursuit, but it was too late. Dilir Khan, on getting Shambhuji's letter, had detached from his camp at Bahādurgarh 4,000 men under Ikhlās Khan (the commander of his vanguard) and Ghairat Khan (his nephew) to advance and escort the fugitive. They met him 8 miles south of Supā, and Dilir himself joined them at Kārkamb, 12 miles further north-east. Dilir Khan was thrown into transports of joy by the desertion of Shivaji's heir to his side. "He felt as happy as if he had conquered the whole Deccan!" "He bent his drums in ecstasy and sent a report to the Emperor. Shambhu was created a 7-hazāri and a Rajah and presented with an elephant."

The Khan with his valuable new ally halted at Akluj (50 miles south of Bahādurgarh) for some time to prepare for the invasion of Bijapur. [B. S. 471. *Dil.* 159.]

§ 6. *Marātha plot to seize Bijapur.*

In this danger Siddi Masaud immediately asked for help from Shivā, as agreed upon. The Rajah sent six to seven thousand heavy cavalry to guard Bijapur. Masaud could not fully trust his ally, he asked the Marātha contingent to halt beside the stream of the village Itangihal (5 m. n. w. of the city), but they came nearer, encamped at Khānāpurā and Khusraupurā, and demanded that one of the gates and one of the towers of the fort should be entrusted to them. Masaud wisely declined. Then they moved to Zuhṛāpurā and encamped on the plain just outside the walls, thus increasing Masaud's suspicion. Soon the allies began to quarrel openly.* The Marāthas were detected in trying to smuggle arms and men into the fort, by concealing the arms in sacks of grain and disguising the soldiers as drivers of the pack-oxen! Then Shivā threw off the mask. He began to plunder and devastate Adil-Shahi territory again. His men looted the suburbs of Bijapur,—Daulatpurā (= Khawāspurā), Khusraupurā and Zuhṛāpurā, and carried off the rich *baniās* for ransom. Near the tomb of Shaikh Ahmad Khawās-Khāni, they slew Ali Razā and wounded Siddi Yaqt. But when they reached the tomb of Ibrāhim Adil Shah, west of the city, a shot from the fort-guns killed the Marātha commander and the men fled away. Masaud now made peace with Dilir Khan.

A Mughal force was invited to Bijapur, royally welcomed, and sent off with a Bijapuri army under Venkatādri

* "It is reported that Shivaji has in person plundered Shahpur, the suburbs of Bijapur, and had liked to have got into the royal city, the conquest whereof is his sole aim, lest it should fall into the Mughal's hands, and then he knows he could not long subsist." (Bombay to Surat, 4 April, 1679, in *Orme MSS.* 116.)

Murāri (the confidant of the regent) and other officers, against the Marāthas. They reached Tikotā (13 miles w. of Bijapur), when spies brought the report that Shivā himself had arrived at Selgur (55 miles w. of Bijapur and the same distance east of Panhālā) with 7 to 8 thousand men and wanted to make a night-attack on the Mughal or the Bijapuri army, whichever would advance first. But a new quarrel between Masaud and Sharzā Khan now paralyzed the power of Bijapur. (B. S. 471—477.)

§ 7. *Dilir captures Bhupālgarh.*

Dilir Khan next marched to the fort of Bhupālgarh,* which Shivaji had built as a store-house of his property and a refuge for the families of his subjects in that neighbourhood during his wars with the Mughals. By great labour the imperialists dragged some guns to the top of a neighbouring height during the night, and next morning began to batter the walls and towers. The assault was launched about 9 A.M. on 2nd April, 1679, and the Mughals fought with vigour till noon, when they captured the fort after heavy slaughter on both sides. Vast quantities of grain and other property and large numbers of people (who had sought refuge there from the neighbouring districts) were captured by the victors. Seven hundred survivors of the garrison were deprived of one hand and then set free; the other captives were evidently sold into slavery.

Before this Shivaji had sent 16,000 horse to relieve the fort. They arrived too late, but hovered on the four sides of the Mughals. Suddenly they learnt that Iraj Khan and Bājāji Rao [Nimbālkar] were bringing provisions from

* Shambhuji's desertion to the Mughals and capture of Bhupalgarh: *Jedhē S.* ; *B. S.* 471, 477-478, 500-501 (best.) *Dil.* 159-163 (reliable.) *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 108, Rajapur to Surat, 16 Dec., 1679, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan., 1680 (return.) *Sabb.* 94. Bhupalgarh, 20 m. n. w. of Jath, 45 m. s. w. of Pandharpur, and 10 m. s. e. of Khanapur in the Satara district; the modern name of the village is *Banur* (*Atlas*, 40 N. E.); described in *Bom. Gaz.* xix. 455-456. *Paramanand Kāvya*, sec. 3.

Parendā to the besieging army, and then they immediately hastened to intercept the convoy. But Dilir Khan detached Ikhlās Khan with 1,500 cavalry to the aid of Iraj Khan. Twelve miles from Bhupālgarh he overtook the Marāthas. Ikhlās Khan's small force was enveloped and he took refuge in a walled village and repelled the Marātha assault with his back to the wall, doing great havoc among the enemy with his artillery, and slaying nearly one thousand of Shivā's men. Then large reinforcements arrived from Dilir Khan, at whose approach the Marāthas fled away. Dilir then went back to Bhupālgarh, burnt everything that he could not carry off, dismantled its fortifications, and returned to Dhulkhed. (B. S. 477—478 ; Dil. 160.)

The fugitive Marāthas, however, scored a success. Near Kārkamb (30 miles south of Parendā), they fell in with Iraj Khan, looted all his grain and the property of his troops, and forced him to flee with a few men into a small fort hard by, where he was afterwards relieved by his kinsman, Mir Muhammad Khan, the *qiladar* of Parendā. (Dil. 161.)

The fall of Bhupālgarh was followed by a period of puzzling intrigue and counter-intrigue between the Mughal viceroy and the Bijapur nobility, and also quarrels between Masaud and Sharzā Khan, Masaud and Dilir, and Masaud and his favourite Venkatādri.

§ 8. *Shivaji's letter on religious toleration.*

About the middle of this year Shivaji sent to Aurangzib a well-reasoned and spirited letter of protest against the *jaziya* polltax, which was drafted by Nila Prabhu in eloquent Persian.

To the Emperor Alamgir—

"This firm and constant well-wisher Shivaji, after rendering thanks for the grace of God and the favours of the Emperor,—which are clearer than the Sun,—begs to inform your Majesty that, although this well-wisher was led by his adverse Fate to come away from your august Presence without taking leave, yet he is ever ready to

perform, to the fullest extent possible and proper, everything that duty as a servant and gratitude demand of him. . .

"It has recently come to my ears that, on the ground of the war with me having exhausted your wealth and emptied your treasury, your Majesty has ordered that money under the name of *jaziya* should be collected from the Hindus and the imperial needs supplied with it. May it please your Majesty! That architect of the fabric of empire, [Jalāl-ud-din] Akbar Padishah, reigned with full power for 52 [lunar] years. He adopted the admirable policy of universal harmony (*sulh-i-kul*) in relation to all the various sects, such as Christians, Jews, Muslims, Dadu's followers, sky-worshippers (*falakia*), *malakia*, heathens (*ansaria*), atheists (*daharia*), Brahmans and Jain priests. The aim of his liberal heart was to cherish and protect all the people. So, he became famous under the title of *Jagat Guru*, 'the World's spiritual guide.'

"Next, the Emperor Nur-ud-din Jahāngir for 22 years spread his gracious shade on the head of the world and its dwellers, gave his heart to his friends and his hand to his work, and gained his desires. The Emperor Shāh Jahān for 32 years cast his blessed shadow on the head of the world and gathered the fruit of eternal life,—which is only a synonym for goodness and fair fame,—as the result of his happy time on earth. (*Verses*)

He who lives with a good name gains everlasting wealth,

Because after his death, the recital of his good deeds keeps his name alive.

"Through the auspicious effect of this sublime disposition, wherever he [Akbar] bent the glance of his august wish, Victory and Success advanced to welcome him on the way. In his reign many kingdoms and forts were conquered [by him.] The state and power of these Emperors can be easily understood from the fact that Alamgir Pādishāh has failed and become distracted in the attempt to merely follow

their political system. They, too, had the power of levying the *jaziya*; but they did not give place to bigotry in their hearts, as they considered all men, high and low, created by God to be [living] examples of the nature of diverse creeds and temperaments. Their kindness and benevolence endure on the pages of Time as their memorial, and so prayer and praise for these (three) pure souls will dwell for ever in the hearts and tongues of mankind, among both great and small. Prosperity is the fruit of one's intentions. Therefore, their wealth and good fortune continued to increase, as God's creatures reposed in the cradle of peace and safety [under their rule], and their undertakings succeeded.

"But in *your* Majesty's reign, many of the forts and provinces have gone out of *your* possession, and the rest will soon do so too, because there will be no slackness on my part in ruining and devastating them. Your peasants are down-trodden; the yield of every village has declined,—in the place of one lakh [of Rupees] only one thousand, and in the place of a thousand only ten are collected, and that too with difficulty. When Poverty and Beggary have made their homes in the palaces of the Emperor and the Princes, the condition of the grandees and officers can be easily imagined. It is a reign in which the army is in a ferment, the merchants complain, the Muslims cry, the Hindus are grilled, most men lack bread at night and in the day inflame their own cheeks by slapping them [in anguish.] How can the royal spirit permit you to add the hardship of the *jaziya* to this grievous state of things? The infamy will quickly spread from west to east and become recorded in books of history that the Emperor of Hindusthan, coveting the beggars' bowls, takes *jaziya* from Brahmins and Jain monks, *yogis*, *sannyāsis*, *bairāgis*, paupers, mendicants, ruined wretches, and the famine-stricken,—that his valour is shown by attacks on the wallets of beggars,—that he dashes down to the ground the name and honour of the Timurids!

"May it please your Majesty! If you believe in the true Divine Book and Word of God (*i.e.*, the *Qurān*), you will find there [that God is styled] *Rabb-ul-ālamin*, the Lord of all men, and not *Rabb-ul-musalmīn*, the Lord of the Muhammadans only. Verily, Islām and Hinduism are terms of contrast. They are [diverse pigments] used by the true Divine Painter for blending the colours and filling in the outlines [of His picture of the entire human species.] If it be a mosque, the call to prayer is chanted in remembrance of Him. If it be a temple, the bell is rung in yearning for Him only. To show bigotry for any man's own creed and practices is equivalent to altering the words of the Holy Book. To draw new lines on a picture is equivalent to finding fault with the painter.

"In strict justice the *jaziya* is not at all lawful. From the political point of view it can be allowable only if a beautiful woman wearing gold ornaments can pass from one province to another without fear or molestation. [But] in these days even the cities are being plundered, what shall I say of the open country? Apart from its injustice, this imposition of the *jaziya* is an innovation in India and inexpedient.

"If you imagine piety to consist in oppressing the people and terrorizing the Hindus, you ought first to levy the *jaziya* from Rānā Rāj Singh, who is the head of the Hindus. Then it will not be so very difficult to collect it from me, as I am at your service. But to oppress ants and flies is far from displaying valour and spirit.

"I wonder at the strange fidelity of your officers that they neglect to tell you of the true state of things, but cover a blazing fire with straw! May the Sun of your royalty continue to shine above the horizon of greatness!" [Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, iii. Ch. 34, App.]

§ 3. *Dilir invades Bijapur. Shivaji aids Adil Shah.*

On 18th August, 1679, Dilir crossed the Bhimā at Dhulkhed, 40 m. due north of Bijapur, and opened a new

campaign against Masaud. That helpless regent begged aid from Shivaji, sending to him an envoy named Hindu Rao charged with this piteous appeal: "The condition of this royalty is not hidden from you. There is no army, money, or ally for defending the fort and no provision at all. The enemy is strong and ever bent on war. You are a hereditary servant, elevated by this Court. And, therefore, you will feel for this house more than others can. We cannot defend the kingdom and its forts without your aid. Be true to your salt; turn towards us. Command what you consider proper, and it shall be done by us." (B. S. 493.)

Shivā undertook the defence of Bijapur,* ordered 10,000 of his cavalry to reinforce Masaud, sent from his forts 2,000 ox-loads of provisions to the city, and bade his subjects send grain and other necessaries to Bijapur for sale, so that the citizens and soldiers there might not suffer from scarcity. His envoy Visāji Nilkanth brought to Masaud his cheering message, "You hold the fort. I shall go out and punish Dilir Khan as he deserves." Visāji reported to the regent that 5,000 Marātha troops had reached Aināpur (20 m. s. e. of Miraj) and 5,000 others Bhupālgarh, waiting for his call to come, when needed.

The Mughal general Sujan Singh took Mangalvidé from Shivā's men about September (M. A. 182), and came nearer to Bijapur. Masaud conciliated Sābāji Ghātgé and sent him with the army of Hurgal to Indi (28 m. n. of Bijapur.) This detachment had a skirmish with Shambhuji who was out foraging; about fifteen men were slain on each side; Sābāji was wounded, but he captured 50 horses, 50 oxen, and 4 camels from the enemy. Shivaji's envoy now reached Bijapur with Anand Rao at the head of 2,500 horse. They were welcomed by Masaud and stationed in the

* Shivaji as the ally of Bijapur in 1679: B. S. 493-497, 504; Sabh. (silent.) F. R. Fort St. George, Vol. 28, p. 34. Vira Raghav from Golkonda to Madras, 14 January, 1680. (Qutb Shah was deterred by the Mughal envoy from sending an army to aid Bijapur, but sent money secretly to Shivaji to enlist troops for its defence.)

Nauraspurā suburb. Bājāji [Nimbālkar], now in Mughal service, laid siege to the fort of Ākluj, but a Bijapuri general named Bahādur marched up from Sangulā (32 m. s.) and drove him away.

But on 15th September, Dilir Khan left his camp at Dhulkhed and came very close to Bijapur, reaching Baratgi, 6 m. n. e. of the city, on 7th October. Here he halted and held palavers with Masaud's envoys. On 30th October Shivaji arrived at Selgur, midway between Panhālā and Bijapur, with 10,000 cavalry. His first detachment left Nauraspurā next day to welcome him there. Shivā wanted to visit Adil Shah; Masaud permitted him to come with an escort of 500 men only. But the Peshwa Moro Trimbaq dissuaded Shivaji from falling into the power of Masaud by entering the fort.

So, on 4th November, 1679, the Marātha king divided his army into two bodies: he himself with 8 or 9 thousand troopers started by the road of Muslah and Ālmalā, and Anand Rao with 10,000 cavalry by way of Man* and Sangulā, to raid the Mughal dominions and divert Dilir from the environs of Bijapur. But Dilir Khan, to whom the capture of Bijapur seemed easy, paid no heed to the Marātha plunder and devastation of those provinces, which was a familiar annual evil, and hoped for the highest rewards from the expected conquest of the Adil-Shahi capital. So, he pressed his attack on it, without retreating. [B. S. 493—'95.]

§ 10. *Dilir's ravages. Return of Shambhuji.*

But his siege of Bijapur was a failure. After vainly trying to make peace with Masaud, he left the environs of the city on 14th November and marched westwards, intending to invade the Miraj-Panhālā region and create a diversion there, which would quickly recall Shivā home. The

* The river Man flows a little to the south of Sangula (20 m. s. of Pandharpur.) Is Mān a copyist's error for Jāt (town)?

scheme seemed promising, as Shambhuji bragged of his ability to capture forts quickly with his Marātha followers and thus make the progress of the imperialists easy, while the petty chiefs (*nāyak-wārs*) of Miraj had been already won over by a Mughal agent.

But Dilir's work was to ravage the Bijapuri territory with insane cruelty. By way of Bāhmanhali, Maknāpur, and Jalgeri, he reached Tikotā (13 m. w. of Bijapur), a rich and populous village, where the wealthy men of the neighbourhood had taken refuge with their families. "The Mughals were utterly unexpected. When Ikhlās Khan with [Dilir's] vanguard arrived there and began to plunder it, the wives of the Hindus and Muslims with their children jumped into the wells near their houses and committed suicide. The village was utterly sacked. Nearly 3,000 men, both Hindus and Muslims, were taken prisoners [for being sold into slavery.] Leaving Tikotā on 18th November, by way of Honvād and Telsang, ravaging the country and carrying off the people as slaves, the imperialists reached Āthni (43 m. w. of Bijapur)." Here, according to the English factory records, a breach took place between the Mughal general and his Marātha ally. Āthni, "a considerable mart," was burnt down and Dilir proposed to sell the inhabitants who were all Hindus. Shambhuji objected to it, but was overruled, and began to grow sick of his associates. (F. R. Surat 108, Bomb. to Surat, 1 Jan., 1680.) On 21st November, Dilir left Āthni for Aināpur, 12 miles westwards, but learnt on the way that Shambhuji had fled away to Bijapur.

Since his coming over to the Mughals in December 1678, Shambhuji had been constantly approached by Shivaji's agents with all sorts of persuasions and promises to return to his father. Even Mahādji Nimbālkar, his brother-in-law, though now a Mughal servant, censured him for his act of desertion. (Shambhu reported the matter to Dilir, who put Mahādji in confinement for some days. Dil. 160.) But by this time Shambhuji had made up his mind

to leave the Mughals.* In the night of 20th November he slipped out of the camp with his wife Yesu Bāi disguised in male attire and only 10 troopers for escort, rode hard to Bijapur in the course of the next day and was warmly received by Masaud. Dilir, on learning of Shambhu's flight on the 21st, promptly returned towards Bijapur and sent an agent, Khwājah Abdur Razzāq, to that city to bribe the regent to capture the Marātha prince (28th.) In the night of the 30th, Shambhuji, getting scent of the matter, issued in secret from Bijapur, met a body of cavalry sent by his father to escort him, and galloped away to Panhālā, which he reached about the 4th of December. (B. S. 501.)

§ 11. *Last campaign of Shivaji.*

We shall now trace the history of Shivaji's movements from 4th November, 1679, when he marched out of Selgur (55 m. w. of Bijapur.) The Marātha cavalry, 18,000 strong, rapidly moved northwards in two parallel divisions under Shivaji and Anand Rao, and poured like a flood through the districts of Mughal Deccan, plundering and burning all the places in their track and taking an immense booty in cash and kind. In the middle of the month, Jālnā, a populous trading town, 40 miles east of Aurangabad, was captured and plundered.

Here the godly saint, Sayyid Jān Muhammad, had his hermitage in a garden in the suburbs. As Shivaji in his raids always spared the holy men and holy places of all religions, most of the wealthy men of Jālnā had taken refuge in this hermitage with their money and jewels. The raiders, finding very little booty in the town and learning of the concealment of the wealth in the saint's abode, entered it

* According to Sabhasad, 94, Aurangzib wrote to Dilir to arrest Shambhu and send him a prisoner to Delhi; but the Mughal general, to keep his word to his guest, informed the Maratha prince of the letter and connived at his flight. Unlikely story. B. S. 501 says that Aurangzib summoned Shambhu to his Court.

and robbed the refugees, wounding many of them. The holy man appealed to them to desist, but they only abused and threatened him for his pains. Then the man of God, "who had marvellous efficiency of prayer," cursed Shivā, and popular belief ascribed the Rajah's death five months afterwards to these curses. (K. K. ii. 271; *Dil.* 165; 91 Q. B. 88.)

Retribution visited the Marātha army very much sooner. Jālnā, both town and suburb, was thoroughly plundered and devastated for four days. Then as the Marāthas were retreating, loaded with booty consisting of "countless gold, silver, jewels, cloths, horses, elephants and camels, an enterprising Mughal officer, Ranmast Khan,* attacked their rear-guard. Sidhoji Nimbālkar with 5,000 men held him in check for three days, but was at last slain with many of his men. In the meantime, very large reinforcements were hastening up to the Mughals from Aurangabad, close at hand, under Kesari Singh and Sardār Khan. When these came to a halt six miles from the fighters, Kesari Singh sent a secret message to Shivā as a brother Hindu, to run away at once before the Mughals could complete their circle and cut him off. Shivaji entrusted himself to his chief spy, Bahirji, under whose skilful guidance the Marātha army escaped by an obscure path after three days and nights of anxious and ceaseless marching. But they had to sacrifice much of their booty, besides losing 4,000 horsemen killed and Hambir Rao wounded.

From this disastrous expedition, Shivaji returned to Patta-garh† (about 22nd November) and rested his exhausted

* Ranmast Khan, brother of Khizr Khan Pani, received a robe of honour from the Emperor on 18th September, 1682, and was created Bahadur Khan in August next (M. A. 222, 235.) Waqnis speaks of him as thanahdar or qiladar of Jalna at this time. We afterwards meet him as thanahdar of Akluj (*Dil.*)

† Patta, 20 m. s. of Nasik and the same distance east of Thal Ghat (*Ind. Atlas*, Old sheet 38), 19.42 N. 73.54 E. The fort was renamed Vishram-garh or the Castle of Rest. Bombay writes (29 Nov.) that he "fled here with 500 horse, having lost the greatest part of his army near Bijapur, where Dilir Khan wholly routed him, and took 2,000 horses besides prisoners." [F. R. Surat 108.] Here the place of battle and the

and stricken army for some days, and then, at the beginning of December, went to Rāigarh, where he seems to have passed the whole of that month.

As Dilir Khan was advancing westwards from Bijapur about the middle of November, seemingly intent on laying siege to Panhālā, and the presence of Shambhuji in the enemy's camp threatened a civil war in the Marātha State, Shivaji tried to convert Panhālā into an impregnable refuge by removing to it the guns of many of his other forts, besides 40 pieces bought from the French. As early as 24th November he had sent Somāji, the brother of Annāji Datto, to remove about 30 pieces of cannon from the forts of Ankolā, Kārwār, Someshwar and Phondā, and drag them to Panhālā "by the strength of men and buffaloes." (F. R. Surat 108, Rajapur to Surat, 30 Dec., Karwar to Surat, 24 Nov., 1679.)

Towards the close of November, a fresh marātha army of 12,000 men assembled near Rājapur in South Konkan. They fired the town (26th) and set out (on the 28th) for Burhānpur, but abandoned the idea and turned off towards Malkāpur, where Shivaji himself was reported to have arranged to meet them with 20,000 more cavalry. Evidently, he did not do so, and the Marātha division that raided Khāndesh, in the last week of November, "burning and plundering Dharangāon, Choprā, and many other considerable towns adjacent", was led by one of his generals. [F. R.

Mughal general are incorrectly named. Rajapur (30 Dec.) puts the loss at "above 4,000 horse," and the commander *Hummedbough* [Hambir Rao] himself very much wounded. The above Bombay letter adds "The Peshwa was intended for Surat, but the overthrow he received by one Ranmast Khan, who killed him 2,000 men and took 400 horse, which diverted him." But the rumour that reached Bombay evidently confounded the campaigns of Shivaji and his Peshwa together; and Surat wrote on 13 Dec., "The advice you (*i.e.*, Bombay) gave us of Shivaji and his Peshwa being routed by the king's army in two several encounters is here quite contrary reported." Sabh. 93, *J. S.*, and 91 *Q.B.* 88, all ascribe the victory over Shivaji to Ranmast Khan. No encounter took place between Dilir and the Marathas near Bijapur from Nov. 1679 to Shiva's death, as *B. S.* clearly shows.

Surat 108, Rajapur to Surat, 6 Dec. ; Vol. 4, Surat Consult. 8 Dec. 1679.]

§ 12. *Domestic troubles of Shivaji.*

Early in December, Shivaji was greatly relieved by the news that his rebel son Shambhuji had left the Mughals and come back to Panhālā (about 4th Dec.) Here Shivaji arrived at the end of the month, to meet the returned prodigal and try to reform him by persuasion.

The recent rebellion of Shambhuji had revealed the serious danger that threatened the newly founded Marātha kingdom. The character of his eldest son filled Shīvā with the gloomiest anticipations of the future. A profligate, capricious and cruel youth, devoid of every spark of honour, patriotism or religious fervour, could not be left sole master of Mahārāshtra. And yet, the only alternative to Shambhu was Rājārām, a boy of ten, whose accession would have meant a regency. But there was so much mutual jealousy and discord among the old ministers of the State, especially between Moro Trimbak, the premier, and Annāji Datto, the viceroy of the West, that a council of regency would have broken up in civil war and the ruin of the State as surely as the Punā council of ministers did a century later. A division of the kingdom between the two princes was proposed, Shambhuji taking Mahārāshtra and Rājārām the Karnāt country beyond the Tungabhadrā ; but the plan was not given effect to. (Sabh. 94, 103.)

Shivaji tried hard to conciliate and reason with Shambhu. He appealed to all the nobler instincts of the prince as well as to his self-interest, read him many a lecture, showed him his treasury, revenue returns, list of forts and muster-rolls of troops and horses, and urged him to be worthy of such a splendid heritage and to be true to all the high hopes which his own reign had raised in the Hindu world. But a born judge of character like Shivaji must have soon perceived that his sermons were falling on deaf

ears, and hence his last days were clouded by despair. (Sabh. 95, 103-104.)

After December, 1679, Shivaji's health apparently declined, and he seems to have had a premonition of the approach of death. (Sabh. 103.) This fact made the choice of an heir a live issue, and the plots and counter-plots in his harem and cabinet thickened in consequence.

§13. *Death of Shivaji.*

On 23rd March, 1680, the Rajah was seized with fever and blood dysentery. The illness continued for twelve days. Gradually all hope of recovery faded away, and then, after giving solemn charges and wise counsels to his nobles and officers, and consoling the weeping assemblage with assurances of the spirit's immortality in spite of the perishability of the body, the maker of the Marātha nation performed the last rites of his religion and fell into a trance, which imperceptibly passed into death. It was the noon of Sunday, 4th April, 1680, the full moon of the month of Chaitra.*

He had not yet completed the 53rd year of his age. The Muslim world ascribed his premature death to the curse of the saint Sayyid Jān Muhammad of Jālnā. In Mahārāshtra there were some whispers of his wife Soyrā Bāi, the mother of Rājārām, having administered poison to him to prevent his giving the throne to Shambhuji.

The old Marāthi *bakhar* written by Sabhāsād, is silent on the point, and with good reason. A servant of Rājārām, in a book written by order of that king and for his eyes, could not possibly have mentioned his mother's murder of her husband even if it had been true. Shambhuji a year

* Last illness and death of Shivaji: Sabh. 103-105; *F. R.* Surat, 108, Bombay to Surat, 28 April, 1680 (followed by me); *M. A.* 194; *Dil.* 165 (one sentence only); *K. K.* ii. 271 (one sentence); *Storia*, ii. 231. 91 *Q.B.* 89 and *Dig.* 462-467 are "loose, traditional works" and charge Soyrā Bai with murder. Orme's story (*Frag.* 89) has been rejected by me, (*Ind. Hist. Quarterly*, iv. 605). In 1680 the Chaitra full moon extended over both 3rd and 4th April (Sat. and Sunday). I follow Sabhāsād who gives Sunday, which agrees with the English *F. R.*

after his accession put Soyrā Bāī to death on the charge of her having poisoned her husband, but it was in all probability a false pretext for wreaking vengeance on his step-mother for her late attempt to crown her own son. Readers of Macaulay's account of the death of Charles II, will remember how at that very time in Europe hardly a sovereign died without the event being ascribed to poison.

It is true that throughout life Shivaji (like all other Eastern sovereigns) was on his guard against being poisoned. We find him, during the Karnātak expedition, repeatedly writing to the English to send him Maldivian cocoanuts, bezoar stone and other "good counter-poisons" (*i.e.*, anti-dotes), but it was a mere precaution.

APPENDIX

SHIVAJI'S WIVES AND CHILDREN.

Wives :—1. *Sai Bāī* (*neé Nimbālkār*),

died 5 Sept. 1659 [*Jedhē S.*]; mother of Shambhuji (born 14 May 1657.)

2. *Soyerā Bāī* (*neé Shirkē*),

put to death by Shambhuji in 1681; mother of Rajaram (born 24 Feb. 1670.)

3. *Putlā Bāī* (*neé Mōbitē*),

burnt herself with Shivaji's corpse, 1680.

4. *Sākwār Bāī* (*neé Gaikwād*),

married January 1656 [*Jedhē S.*]; remained a captive in the hands of the Mughals for many years after the fall of Raigarh in 1689.

5. *Kāshi Bāī* who died about 1st March 1674, [according to the letter of Narayan Shenvi from Raigarh, dated 4th April, and *Rājyāv Kalpataru*.]

The first four wives are mentioned by nearly all the sources. *Jedhē S.* records that (a) Jādav Rao's daughter and (b) Ingle's daughter were married on 8th April and 15th April 1657 respectively, without naming the bridegroom! *Sabhasad*, p. 71, says that Shivaji had seven wives. For other views, *Rajwadē Sankirna Lekh Sangraha*.

Children :—1. Shambhuji. 2. Rajaram. 3. Sakhu Bāī, mar. to Mahādji Nāyak Nimbālkār (son of Bajāji). 4. Ambikā Bāī, mar. to Harji Mahādik. 5. Rāj Kumārī Bāī, mar. to Ganoji Raj Shirkē.

CHAPTER XIV

1. First encounter with the English, 1660.
2. English factors of Rajapur prisoners.
3. Negotiations for Rajapur factory damages.
4. Mission of Lt. Ustick, 1672.
5. Embassy of T. Nicolls, 1673.
6. H. Oxinden's embassy, 1674.
7. English traders interview Shivaji, 1675.
8. History of Rajapur indemnity.
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SHIVAJI'S RELATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH AND THE PORTUGUESE

§1. *Shivaji's first encounter with the English, 1660.*

Early in January 1660, Shivaji's general Doroji seized the port of Rājapur, in pursuit of three junks of Afzal Khan in which Afzal's agent at Dābhol had fled there with his own and his master's property, on the capture of Dābhol port by the Marāthas. From this incident arose the first collision between the English and the Marāthas, but its real cause was not any hindrance offered by Shivaji to the legitimate trade of the East India Company or its servants. It was solely due to the greed and crooked dealings of Mr. Henry Revington, the Chief of the Company's Rājapur factory. An Indian broker employed by him had lent some money to Rustam-i-Zamān and taken a bill for it, falsely in the Company's name as creditor. When Rustam's governor of Rājapur was trying to run away from the invaders in one of the Dābhol junks, the broker influenced Mr. Revington to assist him in getting his money back. Mr. Revington sent an English ship, the *Diamond*, to stop the junk occupied by the governor and make him pay what he falsely represented as "monies due to the Company." A part of the amount was immediately paid in goods. But just then Shivaji's horsemen appeared on the bank to seize the junks of Afzal Khan and called upon the English to give up the

one in which the governor was. The English declined, and the governor gladly seized this device for escaping capture by the Marāthas and urged the English "to take possession of two of these junks and own them." Mr. Revington took one of the vessels over, renamed it the *Rajapur Merchant*, and placed it under an English captain.

In a parley with Doroji, the Marātha general, the English refused to give up the goods in the junk unless he gave them an order on the revenue of the town for the money claimed by them. The largest junk, which had not been taken over by the English, weighed anchor and fell down the creek to beyond the range of the Marātha guns, after firing on Shivā's men on both banks. At this disappointment, the Marāthas seized the English broker Bālji at Jaitāpur (at the mouth of the creek, 11 miles west Rājapur), on the ground that "the English would not take the junk for them, but let her go." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 85.)

Mr. Philip Gyffard was sent to the Marātha camp to demand the release of the broker, but they seized him too, and carried away the two prisoners to Khārépatan fort that night, threatening to detain them unless the English captured the junks for the Marāthas and delivered to them the goods they had taken on the governor's junk (18th January 1660.)

On 13th February, Revington wrote a letter to Shivaji promising him the friendly help of the English in an attack on Dandā-Rājpuri, and soliciting an order for the release of the two captives as they had been seized only because the English "would not take the junks lying in Rājapur river and be enemies to those who are our friends." But before this the broker had already appealed to Shivaji and Rustam-i-Zamān, and orders had come from them for the release of the two captives. Bālji was immediately set free, "but Mr. Gyffard was kept by a rogue Brāhman in Khārépatan castle, out of the lucre and expectation of a bribe." Mr. Revington protested against it to Shivā and Rustam. (Rajapur to Surat, 15 February 1660.)

Before any reply could come from Shivaji, Mr. Revington, learning that the Marātha governor of Khārépatan was sending Mr. Gyffard away to Sātavli (9 miles north-west of Rājapur) or to Khelnā fort, despatched a party of 50 soldiers, who waylaid the Marātha escort in a town 10 miles from Rājapur and rescued Mr. Gyffard by force. (*Ibid*, 23 February, 1660.)

§ 2. *English factors of Rājapur prisoners of Shivaji, 1661-1663.*

The second Marātha attack on the English took place at the beginning of March next year, and here again the Englishmen were clearly in the wrong, though the Company's official attitude was correct and neutral.

In 1660, while Siddi Jauhar, acting on behalf of the Bijapur Government, was investing Shivaji in Panhālā fort, the English factors of Rājapur supplied him with some grenades "which (the vendors promised) undoubtedly will be the chiefest disturbers of the besieged." Some Englishmen of Rājapur were also bribed to go to the Bijapuri camp outside Panhālā and help in the bombardment of the fort, by "tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's." (Ch. 4 §2.)

Shivaji punished this act of hostility about 3rd March 1661, when he surprised Rājapur, plundered the English factory, and carried off four of the factors,—Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor, and Philip Gyffard,—as prisoners.

A graphic account of this second sack of Rājapur is given by the Dutch Chief at Viingurlā: "Shivaji sent 1,000 horse and about 3,000 foot soldiers to take possession of Rājapur. This force, on reaching the town, invited the principal inhabitants to come out and escort it in, according to custom, promising to do no harm. These simple men, suspecting no evil, went to the place of meeting, accompanied by the English President Revington, with two or

three other Englishmen, who thought it well to pay this mark of respect. They were all immediately seized and their property confiscated, after tortures had been inflicted. Revington and those who accompanied him were placed in one of Shivaji's fortresses. . . . The factory was entirely stripped, even the floor being dug up in search of hidden treasure. The robbers also plundered many foreign merchants, who yearly bring goods to Rājapur from Persia and Musqat."*

While the English prisoners were still at Rājapur, the Brāhman agent of Shivaji told them that his master would give them a fine salt port (*mit bandar*) on the coast, if they helped him in taking Dandā-Rājpuri; but they declined to "discourse about it" unless he set them free. Then Shivaji laid a ransom on the captives, and sent them to Waisati fort. Many other persons—Hindu merchants (*banians*), Indian Muslims, Persians and Arabs—were kept there in his prison in a miserable plight and beaten to extort ransom.

The Englishmen steadily refused to pay any ransom and tried to secure their liberty by feigned negotiations for helping the Marāthas with English ships in capturing Dandā-Rājpuri, but taking care to impose such terms as always left the English "a hole to creep out of their obligation" after recovering liberty. Then they tried the effect of threat by saying that if they were not released their countrymen at Surat would grant Aurangzib's desire by transporting a Mughal army into the Deccan [*i.e.*, the Konkan district] by sea. (*Orme MSS.*, Vol. 155, pp. 1-21.)

* *Batavia Dagh-Register*, 1661, p. 215, quoted in Foster, xi. 4-5. The date given is "about the middle of March" [New style], which was equivalent to "about the 5th of March" in the Old style followed in this book. The English report has been lost.

The Dutch statement, that "the Englishmen who had remained behind in Rajapur were likewise imprisoned and one died under torture," was based on false rumour, as only three factors besides Revington were carried off into captivity, and the factor who died at Rajapur, evidently Richard Napier, had been reported on the 16th February before as "dangerously ill and not expected to live" (*F. R.*, Rajapur to Company).

Rāoji Pandit had been sent by Shivaji to take charge of all the prisoners in Songarh and "do with them as he thought fit." The four Englishmen were well-treated. But their captivity was prolonged past endurance. To the demand for ransom they replied that they could pay nothing, having lost their all in the sack of Rājapur. Shivaji's absence on a projected expedition for recovering Kaliān (June, 1661) also delayed the progress of the negotiations about an alliance with the English against the Siddis. The "disconsolate prisoners in Rāigarh," after a year's confinement, lost their temper and wrote in disrespectful and abusive terms to the President and Council at Surat, charging the latter with making no exertion for their release. The reply of the Surat Council written on 10th March 1662, was a stern but well-merited rebuke: "How you came in prison you know very well. 'Twas not for defending the Company's goods, 'twas for going to the siege of Panhālā and tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's. None but what [is] rehearsed is the cause of your imprisonment".*

It seems that the four Englishmen made an attempt to escape from Songarh, but were caught and sent off to Rāigarh to be kept in "closer confinement." Towards the middle of 1662, when their captivity had lasted a year and a half, the Council at Surat, finding all appeals to Shivaji and his suzerain fruitless, commissioned some of the English ships to make reprisals by capturing on the high seas Deccani vessels, whether belonging to the king of Bijapur or Shivaji or any merchants of the country, especially the one bringing the Dowager Queen Bari Sāhibā back from Mecca. They hoped that such a success would compel the Bijapur Government to put pressure on Shivaji to release the Englishmen. But no good prize offered itself to the English privateers. The Surat Council also influenced the Mughal governor of Surat to write to Shāista Khan, who was

* *Ibid*, also Surat to the Prisoners in Rairi castle, 10 March, 1662, *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 85.

then reported to be pressing Shivaji hard (about November 1662), to importune him to move for their release.*

On 3rd February, 1663, the Council commissioned the captain of H. M. S. *Convertite* to capture two vessels of considerable burden which Shivaji was fitting out at Jaitapur for Mochā and loading with "such goods as were driven by storms upon his coast, which was of considerable value." But such a step became unnecessary, as Rāoji Pandit, the Marātha governor of Rājapur, sent for the four captives from Rāigarh and set them free (about 5th February) with a solemn assurance from Shivaji that the English would enjoy his protection in future. The Council at Surat say that they "had desisted from calling that perfidious rebel Shivaji to an account, because they had not either conveniency of force or time." They were still resolved to avenge the wrong done to their masters' property and the sufferings of their "loving brethren," but sadly realized that "as yet we are altogether uncapable for want of shipping and men necessary for such an enterprise, wherefore patience."†

Therefore, instead of resorting to force, they began negotiations with Shivaji for compensation for the loss done to their factory at Rājapur. These were protracted for many years till the hearts of the Englishmen grew sick. Even when Shivaji agreed as to the amount of the damages and admitted his liability for it, the actual payment was repeatedly put off and never fully carried out. With the help of the Factory records preserved in the India Office, London, we can clearly trace the history of these negotiations through their successive stages,—the alternate hopes and disappointments of the English, their diverse tactics, their series of embassies, and their final conviction, at the close of Shivaji's life, that

* Surat to R. Taylor, 17 May, 1662, *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 85; Surat Consult., 12 July, *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 2; also under 21st July, 19th August and 14th November in Vol. 85.

† *F. R. Surat*, Vol. 103, Rajapur to Surat, 6 Feb.; Vol. 2, Surat to R. Taylor, 9 Oct., 1663.

they would get nothing at all from him. The records of this long-drawn diplomatic intercourse afford striking examples of the perseverance and patience of the English traders, though one is apt to smile when he reads how they held diametrically opposite views of Shivaji's character and feelings at different stages of the negotiations, as they hoped for or despaired of a settlement of their claims. Our psychology is naturally coloured by our emotions.

Shivaji's encounter with the English during his two raids on Surat (in 1664 and 1670) and the dispute between them in connection with his fortification of the Khanderi island have been dealt with in earlier chapters.

§3. *Negotiations for Rājapur factory damages.*

The policy of the English traders is thus clearly set forth in a letter from the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the President and Council of Surat, dated 25th November, 1668:

"According to your commands, we shall at convenient time enorder such as we employ to treat Shivaji's servants civilly wherever they meet them, but not to enter into any contract with them, letting them know the great damage the Hon'ble Company hath suffered and the abuses offered to our people on several occasions, for which we expect satisfaction and reparation before we enter into any league with their master,—all of which, we suppose, will come to his ears by one or more of his servants, though we are not of opinion that ever he will be brought to a peaceable treaty till he be forced to it." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.)

In another letter, dated 17th March, 1669, the Bombay Council write, "Shivaji Rajah having by his servants requested a favour of no great import, not exceeding Rs. 300 . . . we . . . having much occasion for a good correspondence with his people on the main [-land] from whence most of provisions come hither, and wood [*i.e.*, fuel] in special,

(which is not to be had otherwhere), we were the more ready to gratify Shivaji Rajah." (*Ibid.*)

On 5th March, 1670, the Surat Council instruct Bombay thus: "The war broke out between Shivaji and the Mughal hath put a check to some overtures which were made to the President of an accommodation with Shivaji touching the Company's demands on him ; but we hope they will yet go forward, . . . but we would not have you appear too forward lest you undervalue our pretence [=lawful claim] and make him cool." (*F. R. Surat*, Vol. 3.)

In October, Shivaji tried to put the English of Bombay in distress, evidently because they refused to sell him war-material (esp. lead) for his contest with the Siddi of Dandā-Rājpuri. Bombay writes to Surat on 14th October, 1670: "A few days since we, as usually, sent our boats to the main [-land] for wood to burn our *chunam* with ; but . . . our boats returned empty, being forbid by Shivaji's people to cut any more wood in those parts." On 12th August 1671 Bombay writes to Surat, "The Deputy Governor [of Bombay] received an answer from Shivaji, . . . by which your Honour, etc., will see how he slighted our friendship." (*F. R. Surat*, 105.)

But in September 1671 Shivaji sent an ambassador to Bombay to treat with the English. His chief motive was to secure English aid against Dandā-Rājpuri, especially a supply of "grenadoes, mortar-pieces and ammunition." The Bombay Council immediately realized that unless he obtained these war-materials he "would not pay a penny" of compensation for the loot of their factory at Rājapur. The President of Surat sent the following instructions to the factors at Bombay: "Let him know that if he gives us such encouragement that we settle in his port, he may obtain from us those advantages that other nations do in whose ports we trade. But we would not positively have them [the English representatives in these negotiations] promise him those grenadoes, mortar-pieces and ammunition he desires, nor absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it con-

venient to help him against Dandā-Rājpuri, which place, if it were in his possession, would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay ; and on the other side, our denial is not consistent at present with our interest, in respect we believe the keeping in suspense will bring him to a speedier conclusion of the treaty, hoping thereby to be furnished with those things he desires." (F. R. Surat, 87.)

The negotiations, as might have been expected from the diverse aims of the two parties, could not possibly end in an agreement. They were protracted till December, when Shivaji was out on his forays and "now not easily to be found or treated with." The English proposed to send Lieut. Stephen Ustick to treat directly with him. This envoy was directed to "set out in a handsome equipage befitting the Company's honour," with Rām Shenvi, the Company's interpreter. (F. R. Surat, 106 and 87.)

As early as the end of November, the Council of Surat gave up all hope of a settlement. They wrote to Bombay (30th November, 1671), "Rām Shenvi hath private [ly] discoursed with us [as to] what Shivaji proposes to us by way of accommodation and what he demands from us in order to the supply of his wars against Dandā-Rājpuri, in both which we find so much subtility, self-policy and unsecure inconstancy on his part, and so great difficulties and apparent hazard on the Company's to deal with him on these terms, that we begin to despair of bringing the business to any issue in the way it is now carried. . . . We do confirm our former resolution that till the matter of satisfaction for the Company's and nation's former losses be first determined, we cannot with honour or safety concede to any thing which he proposeth."

The instructions to Lieut. Ustick were "that he endeavour to end the dispute touching satisfaction of past damages . . . , as also to procure his [i.e., Shivaji's] general *qaul* or *farman* for us to trade with freedom and security in all the ports of his country and inland cities whatsoever, paying 2 per cent. custom." (F. R. Surat, 87.)

The Marātha envoy had brought with himself to Bombay Rs. 6,000 worth of the cloth looted at Surat in October 1670, consisting of *kātanis*, *rumāls*, etc., and asked the English to buy them ; but "they being not commodities proper for the Hon'ble Company to deal in" the factors refused to buy them. But as Shivaji had presumably no ready money to spare, the English were prepared to accept these goods in part payment of "what shall be agreed on to be due for satisfaction of our former losses, provided that the commodities were not over-rated, but cheap and good in their kind." A compromise was, however, made with the Marātha ambassador ; the English lent him Rs. 1,500 upon his goods payable at two months' time. Lieut. Ustick was to have set out on his embassy on 15th January, 1672, but was detained at Bombay by a message from Shivaji saying that he was then too busy opposing the Mughal generals in Punā and Baglānā to receive the envoy. (F. R. Surat, 87 and 106.)

§4. *Mission of Lt. Ustick to Shivā fails, 1672.*

At last Lieut. Ustick was sent on his mission on 10th March, 1672, and came back on 13th May, with failure. "He, after a long and tedious attendance, had half an hour's discourse with him (Shivaji) and his Brahmans to little effect, but at last [Shivaji] proffered 5,000 pagodas towards our losses, and promiseth, if your Honour will please to settle a factory at Rājapur, to show all kindness and civility imaginable to the said factory." (F. R. Surat, 106, 13 March and 14 May, 1672.)

The negotiations broke down on the question of the amount of the indemnity. A Bombay letter to the Company, dated 21st December, 1672, states, "We demanded one hundred thousand Rupees, they offered 20,000, declaring that Shivaji never made more advantage by what was robbed of the English ; that what was taken in the chests, trunks and warehouses of particular men (*i.e.*, European

private traders), it may be was plundered by his soldiers, but he never had anything thereof, and therefore would not satisfy for it ; but what (booty) was received and entered into his books he was willing to restore and make satisfaction for. While these things were transacting, Shivaji was engaged in a great design against the Koli country, whereupon the (Brāhman) minister appointed to treat (with Mr. Ustick) being called away, Mr. Ustick also returned to Bombay." But the English factors deliberately held back from pressing the negotiations to a close. As they write, "We have a hard and ticklish game to play, for the King (Aurangzib) being highly enraged against Shivaji, should he understand that we . . . hold any correspondence with him, it might probably cause him to order some disturbance to be given to your general affairs, not only in these parts but in Bengal also. On the other hand, we are forced to keep fair with Shivaji also, because from his countries we are supplied with provisions, timber and firewood, and likewise your inhabitants of Bombay drive a good trade into the main [-land], which would be a great prejudice to your island if it were obstructed. On these considerations we judge it your interest to suspend the treaty at present. . . . We shall have great difficulty to recover anything for those gentlemen (*i.e.*, private traders) who suffered particularly in that loss at Rājāpur, for Shivaji . . . by the merchants of Rājāpur hath understood what did belong to the Company and what to particular men ; the latter he disowns totally. . . . Had it not been for our standing on some satisfaction for them, we had ended the dispute before now." (O. C. 3722.)

§5. *Embassy of Thomas Nicolls, 1673.*

Between May and December 1672 two envoys were sent by Shivaji to the English factors at Bombay. In February 1673, a third envoy, Pilaji, came from Shivaji, but was dismissed without effecting anything. In May the Bombay

Council resolved "to send Mr. Thomas Nicolls with a Banian broker to make a final demand of the damage done us at Rājāpur, and now lately by his forces in Hubli."*

On 19th May, Nicolls left Bombay with 37 persons in all for Rairi castle, which he was permitted to ascend on the 23rd. He interviewed Shambhuji on the 24th as Shivaji was absent on a pilgrimage. On 2nd June Shivaji returned to the castle, and next day Nicolls was received in audience. The Rajah took the English envoy by the hand and showed him where he should sit, which was on the left hand near one of his side-pillows, and then asked him his business. But in spite of the kindness of his manners, Shivaji did nothing to settle the dispute and on the 6th dismissed Nicolls, saying, "He would send on an answer to the President by one of his own people named Bhimāji Pandit, a day or two after me." So Nicolls returned to Bombay (17th June) without achieving anything. (Nicolls' diary in *O. C.* 3787.)

Soon afterwards Bhimāji arrived at Bombay (21st) and after some discussions left with Nārāyan Shenvi (the interpreter of the English) to represent matters to his master. Late in September the two returned to Bombay with the following letter:—

From Shivaji Rajah to the Hon'ble Gerald Aungier, Governor of Bombay: "I received your Honour's letter by Bhimāji Pandit and Nārāyan Shenvi, who manifested the good correspondence that your Honour doth use with me; likewise they treated with me about the business of Rājāpur which I have answered and do send them again to treat with your Honour, my desire being only to keep the same correspondence which your Honour doth with me. I shall not say more but desire you that there may be no difference in our friendship, for I am very well acquainted of your Honour's prudence. I sent your Honour a present, which I desire you to accept of." (*O.C.* 3952.)

* The latter amounted to 7,894 pagodas, or £3,500. (*F. R. Surat.* Vol. 3 Surat Consult., 24 May, 1673.)

A Committee of the Bombay Council was appointed to meet on 1st October and receive Shivaji's objections to the Company's demands. On 3rd October the Marātha envoy offered 7,000 pagodas, which was refused. Later he increased it to 10,025 pagodas, to be allowed in custom duties, etc. (*O. C. 3758 ; F. R. Surat*, Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 29 September, 1673.)

The Surat Council agreed with Bombay "to accept so small a sum as eight to ten thousand pagodas, which is not the quarter part the damage the nation sustained in Rājāpur ;" of this amount 8,000 pagodas were to be paid in money or goods, and the balance in the form of exemption from all custom duties at the port of Rājāpur for five or at least three years. (*F. R. Surat*, Vol. 3, letter 10 July, 1673.)

The repeated evasions of Shivaji at last thoroughly disgusted the English merchants. As the Surat Council records (19 July, 1673), "Seeing there is no probability of security from such a heathen, who, while we are in treaty with him for satisfaction for our losses at Rājāpur, gives orders for the robbing our factory at Hubli, we can think of no better way to recover the Hon'ble Company and nation's right than by taking what vessels belong to his ports." A little earlier, on 24th May, they had concluded, "It is absolutely necessary to break with him, but not at this time when we have war with the Dutch." But by 1st October an amicable settlement was in sight, "Shivaji holds a fair understanding with us and we with him, the old difference of Rājāpur being in a manner concluded upon honourable terms, to our advantage and reputation." The hopes of the English ran high ; on 23rd October Bombay wrote to Surat, "We are near a conclusion with our neighbour Shivaji for the old wrongs of Rājāpur. . . . The new controversy touching Hubli we have reserved for another time, . . . so that if Shivaji attempts Surat you may be somewhat the safer, though we advise you not to trust him, yet we daresay if he hath a kindness for any nation it is for the English, and we

believe he will not disturb any house where the English flag is."

But the treaty, though fully agreed on between Shivaji's envoy and the English in the third week of October, was not signed and confirmed by Shivaji himself for more than two months afterwards, as he was absent on a long campaign (O. C. 3779, 3870 and 3910.)

§6. *Embassy of Henry Oxinden, 1674.*

The English, therefore, decided to send a formal embassy to Shivaji to conclude the business, especially as his grand coronation was to take place in June 1674. Mr. Henry Oxinden was chosen for the mission, and Nārāyan Shenvi was sent to Rāigarh (arriving there on 24th March), "to prepare business against Mr. Henry Oxinden's arrival to him." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3, Surat Consult., 16 April, 1674.)

The story of Oxinden's mission to Shivaji, from 13th May to 16th June, is graphically told at great length in his *Letters and Memorial or Narrative* which also give valuable details about Shivaji's coronation, the course of the negotiations, and the final agreement.

Shivaji held out for some time on the question of restoring to their owners the ships of the English or of the inhabitants of Bombay wrecked on his coast, but on 11th June, Nirāji Pandit (a minister of Shivaji whom the English had engaged to act as their intermediary with his master) sent word to Oxinden that "the Rajah had granted all our demands and articles, except our money passing current in his country." On the 12th all the ministers (*ashta pradhān*) signed the treaty, which was formally delivered to Oxinden at Nirāji Pandit's house. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.)

In November Shivaji's request to buy 50 great ordnance from 40 to 60 cwt. weight and 2 great brass guns, was politely declined by the English as "so public an action as that must needs provoke this king," Aurangzib. (Surat to Bombay, 13 November 1674.)

§7. *English traders of Rājāpur interview Shivaji, 1675.*

In the terms of the above agreement, the English factory at Rājāpur was re-opened in 1675, with some difficulty, as the following letter from the Rājāpur factors to Surat, dated 6th February 1675, shows:—

"It was thought fit to send the broker with the President's letter to Annāji Pandit and the Subahdār, giving them notice of our arrival. Mr. Ward being earnest for our old house, Annāji told him that he should not have it, and that he did not care whether we stayed here or no ; if we did not, his master would save 1,000 pagodas by it ; and further will have it [that] the house was allowed for in that sum granted us by his master towards satisfaction for our losses. He is not only one of Shivaji's great favourites but Governor-in-Chief of all Konkan, so that we cannot settle on any place but it is under his jurisdiction." (F. R. Surat, 88.)

In March next the factors of Rājāpur had an audience with Shivaji of which a detailed and very interesting report has been preserved.

"The Rajah came on the 22nd [March] about midday, accompanied with abundance of horse and foot and about 150 *palankins*. So soon as we heard of his near approach, we went out of our tent and very near met him. He ordered his *palankin* to stand still, called us very near him, seemed very glad to see us and much pleased [that] we came to meet him, and said the sun being hot he would not keep us now, but in the evening he would send for us.

"[23rd March?] The Rajah came. He stopped his *palankin* and called us to him. When we were pretty near him we made a stop, but he beckoned with his hand till I was up close with him. He diverted himself a little by taking in his hand the locks of my periwig and asked us several questions ; at length asked us how we liked Rājāpur and said he was informed we were not well pleased there, but bid us not be in the least dissatisfied for what [had]

passed. He would order things for the future to our full satisfaction, and that we might be sure that . . . no reasonable request we should make to him would he deny us. . . .

"The next morning [25th March] we were sent for again in the Rajah's name. We were admitted into his presence. I was placed so near him on his right hand that I could touch him. With him we continued about two hours, which was most part spent in answering many of his questions. At length we presented him our paper of desires [previously "translated into the country language"], which after had been read to him with a little pause, seriously looking on us, [he] said that it was all granted us. He would give us a *farmān* for all." But the siege of Phondā, which Shivaji began immediately afterwards, delayed the granting of such a *farmān*. (F. R. Surat, 88. Rajapur letter of 20 Apr. 1675.)

§8. *History of the Rājāpur indemnity.*

In September 1675 Mr. Samuel Austen went to Rāigarh on an embassy from Bombay to demand satisfaction for the damage done to the Company's factory at Dharangāon in Khāndesh. This Shivaji refused to pay, saying that the factory was looted by "vagabonds and scouts without order or the knowledge of his general." He, however, "after a strict debate" gave his *qaul* (assurance of safety) to all the English factories "to prevent like injuries." (O. C. 4106.)

But the Rājāpur damages long continued unpaid. On 19th July 1676 Surat wrote to Bombay suggesting that a "discreet and sober" Englishman with Giridhārdās should be sent to dun the Rajah for the money, as Nārāyan Shenvi was dilatory.

On 11th October news was received from Nārāyan Shenvi at the Marātha Court, that Shivaji was willing to satisfy his debt to the Company in "*vairats* or *batty*," and the Council agreed to accept them if no better terms could be secured. Six days later the Surat Council in disgust

ordered the Rājapur factory to be withdrawn, since, "so long as that pirate and universal robber [Shivaji] lives, that hath no regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be no security in any trade in his country." This was only a threat to Shivaji's ministers, and the factory was dissolved only at the end of 1682.

Early in 1677 the patience of the English seemed to have been exhausted. Surat wrote to Bombay on 26th January 1677, "If Shivaji still continues to baffle you, we desire you to seize and make prize of some of his vessels belonging to Dābhol, Chaul or Kaliān or any other of his ports, letting the men have their liberty and taking care that none of the goods be embezzled or made away, for this will be the only way to make him rightly understand himself." The threat, however, was not carried out. The people of Bombay were entirely dependent on Shivaji's territory on the mainland for their fuel, timber, fresh provisions, and cattle, and he could also have effectually stopped the passage of their export merchandise across the Konkan and Kanārā coast-strip, the whole of which was now in his hands. He, on his part, depended on Bombay for salt and European manufactures.*

In January 1678, as we learn from a Surat letter, "for Shivaji's former debt, they [i.e., the Rājapur factors] are forced to take betel-nuts as Shivaji's ministers will rate it at." But even thus the indemnity was not paid. The Surat Council, in April, May and July, express their indignation at the deceitful fair promises of Shivaji's ministers and that Rajah's evasion of the demands made upon him, and decide to withdraw the factories at Kārwār, Hubli and Rājapur, if matters did not improve. On 18th March 1680 Bombay writes to Surat, "We are very glad the management of the business with Shivaji is to your liking. He hath confirmed all. . . . A hundred *khandi* of betel-nut is sent us on account of our demand for satisfaction of the two vessels lost." On

* F. R. Surat 89. At the marriage of Rajaram (15 March, 1680), he ordered 2,000 wax-candles from Bombay. (Peshwās' Daftar.)

the 4th April following, the Rajah died. (*F. R. Surat*, 89 and 108.)

Shivaji never paid the promised indemnity in full as long as he lived, and the Rājāpur factory was closed in Shambhuji's reign, in December 1682 or January 1683. (*F. R. Surat*, 91.)

In 1684, after Richard Keigwin, the usurping Governor of Bombay, had made a treaty with Shambhuji, the latter wrote to his subahdar of Rājāpur: "Captain Henry Gary and Thomas Wilkins, ambassadors, and Ram Shenvi, interpreter, on behalf of the English, came to me earnestly desiring peace with me, intimating that my father Shivaji Rajah did contract to pay them 10,000 pagodas Padshahi on account of goods taken from them, of which account 3,367 being paid, there remains 6,633, requesting me to pay the same. . . . I have promised them to satisfy what remains unpaid of the said 10,000 pagodas." (To be paid in kind by rebuilding the English factory-house at Rājāpur, and in cocoanuts, betel-nuts, &c., by degrees.) (*F. R. Surat*, 109.)

§9. *Shivaji and the Portuguese.*

Portuguese India touched only a fringe of Shivaji's activities and did not influence his policy or history to any appreciable extent. The inadequacy of the small population of Portugal for maintaining a colonial empire, the suppression of the national energy during the sixty years of Spanish domination (1580—1640), the ruinous naval war with Holland (1650—1663), and the rapid moral decline of their settlers in Asia,—all made the Portuguese in India in Shivaji's time a decadent Power, anxious only to hold their own, and timidly averting an armed encounter with every other State by employing friendly appeal, patient endurance and diplomatic evasion. Their territory of Goa was then much smaller than now, as it did not include Phondā, Bicholim, Pernem or Sānquelim. But their Konkan possessions, called the Province of the North, practically

stretched from Chaul to Daman along the coast and for a short distance inland. Out of these, Bombay island was given up to the English in 1662. Immediately east of these lay the dominions of the Mughal and Adil Shah, and the conquest of them by Shivaji made the Marātha power impinge upon the Portuguese territory on the coast. But though there were occasional plunderings and skirmishes between the two, these never led to a regular war, before Shambhuji's time.

The conflict between Shivaji and the Portuguese arose out of four things, namely,—

(a) The Portuguese claim to dominate the Indian seas and insistence that all Asiatic vessels plying there should take passports from them for a fee. But though they helped the Siddi of Janjirā in his earlier wars with Shivaji, they had no naval war with the Marātha king himself.

(b) The *desāis* of the south Ratnagiri district on being dispossessed by Shivaji, took refuge in Goa and made it a base of their operations against him, thus violating the neutrality of Portuguese territory.

(c) The interruption of trade from the upland parts to Goa (especially in rice, livestock, &c.) by Shivaji's officers.

(d) Shivaji's claim to *chauth* from the Daman villages which had once been subject to the Koli Rajahs.

But the Portuguese viceroys very wisely avoided war with him and remained strictly neutral during his wars with the Mughals and Bijāpur, though solicited by both sides to help them.

When, in 1659, Shivaji's first few vessels, built at Bhiwandi, Kaliān and Pen, began to ply the sea, the Portuguese viceroy ordered his deputy at Bassein to hinder their voyage. But with the growth of Shivaji's power, the Government of Goa found it politic to assume a more friendly attitude towards him. At the end of June 1659, Shivaji wrote to the Viceroy of Goa that owing to differences and disputes between himself and the Siddi of Danda and the other Abyssinians of that port, he had sent a detachment of horse

and foot against the Siddi, and he requested the Portuguese captains of Chaul and Bassein to help his forces with provisions and stop the supply of food stuff to the Abyssinians, as a mark of friendship with him. On this, the Viceroy in Council resolved to write to these captains that they should not *openly* give any help or show any favour to the Abyssinians of Danda, but *secretly* do what was possible with every precaution so that others might not know of it in any way whatever and report it to Shivaji!

Lakham Sāvant and other *desāis* of the country immediately north of Goa, had opposed Shivaji's advance at the end of 1664, but they had been signally defeated, deprived of their lands and forced to flee to the Portuguese district of Bārdes, from which they fitted out expeditions for recovering their former possessions. (Ch. 10, §4.) The viceroy's repeated warnings to them to maintain peace had no effect, and at last on 19th November 1667, N. S., Shivaji's forces made a dash into Bārdes in order to punish these *desāis*. For three days they sacked various villages and carried off a large number (1600) of Portuguese subjects and cattle.* Three Padrés and some Indian Christians were beheaded by them, evidently in retaliation for the abduction and conversion of Shivaji's subjects, especially Brahmans. The viceroy complained to Shivaji against this act of war while he was maintaining amity. He sent (24th Nov. N. S.) Rāmoji Shenvi Kothāri as his envoy to the Marātha king, who replied in friendly terms. Next, Shivaji's agent Sakho Pant came to Goa and a treaty of peace was arranged, (signed by the viceroy on 5th December and sealed by Shivaji on the 11th.) Father Gonsalo Martins,

* A report written by the Franciscan monks in Goa in 1722 states, "In the year 1667, a petty prince named Shivaji of the Hindu race, entered Bardes (territory) with a large army, for (our) having harboured at the village of Kolwāl in Bardes, one of his (revolted) desais named Keshav Naik. They proceeded to search for the said desai at Kolwāl and on the way put to the sword a large number of Christians whom they encountered on the way. to avenge on the Portuguese the shelter given to that desai." [Da Silva Rego, *Documentacao*, vol. 5.]

S.J., was sent by the viceroy to Shivaji's Court to get the treaty ratified and take delivery of the released captives. It was promised in this treaty that the trade between Portuguese India and Shivaji's territory above the Ghāts would no longer be obstructed by his officers. (*Pissurlencar, Antigualhas*, I. 1. 120—131. *Agentes da Diplomacia*.)

But the desāis continued to violate the neutrality of Goa by sallying out to attack Shivaji's men, and the viceroy had to expel them from the Portuguese dominions at the beginning of June 1668.

The treaty of amity and peace with Shivaji was renewed on 10th Feb. 1670, each side agreeing to a restitution of the shipping of the other side detained by it during their recent quarrel. In addition,

(a) the viceroy removed a constant source of friction by extending to Shivaji's ships equality of treatment with Mughal vessels in the matter of granting Portuguese passes on the payment of the customary fee. The small Marātha coastal traders (especially provision-boats) were not required to take out passes.

(b) The viceroy, who had helped the Siddi during Shivaji's grand attack on Janjirā in 1669, now offered as a mutual friend to mediate between these two Powers and compose their quarrel. Shivaji's envoy Vittal Pandit had come to Goa to try to win Portuguese support for his master's war.

(c) Shivaji repeated his promise to forbid his officers to harass or overtax the trade between Goa and the country above the Ghāts.

(d) Shivaji agreed not to build any fort or stone-house at any place in his dominions on the Portuguese frontier unless a river separated the two States.

The Rajahs of Rāmnagar (of the predatory Koli tribe) had been accustomed from early times to levy an annual blackmail from the Daman district in their neighbourhood. This money was popularly called *chauth* or one-fourth of the revenue, but in practice the proportion varied from

10 to 25 p. c. in the different villages, and the Rajah was known as the *Chauthiā Rajah* (*Storia do Mogor*, ii. 132.) Shivaji after his annexation of Rāmnagar (1676) demanded this payment from the Portuguese as his lawful right in succession to the Koli Rajah. The viceroy of Goa delayed giving a direct answer as long as possible, by every diplomatic device, such as calling for reports from his local officers, examining the old revenue accounts, settling the details about particular villages, &c., while at the same time he professed unbroken friendship with Shivaji and eagerness to give him every satisfaction. The negotiations were thus spun out for over two years. Shivaji's envoy Pitāmbar Shenvi, who had reached Goa in December 1677 on this mission, died next August, and was succeeded by his grandson Jivāji and later by Ganesh Sethi. At last Shivaji's patience was worn out and he threatened war, but his premature death gave the Portuguese a short respite.*

We may here add, that it is the considered opinion of Chevalier Pissurlencar that there was no forcible conversion of Hindus to Christianity in Goa territory in Shivaji's time. The Portuguese persecutions of the Hindus (mostly in the 16th century) are described in Da Cunha's *Bassein* and Goez. Hindu temples and Muslim mosques were demolished for building churches. But there was no forced conversion of pagans; in famine years the Catholic Fathers used to buy Hindu children from their guardians and make them converts. Particularly Hindu and Muslim orphans were considered as wards of the State, fed and brought up as Christians. When Shivaji demanded the restoration to his hands of any Hindu (particularly Brahman) boy convert,

* I pass over the abortive negotiations of the Portuguese with the Mughals and with Shivaji from which nothing of consequence resulted. The details are given in P. S. Pissurlencar's careful and fully documented works, *Portugueses e Maratas*, i. *Shivaji*, also *Antigualhas*, I. i. 116-131; 62-71 (*Chauthiā*), and A. B. de Braganca Pereira in *O Oriente Português*, Nos. 24 et 25 (1939), on which I have based this section. Several treaties and letters are given in Biker, iv. Also, Pissurlencar, *Agentes da Diplomacia* (esp. full notes.)

at the prayer of the boy's former guardian, the Portuguese governor declined on the ground that it was against the rules of his State to deliver any Christian to a pagan authority for the purpose of being made a pagan again. This was the real cause of the friction. [Bomb. Gaz., XIV, Thana, 32, 349; I. ii. 59.] A Portuguese book, the *Vergel de Plantas* written before 1680, states that "In 1667 there were counted in Bardes, by the favour of the viceroy, the Conde de S. Vicente, 46,450 Christians converted by the [Franciscan] Padres of the Province of St. Thomé, and 7,000 Hindus, out of whom 4,000 have been baptised; as for the remaining 3,000 they are labouring with great zeal for their conversion with likely hope of success." [Pissurlencar.]. The words "favour of the viceroy" do not mean force but only the prohibition of the sale of Hindus as slaves to other than the Christian Fathers, who converted them.

CHAPTER XV

GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

1. Extent of kingdom and dependencies.
2. Revenue and hoarded treasure.
3. Strength of army.
4. Council of eight ministers.
5. Army organisation.
6. Revenue system and administration.
7. Religious policy.
8. Effect of Shivaji's reign.

§1. *Extent of his kingdom and dependencies.*

At the time of Shivaji's death his kingdom included all the country (except the Portuguese possessions) stretching from Rāmnagar (modern Dharampur State in the Surat Agency) in the north, to Kārwār or the Gangāvati river in the Bombay district of Kanārā, in the south. The eastern boundary embraced Baglānā in the north, then ran southwards along an irregular shifting line through the middle of the Nāsik and Punā districts, and encircled the whole of the Satārā and much of the Kolhāpur districts. This tract formed what the Marāthi documents describe as his *swarāj* or 'own kingdom' and the Persian accounts as his 'old dominions' (*mulk-i-qadim*.) Here his ownership was recognized as legally established and beyond question. A recent but permanent acquisition was the Western Karnātāk or the Kanārese-speaking country extending from Belgāum to the bank of the Tungabhadrā opposite the Bellāry district of the Madras Presidency.

This was the consolidated portion of his kingdom, and it formed three provinces, each under a viceroy. The northern division, including the *Dāng* and Baglānā, the Koli country south of Surat, Konkan north of Bombay, and the Deccan plateau or *Desh* southwards to Punā, was governed by Moro Trimbak Pinglē. The southern division,

which was made up of Konkan south of Bombay, Sāvantvādi and the North Kanārā coast,—formed the viceroyalty of Annāji Datto. The south-eastern division, ruled by Dattāji Pant, covered the Satārā and Kolhāpur districts of Desh and the Karnātak districts of Belgāum and Dhārwar to Kopal west of the Tungabhadrā. (Sabh. 77; Parasnīs MS.; a Persian MS. roll of V. K. Rājwadé; English summary by Māwjee, in *J. Bo. Br. R. A. S.*)

Shivaji's latest annexation was the country extending from the Tungabhadrā opposite Kopal to Vellore and Jinji, *i.e.*, the northern, central and eastern parts of the present kingdom of Mysore and portions of the Madras districts of Bellāry, Chittur and Arcot. His two years' possession of them before his death was too short to enable him to consolidate his gains here, and this province was really held by an army of occupation and remained unsettled in 1680; only the forts garrisoned by him and as much of the surrounding lands as they could command, acknowledged Marātha rule.

Besides these places there was one region where the contest for mastery was still undecided at the time of his death. This was the Kanārā highlands, including the South Dhārwar district and the principalities of Sundā and Bednur. Shivaji had inflicted some defeats upon the local Nawāb, a vassal of Bijapur; but Bānkāpur, the provincial capital, was still unconquered by him when he breathed his last. So also was Bednur, which merely paid him tribute.

Outside these settled or half-settled parts of his kingdom, there was a wide and very fluctuating belt of land subject to his power but not owning his sovereignty. It consisted of the adjacent parts of the Mughal empire (*Mughlāi* in Marāthi), which formed the happy hunting-ground of his horsemen. In these he levied blackmail (*khandani*, *i.e.*, ransom, in Marāthi), as regularly as his army could repeat its annual visit to them. The money paid was popularly called *chauth*, because it amounted to *one-fourth* of the standard assessment of the land revenue

of a place.* But as this paper assessment was always larger than the actual collection, the real incidence of the *chauth* was considerably more than one-fourth of what the peasants paid to their legitimate sovereign. The payment of the *chauth* merely saved a place from the unwelcome presence of the Marātha soldiers and civil underlings, but did not impose on Shivaji any corresponding obligation to guard the district from foreign invasion or internal disorder. The Marāthas looked only to their own gain and not to the fate of their prey after they had left. The *chauth* was only a means of buying off one robber, and not a subsidiary system for defence against all enemies. The lands subject to the *chauth* cannot, therefore, be rightly called spheres of influence.

The territory, old and new, under Shivaji contained 240 forts, out of which 111 were built by him and 79 were situated in Madras. [Sabh. 99-102; a helpful list by D. V. Kalé in *Shivaji Souvenir*, 1927.]

§2. His revenue and hoarded treasure.

His revenue is put by his courtier Sabhāsād at the round figure of one *krone* of *hun*, while the *chauth* when collected in full brought in another 80 *lakhs*. If these statements are correct, Shivaji's theoretical income at its highest was seven *krores* of Rupees. The sum actually realized was considerably less than this paper-estimates,—probably sometimes falling as low as one-tenth of it. (Sabh. p. 104; 91 Q.B. 75.)

The treasure and other valuable things left behind by Shivaji are enumerated in great detail by Sabhāsād (96-97) and the *Tarikh-i-Shivaji* (f. 42-44.) But we cannot be sure that all the figures have been correctly copied in the MSS. of these two works that have come down to us. Moreover, the gold and silver coins were of such an immense variety of denominations countries and ages,—a faithful index to

* The best account of the origin of Chauth,—Pissurlencar, *Antigualhas*, I. i. 62-71.

the wide range and thorough character of Shivaji's looting campaigns,—that it is impossible to reduce the total value of his hoard to any modern currency with even tolerable accuracy. The curious reader is referred to my translation in my *House of Shivaji*, Ch. XI.

§3. Strength of his army.

The growth of his army is thus recorded: at the outset of his career he had 1,200 household cavalry (*pāgā*) and 2,000 *silāhdārs* or mercenary horsemen who provided their own arms and mounts. After the conquest of Jāvli their number was increased to 7,000 *pāgā*, 3,000 *silāhdārs* and 10,000 *Māvle* infantry. He also enlisted 700 Pathans from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. After the destruction of Afzal Khan he raised his forces to 7,000 *pāgā*, 8,000 *silāhdārs*, and 12,000 infantry. At the time of his death, his army consisted of 45,000 *pāgā* (under 29 colonels), 60,000 *silāhdārs* (under 31 colonels) and one *lakh* of *Mālvé* infantry (under 36 colonels.) But *T. S.* states that he left 32,000 horses in his stables, besides 5,000 given to the *bārgirs*. (Sabh. 5, 8, 23, 97-98; *T. S.* f. 43 b.)

The core of his army was, therefore, formed by 30 to 40 thousand regular and permanently enlisted cavalry in his own service, and about twice that number of infantry militia (*hasham*), whom he used to withdraw from the cultivation of their fields during the campaigning season only, as in England under King Alfred. The infantry garrisoning his forts were permanently recruited, though they were given fields in their neighbourhood. The number of the *silāhdārs* who hired themselves and their horses out to him varied greatly from year to year, according to his need, their expectation of plunder in the impending campaign, and the demand for their services in the neighbouring States at a particular time. In the earlier stages of his career, local chieftains with their retainers used to join him in his raids (*e.g.*, Surat in 1664) and swell his

army by the adhesion of a body of irregulars. The same thing happened in his invasion of Madras in 1677.

His elephants are numbered 1,260 by *Sabhāsād*, but *T. S.* gives 125 and *Chit.* 300, which are more likely figures. The camels were 3,000 (*T. S.*) or 1,500 (*Chit.*) The number of his artillery-pieces is not mentioned. *Chitnis* (a doubtful authority) tells us that 200 guns were kept ready for field service and the rest were placed in the forts; each field gun had some elephants and a battalion of infantry attached to it.

§4. *Council of Eight Ministers.*

His earliest administrative Council, in the days of *Dādāji Kond-dev*, was composed of four officers only, *viz.*, the *Peshwā*, the *Majmuādār*, the *Dabir*, and the *Sabnis*. When, in 1647, *Shivā* became his own master, he added a Master of the Horse (*Sar-i-naubat*) and a second *Dabir* to the above four. In 1656, after the conquest of *Jāvli* (which practically doubled his territory) the Council was further expanded by creating a *Surnis* and a *Wāqnis* and two distinct commanders for the infantry and cavalry arms. After his return from *Agra* he appointed a Lord Justice to try all suits in the kingdom according to the Sanskrit lawbooks. By 1674 the number of ministers had risen to eight, which continued till his death. (*Sabh.* 3, 5, 7-8, 55, 83-84.)

This Council of eight ministers, called the *ashta pradhān*, was in no sense a Cabinet. Like *Louis XIV* and *Frederick the Great*, *Shivaji* was his own prime-minister and kept all the strings of the administration in his own hands. The eight *pradhāns* merely acted as his secretaries: they had no initiative, no power to dictate his policy; their function was purely advisory when he was in a mood to listen to advice, and at other times to carry out his general instructions and supervise the details in their respective departments. It is very likely that *Shivaji* never interfered with the Ecclesiastical and Accounts departments, but that

was due entirely to his low caste and illiteracy. The Peshwā's position at Court was, no doubt, higher than that of the other *pradhāns*, because he was closer to the king and naturally enjoyed more of his confidence ; but they were in no sense his subordinates. The solidarity of the British Cabinet, as well as its power, was wanting in the Marātha Council of Eight.

The eight ministers were the following :—

1. The prime-minister, (Persian title *Peshwā*, Sanskrit *Mukhya Pradhān*.) His duties were to look after the welfare of the State in general terms, to represent the king in his absence, and to keep peace among the other officers, so as to promote harmony in the administration. All royal letters and charters had to bear his seal below the king's.

2. The auditor, (Persian *Majmuādār*, Sanskrit *Amātya*.) He had to check all the accounts of public income and expenditure and report them to the king, and to countersign all statements of accounts both of the kingdom in general and of the particular districts.

3. The chronicler, (Persian *Waqiā-navis*, Sanskrit *Mantri*.) His duties were to compile a daily record of the king's doings and Court incidents, and to watch over the king's invitation-lists, meals, companions, &c., so as to guard against murder plots.

4. The superintendent, (Persian *Shuru-navis*, Sanskrit *Sachiv*.) He had to see that all royal letters were drafted in the proper style, to revise them, and to write at the head of charters the words *Shuru shud*, or 'Here begins'. He had also to check the accounts of the *mahals* and *parganas*.

5. The foreign secretary, (Persian *Dabir*, Sanskrit *Sumant*.) He was the king's adviser on relations with foreign States, war and peace. It was also his duty to keep intelligence about other countries, to receive and dismiss foreign envoys, and maintain the dignity of the State abroad.

6. The commander-in-chief, (Persian *Sar-i-naubat*, Sanskrit *Senāpati*.)

7. The ecclesiastical head, (Persian *Sadr* and *Muhatasib*) joined together, Marathi *Pandit Rāo* and *Dānādhyaksha*.) It was his function to honour and reward learned Brahmins on behalf of the king, to decide theological questions and caste disputes, to fix dates for religious ceremonies, to punish impiety and heresy, and to order penances, &c. He was Judge of Canon Law, Royal Almoner, and Censor of Public Morals combined.

8. The chief justice, (Persian *Qādi-ul-quzāt*, Sanskrit *Nyāyādhish*.) He tried civil and criminal cases according to the Hindu law and endorsed all judicial decisions, especially about rights to land, village headmanship, &c.

All these ministers with the exception of the Commander-in-chief and sometimes the Chronicler also, were of the Brāhman caste, and all of them, with the exception of the last two, had also to take the command of armies and go out on expeditions when necessary. All royal letters, charters and treaties had to bear the seals of the king and the *Peshwā* and the endorsement of the next four ministers, i.e., other than the Commander-in-chief, the Ecclesiastical Head, and the Chief Justice.*

The actual work of State correspondence was conducted by *Kāyasthas*, of whom two were famous, viz., *Bālāji Āvji* the *chitnis* and *Niloji* (*Nilkanth Yesāji*) the *munshi* or Persian secretary. The muster-rolls of the army were written and the pay-bills drawn up by a class of officers called *sabnises*, who corresponded to the *bakhshis* or pay-masters of the Mughal army, but occupied a much lower rank.†

§5. Army organization.

We now turn to Shivaji's civil and military regulations. Every fort and outpost (*thānah*) was placed under three

* So says Chitnis. But Oxinden's letters imply that all the ministers endorsed Shivaji's treaty with the English.

† *Sabb.* 84; Chitnis, 167-168; *Sanads and Letters*, 123-130; *Bhonsalyāñchē Kulāchār* (1823), printed in *Itihās Sangraha*.

officers of equal status, *viz.*, the *havlādār*, the *sabnis* and the *sar-i-naubat*, who were to act jointly. "No fort was to be left solely under a *havlādār*, lest a single traitor should be able to deliver it to the enemy. The *havlādār* and the *sar-i-naubat* were selected from the Marātha caste and the *sabnis* from the Brāhmans,"—so that one caste served as a check upon another. The stores and provisions in the forts were in charge of a Kāyastha officer called the *kārkhānah-navis*, who wrote the accounts of their incoming and expenditure. In the larger forts, where the bounds were extensive, the walls were divided into five or six sections, and each of these was guarded by a special *tat-sar-i-naubat*. The environs of a fort were watched by men of the *Parwāri* and *Rāmushi* castes.

The *havlādār* of a fort was empowered to change the lower officers and to write official letters and seal them with his own seal. All letters from Government were to be addressed to him. He had to lock the fort-gates at sunset and open them at sunrise, carry the keys with himself and sleep with them under his pillow. He had to make frequent tours of inspection in and outside the fort, pay surprise visits to the sentinels, while the *sar-i-naubat* had to inspect the work of the patrolling parties and the night-watch. Minute written instructions were given by Shivaji for keeping in each fort munition, provisions, building-materials, and other necessary stores adequate to its size, and for keeping proper watch ; and these regulations were rigidly enforced.

All soldiers, whether musketeers, spearmen, archers or swordsmen, were recruited only after a careful personal inspection by Shivaji himself and taking security for every new soldier from the men already in his service.

In the State cavalry (*pāgā*), the unit was formed by 25 troopers (*bārgirs*) ; over 25 men was placed one *havlādār*, over 5 *havlādārs* one *jumlādār*,* and over 10 *jumlās* or

* Chit., 81, says that there was an intermediate officer called *subahdar* in command of 5 *jumlās*, below the *hazari*.

1,250 men one *hazāri*. Still higher ranks were the 5-*hazāris* and the supreme commander or *sar-i-naubat* of cavalry. For every twenty-five troopers there were a water-carrier and a farrier.

The *silāhdārs*, or troopers who supplied their own horses and arms, were organized on a different plan, but acted under the orders of the same *sar-i-naubat* of cavalry, and ranked lower than the *pāgā* horsemen.

In the infantry, whether fort-garrisons or Māvlé militiamen, there was one corporal (*nāyak*) to every nine privates (*pāiks*) ; over 5 *nāyaks* one *havlādār*, over two (or three) *havlādārs* one *jumlādār*, and over 10 *jumlādārs* one *hazāri**. There seems to have been no 5-*hazāri* among the infantry, but only 7-*hazāris*, over whom was the *sar-i-naubat* of infantry. Shivaji's Guard brigade of 2,000 select Māvlé infantry was splendidly equipped dressed and armed at great expense to the State. (Sabh. 56).

The *pāgā* *jumlādār* had a salary of 500 *hun* a year and the right to use a *palki*. Attached to him was a *majmuādār* on 100 to 125 *hun*. A *hazāri* drew 1,000 *hun* a year ; under him were a *majmuādār*, a Marātha *kārbhāri* (manager or steward), and a revenue-writer (*jamā-navis*) of the Kāyastha caste, for whom 500 *hun* was assigned. The accounts of military income and disbursement had to be made up with the signature of all the four. A commander of 5,000 drew 2,000 *hun* and had the same three civil officers attached to his office. *Kārkuns* (clerks), reporters, couriers and spies were posted to every higher command down to a *hazāri*, under the orders of the *sar-i-naubat*.

An infantry *jumlādār* drew 100 *hun* a year, and had a *sabnis* (muster-writer) on 40 *hun*. A *hazāri* drew 500 *hun* and his *sabnis* 100 to 125 *hun*.

It was Shivaji's settled policy† to use his army for

* Chit., 83, gives one *jumladar* over five *havladars* and one *hazari* over five *jumladars*.

† The method followed by the Pindharis in 1810-16, as described by a contemporary English officer, may be taken to illustrate the conduct of the

drawing supplies from foreign dominions every year. "The troops were to live in cantonements in the home territory during the rainy season (June—September.) Grain, fodder and medicines were kept in stock for the horses, and the huts of the troopers were kept thatched with grass. On the day of *Dashaharā* (early in October) the army should set out from the camp for the country selected by the Rajah. At the time of their departure a list was made of all the property that every man, high or low, of the army carried with himself. The troops were to subsist in foreign parts for eight months and also levy contributions. No woman, female slave or dancing-girl was to be allowed to accompany the army. A soldier keeping any of these was to be beheaded. No woman or child was to be taken captive, but only men. Cows were exempt from seizure, but bullocks might be taken for transport only. Brāhmans were not to be molested, nor taken as hostages for ransom. No soldier should misconduct himself [during a campaign.]

Eight months were to be passed in such expeditions abroad. On their return to their own frontier in *Vaishākh* (April) the whole army was to be searched, the property found was to be compared with the old list, and the excess was to be deducted from their salary. Any one secreting

Maratha troops in Shivaji's time, though not of the more developed forces of the Peshwas: "Until the close of the rains and the fall of the rivers, their horses were carefully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard work. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the *Dassera*. The horses were then shod.....and all that were so inclined set forth on a foray..... All were mounted, though not equally well..... The favourite weapon was a bamboo spear, from 12 to 18 feet long..... It is not surprising that a body so constituted, and moving without camp-equipage of any kind, should traverse the whole of India in defiance of the most active pursuit by regular troops along the same line of march..... As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hours on the same spot, the utmost despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an entrance ; every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was immediately put to the most horrid torture..... It was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away." [Prinsep's *History of.....Marquess of Hastings*, i. 38-39.]

any booty was liable to punishment on detection by the general.

The generals on their return should see the Rajah, deliver their booty in gold, silver, jewels and costly cloth to him, present their accounts, and take their dues from the Treasury. The officers and men were to be promoted or punished according to their conduct during the late campaign. Then they would again remain for four months in camp. [Sabh. 25-28.]

§6. *Revenue system and administration.*

"The land in every province was to be measured and the area calculated in *chāvars*. The measuring-rod was 5 cubits and 5 *muthis* (closed fists) in length. A cubit was equal to 14 *tansus*, and the measuring-rod was [therefore] 80 *tansus* long. Twenty *kāthis* (rods) square made a *bighā* and 120 *bighās* one *chāvar*. The area of each village was thus ascertained in detail. An estimate was made of the expected produce of each *bighā*, three parts of which were left to the peasant and two parts taken by the State.*

"New *ryots* who came to settle were to be given money for seeds and cattle, the amount being recovered in two or four annual instalments. The revenue should be taken in kind at harvest time."

Shivaji wanted to sweep away the middle-class of revenue farmers and come into direct relations with the cultivators. "The *ryots* were not subject to the authority of the *zamindārs*, *deshmukhs*, and *desāis*, who had no right

* Captain Robertson in 1820 and 1825 gave a different and more complicated account of Shivaji's revenue system. (*Bom. Gaz.*, xviii. Pt. ii. pp. 321-322.) It is quite probable that the system was not so simple and uniform as Sabhasad represents it; but we do not know the Captain's authorities and have no means of testing his statement about a system founded nearly two centuries ago by a dynasty which had long passed away, and the continuity of whose tradition had been broken. A *tansu* was the breadth of the second and third fingers (or, in Mughal India, the breadth of 8 barley corn).

to exercise the powers of a political superior (overlord) or harass the *ryots*."

"In the Nizam-Shahi, Adil-Shahi and Mughal territories annexed, the *ryots* had formerly been subject to *patils*, *kulkarnis* and *deshmukhs*, who used to do the collection work and pay what they pleased to the State, sometimes only 200 or 300 *hun* for a village yielding 2,000 *hun* as revenue. These *mirāsdārs* (hereditary landlords), thus growing wealthy, built forts, enlisted troops, and became powerful. They never waited upon the revenue officer of Government and used to show fight if he urged that the village could pay more to the State. This class had become unruly and seized the country. But Shivaji dismantled their castles, garrisoned the strong places with his own troops, and took away all power from the *mirāsdārs*. Formerly they used to take whatever they liked from the *ryots*. This was now stopped. Their dues were fixed after calculating the (exact) revenue of the village, and they were forbidden to build castles." (Sabh. 29-31.)

Similarly, military, fief-holders were given no political power over their tenants. "The *sar-i-naubats*, *majmuādārs*, *kārkuns* and the officers in the Rajah's personal service were given assignments on the revenue (*tankhā barāt*) for their salary. The lands cultivated by them were subject to assessment like the fields of the *ryots*, and the amount of the revenue due was deducted from their pay. For the balance they got orders on the Treasury of the capital or the districts. Men serving in the army, the militia or the forts were not to be given proprietary (*mokāsā*) rights over any village in entirety. Their dues were to be paid either by assignment of revenue or by cash from the Treasury. None but the *kārkuns* had any jurisdiction over the land. All payments to the army were to be made by the *kārkuns*. The grant of *mokāsā* rights would have created disorder among the peasants; they would have grown in strength and disobeyed the Government collectors; and the growing power of the *ryots* would have ended in rebellion at various

places. The *mokāsā*-holders and the *zamindārs* if united would have become uncontrollable. No *mokāsā* was to be granted to any one." (Sabh. 27-28.)

Over two *mahals*, yielding a revenue of from 75,000 to 1,25,000 *hun* in the aggregate, a *subahdār* on 400 *hun* and a *majmuādār* on 100 to 125 *hun* a year were appointed. The *subahdār* was to have a *palki* allowance of 400 *hun*. All civil and military officers with a salary of 125 *hun* or more were given the right to hold parasols (*āftāb-gir*) over their heads, with an allowance from the State for bearers. Where necessary, a *subahdar* was posted over a tract yielding only one *lakh* of Rupees. To the disturbed provinces across the frontier, a military force was sent with the collectors of blackmail. The *subahdars* were all Brāhmans, under the Peshwā's supervision. (Sabh. 28 and 77.)

§7. Religious policy.

Shivaji's religious policy was very liberal. He respected the holy places of all creeds in his raids and made endowments for Hindu temples and Muslim saints' tombs and mosques alike. He not only granted pensions to Brāhman scholars versed in the *Vedas*, astronomers and anchorites, but also built hermitages and provided subsistence at his own cost for the holy men of Islam, notably Baba Yaqut of Keloshi (4 m. s. of Bankot on the Ratnagiri coast.) "The lost Vedic studies were revived by him. One maund of rice was (annually) presented to a Brāhman who had mastered one of the books of the *Vedas*, two maunds to a master of two books, and so on. Every year the Pandit Rao used to examine the scholars in the month of Shrāvan (August) and increase or decrease their stipends according to their progress in study. Foreign pandits received presents in goods, local scholars in food. Famous scholars were assembled, honoured and given money rewards. No Brāhman had occasion to go to other kingdom to beg." (Chit. 85, 43. Sabh. 30. 91 Q.B. 74.)

Shivaji's spiritual guide (*guru*) was Rāmdās Swāmi, one of the greatest saints of Mahārāshtra, (born 1608, died 1681.) An attempt has been made in the present generation to prove that the Marātha national hero's political ideal of an independent Hindu monarchy was inspired by Ramdās ; but the evidence produced is neither adequate nor free from suspicion.* The holy man's influence on Shivaji was spiritual, and not political. After the capture of Satārā, (1673) Shivaji installed his *guru* in the neighbouring hill-fort of Parli or Sajjangarh, and guides still point out to the credulous tourist the seat on the top of Satārā hill from which Shivaji used to hold converse with the saint, across four miles of space! A charming anecdote is told, that Shivaji could not understand why Rāmdās used to go out daily on his begging tour, though his royal disciple had made him rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and that he next day placed at his feet a deed making a gift of all his kingdom to the saint. Rāmdās accepted the gift, appointed Shivaji as his vicar, and bade him rule the realm thenceforth not as an autocratic owner, but as a servant responsible for all his acts to a higher authority. Shivaji then made the red ochre-coloured robe of a Hindu *sannyāsi* his flag, *bhagwā jhāndā*, in order to signify that he fought and ruled in the livery of his ascetic lord paramount, and conducted himself "as ever in his great Taskmaster's eyes."

§8. Effect of Shivaji's reign.

So much for Shivaji's regulations in theory. But in practice they were often violated except where he was personally present. Thus, the assertion of Sabhāsād and Chitnis that his soldiers had to deliver to the State every item of the booty taken by them, is contradicted by the sack of Dharanāgāon (1679), where the English factors were robbed of many

* Shivaji and Ramdas: Chit. 44-53, also his *Shambhuji Bakhar*, 5-6 ; Prof Bhate's *Shivaji ani Ramdas* ; the publications and now-defunct monthly magazine of the Ramdasi coterie of Dhulia (notably Mr. Rajwade.)

things without these being entered in the official list of the Marātha army or credited to Shivaji's Treasury (Ch. 14.) Shivaji could not be everywhere and at all times ; hence it was impossible for him to prevent private looting by his troops and camp-followers. In the wake of the Marātha army, gangs of private robbers took to the road. The Pindhāris were the logical corollary of the Marātha soldier, to whom rapine was a normal duty.

Shivaji justified his spoliation of his neighbours by saying, as he did to the Mughal governor of Surat (1672), "Your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country. That army must be paid for by his subjects." Such a plea might have been true at the beginning of his career and in relation to Mughal territory only, but cannot explain his raids into Bijapur and Golkondā, Kanārā and Tanjore. It fails altogether as a defence of the foreign policy of the Peshwas.

But whatever might be the moral quality of the means he employed, his success was a dazzling reality. This jāgirdār's son proved himself the irrepressible opponent of the Mughal empire and all its resources. This fact deeply impressed the minds of his contemporaries in India and abroad. Aurangzib was in despair as to how he could subdue Shivā. A significant statement is made in a news-letter of his Court in 1670 that the Emperor read a despatch from the Deccan, recounting some raids of Shivā, and then "remained silent". In the inner council of the Court he often anxiously asked whom he should next send against Shivaji, seeing that nearly all his great generals had failed in the Deccan, and Mahābat Khan irreverently replied with a sneer at Qāzi Abdul Wahāb's influence over the Emperor, "No general is necessary. A decree from the Chief Qāzi will extinguish Shivā!" The Persian king, Shāh Abbās II., sent a letter taunting Aurangzib, "You call yourself a Padishah, but cannot subdue a mere zamindār like Shivā. I am going to India with an army to teach you your business." [K. K. ii. 216.]

To the Hindu world in that age of renewed persecution, Shivaji appeared as the star of a new hope, the protector of the ritualistic paint-mark (*tilak*) on the forehead of the Hindus, and the saviour of the Brāhmans. [Bhushan's poems.] His Court, as later his son's, became the rallying-point of the opposition to Aurangzib. The two rivals were both supermen, but contrasts in character.

CHAPTER XVI

SHIVAJI'S ACHIEVEMENT, CHARACTER AND PLACE IN HISTORY

1. Shivaji's policy how far traditional.
2. Causes of his failure to build an enduring State.
3. Hindrances to true nationality.
4. Neglect of the economic factor by the Marathas.
5. Excess of finesse and intrigue.
6. Character of Shivaji.
7. His genius analyzed.
8. His political ideal and difficulties.
9. His influence on the spirit.

§1. *Shivaji's policy how far traditional.*

Shivaji's State policy, like his administrative system,* was not very new. From time immemorial it had been the aim of the typical Hindu king to set out early every autumn to "extend his kingdom" at the expense of his neighbours. Indeed, the Sanskrit law-books lay down such a course as the necessary accomplishment of a true Kshatriya chief. (Manu. vii. 99-103, 182.) In more recent times it had also been the practice of the Muhammadan sovereigns in North India and the Deccan alike. But these conquerors justified their territorial aggrandizement by religious motives. According to the Qurānic law, there cannot be peace between a Muhammadan king and his neighbouring "infidel" States. The latter are *dār-ul-harb* or legitimate seats of war, and it is the Muslim king's duty to slay and plunder in them till they accept the true faith and become *dār-ul-islām*, after which they will become entitled to his protection.†

The coincidence between Shivaji's foreign policy and that of a Qurānic sovereign is so complete that both the

* For an earlier parallel and possible model, see the Adil-Shahi rules given in B. S. 348-352.

† For a detailed account and authorities, see Sarkar's *History of Aurangzib*, iii. ch. 34 §1.

history of Shivaji by his courtier Krishnāji Anant and the Persian official history of Bijapur use exactly the same word, *mulk-giri*, to describe such raids into neighbouring countries as a regular political ideal. The only difference was that in theory at least, an orthodox Muslim king was bound to spare the other Muslim States in his path and not to rob or shed the blood of true believers, while Shivaji (as well as the Peshwās after him) carried on his *mulk-giri* into all neighbouring States, Hindu no less than Islamic, and squeezed rich Hindus as mercilessly as he did Muhammadans. Then, again, the orthodox Islamic king, in theory at least, aimed at the annexation and conversion of the other States, so that after the short sharp agony of conquest was over those places enjoyed peace like the regular parts of his dominion. But the object of Shivaji's military enterprises, unless his Court-historian *Sabhāsād* has misrepresented it, was not annexation but mere plunder, or to quote his very words. "The Marātha forces should feed themselves at the expense of foreign countries for eight months every year, and levy blackmail." (Sabh., 26.)*

Thus, Shivaji's power was exactly similar in origin and theory to the power of the Muslim States in India and elsewhere, and he only differed from them in the use of that power. Universal toleration and equal justice and protection for all his subjects were his distinctive policy in the permanently occupied portion of his realm, as we have shown elsewhere.

§2. *Causes of Shivaji's failure to build an enduring State.*

Why did Shivaji fail to create an enduring State? Why did the Marātha people stop short of the final accomplish-

* "Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to himself, a Maratha chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of harvest, and demanding a consideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The visit is annually repeated, and the demand pro-

ment of their union and dissolve before they had consolidated into an absolutely compact political body?

An obvious cause was, no doubt, the shortness of his reign, barely ten years after the final rupture with the Mughals in 1670. But this does not furnish the true explanation of his failure. It is doubtful if with a very much longer time at his disposal he could have averted the ruin which befell the Marātha State under the Peshwās, for the same moral canker was at work among his people in the 17th century as in the 18th. The first danger of the new Hindu kingdom established by him in the Deccan lay in the fact that the national glory and prosperity resulting from the victories of Shivaji and Bāji Rao I. created a reaction in favour of Hindu orthodoxy ; it accentuated caste distinctions and ceremonial purity of daily rites which ran counter to the homogeneity and simplicity of the poor and politically depressed early Marātha society. Thus, his political success sapped the main foundation of that success.

In the security, power and wealth engendered by their independence, the Marāthas of the 18th century forgot the past record of Muslim persecution ; their social grades turned against each other. The Brāhmans living east of the Sahyādri range despised those living west of it, the men of the hills despised their brethren of the plains, because they could now do so with impunity. The head of the State, though a Brāhman, was despised by his Brāhman servants belonging to other branches of the caste—because the first Peshwā's great-grandfather's great-grandfather had once been lower in society than the Desh Brāhmans' great-grandfather's great-grandfathers! While the Chitpāvan Brāhmans were waging a social war with the Deshastha Brāhmans, a bitter jealousy raged between the Brāhman ministers and governors and the Kāyastha secretaries. We have unmistakable traces of it as early as the reign of Shivaji. "Caste

portionally enhanced. Whatever is thus exacted is called the *chauth*, and the process of exaction a *mulk-giri* expedition." [Prinsep's *History.....of the Marquess of Hastings*, i. 22.]

grows by fission." It is antagonistic to national union. In proportion as Shivaji's ideal of a Hindu *swarāj* was based on orthodoxy, it contained within itself the seed of its own death. As Rabindranāth Tāgore remarks:

"A temporary enthusiasm sweeps over the country and we imagine that it has been united ; but the rents and holes in our body-social do their work secretly ; we cannot retain any noble idea long.

"Shivaji aimed at preserving the rents ; he wished to save from Mughal attack a Hindu society to which ceremonial distinctions and isolation of castes are the very breath of life. He wanted to make this heterogeneous society triumphant over *all* India! He wove ropes of sand ; he attempted the impossible. It is beyond the power of any man, it is opposed to the divine law of the universe, to establish the *swarāj* of such a caste-ridden, isolated, internally-torn sect over a vast continent like India."*

Shivaji and his father-in-law Gaikwār were *Marāthas*, *i.e.*, members of a despised caste. Before the rise of the national movement in the Deccan in the closing years of the 19th century, a Brāhman of Mahrāshtra used to feel insulted if he was called a *Marātha*. "No," he would reply with warmth, "I am a *Dakshina Brāhman*." Shivaji keenly felt his humiliation at the hands of the Brāhmans to whose defence and prosperity he had devoted his life. Their insistence on treating him as a Shudra drove him into the arms of Bālāji Āvji, the leader of the Kāyasthas, and another victim of Brāhmanic pride. The Brāhmans felt a professional jealousy for the intelligence and literary powers of the Kāyasthas, who were their only rivals in education and Government service, and consoled themselves by declaring the Kāyasthas a low-caste not entitled to the Vedic rites and by proclaiming a social boycott of Bālāji Āvji who had ventured to invest his son with the sacred thread. Bālāji

* From his *Rise and Fall of the Sikh Power*, as translated by me in the *Modern Review*, April 1911.

naturally sympathized with his master and tried to raise him in social estimation by engaging Gāgā Bhatta who "made Shivaji a pure Kshatriya". The high-priest showed his gratitude to Bālāji for his heavy retainer by writing a tract [or rather two] in which the Kāyastha caste was glorified but without convincing his contemporary Brāhmans.*

There was no attempt at well-thought-out and organized communal improvement, spread of education or unification of the people, either under Shivaji or under the Peshwās. The cohesion of the people in the Marātha State was not organic but artificial, accidental, and therefore precarious. It was solely dependent on the ruler's extraordinary personality and disappeared when the country ceased to produce supermen among its rulers.

A Government of personal discretion is, by its very nature, uncertain. This uncertainty reacted fatally on the administration. However well-planned the machinery and rules might be, the actual conduct of the administration was marred by inefficiency, sudden changes of personnel, and official corruption, because nobody felt secure of his post or of the due appreciation of his merit. This has been the bane of all autocratic States in the East and the West alike, except where the autocrat has been a "hero as king" or where a high level of education, civilization and national spirit among the people has prevented the evil.

* Nor has he succeeded in convincing posterity. In 1916 Mr. Rajwadé, a Brahman writer, published a denial of the Kayastha claims (*Chaturtha Sam. Britta*), on the occasion of editing this tract. He has provoked replies, one of which, *Rajwadé's Gaga Bhatti* by K. T. Gupte makes some attempt at reasoning and the use of evidence, while another, *The Twanging of the Bow* by K. S. Thakré, has the same tone as Milton's *Tetrachordon* or *Against Salmasius!* This is happening in the 20th century, and yet Mr. Rajwadé and Prof. Bijapurkar (who persistently treated Shivaji's descendants as Shudras) are nationalists, even Chauvinists.

It was with a house so divided against itself that the Puna Brahmins of the 18th century hoped to found an all-Indian Maratha empire, and there are Puna Brahmins in the 20th century who believe that the hope failed only through the superior luck and cunning of the English!

§3. Hindrances to true nationality in Shivaji's age.

The society of Shivaji's age and country was so different from our own that some straining of the historical imagination is necessary before we can understand the difficulties that he had to combat.

Land was the only stable thing in an ever-changing world, subject to the appalling outbursts of Nature's forces, which swept away man and his handiwork, and the even more violent transformations of political revolution. But the new conquerors always left the land to the old peasant because he alone could till it in that age of sparse population, and they continued the revenue collection in the hands of the old hereditary middlemen, because they alone knew the details of the locality and could ensure some payment from the land to a distant sovereign who would have found it impossible to collect his dues from each petty tiller of the soil directly. The offices in connection with land, therefore, tended to become hereditary and the contractor of revenue blossomed in time into a landowner with a permanent family claim to a portion of the yield of his village or district. Attachment to one's ancestral land was the strongest passion in that age of little trade and small scale industries. I know of a Brâhman family which migrated from the Ratnagiri district to Ahmadabad six generations ago, and no longer own an inch of land in their ancient home nor keep any business connection with it, and yet they have carefully preserved for two centuries the old title-deeds of their long-abandoned lands.

And, in that age land-rights were unsettled and perplexing by reason of the variety and complication of the personal claims to one and the same tract. Illustrations of this state of things can be found almost everywhere in the Deccan; I give the case of Sâvant-vâdi as readily available in print. In this small region there was in the sixteenth century a *desâi* (or *zamindâr*) of the Prabhu caste at Kudâl for collecting the revenue on behalf of the Bijapur Sultan,

with a *dalvi* or captain of the Rajput caste under him to lead his troops. The *dalvi* rebelled against his master the *desāi* and sought the help of a neighbouring *sāvant* or chief of the Marātha caste. At first the *desāi* suppressed the rebel with the support of his sovereign. But in the third generation an able *sāvant* rose to power, secured the *desāi*-ship of Bāndā from Adil Shah, and after extirpating most of the Prabhu *desāis* annexed the Kudāl pargana. But some members of the dispossessed family escaped and revived their claim to the land. Next, Shivaji stepped in to oust the *sāvant*! Further complications were introduced by two branches of the same family (often two brothers) fighting for the same estate and transmitting their disputes to their sons and grandsons.

Into this world of bewildering confusion of land-rights and revenue offices,—where nothing was generally known for certain or acknowledged as a clear final settlement,—Shivaji (like all other conquerors) burst as a new dissolving force. He had to give his own decision on these claims. All who lost their suits before him, all who were displaced in office by his nominees, immediately turned against him and tried to make their claims good by joining his enemies and opposing his Government. There was no national feeling, no spirit of accepting the law of the land even when honestly administered.

To every one in that age his own fief (*watan*) was the only reality, the only object of a man's lifelong endeavour, his highest reward on earth, while Fatherland (*patria*), if thought of at all, was felt to be an abstract idea, a non-entity. *Watan* could yield honour power and the pleasures of life, while *patria* was a mere word, a figment of the imagination.

A further hindrance to the growth of patriotism was the infinitely minute sub-division of society, which made the formation of one nation, or a compact body of men moved by community of life, thought and interests, impossible, and even inconceivable. Apart from the impassable

chasm between the Hindus and the Muslims living on the same soil and under the same rulers, the Hindus themselves were split up into innumerable mutually warring (or, at best, contemptuously detached and indifferent) fragments. Not only did one caste despise and persecute another, but even among the members of the same caste there were distinctions as sharp as those marking off the Muhammadan from the Hindu or the Shudra from the Brāhman. Certain families claimed to be of nobler blood (*kulin*) than all others of the same caste and locality, and depressed and insulted the latter in society. The highest aim of a Hindu in that age—as even in our times,—was to elevate his own family (and often also his own sub-division of a caste) in the social scale by lavish bounty to the Brāhmans and the caste elders, by hypergamy, or by a nearer approach to the practices of the highest or “twice-born” castes. But the dominant families (or castes) tried to keep the newer or lower ones down at their former level of degradation by turning all the engines of social persecution against them. They took away from such daring aspirants and disturbers of the primeval stereotyped usage and custom, not only the benefit of the clergy but also all the amenities of social life and the services of the public servants of the village. This boycott or out-casting (*grāmanya*) was a more terrifying penalty than death itself.

It was only human nature if the noblest members of the despised families (or castes) resented this injustice and tyranny of society and, in the bitterness of public humiliation, sought to be avenged on the persecuting church and State by going over to the enemies of their country and faith. Such action, on the part of the oppressors and the oppressed alike, is impossible where a true sense of nationality has taken root. Patriotism could not grow on the Indian soil (except among compact clans of blood-kindred like the Rajputs.) The State, as an impersonal continuous being,—higher and more durable than our individual selves, could not be conceived of by the rulers of

Hindu India whose sole care was for the benefit of self and not for the good of the community as a whole.

As an acute English observer wrote in 1803: "Every Marātha prince, and every jagirdar or military chief in the [Marātha] empire, has a *khazānā* or collection of treasure, consisting of specie and jewels, which is lodged in a secret depository within the walls of a strong fortress, often erected for the purpose, on one of the most inaccessible mountains in his dominions. This private treasure is the first and never-ceasing object of his ambition to increase. . . . No want of money for supporting a war, *even in defence of his own territory*, ever induces a Marātha chief to supply the deficiency from his private treasury; the loss of which would be to him a much more grievous calamity than the subjugation of his country."*

Such were the men among whom Shivaji tried to build up his edifice of an independent national State, the men whom he had to employ as his instruments, the men to whom he had to leave his uncompleted task. The leaders were actuated by an insane pride of birth, an all-devouring jealousy about precedence, an ambition that blinded them to all consequences, an incapacity for self-subordination to law and corporate loyalty that marks the lesser breeds, a lack of political vision and of practical realism. As for the masses, they were human sheep, worthy to be led by such shepherds; their horizon was bounded by the hard conditions of their daily toil, with a simple emotional faith as their only solace.

In such conditions not even a superman can create a nation and leave an enduring State behind him. Shivaji with his transcendent genius could have barely laid their

* *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1803, p. 4. A recent example was that of Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1809, as described by Capt. Broughton: "While Sindhia is daily submitting to these and similar insults [from his unpaid soldiery], he possesses a privy purse of 50 lakhks; which no distress either of himself or his troops is sufficiently powerful to induce him to violate." (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Const. ed., p. 160.)

true foundations if a long reign of internal peace had been granted to him and he had been followed by a line of worthy successors. But he lived for less than six years after his coronation, and his kingdom perished with his sons.

§4. *Neglect of the economic factor by the Marāthas.*

The Marātha rulers neglected the economic development of the State. Some of them did, no doubt, try to save the peasantry from illegal exactions, and to this extent they promoted agriculture. But commerce was subjected to frequent harassment by local officers, and the traders could never be certain of freedom of movement and security of their rights on the mere payment of the legal rate of duty. The internal resources of a small province with no industry, little trade, a sterile soil, and an agriculture dependent upon scanty and precarious rainfall,—could not possibly support the large army that Shivaji kept or the imperial position and world-dominion to which the Peshwās aspired.

The necessary expenses of the State could be met, and all the parts of the body-politic could be held together only by a constant flow of money from outside its own borders, *i.e.*, by a regular succession of raids. As the late Mr. G. K. Gokhalé laughingly told me when describing the hardships of the present rigid land assessment system in the Bombay Presidency, "You see, the rate of the land revenue did not matter much under Marātha rule. In those old days, when the crop failed our people used to sally forth with their horses and spears and bring back enough booty to feed them for the next two or three years. Now they have to starve on their own lands."

Thus, by the character of his State, the Marātha's hands were turned against everybody and everybody's hands were turned against him. It is the very nature of a *Krieg-staat** to move in a vicious circle. It must wage war periodically

* A Government that lives and grows only by wars of aggression.

if it is to get its food ; but war, when waged as a normal method of supply, destroys industry and wealth in the invading and invaded countries alike, and ultimately defeats the very end of such wars. Peace is death to a *Krieg-staat* ; but peace is the very life-breath of wealth. A State founded on war, therefore, kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. To take an illustration, Shivaji's repeated plunder of Surat scared away trade and wealth from that city, and his second raid (in 1670) brought him much less booty than his first, and a few years later the constant dread of Marātha incursion entirely impoverished Surat and effectually dried up this source of supply. Thus, from the economic point of view, the Marātha State had no *stable* basis, no normal means of growth *within itself*.

§5. Excess of finesse and intrigue.

Lastly, the Marātha leaders trusted too much to finesse. They did not realize that without a certain amount of manly openness and fidelity to promises no society can hold together. Stratagem and falsehood may have been necessary at the birth of their State, but it was continued during the maturity of their power. No one could rely on the promise of a Marātha minister or the assurance of a Marātha general. Witness the long and finally fruitless negotiations of the English merchants with Shivaji for compensation for the looting of their Rājapur factory. The Marātha Government could not always be relied on to abide by their treaty obligations.

Shivaji, and to a lesser extent Bāji Rāo, I., preserved an admirable balance between war and diplomacy. But the latter-day Marāthas lost this practical ability. They trusted too much to diplomatic trickery, as if empire were a pacific game of chess. Military efficiency was neglected, war at the right moment and in the right fashion was avoided, or, worse still, their forces were frittered away in unseasonable campaigns and raids conducted as a matter of routine, and

the highest political wisdom was believed to consist in *rāj-karan* or diplomatic intrigue. Thus, while the Marātha spider was weaving his endless cobweb of hollow alliances and diplomatic counter-plots, the mailed fist of Wellesley was thrust into his laboured but flimsy tissue of statecraft, and by a few swift and judicious strokes his defence and screen was torn away and his power left naked and helpless. In rapid succession the Nizām was disarmed, Tipu was crushed, and the Peshwā was enslaved. While Sindhiā and Holkar were dreaming the dream of the overlordship of all India, they suddenly awoke to find that even their local independence was gone. The man of action, the soldier-statesman, always triumphs over the mere scheming Machiavel. Punic perfidy never succeeds in the long run.

✓ §6. *Character of Shivaji.*

Shivaji's private life was marked by a high standard of morality. He was a devoted son, a loving father and an attentive husband, though he did not rise above the ideas and usage of his age, which allowed a plurality of wives and the keeping of concubines even among the priestly caste, not to speak of warriors and kings. Intensely religious from his very boyhood, by instinct and training alike, he remained all through his life abstemious, free from vice, respectful to holy men, and passionately fond of hearing scripture readings and sacred stories and songs. But religion remained with him an ever fresh fountain of right conduct and generosity ; it did not obsess his mind nor harden him into a bigot. The sincerity of his faith is proved by his impartial respect for the holy men of all sects (Muslim as much as Hindu) and toleration of all creeds. His chivalry to women and strict enforcement of morality in his camp was a wonder in that age and has extorted the admiration of hostile critics like Khāfi Khan.

He had the born leader's personal magnetism and threw a spell over all who knew him, drawing the best elements

of the country to his side and winning the most devoted service from his officers, while his dazzling victories and ever ready smile made him the idol of his soldiery. His royal gift of judging character was one of the main causes of his success, as his selection of generals and governors, diplomats and secretaries was never at fault, and his administration was a great improvement on the past.

His army organization was a model of efficiency ; everything was provided beforehand and kept in its proper place under a proper caretaker ; an excellent spy system supplied him in advance with the most minute information about the theatre of his intended campaign ; divisions of his army were combined or dispersed at will over long distances without failure ; the enemy's pursuit or obstruction was successfully met and yet the booty was rapidly and safely conveyed home without any loss. His inborn military genius is proved by his instinctively adopting that system of warfare which was most suited to the racial character of his soldiers, the nature of the country, the weapons of the age, and the internal condition of his enemies. His light cavalry, stiffened with swift-footed infantry, was irresistible in the age of Aurangzib. More than a century after his death, his blind imitator Daulat Rao Sindhiā continued the same tactics when the English had galloper guns for field action and most of the Deccan towns were walled round* and provided with defensive artillery, and he therefore failed ignominiously.

§7. *Shivaji's genius analyzed.*

The greatness of Shivaji's genius can be fully realised not from the extent of the kingdom he won for himself, nor from the value of the hoarded treasure he left behind him, but from a survey of the conditions amidst which he rose to sovereignty.

* Owen's *Selections from Wellington's Desp.*, 284, 289.

He was truly an original explorer, the maker of a new road in mediæval Indian history, with no example or guide before him. When he chose to declare his independence, the Mughal empire seemed to be at the height of its glory. Every local chief who had, anywhere in India, revolted against it had been crushed. For a small jagirdar's son to defy its power, appeared as an act of madness, a courting of sure ruin. Shivaji, however, chose this path, and he succeeded.

His success can be explained only by an analysis of his political genius. First and foremost he possessed that unfailing sense of reality in politics, that recognition of the exact possibilities of his time (*tact des choses possibles*) which Cavour defined as the essence of statesmanship. His daring was tempered and guided by an instinctive perception of how far his actual resources could carry him, how long a certain line of action or policy was to be followed, and where he must stop. For the lack of this political insight his rash son Shambhuji came to a miserable end and undid the work of Shivaji's life.

Shivaji possessed the true master's gift of judging character at sight and choosing the fittest instruments for his work. This is proved by the successful execution of his orders by his agents in his absence. Many of the distant expeditions of his reign were conducted not by himself in person but by his generals, who almost always carried out his orders according to plan. This was a novel feat in an Asiatic monarchy, where everything depends on the master's presence. It was the training gained in Shivaji's service, aided by the Marātha national character for personal independence and initiative, that enabled the disorganized Marātha people to stand up against all the resources of the mighty Aurangzib for eighteen years after the murder of Shambhuji and ultimately to defeat him, even though they had no king or capital to form the centre of the national defence.

His reign brought peace and order to his country,

assured the protection of women's honour and the religion of all sects without distinction, extended the royal patronage to the truly pious men of all creeds (Muslims no less than Hindus), and presented equal opportunities to all his subjects by opening the public service to talent irrespective of caste or creed.* This was the ideal policy for a State with a composite population like India.

His gifts were peace and a wise internal administration. The stability of these good conditions was the only thing necessary for giving permanence to Shivaji's work and ensuring national consolidation and growth. But that stability was denied to his political creation. Only his example and name remained to inspire the best minds of succeeding generations with ideals of life and government, not unmixed with vain regrets.

§8. *Shivaji's political ideal and difficulties.*

Did Shivaji merely found a *Krieg-staat*? Was he merely an *entrepreneur* of rapine, a Hindu edition of Alauddin Khilji or Timur?

I think it would not be fair to take this view. For one thing, he never had peace to work out his political ideas. The whole of his short life was one struggle with enemies, a period of preparation and not of fruition. All his attention was necessarily devoted to meeting daily dangers with daily expedients and he had not the chance of peacefully building up a well-planned political edifice.

In this vast Gangetic valley and the wide *Desh* country rolling eastwards through the Deccan, Nature has fixed no boundary to States. Here a kingdom's size changes with

* He was himself a Hindu, sincere in belief and orthodox in practice, and yet he employed a number of Muhammadan officers in the highest positions, such as Munshi Haidar (who became Chief Justice of the Mughal empire on entering Aurangzib's service), Siddi Sambal, Siddi Misri, and Daulat Khan (admirals), besides commanders like Siddi Halal and Nur Khan. (*Dil.* i. 100.) He gave legal recognition to the Muslim *qazis* in his dominions.

daily changes in its strength as compared with its neighbours'. There can be no stable equilibrium among them for more than a generation. Each has to push the others as much for self-defence as for aggression. Each must be armed and ready to invade the others, if it does not wish to be invaded and absorbed by them. Where friction with neighbours is the normal state of things, a huge armed force, sleepless vigilance, and readiness to strike the first blow are the necessary conditions of the very existence of a kingdom. The evil could be remedied only by the establishment of a universal empire throughout the country from sea to sea.

Shivaji could not for a moment be sure of the Delhi Government's pacific disposition or fidelity to treaty. The past history of the Mughal expansion into the Deccan since the days of Akbar, was a warning to him. The imperial policy of annexing the whole of South India was as unmistakable to Shivā as to Adil Shah or Qutb Shah. Its completion was only a question of time, and every Deccani Power was bound to wage eternal warfare with the Mughals if it wished to survive. Hence Shivaji lost no chance of robbing Mughal territory in the Deccan.

With Bijapur his relations were somewhat different. He could raise his head or extend his dominion only at the expense of Bijapur. Rebellion against his liege lord was the necessary condition of his being. But when, about 1662, an understanding was effected between him and the Adil-Shahi ministers, he gave up molesting the heart of the Bijapur kingdom. With the Bijapuri barons whose fiefs lay close to his dominions, he had, however, to wage war till he had wrested Kolhāpur, North Kanārā and South Konkan from their hands. In the Karnatak division, *viz.*, the Dhārwar and Belgāum districts, this contest was still undecided when he died. With the provinces that lay across the path of his natural expansion he could not be at peace, though he did not wish to challenge the central Government of Bijapur. This attitude was changed by the death of Ali II. in 1672, the accession of the boy Sikandar Adil Shah, the faction-

fights between rival nobles at the capital, and the visible dissolution of that Government. But Shivaji helped Bijapur greatly during the Mughal invasion of 1679.

§9. His influence on the spirit.

Shivaji's real greatness lay in his character and practical ability, rather than in originality of conception or length of political vision. Unfailing insight into the character of others, efficiency of arrangements, and instinctive perception of what was practicable and most profitable under the circumstances,—these were the causes of his success in life. To these must be added his personal morality and loftiness of aim, which drew to his side the best minds of his community, while his universal toleration and insistence on equal justice for all gave contentment to all classes subject to his rule. He strenuously maintained order and enforced moral laws throughout his own dominions, and the people were happier under his sway than anywhere else.

His splendid success fired the imagination of his contemporaries, and his name became a spell calling the Marātha race to a new life. His kingdom was lost within nine years of his death. But the imperishable achievement of his life was the raising of the Marāthas into an independent self-reliant people, conscious of their oneness and high destiny, and his most precious legacy was the spirit that he breathed into his race.

The mutual conflict and internal weakness of the three Muslim Powers of the Deccan were, no doubt, contributory causes of the rise of Shivaji. But his success sprang from a higher source than the incompetence of his enemies. I regard him as the last great constructive genius and nation-builder that the Hindu race has produced. His system was his own creation and, unlike Ranjit Singh, he took no foreign aid in his administration. His army was drilled and commanded by his own people and not by Frenchmen. What he built lasted long; his institutions were looked up

to with admiration and emulation even a century later in the palmy days of the Peshwas' rule.

Shivaji was illiterate ; he learnt nothing by reading. He built up his kingdom and Government before visiting any royal Court, civilized city, or organized camp. He received no help or counsel from any experienced minister or general. But his native genius, alone and unaided, enabled him to form a compact kingdom, an invincible army and a practical and beneficent system of administration.

Before his rise, the Marātha race was scattered like atoms through many Deccani kingdoms. He welded them into a mighty nation. And he achieved this in the teeth of the opposition of four great Powers like the Mughal empire, Bijapur, Portuguese India, and the Abyssinians of Janjirā. No other mediæval Hindu has shown such capacity.

Before he came, the Marāthas were mere hirelings, mere servants of aliens. They served the State, but had no lot or part in its management ; they shed their life-blood in the army, but were denied any share in the conduct of war or peace. They were always subordinates, never leaders.

Shivaji was the first to challenge Bijapur and Delhi and thus teach his countrymen that it was possible for them to be independent leaders in war. Then, he founded a State and taught his people that they were capable of administering a kingdom in all its departments. He has proved by his example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a State, defeat enemies ; they can conduct their own defence ; they can protect and promote literature and art, commerce and industry ; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading fleets of their own, and conduct naval battles on equal terms with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to the full stature of their growth.

He has proved that the Hindu race can still produce not only *jamādārs* (non-commissioned officers) and *chitnises* (clerks), but also rulers of men, and even a king of kings (*Chhatrapati*.) The Emperor Jahāngir cut the *Akshay Bat* tree of Allahabad down to its roots and hammered a red-hot

iron cauldron on to its stump. He flattered himself that he had killed it. But lo! within a year the tree began to grow again and pushed the heavy obstruction to its growth aside!

Shivaji has shown that the tree of Hinduism is not really dead, that it can rise from beneath the seemingly crushing load of centuries of political bondage, exclusion from the administration, and legal repression ; it can put forth new leaves and branches ; it can again lift its head up to the skies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Bakhars.

The royal period of Marātha history, by which we mean the reigns of Shivaji and his two sons (1660—1700), differs fundamentally from the Peshwā period (1707—1802) not only in the extent but also in the character of its historical records. A vast and varied mass of contemporary documents in English Persian and Marāthi illuminates the rule of the Peshwas. But when we come to study the lives of Shivaji and his sons, we are held up by an utter lack of State-papers, detailed official histories, personal memoirs and public letters such as are plentiful in the case of Mughal history. For one thing, few if any such historical materials were written in the days of this busy king and his sons; and secondly, at the close of the royal period, every Marātha capital and fort was occupied by the Mughals and the State records preserved there were burnt or dispersed. The original papers of this royal period in the Marāthi language that have come down to us are, with a very few exception, *private* legal documents, such as deeds of grant, decisions of law-suits, partition-awards, orders on petitions &c., which have been so long carefully preserved by private families as title-deeds. Hence, the only *contemporary* records of a truly historical nature relating to Shivāji's and Shambhuji's times, that now survive are in the English, Persian, Portuguese and Rājasthāni languages, and none in Marāthi.

Appropriately enough, the first narrative of Shivāji's career in Marāthi was composed by his official chronicler and recorder, Wāqnis. But the original text of it, completed about 1685, is now lost, and we possess only extracts from it made probably a generation later by Khando Anāji Mālkārē, who has padded out this source by interpolating in it every movement and posting of his father Anāji Ranganāth Mālkārē in Shivāji's reign. It is impossible to believe that the Wāqnis himself could have cared for such small fry as Anāji Ranganāth and considered him worthy of mention almost as often as the Prime Minister himself,—which is exactly what we find in this *bakhar* in its present form. In my opinion it would be truer to name it the Wāqnis-Mālkārē *bakhar*, as it is the composite work of the two men,—the Wāqnis supplying the nucleus and Mālkārē the additions and embellishments.

This work is popularly known as the 91 *Qalmi Bakhar* or Narrative in 91 sections. V. S. Wākaskar has published (Baroda 1930) a highly valuable variorum edition of the different recensions of the text (originally printed by Pārasnis in the *Bhāratavarsha* magazine, Rājwadē in the *Prabhāt* and Sānē in the *Kāvy-etiḥās S.*), together with the English translation of the Rāigarh ms. made in 1806 by Lt. Frissell (and first printed by Forrest in *Selections . . . Maratha Series, Vol. I*) and my English translation of the Persian version called the *Tārikh-i-Shivāji* (I.O.L. ms. Pers. 1957, Br.

Mus. Ricu's *Catal.* i. p. 327) and first published in the *Modern Review*, 1907.

The earlier Marāthi account of Shivāji preserved intact, is the *Sabhāsād Bakhar*, which was completed in 1697 (according to the colophon of an old ms. with Y. R. Gupté.) It was written at Jinji at the request of Shivāji's son Rājārām, by Krishnāji Anant (*Sabhāsād*) courtier. We know from the *Memoires* of Francois Martin that this Krishnāji was next only to the Peshwā in importance among Rājāram's ministers, and that the French in Pondicherry made him their patron at Rājāram's court. His book is free from many of the legends and supernatural elements which bring discredit to the *91 Qalmi Bakhar*, and its author gives evidence of a higher intellect than Malkaré's. But even the *Sabhāsād Bakar*, though written by a contemporary of Shivaji, is not based on State-papers and written notes, because it was composed while Rājāram was closely besieged in Jinji fort, to which he had escaped from Mahārāshtra by the skin of his teeth, leaving everything behind him, and after roving hither and thither in constant risk of capture. Such a master and his servants, running with their lives in their hands, before relentless pursuers, could not have burdened themselves with papers during their perilous flight across the entire Deccan peninsula. *Sabhāsād*'s work, therefore, is entirely derived from his memory—the half-obliterated memory of an old man who had passed through many privations and hardships. But he was a contemporary and servant of Shivāji, while Malbar Ram Rao Chitnis wrote 130 years after that king's death, and had no State-papers of Shivāji's or Shambhuji's times, because he does not cite a single document, and all his true facts are derived from *Sabhāsād*, thereby proving that he had no independent source of information. Therefore, I have totally rejected Chitnis.

But *Sabhāsād*'s is still the most valuable Marāthi account of Shivāji and our main source of information from the Maratha side. Later biographies in the same language have mostly copied this *Sabhāsād Bakhar* and padded it out with Sanskrit quotations, miracles, rhetorical flourishes, commonplace remarks, and details imagined from the probabilities of the case, and in some cases also forged letters.

Of these bogus *bakhars* only one deserves examination because of the trust placed in it by some modern Marāthi writers. It is the *Shiva-dig-vijaya*, published by P. R. Nandurbarkar and L. K. Dandekar (Baroda, 1895.) Falsely described as written by Khando Ballāl (the son of Shivāji's secretary, Bālāji Āvji) in 1718, but really fabricated by a modern writer familiar with the style of the Europeanised vernacular novels written in imitation of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. Too much gush (esp., pp. 453, 208, 444), rhetorical padding and digression. Historical anachronisms of ludicrous absurdity abound (esp., pp. 58, 59, 138, 199, 357, 417, 434, 447). The author speaks of an English *General* being present at Shivāji's coronation and of artisans from *Calcutta* being brought to decorate his hall in 1674! Shiva bows to his mother *two years after* her death (p. 296). Tānāji Mālusaré visits Haidarabad seven years after his death (p. 301). Mīrzā Raja Jai Singh retires to die at Jaipur in 1667, whereas that capital was founded in 1727 (p. 357.) Many passages prove it to be a concoction of

modern Prabhu Kāyasthas for the purpose of glorifying the men of that caste who served Shivāji (pp. 172-176, 347, 368.) Many incidents alleged here are proved false by known histories.

Abstract Chronologies in Marāthi.

The *Jedhē Shakāvali* or skeleton chronology in its surviving fragment runs from 1618 to 1697, without any formal preface or conclusion. Its correctness depends upon three conditions, *viz.*, (a) the *Jedhēs'* personal knowledge of what they wrote down, (b) their promptness in recording every event after its happening, instead of trusting to a dim and distant memory, and (c) the accuracy of the transcriber of the only manuscript of it (copied in the middle of the 18th century) that has come down to us. This family did not record the successive occurrences in a bound volume (or in a big family Bible as in old English houses), but on loose sheets of paper, which were afterwards compiled together, we know not with what accuracy nor with what gaps between. For the period before 1660,—in which year Shivāji first clearly demonstrated his power of standing on his own legs and former vassals of Bijapur like the *Jedhē* chieftains found that it was safer to join him than to keep aloof or play a double game (which is Bhave's charge against Kanhoji *Jedhē*),—the dates in the *Jedhē Chronology* are often demonstrably wrong (*e.g.*, the death of Ibrahim Adil Shah, the fall of Daulatabad, etc.) Even for later times, some months and years have been wrongly given or at least copied (*e.g.*, the interview with Aurangzib and the fall of Vellore). Several of the entries, particularly those relating to the Muslim States, were merely borrowed by *Jedhē's* clerks from other sources, because we know that short Persian manuals of historical dates were in circulation in ploished society in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Hence, it is not safe to rely on *Jedhē's* testimony for any doubtful date when not supported by some other authority.

As a general rule, where *Jedhē* gives three incidents under one year, the date of one is demonstrably true, that of another equally false, and the third is one on which other authorities are silent. How can this third be accepted on the ground of one of its companions being correct? It is equally reasonable to reject it because the second date in that year is admittedly false (see p. 158 before).

Such skeleton chronologies (*Shakāvalis*) were in use among various noble families in Mahārāshtra in the 18th century, and have been recovered in parts only. There was a short kernel of the leading events common to them all; but each family added entries about what happened to its own ancestors or about events in its neighbourhood, and therefore they cannot serve as independent checks on one another. Many mistakes were also made in reading the old *Modi* script of the original MSS.

Sanskrit laudatory poems

Some Sanskrit poems written in Shivaji's time have survived and have been printed in the present century. Only two of them are of historical

value, though for a single small episode in each case, namely Jayarām Pidye's *Parniāla-parvata-grahan-ākhyānam* and Nishchal Puri's *Shivarāj-Rājyāvishek-Kalpataru*. The rest are worthless.

✓ Shivaji's court poet Paramānand wrote a Sanskrit epic on the Bhonslē royal house; edited with a Marathi translation by S. M. Divekar in 1927, under the title of the *Shiva-Bhārat*. It is a fragment, in 31 cantos and 9 verses, which ends abruptly in April 1661. It has been hailed by the ignorant as a historical source of first-rate authenticity written by a contemporary. But the author himself makes no such high claim. He has given his poem the title of *Surya-vamsham*, showing thereby that his literary model was Kālidās's epic the *Raghu-vamsham*, which deals with legendary pre-historic kings. Paramānand also calls his poem an *anu-Purāna* or *quasi-epic*, which places it in the class of mythical stories, without any pretension to historical truth.

In fact it is merely a laudatory poem written by a Court flatterer. In India the art of literary beggary was carried to nauseating lengths by the Brahman Court poets of the Hindu kings, as well as by the Persian chroniclers of the Mughal Emperors; the very training, mode of life, and literary models of these men made them unfit to be sober recorders of fact. At best they reproduce the traditions current among their class. Paramānand beats Abul Fazl hollow in his exaggerated praise of his patron. That Muslim author, even when landing Akbar up to the skies, restrains himself within the bounds of human possibility; but the Hindu sycophant ascribes supernatural feats to his hero! When confronted with contemporary Persian histories many of Paramānand's statements of fact prove to be false. [One school of writers in Mahārāshtra now suspect it of being a very late Tanjore fabrication.]

Value of European Factory Records and other non-Marathi sources.

The records of the English factories on the Bombay coast and inland are of the highest value for dates and facts. Sometimes the factors frankly confess that the reports they have heard and are writing down immediately after are so contradictory that they know not what to believe. But, on the other hand, the English at Rajapur and Karwar employed paid spies who travelled in Shivaji's dominions and brought back news of his doings and plans; the information from the different factories helped to check and correct one another; and a false rumour is usually followed in the record of a later date by its contradiction. Above all, these factory records have the supreme merit of having been preserved in the original manuscript without any later garbling or interpolation.

The value of the *Mémoires* of François Martin (or Pondicherry) is the highest imaginable for Shivaji's Karnatak expedition. His agents were frequently in attendance in the camp of Shivaji and the reports they brought back were immediately entered in his diary. The English of Madras also sent a clever Brahman to Shivaji on two or three occasions. The reports of such witnesses entirely disprove the later gossip about the

Karmatak expedition given in the Marathi books. The Jesuit annual letter for 1677 (Madura) is mostly wrong and based on rumour.

The Portuguese Government possess records which are of first-rate authenticity within their own limited sphere and for their relations with Shivaji and his neighbours. Their official letters and diaries were immediately copied, and have been preserved ungarbled ever since. The Dutch touched only one fringe of Shiva's dominions and their reports were made from too great a distance from him to be of use to us except in lighting up some stray incident or detail.

The Persian and Rajasthani sources are of unrivalled authenticity and importance for the history of Shivaji. In Persian we have the very detailed annals of Shah Jahan and Aurangazib based upon the records in the State archives, the despatches of Jai Singh and the letters of Aurangazib, the correspondence of many of the higher nobles, and the personal memoirs of Bhimsen and Khafi Khan who lived in the Deccan at the time. As for dates and incidents, the most correct information is given in the Persian news-letters, called *ākhabārāt*, which are preserved in Jaipur and London (Royal Asiatic Society.) All these are absolutely contemporary and ungarbled. The same praise is due to the letters written by the officers of the Jaipur Rajahs in Dingal, or the Rajasthani dialect. (See pp. 138-139 of this book.) These two groups of materials clearly show that their authors were accurate matter-of-fact observers or realists, while the Marathi, Hindi and Sanskrit writers on our subject are mostly found to be neurotics.

SOURCES

Marathi

The following is a list of the most reliable and useful sources in Marathi. I have excluded all works which have been superseded by more recent publications or deserve to be rejected as unauthentic; and also taken no note of dissertations in that language which are mostly prolix, irrelevant, and unconvincing to a detached observer.

Shiva-chhatrapati-chen Charitra by Krishnāji Anant Sabhāsād, ed. by K. N. Sené, 4th ed., 1923.

A small book of 106 pages, composed from memory without the help of written memoranda or documents. The events are not arranged in the order of time. Some of the statements are incorrect. Weak in topography, no dates. Language very condensed.

91 *Qalmi Bahar*, ed. by V. S. Wakaskar (Baroda 1930).

Shiva-Kālin-Patra-sār-sangraha, 3 vols. (Poona), a most useful calendar of letters and other documents, with a full chronology and index, which lighten the student's labour. For documents published later than the third volume, consult *Shiva-Charitra-Sāhitya*, 9 volumes issued. *Shiva-Charitra Sāhitya* useful for society and administration, when the wheat is patiently sifted from the mass of chaff.

Shri Shiva-Shāhīchā Lekhanālamkār, by Joshi and Chāndorkar (Poona, 1934), prints and discusses a letter containing a line at the end (unsigned) ascribed to Shivaji's hand.

Shiva-Charitra-Pradipa, ed. D. V. Apte and S. M. Divekar, (Poona, 1925), a good collection of documents and studies.

Shivaji Souvenir, ed. by G. S. Sardesai (Bombay, 1927), in English, Marathi and Gujrati.

Rejected—*Chitragupta Bakhar* (written c. 1760), *Shiva-dig-vijaya* (pub. 1895), *Chitnis Bakhar* (wr. 1810), *Shiva Pratap* (Baroda), *Shedgaonkar Bakhar* (1917), *Moreyanchi Bakhar*, *Jedhé Karinā*, *Powādas*, *Tanjavur chā Shilālekh* (1803), etc.

Sanskrit

Parnāla-parvata-grahan-ākhyānam, by Jayaram Pidye, ed. by S. M. Divekar (1923.) Business-like straightforward narrative, singularly free from the usual hyperbole and verbosity of poets. Covers only 1673.

Shiva-rāj-Rājyāvishek-Kalpataru, a short poem of 234 verses, describing Shivaji's coronation (1674), written by Aniruddha Saraswati in the form of a dialogue between Govinda and Nischal Puri, both on pilgrimage to Konkan *tirthas*. RASB. ms. 3088, G. 10185.

Surya-vamsham by Paramānand, (wrongly called by modern Maharashtraans as the *Shiva-Bhārat*), ed. by S. M. Divekar (1927). Other cantos of this poem, since discovered, have been printed as *Paramānanda Kāvya* in the Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 1952, ed. by G. S. Sardesai. Very useful for the tantrik influence on Shambhuji.

Section III of 13 cantos is invaluable as giving the inner history of Shambhuji's rebellion and Shivaji's plans of succession. Written by a partisan of Shambhuji and Shāhu. Critically examined in my *House of Shivaji* and foreword to *Param-Kavya*.

Rādhāmādhaba-vilāsa-Champu of Jayaram Pindyé, ed. by V. K. Rājwadé (1922)—mere fulsome adulation of the boy Shivaji.

The Hindi poems of Bhushan have been rejected, as totally unhistoric; indeed, Bhushan is now held to have been born two years after the death of Shivaji and to have written to gratify his grandson Rajah Shāhu! The *Chhatra-prakāsh* of Lāl Kavi is equally late and traditional.

Persian

Alamgir-namah by Mirzā Md. Kāzim.

Masir-i-Alamgiri by Sāqi Mustad Khan, Eng. tr. by me (R.A.S.B.)

Muntakhab-ul-Lubāb, by Khafi Khan.

Nuskhā-i-Dilkashā by Bhimsen Burhanpuri (personal memoirs.)

Akhbārāt-i-Darbār-i-mualā, for many years (London and Jaipur MSS.)

Muhammad-nāmah (or History of Muhammad Adil Shah) by Md. Zahur, the son of Zahuri, (my own copy made from the Kapurthala MS.)

Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II. (only the 1st ten years of his reign), by Sayid Nurullah, (copy made for me from the India Office MS.)

Basātīn-us-Salātīn, by Md. Ibrāhim Ali Zubairi. The lithographed ed. (Haidarabad) cited in this ed.

Adāb-i-Alamgiri by Qabil Khan.

Half Anjuman by Udiraj Tala-yar, Paris MS. and Benares MS.

Faiyyūz-ul-qawāñin.

Khatut-i-Shivaji, R. A. S. MS.

Parasnīs MS.—A volume in which some Persian letters from the Mughal Government to Shivaji and his descendants were copied (evidently for the use of Grant Duff) by order of the Rajah of Satara. Some of the dates are wrong. There is a MS. English translation in another volume.

English

Original Correspondence (O. C.), India Office MS. records. This series includes letters from Surat and Bombay to the E. I. Co., (London) and letters between Surat and Bombay and the subordinate factories. There is a catalogue of these, giving writer, place and date, but very little indication of the contents. In most cases there is a volume for every year. *O. C.* volumes deal indiscriminately with all parts of India where the Company had factories. From 1682 to 1689 they contain little beyond duplicates of what is given in the *F. R.*

Factory Records (F. R.), India Office MS. records. There is a distinct series for each principal factory, such as Rajapur, Surat, Bombay, Fort St. George, etc. They include (a) Consultations at these factories and (b) copies of letters received and dispatched by them (some being repeated in *O. C.*) There are several gaps in the period 1660-1689 and the existing volumes are unindexed.

Surat Consultations—none extant for 1656-'60, 64, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81 and 84-96, but the gaps are partially filled by the *Letters received and dispatched* and the *O. C.* Only four volumes have survived for 1660-1683.

Surat Letters—about 20 volumes for the period in question.

Records of Fort St. George: Diary and Consultation Book, for 1672-78 and 1678-79, printed at Madras, (1910 and 1911.) A few other papers are given in Love's *Vestiges of Old Madras*, 3 vols.

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Dutch Factory Records preserved in the India Office, London. Vols. 23-29, covering 1659-'70, are in English translations, while Vols. 30-42, covering 1670-89, are in Dutch. They are very disappointing to the historian of Shivaji and contain very few references to the Marathas. The volumes from 1671 onwards contain scarcely any remarks on the affairs of eastern India. "Up to 1664 or so, the compiler copied the letters from India into the *Dagh Register*, verbatim or almost so. From about 1665 to the end of the series, the Indian letters were copied into a different

Register, *viz.*, 'Incoming letters' ; the *Dagh Register* refers to this for details, and gives at most an occasional scrap of news. It is conceivable, but I fear very improbable that the Registers of Incoming Letters, or some of them, may be in existence at Batavia." (Moreland.)

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J. Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, 3 vols. (1826.)

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Portuguese and French

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A. B. de Braganca Pereira—*O Oriente Portugues*, nos. 24 and 25 (1939.)

J. F. J. Biker—*Colleccao de Tratados . . .*, tomo iv. (Lisbon, 1884), contains treaties and diplomatic correspondence.

Cosme da Guarda—*Vida e accoens do famoso e felicissimo Sevagi* (Lisbon 1730), composed in 1695, 168 pages. Full of gross inaccuracies, mistakes of persons, useless digressions, and bazar gossip. Contains a minimum of facts, dates and proper names, and a maximum of words and general descriptions. It tells us nothing new that is historically true. C. da Guarda was not the real name of the author.

G. French

Voyage des Indes Orientales, par M. Carre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1699.) Contains an account of Shivaji in 1671-72. Hearsay. Eng. tr. in Hakluyt.

La Mission du Maduré, par J. Bertrand, tome 3. (Paris, 1850.) Contains the annual Jesuit letters from the Madura mission.

Mémoires of Francois Martin, 1665-1694, 3 vols. (1931-4.)

The *Journal* of B. Deslandes (from the Paris MS.) has been translated by me into English and published in the Puna Mandal's periodical.

La Compagnie Indes Orientales et Francois Martin, par Paul Kaepelin (Paris, 1908.) Extremely valuable narrative with exact citations of original documents (and even extracts from them.)

The *Histoire de Sevagi et de son successeur*, par J. D'Orleans, S. J., appended to his *Histoire des Deux conquerans Tartares*, (Paris, 1688), though the earliest life to be printed, is worthless. I have published an English translation of it in the *Modern Review*, May, 1924.

The other French and Dutch works that treat of Shivaji—of very little value—are described in Orme's *Fragments* (ed. of 1805), pp. 171-179.

CHRONOLOGY

[All the dates in this book are given in the Old Style or unreformed Calendar which continued in use in England down to 1752. The New Style dates (usually *ten days later* for Shivaji's lifetime), which occur in the French, Portuguese and Dutch writings, have been reduced by me to the Old Style. In some cases a discrepancy of one day may be noticed, but it is due to the difference between different astronomical works in converting Hindu lunar or Hijera dates into the Christian era. I have followed the conversion-tables in Swami-Kannu Pillai's *Indian Ephemeris*.

Sh.=Shivaji. Kh.=Khan. c.=*circa*, about.

1626. 14 May. Malik Ambar dies; Fath Khan succeeds as Nizam-Shahi *wazir*.

1627. 10 April. Birth of Shivaji.
12 Sep. Ibrahim Adil Shah dies, Muhamad Adil Shah succeeds.
29 Oct. Jahangir dies.

1628. 4 Feb. Shah Jahan crowned Emperor.
c. No. Shahji raids Mughal Khandesh, is expelled.

1630. c. Dec. Shahji comes over to the Mughals, deserts them about June 1632.

1633. 17 June. Mughals capture Daulatabad (with Husain Nizam Shah in it).
August. Shahji crowns a puppet Nizam Shah.

1635. Jan.-Feb. Khan-i-Dauran pursues Shahji.
c. Oct. Khawas Kh. murdered at Bijapur.

1636. July-Oct. Khan-i-Zaman, with Bijapur aid, pursues Shahji to Mahuli and utterly defeats him. Shahji gives up puppet Nizam Shah and enters Bijapur service.

1637. 25 Feb. Adil Shah grants Puna jagir to Shahji.

1638. Shivaji and his mother are brought to Puna from Shivneri.

1640. Shivaji visits his father at Bangalore, but is soon sent back to Puna.

1646. Muhammad Adil Shah falls seriously ill and continues helpless till his death (1656).
? Shivaji secures Torna fort.

1647. 7 March. Dadaji Kond-dev dies.
? Shivaji gains Kondana.

1648. 25 July. Shahji arrested by the Adil-Shahi c.-in-i. before Jinji.
15 July. Murad Bakhsh appointed viceroy of Mughal Deccan.
9 Oct. Shivaji seizes Purandar fort.

1649. Sep. Shaista Khan appointed viceroy of Mughal Deccan *vice* Murad (who reaches Delhi on return in December).
16 May. Shahji released.

1656. 15 Jan. Shivaji captures Javli.
 6 April. Sh. comes to Raigarh and takes it.
 28 Aug. Baji Chandra Rao Moré escapes from Shivaji's hands.
 24 Sep. Sh. arrests Mohité and gains Supa.
 4 Nov. Muhammad Adil Shah dies, Ali II. succeeds.

1657. 28 Feb. Aurangzib arrives near Bidar, begins siege of it on 2 March, takes it on 29 March.
 27 April. Aurangzib starts for Kaliani, which surrenders on 1 Aug.
 c. 27-29 April. Maratha attempt to loot Ahmadnagar fails.
 30 April. Sh. loots Junnar.
 14 May. Birth of Shambhuji.
 4 June. Nasiri Kh. defeats Sh. near Ahmadnagar.
 24 Oct. Sh. takes Kalian-Bhivandi.
 11 Nov. Kh. Muhammad, wazir, murdered at Bijapur.

1658. 8 Jan. Sh. takes Mahuli.
 14 Jan. Sh. goes to Rajgarh.
 Aurangzib starts from Aurangabad to contest the throne, leaves Burhanpur on 20 March.
 21 July. First enthronement of Aurangzib.
 30 Aug. Sh. sends Sonaji as envoy to Delhi.

1659. 10 March. Sh. goes from Rajgarh to Shivapatnam.
 c. April. Adil Shah orders Maval deshmukhs to join Afzal Kh.
 11 July. Sh. goes to Javli.
 5 Sep. Sai Bai (w. of Sh.) dies.
 10 Nov. Afzal Kh. killed, his army defeated.
 28 Nov. Sh. gains Panhala, which he enters on 2 Dec.
 ? Sh. takes Danda town.
 28 Dec. Sh. defeats Rustam and Fazal Kh. near Kolhapur.

1660. c. 5 Jan. Sh. raids Dabhol.
 c. 10 Jan. Sh. raids Rajapur (first time).
 14 Jan. Sh. raids Bijapuri territory (towards Gadag).
 25 Feb. Shaista Kh. marches out of Ahmadnagar.
 2 March. Sh. enters Panhala, is besieged by Jauhar.
 9 May. Shaista Kh. enters Puna.
 6 June. Sh. takes Wasota.
 21 June. Shaista Kh. arrives before Chakan, lays siege, and takes it on 15 Aug.
 13 July. Sh. escapes from Panhala.
 c. 26 Aug. Shaista returns from Chakan to Puna.
 22 Sep. Panhala yielded to Jauhar.
 20 Nov. Parenda sold to Mughals by Bijapuri qiladar Ghilab.

1661. 3 Feb. Shiva defeats Kar Talb Kh. at Umbarkhind.
 Feb. Sh. loots Nizampur, captures Dabhol-Prabhavali.
 c. 3 March. Sh. seizes Rajapur and takes English factors prisoner.
 They are released c. 5 Feb. 1663.
 29 April. Sh. enters Shringarpur.
 c. May. Mughals take Kalian from Shiva.

c. 3 June. Sh. at Mahad for two days.
 Sh. passes the summer in Wardhangarh.
 21 Aug. Kavji Kodhalkar raises the siege of Deiri by Bulaki.

1662. Jan.-Mar. ? Sh. defeats Namdar Kh. at Mira Dongar and raids Pen.

1663. March. Long chase of Netaji by Mughals.
 30 March. Sh. in Raigarh (more probably Rajgarh.)
 5 April. Sh. surprises Shaista Kh. in Puna.
 May. Sh. goes by way of Kudal to Vingurla (c. 18 May), returns soon.
 Nov. Jaswant lays siege to Kondana.
 ? Bhadrappa, Rajah of Bednur, murdered.

1664. 6-10 Jan. Shivaji's first loot of Surat.
 c. 15 Jan. Shaista Kh. leaves Aurangabad, Muazzam succeeds as viceroy.
 23 Jan. Death of Shahji.
 5 Feb. Sh. returns to Rajgarh.
 28 May. Jaswant raises siege of Kondana, Sh. visits it on 30th.
 July. Sh. raids Ahmadnagar.
 c. 15 Oct. Khawas repulses Sh., who retrieves his position and retakes Kudal (c. 28th.)
 20 Oct. Sh. massacres Ghorpares of Mudhol.
 Nov. Sh. conquers Savant-vadi.
 24 Nov. Sindhudurg (Malvan) fort commenced.
 c. 5 Dec. Sh. plunders Vingurla.
 c. 10 Dec. Marathas loot Hubli, first time.

1665. 8 Feb. Shiva sails from Malvan, plunders Basrur, and on return bathes at Gokarna, reaches Karwar (22 Feb.) and leaves for home (23 Feb.)
 14 Mar. Sh. reaches Bhingarh, 25 m. n. of Karwar.
 3 Mar. Jai Singh reaches Puna.
 30 Mar. Dilir Kh. alights near Purandar and begins its siege.
 14 April. Rundramāl capitulates.
 11 June. Sh. meets Jai Singh before Purandar, visits Dilir (12th.)
 12-13 June. Treaty of Purandar.
 14 June. Sh. leaves Jai Singh's camp for Rajgarh.
 18 June. Shambhuji reaches Jai Singh's camp.
 June-July. Bahol L. (minister of Bijapur) dies.
 27 Sept. Sh. returns to Jai Singh's camp (Purandar) to receive a *farman* (on 30th.)
 Oct.-Nov. Sh. reconquers S. Konkan from Bijapuris (except Kudal and Vingurla.)
 20 Nov. Jai Singh and Shiva start on invasion of Bijapur.
 25 Dec. First battle with Bijapuris, 2nd battle on 28th.

1666. 5 Jan. Jai Singh begins his retreat from environs of Bijapur.
 11 Jan. J. S. sends Shiva away to attack Panhala.
 16 Jan. Shiva's attack on Panhala fails.
 5 March. Sh. starts for Agra.
 20 March. Netaji comes back from Bijapur side to Jai S.

Feb.-March. Shiva's first attempt on Phonda fails.

11 May. Sh. reaches outskirts of Agra.

12 May. Sh. has audience of Aurangzib.

19 Aug. Sh. escapes from Agra.

20 Aug. Raghunath Korde arrested at Agra.

12 Sep. Sh. returns to Rajgarh [11 Dec. acc. to *Shivapur Yadi*.]

Dec. Pir Mian and Taj Kh. slain at Devrukh.

1667. 23 Mar. Jai S. recalled from Deccan; Muazzam sent as viceroy.

April. Sh. writes to Aurangzib offering submission.

3 April. Trimbak and Raghunath escape from Agra.

c. 1-8 May. Bahlol and Vyankoji lay siege to Rangna; Sh. raises it.

28 Aug. Jai Singh dies at Burhanpur.

Aug. Sh. makes peace with Adil Shah.

27 Oct. Shambhuji reaches Aurangabad, sees Jaswant (28th) and Muazzam (4th Nov.), leaves Aurangabad on return, 5th Nov.

1668. 9 March. Muazzam writes to Sh. reporting Emperor's recognition of his title of Rajah.

5 Aug. Pratap Rao goes with a contingent to serve at Aurangabad.

Oct. Sh.'s plot to surprise Goa detected.

c. 20 Oct. Sh. at Ashtami (near Chaul.)

Nov. Sh. inspects his forts in Ratnagiri district; returns to Rajgarh early in Dec.

1669. c. 1 March. Sh. at Rajgarh and very quiet.

April. Siddi besieges some of Sh.'s forts.

9 April. Aurangzib issues general order for temple destruction throughout Mughal empire; Benares Vishweshwar demolished in Aug. 1669, Mathura Keshav Rai in Jan. 1670.

May-Oct. Sh. continues vigorous attack on Siddi of Janjira.

Oct. Ludi Kh. holds Kalian.

c. 1 Nov. Sh. seizes Portuguese vessels, they make reprisals.

1670. c. 1 Jan. Sh. breaks with Mughals. Pratap Rao returns from Aurangabad.

4 Feb. Tanaji captures Kondana (Singhgarh.)

24 Feb. Rajaram born.

Sh. recovers Purandar (8 Mar.), Kalian (c. 15 Mar.), Lohgarh (13 May), Mahuli (16 June), Karnala (22 June), Rohira (24 June.)

Aug. Sh. invades Mughal territory; siege of Shivner fails. Grand attack on Janjira.

3-5 Oct. Sh. loots Surat (second time.)

17 Oct. Battle of Dindori.

c. 25 Oct. Moro Pant captures Trimbak.

c. 24 Nov. Sh. marches north of Bombay, turns back on 26th.

Dec. Sh. captures Ahivant &c.; raids Khandesh and Berar, sacks Karinjā.

1671. c. 5 Jan. Shiva captures Salhir.

c. 10 Feb. Siddi Qāsim recovers Dandā.

Early Feb. Mahabat and Daud besiege Ahivant.

Apr.-May. Mahabat captures Ahivant &c.

Sept. Bahadur and Dilir lay siege to Salhir, leave the region in Oct.

Sep. Sh.'s ambassador visits Bombay.

Oct. Sh. in Raigarh.

End of Dec. Dilir sacks Puna, massacres population.

1672. c. 10 Jan. Shiva at Mahad, assembling an army against Dilir.

c. 1-7 Feb. Moro Pant raises siege of the *machi* of Salhir after defeating Ikhlas Kh., Muhamam S., and other Mughal generals; then takes Mulhir.

c. 15 Feb. Sh. at Raigarh.

c. 15 Mar.-8 May. Lt. Ustick visits Raigarh on embassy to Sh.; fails.

21 April. Abdullah Qutb Shah dies; Abul Hasan succeeds.

June. Muazzam leaves Deccan; Bahadur Kh. acts as viceroy till Aug. 1677.

5 June. Moro Pant captures Jawhar town, and Ramnagar (c. 5 July.)

July. Moro Pant raids Nasik district.

24 Nov. Ali II. dies; Sikandar Adil Shah succeeds; Khawas Kh. becomes wazir (for 3 years.)

Nov.-Dec. Maratha raid into Berar and Telengana foiled by Mughals.

29 Dec. Shiva breaks with Bijapur and sets out on campaign.

1673. 6 March. Annaji gains Panhala for Shiva.

9 March. Sh. starts from Raigarh, reaches Panhala c. 16.

1 April. Sh. gains Parli.

c. 15 April. Battle of Ummani.

Early May. Pratap Rao sacks Hubli (2nd.) Bahlool expels Maratha raiders from Kanara uplands, then takes post at Kolhapur and presses the Marathas hard from June to Aug.

2 June. Sh. returns to Raigarh from pilgrimage.

3 June. English envoy Nicolls interviews Sh.

27 July. Sh. gains Satara.

10 Oct. (Dashahara.) Sh. starts on Kanara expedition, reaches Satara 15th, takes Pandavgarh on 13th [17th, acc. to *Shivapur Yadi*], loots Bankapur.

c. 15 Oct.-12 Dec. Sh. absent campaigning in Kanara.

Nov. Sharza Kh. kills Vitoji Shinde in battle.

4-8 Dec. Sh. at Kadra; his troops twice defeated by Adil-Shahis.

16 Dec. Sh. returns from Kanara.

1674. c. 20 Jan. Dilir repulsed in attempt to descend into Konkan.

24 Feb. Pratap Rao slain at Nesari.

c. 1 March. Kishi Bāī, wife of Sh., dies.

23 March. Anand Rao loots bazar of Sampgaon, then fights Khizir Kh.

March. Daulat Kh. defeats Siddi Bleet in Muchakundi creek.

3 April. Narayan Shenvi meets Sh. at Raigarh.

8 April. Sh. reviews his troops at Chiplun; arrives near Karwar 22nd; takes Kelanja 24th.

7 April. Aurangzib leaves Delhi for Hasan Abdal to suppress Khaibar Pass rebellion; returns 27th March, 1676.

12 May. Sh. returns to Raigarh after pilgrimage to Chiplun.

16 May. Sh. goes on pilgrimage to Pratapgarh, returns to Raigarh on 21st.

28 May. Sh. invested with sacred thread; marries with Vedic *mantras* on 29th.

6 June. Shivaji's coronation; *Rajyabhishek era* founded.

8 June. Sh. marries again, "without ceremony."

12 June. Oxinden gets treaty signed by ministers at Raigarh.

18 June. Jija Bai dies.

c. 15 July. Marathas plunder Bahadur Kh.'s camp at Pedgaon.

c. 26 Aug. Anaji arrives at Kudal, is foiled by Muhammad Kh.

24 Sep. Second (or tantrik) enthronement of Shiva.

Nov.—15 Dec. Sh. raids Baglana and Khandesh.

1675. End of Jan. Dattaji raids Kolhapur district.

4 Feb. Shambhuji invested with sacred thread.

c. 15 Feb. Mughals sack Kalian.

6 Mar. Shiva starts on campaign; takes Kolhapur, reaches Rajapur (22nd) and halts four days, here English merchants meet him; then he marches to Kudal.

8 April. Sh. lays siege to Phonda, captures it c. 6 May; his general burns Karwar town 26th April.

May. Sh. captures Shiveshwar, Ankola, Karwar fort, &c.

March-May. Shiva befools Bahadur Kh. by false peace proposals.

12 June. Shiva passes by Rajapur, on return to Raigarh.

June-Aug. Marathas invade Sunda country.

July-Dec. Grand attack on Janjira fails.

7 Sep. Shiva at Raigarh; embassy of Austen.

Nov. Bahadur Kh. invades N. Konkan.

11 Nov. Bahlol arrests Khawas and becomes wazir of Bijapur (for 2 years.)

1676. 18 Jan. Bahlol murders Khawas. Civil war in Bijapur.

Jan.-March. Shiva very ill; his perfect recovery reported in Surat letter of 7th April.

May. Moro Pant occupies Ramnagar; returns to Raigarh at end of the month.

31 May. Bahadur Kh. crosses the Bhima near Halsangi for attacking Bahlol.

1 June. Bahlol defeats Bahadur at Halsangi; Islam Kh. slain. [M. A. gives 13 June as date.]

19 June. Netaji Palkar made a Hindu again by purifying rites.

June-Dec. Attack on Janjira renewed.

Early Oct. Narayan Shenvi present at Raigarh.

1 Nov. Shambhuji goes to Shringarpur.

Dec. Siddi Sambal burns Jaitapur.

1677. Jan. Hambir Rao defeats Husain Kh. Miana near Yelburga.
 c. 5 Feb. Shiva reaches Haidarabad, halts for one month, leaves c. 10 March.
 c. 24 Mar.—1 April. Sh. at Shri Shaila.
 4 May. Date of Sh.'s grant to a Brahman for *puja* at Tirupati.
 c. 5 May. Sh. reaches Peddapolam (near Madras); his cavalry advances through Conjeveram (9 May) to Jinji.
 c. 13 May. Jinji sold to Shivaji; he arrives there c. 15th.
 c. 23 May. Sh. arrives before Vellore, begins siege.
 26 June. Sh. arrives near Tiruvādi, routs Sher Kh. Lodi, who flees to Bonagirpatam (27th), which Shiva invests.
 5 July. Sher Kh. gives up his territories to Shiva by treaty.
 c. 12 July. Sh. arrives at Tirumala-vādi (on the Kolerun.)
 c. 23 July. Vyankoji flees away from Sh.'s camp.
 c. 27 July. Sh. begins return from Tirumala-vādi, at Tundumguri (31 July), Vriddhāchalam (1-3 Aug.), Vanikam-vādi (22 Sep.), two days' march of Madras (3 Oct.)
 c. 2 Sep. Skirmish between Marathas and Portuguese of Daman.
 Oct. Arni falls to Sh.
 c. 5 Nov. Sh. ascends Mysore plateau for return home.
 16. Nov. Vyankoji attacks Shantaji near Ahiri.
 Nov. Dattaji loots Hubli (3rd raid.)
 Dec. Shivaji's envoy Pitambar Shenvi reaches Goa.
 23 Dec. Bahol Kh. dies after long illness.
 7 July. Bahadur Kh. captures Kulparga; and Naldurg on 2 Aug. [acc. to *M. A.* 14 May.]
 Aug. Bahadur is recalled from Deccan, Dilir left in charge.
 Sep. Dilir invades Golkonda, is defeated at Malkhed and driven back to Naldurg.
 Nov. Masaud on behalf of Bijapur makes humiliating peace with Dilir.

1678. Jan. Moro Pant plunders Trimbak, Nasik, &c.
 c. 16 Jan. Sh. at Lakshmiswar.
 c. 26 Jan.—23 Feb. Sh. besieges Belvadi.
 21 Feb. Siddi Masaud becomes wazir of Bijapur.
 c. 4 April. Sh. reaches Panhala.
 c. 25 April. Marathas plunder Mungi-Paithan.
 May? Sh.'s second attempt on Shivneri fails.
 May. Sh. returns to Raigarh.
 21 July. Vellore capitulates to Sh.
 c. 20 Aug. Pitambar Shenvi dies at Kudāl.
 18 Sep. Muazzam (Shah Alam) reappointed viceroy of Deccan.
 Oct. Daulat Kh. bombards Janjira.
 Dec. Raghunath Shenvi Kotari sent from Goa as envoy to Shiva.

1679. 13 Dec. Shambhuji escapes to Dilir Kh.
 25 Feb. Shah Alam reaches Aurangabad.
 3 Mar. Moro Pant secures Kopal fort for money.
 2 April. Aurangzib reimposes *jaziya* on Hindus.

2 April. Dilir captures Bhupalgarh.
 9 April. Anand Rao captures Balapur.
 18 Aug. Dilir crosses the Bhima to invade Bijapur, halts at Dhul-khed up to 15 Sep.
 28 Aug. Sh. begins to fortify Khanderi island.
 Sep. Mughals capture Mangalbira.
 c. 10 Sep. Sh. seizes and fortifies Khanderi island.
 19 Sep. First naval battle between English and Shiva; second battle 18 Oct.
 7 Oct. Dilir arrives near Bijapur fort, leaves on 14 Nov.
 30 Oct. Shiva arrives at Selgur to aid Adil Shah.
 4 Nov. Sh. starts from Selgur to raid Mughal provinces.
 c. 15-18 Nov. Sh. raids Jalna, fights Ranmast Kh. for 3 days.
 c. 22 Nov. Sh. reaches Patta, halts for about a fortnight.
 20 Nov. Dilir sacks Athni. Shambhu escapes from his camp on 21st.
 30 Nov. Shambhuji flees from Bijapur, reaches Panhala c. 4 Dec.
 c. 24-30 Nov. Marathas raid Khandesh, sack Dharangaon.
 c. 4-25 Dec. Sh. resides in Raigarh?
1680. c. 1 Jan. Shiva reaches Panhala.
 18 Jan. Shiva meets Shambhuji in Panhala.
 26 Jan. Daulat Kh.'s attack on Underi fails.
 Feb? Sh. returns from Panhala to Raigarh.
 7 March. Rajaram invested with sacred thread.
 15 March. Rajaram married.
 23 March. Shivaji's last illness begins.
 4 April. Death of Shivaji.

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